STUDIES 
MILITARY  AND   DIPLOMATIC 

1775-1865 


THE  xMACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK   •    BOSTON   •    CHICAGO 
ATLANTA  •    SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •  BOMBAY  •  CALCUTTA 

MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


STUDIES 

MILITAEY  AND  DIPLOMATIC 

1775-1865 


BY 

CHARLES  FRANCIS  ADAMS 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1911 

All  rights  reserved 


COPTBIGHT,   1911, 

Bt  the  macmillan  company. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  October,  191 1 


NortoOOtJ  #«B8 

J.  8.  Cushing  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 

Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

MILITARY   STUDIES: 

The  Battle  of  Bunker  Hill 1 

Battle  of  Long  Island 22 

Washington  and  Cavalry 59 

The  Revolutionary  Campaign  of  1777 114 

The  Battle  of  New  Orleans 174* 

The  Ethics  of  Secession 203 

Some  Phases  of  the  Civil  War 232 

Lee's  Centennial 291 

DIPLOMATIC   STUDIES: 

An  Historical  Residuum 344 

Queen  Victoria  and  the  Civil  War 375 

INDEX 415 


STUDIES:   MILITARY  AND  DIPLOMATIC 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BUNKER  HILL1 

In  Carlyle's  Life  of  Frederick  the  Great  there  is  an  account 
of  a  curious  conversation  in  December,  1745,  between 
Frederick  and  D'Arget,  the  secretary  of  Valori,  at  that  junc- 
ture the  French  ambassador  at  Berlin.  It  was  at  the  close  of 
the  Second  Silesian  War,  from  which  Frederick,  then  only 
thirty -three  years  of  age,  had  emerged  victorious ;  thenceforth 
to  be  till  he  died  the  leading  figure  in  European  political  action. 
He  was  just  entering  on  the  eleven  years  of  more  or  less 
broken  peace  which  preceded  the  Seven  Years7  War.  D'Ar- 
get,  at  the  instance  of  Valori,  had  suggested  some  grand 
political  combinations  in  which  Frederick  was  to  figure  as 
the  "  Pacificator  of  Europe."  The  king  listened  to  him, 
and  then  replied:  "It  is  too  dangerous  a  part  for  playing. 
A  reverse  brings  me  to  the  verge  of  ruin :  I  know  too  well 
the  mood  I  was  in  last  time  I  left  Berlin  ever  to  expose  my- 
self to  it  again !  If  luck  had  been  against  me  there,  I  saw 
myself  a  monarch  without  a  throne;  ...  A  bad  game 
that;  ...  I  am  not  in  alarm  about  the  Austrians.  .  .  . 
They  dread  my  army ;  the  luck  that  I  have.  ...  I  would 
not  henceforth  attack  a  cat  except  to  defend  myself."  And 
so,  says  Carlyle,  Frederick  "  seems  to  have  little  pride  in  his 
'Five  Victories' ;  or  hides  it  well  .  .  .  and  at  times  acknowl- 

1  The  American  Historical  Review,  Vol.  I,  401  (April,  1896). 

B  1 


2  ;\  t ;  ; :  :  ; — / ;  ^MILITARY  STUDIES 

edges,  in  a  fine  sincere  way,  the  omnipotence  of  Luck  in 
matters  of  War."  * 

On  the  14th  of  October,  1895,  the  centenary  of  the  death 
of  Colonel  William  Prescott,  who  commanded  in  the  redoubt 
at  Bunker  Hill,  was  commemorated  at  Boston,  and  Dr. 
William  Everett  then  delivered  an  address  marked  by  a  high 
order  of  eloquence  and  much  reflection.  A  month  later, 
on  the  13th  of  November,  there  was  unveiled  at  Hartford, 
Conn.,  a  bronze  statue  of  Colonel  Thomas  Knowlton,  of 
Ashford,  the  gallant  officer  who  commanded  the  Connecticut 
troops  which  covered  Prescott's  left,  and  whose  death  a  year 
later  at  Harlem  Heights  was  not  the  least  of  the  grievous 
losses  sustained  by  the  American  army  in  the  disastrous 
New  York  campaign  of  1776.  These  events,  and  the 
addresses  they  called  forth,  revived  the  memory  of  two  of 
the  most  interesting  and  important  military  operations  in  the 
struggle  for  American  Independence,  in  both  of  which,  also, 
"the  omnipotence  of  Luck  in  matters  of  War"  made  itself 
felt  in  a  way  not  to  be  overlooked. 

And  first  of  Bunker  Hill.  The  affair  of  the  17th  of  June, 
1775,  on  the  peninsula  of  Charlestown,  opposite  Boston, 
affords,  indeed,  one  of  the  most  singular  examples  on  record 
of  what  might  be  called  the  " balancing  of  blunders"  between 
opposing  sides,  and  of  the  accidental  inuring  of  all  those 
blunders  to  the  advantage  of  one  side.  So  far  as  the  Ameri- 
can, or  what  we  call  the  patriot  cause,  was  concerned,  the 
operation  ought  to  have  resulted  in  irretrievable  disaster, 
for  on  no  correct  military  principle  could  it  be  defended; 
and  yet,  owing  to  the  superior  capacity  for  blundering  of 
the  British  commanders,  the  movement  was  in  its  actual 
results  a  brilliant  success;    and,  indeed,  could  hardly  have 

i  Carlyle,  Frederick  II,  Book  XV,  Chap.  XV ;  Works  (Sterling  Ed.), 
Vol.  IX,  17-21,  37. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BUNKER  HILL  3 

been  made  more  so  had  the  Americans  controlled  for  that 
occasion  the  movements  of  both  sides,  and  so  issued  orders 
to  their  opponents.  Looking  over  the  accounts  of  that 
battle  and  examining  the  ground  upon  which  it  was  fought, 
it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  the  Americans  could  know- 
ingly have  put  themselves  in  such  an  untenable  position; 
much  more  how  the  British  should  so  utterly  have  failed 
to  take  advantage  of  the  mistakes  of  their  inexperienced 
antagonists. 

In  1775  Charlestown,  including  Breed's  Hill,  was  a  pen- 
insula of  limited  size  and  hilly  formation,  connected  with  the 
mainland  by  a  single  narrow  causeway,  which  was,  at  times 
of  sufficiently  high  tide,  itself  overflowed.  When,  therefore, 
on  the  night  of  the  16th-17th  of  June,  Colonel  Prescott  led 
his  force  across  the  causeway,  and  established  it  upon  Breed's 
Hill,  he  put  himself  and  those  who  followed  him  in  a  trap 
where,  with  an  enemy  having  complete  control  of  the  sea, 
and  so  commanding  his  rear  and  both  flanks,  it  was  merely 
necessary  to  snap  the  door  and  hold  him,  utterly  powerless 
either  to  escape  or  to  resist.  He  had  literally  thrust  his 
head  into  the  Lion's  mouth. 

Consequently,  when  the  guns  of  their  ships  woke  up  the 
British  officers  in  Boston  on  the  morning  of  the  17th  of  June, 
had  there  been  any,  even  a  moderate,  degree  of  military 
capacity  in  their  commander,  he  would  have  ejaculated  his 
fervent  thanks  to  Heaven  that  his  enemy  had  thus  delivered 
himself  into  his  hands;  and  proceeded  incontinently  to 
"bag"  him.  To  do  this,  it  was  only  necessary  for  him  to 
move  a  sufficient  detachment  around  by  water  to  the  cause- 
way connecting  Charlestown  with  the  mainland,  seize  it 
securely  under  cover  of  the  fire  of  his  ships  and  floating 
batteries,  there  establish  himself,  and  quietly  wait  a  few 
hours  for  the  enemy  to  come  down  to  surrender,  or  come  out 


4  MILITARY  STUDIES 

to  be  killed.  To  bring  this  result  about  he  might  not  have 
been  compelled  to  fire  a  single  gun ;  for  his  enemy  had  not 
even  placed  himself  upon  the  summit  of  Bunker  Hill,  which 
overlooked  and  commanded  Charlestown  Neck,  but  had 
absolutely  moved  forward  to  the  lower  summit  of  Breed's 
Hill,  between  Bunker  Hill  and  Boston,  from  which  point, 
with  a  powerful  and  well-equipped  enemy  in  undisputed 
control  of  the  water,  he  would  have  been  unable  to  escape 
and  powerless  to  annoy.  His  position  would  have  been 
much  that  of  a  rat  when  the  door  of  a  trap  is  securely  sprung 
behind  it.  The  only  alternative  to  an  ignominious  sur- 
render would  have  been  a  general  engagement  on  open 
ground ;  for,  with  his  line  of  communication  cut  off,  unable 
to  advance,  unable  to  retreat,  and  unable  even  to  strike  or 
worry  his  adversary,  between  whom  and  himself  he  had 
interposed  Bunker  Hill,  the  only  course  open  to  Prescott 
would  have  been  the  hurried  abandonment  of  his  redoubt; 
and  a  scramble  to  get  possession  of  the  summit  of  Bunker 
Hill.  Had  he  succeeded  in  doing  that,  the  patriot  army 
would  still  have  been  hopelessly  cut  in  two,  and  mere  star- 
vation would  within  twenty-four  hours  have  compelled  the 
Americans  to  choose  between  surrender  and  an  almost  hope- 
less aggressive  movement.  In  case  of  a  general  engagement, 
the  patriots,  a  mere  mob,  must  attack  a  well-armed  and 
disciplined  opponent,  on  ground  of  his  own  selection  and 
protected  by  the  guns  of  a  fleet.  Such  an  engagement,  under 
the  circumstances  then  existing,  could,  in  all  human  prob- 
ability, have  had  but  one  result.  The  patriot  forces  must 
have  been  routed  and  dispersed;  for,  hardly  more  than  a 
partially  armed  militia  muster,  they  were  without  organiza- 
tion or  discipline,  only  inadequately  supplied  with  weapons, 
artillery,  or  munitions,  and,  except  on  Breed's  Hill,  unpro- 
tected even  by  field  works. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BUNKER  HILL  5 

The  untenable  position  into  which  the  patriots  had  got 
themselves,  and  the  course  to  pursue  in  dealing  with  them, 
were,  from  a  military  point  of  view,  so  obvious  that,  in  the 
council  of  war  that  morning  held  in  Boston,  the  proper 
military  movement  was  at  once  urged,  it  is  said,  by  a  major- 
ity of  the  British  officers  with  Clinton  at  their  head.  In- 
stead of  following  it,  a  sufficient  force  of  British  was  sent 
across  to  Charlestown,  landed  directly  in  the  face  of  their 
enemy,  and  proceeded  to  take  the  American  intrenchments 
by  assault ;  finally,  after  great  loss,  doing  so,  and  absolutely 
driving  the  rat  out  of  the  trap,  of  which  the  British  com- 
mander had  left  the  door  wide  open.  A  more  singular 
exhibition  of  apparently  unconscious  temerity  on  one  side, 
and  professional  military  incapacity  on  the  other,  it  would 
be  difficult  to  imagine. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  becomes  somewhat  curious 
to  consider  the  actuating  causes  of  the  operations  on  that 
day.     Who  was  responsible  for  what  occurred? 

It  is  sometimes  asserted  that,  so  far  as  the  Americans  were 
concerned,  their  object  was  to  force  the  fight  with  a  view  to 
firing  the  colonial  heart,  and  that  the  result  entirely  justified 
the  calculation.  This  may  be  true.  Nevertheless,  on  the 
other  side,  it  is  apparent  that,  unless  the  American  com- 
manders calculated  with  absolute  certainty  upon  the  utter 
incapacity  of  their  opponents,  by  the  precise  move  then 
made  they  placed  the  cause  which  they  had  at  heart  in  most 
imminent  jeopardy,  and  came  dangerously  near  quenching 
the  so-called  fire  in  the  colonial  heart  in  a  sickening 
drench  of  blood,  spilled  in  defeat ;  for  if,  instead  of  attacking 
the  American  line  in  front  exactly  at  the  point  where  it  was 
prepared  for  attack  and  braced  to  resist,  the  British  had 
operated  by  sea  and  land  in  their  rear,  it  is  difficult  to  see 
what  could  have  saved  the  patriot  cause  from  a  complete 


6  MILITARY  STUDIES 

collapse.  If  Colonel  Prescott  and  his  detachment  had  been 
obliged  to  surrender,  and  on  the  evening  of  June  17  had  been 
ignominiously  marched  prisoners  into  Boston,  it  would  only 
have  remained  for  Gage,  by  a  vigorous  movement  next  day 
from  Charlestown  in  the  direction  of  Cambridge,  distant  an 
hour's  march,  to  have  dispersed  the  now  demoralized  patriot 
army  and  made  any  further  organized  armed  resistance 
practically  impossible.  Even  numerically  the  forces  were 
very  nearly  equal.  Beside  the  ships  of  war,  General  Gage 
could  muster  8000  effectives  operating  on  interior  lines ; 
while,  with  a  force  nominally  16,000  strong,  General  Ward 
could  probably  never  have  put  10,000  men  in  action.  A 
general  engagement  was  the  one  result  the  British  com- 
mander ought  on  every  consideration  to  have  sought  to 
bring  about;  while  the  American  officers  knew  perfectly 
well  that  for  a  general  engagement  they  were  prepared  in 
no  single  respect.  Yet  the  occupation  of  Bunker  Hill  by 
the  patriot  forces  meant,  if  met  by  the  British  with  any 
degree  of  military  skill,  an  immediate  general  engagement. 
It  is  quite  out  of  the  question  to  suppose  that  those  who 
assumed  to  guide  the  patriot  operations  could  have  meas- 
ured this  risk,  and  then  knowingly  taken  it.  There  are 
limits  to  any  amount  of  rashness,  except  that  of  ignorance. 
While  the  course  which  should  have  been  pursued  by  the 
British  commander  was  apparent,  the  theory  on  which  the 
patriots  acted  is,  thus,  more  difficult  to  explain.  The 
movement  on  the  night  of  June  16  had  been  decided  upon 
at  a  council  of  civilians  and  military  officers  held  that  day 
at  Cambridge.  More  than  a  month  before,  a  joint  committee 
of  the  council  of  war  and  the  committee  of  safety  had, 
after  careful  consideration  of  the  ground,  recommended  the 
construction  of  a  strong  redoubt  on  Bunker  Hill.  At  the 
same  time,  however,  provision  was  to  be  made  for  apparently 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BUNKER  HILL  7 

a  simultaneous  occupation  of  Winter,  Prospect  and  Plowed 
Hills  on  the  other,  or  land,  side  of  Charlestown  Neck.  This 
plan  of  operations  is  intelligible.  If,  at  the  same  time  that 
Bunker  Hill  was  occupied,  Prospect,  Winter  and  Plowed 
Hills  also  had  been  occupied,  the  patriot  army  would  have 
commanded  Charlestown  Neck,  and,  by  preventing  a  land- 
ing there  and  driving  away  the  floating  batteries,  could  have 
kept  communication  open  between  their  army  and  the 
advanced  and  isolated  force  in  occupation  of  the  heights  on 
the  Charlestown  peninsula.  To  do  this  successfully  implied, 
it  is  true,  the  control  of  a  body  of  artillery  and  munitions 
far  in  excess  of  what  the  provincial  force  had ;  but  still, 
from  a  military  point  of  view,  the  plan  was  well  conceived 
and,  if  successfully  carried  out,  would  have  compelled  an 
immediate  evacuation  of  Boston  by  the  British. 

But,  had  this  line  of  operation  been  pursued,  it  would 
have  been  quite  needless  to  occupy  Breed's  Hill  at  the  out- 
set; seeing  that  Breed's  Hill  was  immediately  in  front  of 
Bunker  Hill  and  thirty-five  feet  lower,  so  that  artillery 
posted  on  Bunker  Hill  commanded  it  completely.  It 
could  accordingly  have  been  occupied  at  any  time  when  a 
force  in  firm  possession  of  Bunker  Hill  was  ready  to  advance 
and  take  it. 

If  such  was  the  general  plan  of  operations  under  which 
Colonel  Prescott's  movement  of  the  16th  of  June  was  or- 
dered, the  next  question  is,  —  Who  was  responsible  for  its 
partial  execution,  and  consequent  failure?  Its  success 
involved  two  things :  first,  the  seizing  of  Bunker  Hill ;  and, 
secondly,  and  at  the  same  time,  the  erection  of  works  upon 
Prospect,  Winter,  and  Plowed  Hills,  or  the  high  ground  at 
the  base  of  those  hills  commanding  Charlestown  Neck  and 
the  adjacent  water.  It  is  impossible  to  ascertain  conclu- 
sively whether  any  one  was  then  in  command  of  the  left  wing 


8  MILITARY  STUDIES 

of  the  provincial  army.  If  any  one,  it  was  Putnam.  At  the 
council  of  war  he  had  strenuously  advocated  the  forward 
movement  to  Bunker  Hill ;  and,  it  is  said,  the  same  evening 
discussed  with  Knowlton,  at  the  quarters  of  the  latter,  the 
reasons  and  details  of  the  step.  Knowlton  was  a  natural 
soldier,  and  he  at  once,  the  same  authority  asserts,  pointed 
out  to  the  far  from  clear-headed  Connecticut  farmer  meta- 
morphosed into  a  general,  that,  if  the  proposed  move  was 
made,  the  enemy  under  cover  of  his  floating  batteries  could 
land  troops  at  the  Neck,  cutting  off  both  reinforcements  and 
retreat;  that  the  approaches  and  flanks  of  the  position 
could  be  enfiladed  from  the  shipping;  and,  finally,  that 
Gage  could,  by  a  judicious  disposal  of  the  land  and  naval 
forces  at  his  command,  compel  the  American  force  on  the 
peninsula  to  surrender  from  mere  starvation.1 

This  excellent  advice,  if  really  given,  seems  to  have  been 
thrown  away  on  Putnam,  who  during  the  following  day  was 
most  active  in  all  parts  of  the  field,  and  appears  to  have  been 
recognized  in  a  way  as  the  general  officer  in  command  of  the 
entire  field  of  operations,  while  unquestionably  Colonel 
Prescott  was  in  immediate  charge  of  the  detachment  on 
Bunker  Hill.  He  occupied  the  position  of  a  brigadier- 
general  whose  command  was  in  action ;  while  Putnam  held 
in  vague  unmilitary  fashion,  the  position  of  chief  of 
the  grand  division  with  which  Prescott's  command  for  the 
time  being  co-operated.  Certainly,  on  the  night  succeeding 
the  engagement,  General  Putnam  was  active  in  holding  and 
fortifying  Prospect  Hill,  and  was  then  practically  recognized 
as  in  a  sort  of  irresponsible  command  of  the  left  wing  of 
Ward's  army.  If,  therefore,  any  one  was  to  blame  for  the 
failure  to  carry  out  that  essential  part  of  the  original  plan 

Historical  Address  of  P.  Henry  Woodward  at  the  Knowlton  Cere- 
monial, p.  20. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BUNKER  HILL  9 

of  operations  which  included  the  fortification  of  the  ground 
commanding  Charlestown  Neck  from  the  land  side,  it  was 
Putnam. 

But  the  truth  probably  is  that  no  one  was  responsible. 
The  lack  of  organization  in  the  patriot  army  was  then  such 
that  no  distinctive  and  recognized  officer  was  in  charge  of 
the  left  wing.  Prescott  had  his  orders  direct  from  the  head- 
quarters at  Cambridge ;  and  the  other  officers  with  separate 
New  Hampshire  or  Connecticut  commands  seem  throughout 
what  occurred  to  have  taken  orders,  or  declined  to  take 
them,  pretty  much  as  they  saw  fit. 

It  is,  however,  useless  to  venture  surmises  on  this  head. 
The  essential  fact  is  that  Prescott  was  ordered  to  march 
across  Charlestown  Neck  and  to  occupy  Bunker  Hill;  and 
did  so,  leaving  his  rear  wholly  unprotected.  After  that, 
on  his  own  responsibility,  he  exposed  himself  to  great  addi- 
tional risk  by  advancing  from  the  summit  of  Bunker  Hill, 
from  which  he  overlooked  both  Breed's  Hill,  in  his  front,  and 
his  single  line  of  retreat  across  Charlestown  Neck  in  his  rear, 
to  the  lower  summit  before  him,  at  which  point  he  was  help- 
lessly in  the  trap,  unless  his  opponent,  by  coming  at  him  in 
front,  drove  him  bodily  out  of  the  hole  in  which  he  had  put 
himself.     His  opponent  did  just  that ! 

It  was  well  for  the  patriot  cause  that  both  Gage  and  Howe 
outranked  Clinton  that  day.  When,  in  the  morning,  with 
the  eye  of  a  soldier,  Clinton  urged  Gage  to  pay  no  attention 
to  the  patriot  front,  but  to  seize  the  causeway  in  its  rear, 
Gage  seems  to  have  replied  that  to  do  so  was  not  in  accord- 
ance with  correct  military  principles,  as,  by  such  a  move- 
ment, his  force  engaged  might  be  placed  between  two 
divisions  of  the  enemy.  In  other  words,  the  movement 
suggested  might  bring  on  the  very  thing  he  should  most 
have  sought  to  bring  on,  —  a  general  engagement  under 


10  MILITARY  STUDIES 

cover  of  his  ships.  But  this  was  not  his  real  reason  for 
acting  as  he  did.  Gage  was,  in  fact,  that  not  uncommon 
type  of  soldier  familiarly  known  in  military  parlance  as  a 
" butt-head."  As  such,  he,  as  a  matter  of  course,  fell  into 
the  dangerous  error  of  underestimating  his  opponent;  and, 
while  he  could  urge  an  abstractly  correct  military  principle, 
he  had  not  the  capacity  to  judge  whether  it  had  any  applica- 
tion to  the  facts  before  him.  So  much  for  laboring  with 
Gage  in  the  morning. 

But  Clinton  on  that  occasion  seems  to  have  had  a  hard 
time  of  it.  Having  failed  to  inspire  Gage  with  a  certain 
degree  of  intelligence  in  the  early  hours  of  the  day,  he,  in  its 
later  hours,  tried  his  hand  on  Howe.  When,  at  last,  about 
four  o'clock  of  the  long  June  afternoon,  with  several  hours 
of  daylight  still  before  him,  Howe  stormed  the  redoubt  and 
drove  Prescott's  little  force  out  of  it  and  in  pell-mell  flight 
over  Bunker  Hill  and  across  the  causeway  to  the  hills  be- 
yond, Clinton,  again  with  the  eye  of  a  soldier  to  the  situa- 
tion, urged  his  superior  in  command  to  follow  up  his  advan- 
tage, cross  the  causeway,  and,  then  and  there,  smite  and 
spare  not. 

The  thing  was  perfectly  practicable.  The  confusion  in 
the  patriot  ranks  was  complete.  In  vain  had  Putnam 
tried  to  hold  his  own  men,  and  rally  the  fugitives  from  the 
redoubt,  in  the  partially  finished  works  on  Bunker  Hill. 
He  had  been  simply  swept  away  in  the  panic  rout.  On  the 
land  side  of  Charlestown  Neck  the  patriots  had  no  works 
thrown  up  behind  which  they  might  hope  to  rally.  Cam- 
bridge and  headquarters  were  only  two  miles  away.  They 
had  challenged  the  blow;  and  the  blow  was  impending. 
Fortunately  for  the  patriots  and  the  patriot  cause,  Howe, 
and  not  Clinton,  was  now  in  immediate  command  of  the 
king's  troops.     Howe,  though  personally  brave,  and  really 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BUNKER  HILL  11 

capable  as  a  tactician,  was  sluggish  of  temperament.  Sub- 
sequently, and  when,  succeeding  Gage,  he  was  in  chief 
command,  though  personally  popular  with  his  associates, 
the  lack  of  aggressive  energy  he  uniformly  evinced  in  the 
hour  of  victory,  was  with  the  more  soldierly  among  them 
ground  not  only  of  comment  but  of  outspoken  complaint. 
On  June  17,  this  deficiency  stood  Ward  and  Putnam  in 
good  stead.  Howe  wholly  failed  to  avail  himself  of  the 
opportunity  Clinton  then  saw  and  pointed  out  to  him. 

The  singular  thing,  however,  in  all  these  operations,  as 
already  pointed  out,  is  that,  from  beginning  to  end,  if  the 
patriot  army  had  been  commanded  by  a  military  genius  of 
the  highest  order,  and  gifted  with  absolute  prescience,  — 
having,  moreover,  the  power  to  issue  commands  to  both 
sides,  —  he  could  not,  so  far  as  the  Americans  were  con- 
cerned, have  bettered  the  course  of  events.  The  whole 
purpose  of  the  move  was  to  forestall  the  proposed  opera- 
tions of  the  British,  who  planned  on  the  18th,  only  a  day 
later,  to  occupy  Bunker  Hill  and  Dorchester  Heights,  pre- 
liminary to  an  advance  on  the  patriot  lines  at  Cambridge. 
It  was  intended  to  draw  their  fire.  If,  in  doing  this,  Prescott 
had,  in  obedience  to  his  orders,  and  as  technically  he  un- 
questionably should  have  done,  contented  himself  with 
seizing  Bunker  Hill  and  there  intrenching,  it  can  hardly  be 
questioned  that  the  British  would  then  have  landed  on 
Charlestown  Neck,  immediately  in  his  rear,  and  forced  him 
to  retreat  precipitately  as  the  alternative  to  surrender. 
His  very  reckless  audacity  in  moving  forward  to  Breed's 
Hill  led  to  their  attacking  him  squarely  in  front. 

Had  Prescott  directed  the  assaulting  column,  he  would 
have  ordered  it  to  do  just  that.  But  his  good  fortune  did 
not  stop  here.  Twice  he  repulsed  the  attacking  force,  in- 
flicting terrible  loss  upon  it;   and  this  is  his  great  claim  for 


12  MILITARY  STUDIES 

credit  on  that  memorable  day.  Prescott  was  evidently  a 
fighter.  He  showed  this  by  his  forward  midnight  move 
from  Bunker  to  Breed's  Hill;  and  he  showed  it  still  more 
by  the  way  in  which  he  kept  a  levy  of  raw  ploughmen  steady 
there  during  the  trying  hours  that  preceded  conflict;  and 
then,  in  face  of  the  advancing  line  of  regulars,  made  them 
hold  their  fire  until  he  gave  the  word.  This  was  superb,  — 
it  deserves  unstinted  praise.  Again,  the  luck  of  the  Ameri- 
cans soared  in  the  ascendant.  Under  the  exact  conditions 
in  which  they  then  found  themselves,  they  had  chanced  on 
the  right  man  in  the  right  place,  —  and  it  was  one  chance 
in  a  thousand. 

And  then  followed  yet  more  good  luck,  —  indeed,  a 
crowning  stroke.  Twice  did  Prescott  repulse  his  enemy. 
Had  he  done- so  a  third  time,  he  would  have  won  a  victory, 
held  his  position,  and,  the  next  day,  in  all  human  probability, 
the  force  which  relieved  him  would  have  been  compelled  to 
surrender,  because  of  properly  conducted  operations  in  its 
rear  under  cover  of  the  British  fleet.  For  it  is  impossible 
to  suppose  that  Clinton's  advice  would  not  then  have  been 
followed;  and  had  it  been  followed,  with  Clinton  in  charge 
of  the  operations  in  the  field,  a  result  not  unusual  in  warfare 
would  no  doubt  have  been  witnessed,  —  the  temporary  and 
partial  success  of  one  day  would  have  been  converted  into 
the  irretrievable  disaster  of  the  succeeding  day.  It  was  so 
with  Napoleon  himself  at  Ligny  and  Waterloo. 

Fortunately  for  Prescott  and  the  patriot  cause,  the  am- 
munition within  the  Bunker  Hill  redoubt  was  pretty  much 
consumed  before  the  third  assault  was  made;  and  so  his 
adversaries  drove  the  patriot  commander  out  of  his  trap 
and  into  the  arms  of  his  own  friends.  In  spite  of  himself 
Prescott  was  saved  from  ultimate  disaster.  Yet,  curiously 
enough,  he  does  not  even  then  seem  to  have  realized  his 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BUNKER  HILL  13 

luck;  for,  instead  of  going  back  to  the  headquarters  of 
General  Ward,  as  well  he  might  have  gone,  in  a  towering 
rage  over  the  incompetence  which  had  put  him  and  his 
command  in  such  a  position,  without  reason  or  support  — 
a  position  from  which  he  had  escaped  only  by  a  chance  in  a 
thousand,  —  in  place  of  taking  this  view  of  the  matter,  he 
actually  offered,  if  a  fresh  force  1500  strong  was  put  under 
his  command,  to  recross  Charlestown  Neck  and  recapture 
Bunker  Hill  the  next  day,  —  in  other  words,  to  go  back 
into  the  trap  from  which  the  stupidity  of  his  opponents 
had  forcibly  driven  him! 

The  original  plan  of  operations  matured  by  the  Cambridge 
council,  including  as  it  did  the  simultaneous  occupation  of 
both  Prospect  and  Bunker  Hills,  was,  therefore,  bold,  well- 
conceived,  calculated  to  produce  the  results  desired,  and 
entirely  practicable;  assuming  always  that  the  patriot 
army  had  the  necessary  artillery  and  ammunition  to  equip 
and  defend  the  works  it  was  proposed  to  construct.  Such 
was  not  the  case ;  but,  doubtless,  under  the  circumstances, 
something  had  to  be  risked. 

This  plan,  thoroughly  good  as  a  mere  plan,  was,  however, 
executed  in  part  only,  and  in  such  a  way  as  to  expose  the 
provincial  army  and  cause  to  disaster  of  the  worst  kind. 
And  yet,  through  the  chances  of  war,  —  the  pure  luck  of 
the  patriots,  —  every  oversight  of  which  they  were  guilty, 
every  blunder  they  committed,  worked  to  their  advantage, 
and  contributed  to  the  success  of  their  operations !  They 
completely  drew  the  British  fire  and  forestalled  the  con- 
templated offensive  operations,  throwing  the  enemy  on  the 
defensive;  they  inspired  the  American  militia  with  confi- 
dence in  themselves,  filling  them  with  an  aggressive  spirit ; 
they  fired  the  continental  ardor;  and,  finally,  the  force 
engaged  was  extricated  from  a  false  and  impossible  position, 


14  MILITARY  STUDIES 

after  inflicting  severe  punishment  on  its  opponents.  For 
that  particular  occasion  and  under  the  circumstances, 
Cromwell  or  Frederick  or  Napoleon  in  command  would 
probably  have  accomplished  less;  for,  with  the  means  at 
disposal,  they  never  would  have  dared  to  take  such  risks, 
nor  would  they  ever  have  thrust  themselves  into  such  an 
utterly  untenable  position. 

To  penetrate  the  mind  and  plan  of  an  opponent  —  to 
pluck  out  the  heart  of  his  counsel  and  to  make  dispositions 
accordingly  —  has  ever  been  dwelt  upon  as  one  of  the 
chief  attributes  of  the  highest  military  genius,  —  Hannibal, 
Caesar,  Gustavus,  Marlborough,  Frederick,  Napoleon,  all 
possessed  it  in  a  noticeable  degree.  Possibly,  General  Ward 
and  Colonel  Prescott  may  instinctively  have  acted  in  obe- 
dience to  this  rarest  military  quality  on  the  16th  and  17th 
of  June,  1775.  If  so,  they  certainly  developed  a  capacity 
for  which  the  world  has  not  since  given  them  credit;  and 
the  immediate  results  justified  to  the  fullest  extent  their 
apparently  almost  childlike  reliance  on  the  combined  pro- 
fessional incapacity  and  British  bull-headedness  of  General 
Thomas  Gage.  Fourteen  months  later,  as  will  hereafter  be 
seen,  Ward's  more  famous  successor  got  himself  and  his 
army  into  a  position  on  Long  Island  scarcely  less  false  and 
difficult  than  Prescott's  at  Bunker  Hill.1  He,  also,  was  then 
saved  from  irretrievable  disaster  through  sheer  good  luck, 
happily  combined  with  his  opponent's  incompetence.  In 
this  case,  however,  Fortune  did  not,  as  at  Bunker  Hill, 
positively  shower  its  favors  on  the  patriot  cause. 

Yet  in  one  respect  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill  was,  in 
reality,  epochal.  Prescott  did  not  occupy  Breed's  Hill  and 
begin  to  throw  up  his  intrenchments  until  nearly  midnight 
on  the  16th-17th  of  June.     Thus  his  men  had  but  about  four 

i  Infra,  28-35. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BUNKER  HILL  15 

hours  in  which  to  work  before  the  break  of  day  disclosed  their 
whereabouts.  Yet  when,  less  than  twelve  hours  later,  the 
British  stormed  the  field-works,  they  were  amazed  at  their 
extent  and  completeness,  and  could  not  believe  that  they 
had  all  been  thrown  up  in  a  single  summer's  night.  It  was 
something  new  in  warfare. 

There  can  be  few  things  more  instructive  and  suggestive, 
from  a  military  point  of  view,  than  a  visit  to  the  battle-fields 
of  Waterloo  and  Sedan,  passing  rapidly  from  the  former 
to  the  latter.  To  one  whose  impressions  of  active  warfare 
and  military  field  methods  are  drawn  from  campaigns  in 
Virginia,  now  thirty  years  ago,  it  is  not  easy,  while  surveying 
the  scenes  of  the  battles  of  1815  and  1870,  to  understand 
what  the  English  in  the  one  case  and  the  French  in  the  other 
were  doing  in  the  hours  which  preceded  the  engagements. 
In  the  Virginia  campaigns  nothing  was  of  more  ordinary 
observation  than  the  strength  and  perfect  character  of 
the  intrenchments  which  both  armies  habitually  threw  up. 
Such  skill  in  the  alignment  and  construction  of  these  works 
did  the  common  rank  and  file  of  the  armies  acquire,  that  a 
few  hours  always  sufficed  to  transform  an  ordinary  bivouac 
into  a  well-protected  camp.  In  the  case  of  Waterloo,  the 
Duke  of  Wellington  had  days  and  even  weeks  before  selected 
it  as  his  battle  ground ;  he  had  even  caused  a  topographical 
survey  to  be  made  of  it;  he  arrived  there  from  Quatre 
Bras  twenty  hours  before  the  battle  of  Waterloo  began;  he 
made  all  his  dispositions  at  his  leisure.  Yet  not  a  spadeful 
of  dirt  seems  to  have  been  thrown ;  and  the  next  day,  while 
his  line  was  exposed  to  the  fury  of  Napoleon's  famous 
artillery,  the  French  cavalry  rode  unobstructed  in  and  out 
among  the  English  squares. 

It  seems  to  have  been  the  same,  more  than  half  a  cen- 
tury later,  at  Sedan.     Strategically,  the  French  were  there  in 


16  MILITARY  STUDIES 

almost  as  false  a  position  as  the  Americans  at  Bunker  Hill. 
They  were  in  a  hole,  —  rats  in  a  trap.  Tactically,  their 
position  was  by  no  means  bad.  The  ancient  fortifications 
of  Sedan  secured  and  covered  their  centre;  while  their  two 
wings  were  free  to  operate  on  the  high  grounds  behind, 
sloping  sharply  to  the  river.  They  occupied  the  inside  of 
a  curve,  with  perfect  facilities  for  the  concentration  of  force 
by  interior  lines.  A  better  opportunity,  so  far  as  the  char- 
acter of  the  ground  and  country  was  concerned,  for  the 
rapid  throwing  up  of  intrenchments  and  field-works  could 
not  have  been  desired.  As  at  Waterloo,  the  facilities  were 
everywhere.  McMahon's  army,  when  surprised  and  cor- 
nered in  Sedan,  was,  it  is  true,  on  its  march  to  Metz,  and  all 
was  in  confusion.  But  they  had  twelve  hours'  notice  of 
what  was  impending,  and  they  fought  on  the  ground  on 
which  they  had  slept.  Yet,  again,  not  a  spadeful  of  dirt 
seems  to  have  been  thrown.  What  were  the  French  think- 
ing of  or  doing  all  those  hours? 

Judging  by  the  record  of  Bunker  Hill,  and  recollections 
of  what  was  habitually  done  ninety  years  later  in  Virginia, 
if  an  army  of  either  Federals  or  Confederates,  as  developed 
in  1865,  had  held  the  ground  of  the  British  at  Waterloo  or 
the  French  at  Sedan,  the  lines  and  intrenchments  which  on 
the  days  of  battle  would  have  confronted  Napoleon  and 
Von  Moltke  could  hardly  have  failed  to  give  them  pause. 
Before  those  temporary  works  they  would  have  seen  their 
advancing  columns  melt  away,  as  did  Gage  at  Bunker  Hill, 
Pakenham  at  New  Orleans,  and  Lee  at  Gettysburg. 

The  simple  fact  seems  to  have  been,  that,  until  the  modern 
magazine  gun  made  it  an  absolute  necessity,  digging  was 
never  considered  a  part  of  the  soldier's  training.  Indeed, 
it  was  looked  upon  as  demoralizing.  In  the  same  way,  the 
art  of  designing  temporary  field-works  and  camp  intrench- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BUNKER  HILL  17 

ments  was  not  regarded  as  belonging  to  the  regimental 
officers'  functions.  The  famous  lines  of  Torres  Vedras 
showed  that  Wellington  knew  well  how  to  avail  himself  of 
defensive  works ;  but  they  were  laid  out  on  a  large  scale  and 
on  scientific  principles.  Mere  temporary  field-works  and 
improvised  protections  seem  to  have  been  contemptuously 
looked  down  upon  as  a  branch  of  irregular  warfare  or  Indian 
fighting.  It  was  something  unprofessional;  even  savoring 
of  cowardice.  Often,  during  the  War  of  Secession,  old 
West  Point  graduates,  high  in  rank  but  somewhat  hide- 
bound, might  be  heard  lamenting  in  the  same  spirit  over 
the  ever-growing  tendency  of  the  armies  to  protect  them- 
selves by  intrenchments  wherever  they  camped.  It  made 
soldiers  afraid  of  exposure!  As  the  military  martinets  ex- 
pressed it,  they  wanted  the  rank  and  file  "to  stand  up, 
and  fight  man-fashion."  How  often,  in  those  days,  was 
that  expression  used  !  Yet  their  idea  of  fighting  was  appar- 
ently that  of  Wellington  at  Waterloo,  and  of  McMahon  at 
Sedan.  At  either  of  those  places  our  veterans  of  1865, 
Federals  or  Confederates,  would  have  protected  themselves 
with  field-works,  though  only  bayonets  were  to  be  had  for 
picks,  and  tin  dippers  did  duty  for  shovels. 

Putnam,  therefore,  showed  a  very  profound  insight 
when,  on  the  eve  of  Bunker  Hill,  he  remarked  that,  as  a 
soldier,  the  Yankee  was  peculiar.  He  didn't  seem  to  care 
much,  the  Connecticut  general  said,  about  his  head,  but  he 
was  dreadfully  afraid  of  his  shins ;  cover  him  half-leg  high, 
and  you  could  depend  on  him  to  fight.  The  fact  seems  to 
be  that,  as  a  fighting  animal,  the  Yankee  is  unquestionably 
observant.  Breastworks  are  in  battle  handy  to  the  assailed ; 
and  he  saw  at  once  that  breastworks  admit  of  rapid  and  easy 
construction  to  men  accustomed  to  the  use  of  shovel  and 
pick.     Prescott  taught  that  lesson  on  the  17th  of  June,  1775. 


18  MILITARY  STUDIES 

He  did  not  realize  it,  and  apparently  it  took  almost  a  century 
for  the  professional  soldier  to  master  the  fact  thoroughly; 
but  those  light,  temporary  earthworks,  scientifically  thrown 
up  on  Bunker  Hill  in  the  closing  hours  of  a  single  June  night, 
introduced  a  new  element  into  the  defensive  tactics  of 
the  battle-field.  Its  final  demonstration  was  at  Plevna,  a 
whole  century  later. 


The  facts  in  this  paper  set  forth,  and  the  inferences  drawn  there- 
from, are  so  obvious  that  they  would  naturally  suggest  themselves 
to  an  investigator  from  an  examination  of  any  topographical 
map  of  the  Charlestown  peninsula,  and  more  forcibly  still  to  one 
familiar  with  the  ground.  From  a  military  point  of  view,  they 
were  apparent  at  the  time;  and,  naturally,  have  not  wholly 
escaped  attention  since. 

In  the  Library  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society  there  is 
a  copy  of  Israel  MauduhVs  "  Remarks  upon  Gen.  Howe's  Account 
of  his  Proceedings  on  Long  Island"  (London,  1778),  on  the  fly  leaf 
of  which  is  pasted  a  clipping  from  an  issue  of  the  London 
Chronicle,  of  August  3,  1779,  containing  a  communication  signed 
with  the  initials  "T.  P."  The  letter  was  written  shortly  after  the 
reports  concerning  the  Bunker  Hill  affair  reached  England,  and 
with  some  knowledge  of  the  locality.  Every  position  taken  and 
criticism  advanced  in  the  text  will  be  there  found  set  forth  as 
something  well  understood  at  the  time,  and  which  did  not  admit 
of  dispute.  In  a  pamphlet  entitled  "A  View  of  the  Evidence 
Relating  to  the  Conduct  of  the  American  War  under  Sir  William 
Howe,"  are  printed  certain  letters  and  documents  entitled  "Fu- 
gitive Pieces,"  etc.  First  among  these  is  a  letter  from  Boston,  dated 
July  5,  1775,  or  eighteen  days  after  the  battle.  It  was  written  ap- 
parently by  a  British  officer  then  serving  under  General  Gage; 
and  in  it  the  tactics  employed  by  Howe  are  severely  criticised. 
The  writer  says  :  "Had  we  intended  to  have  taken  the  whole  rebel 
army  prisoners,  we  need  only  have  landed  in  their  rear  and  occupied 
the  high  ground  above  Bunker  Hill,  by  this  movement  we  shut 
them  up  in  the  Peninsula  as  in  a  bag,  their  rear  exposed  to  the  fire 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BUNKER  HILL  19 

of  our  cannon,  and  if  we  pleased  our  musketry;  in  short  they 
must  have  surrendered  instantly,  or  been  blown  to  pieces.  .  .  . 
The  brave  men's  [i.e.  British]  lives  were  wantonly  thrown  away. 
Our  conductor  [Howe]  as  much  murdered  them  as  if  he  had  cut 
their  throats  himself  on  Boston  Common."  See  Proceedings  of 
Mass.  Hist.  Soc,  1910,  Vol.  XLIV,  pp.  96-103.  In  the  library 
of  Harvard  University  there  is  a  pamphlet,  entitled,  "  The  Com- 
plaint of  W.  Neil  Maclean  to  the  Honorable  the  Commons  of 
Great  Britain  in  Parliament  Assembled"  (123  pp.  8vo).  A 
very  rare  tract,  this  was  published,  apparently,  about  1790,  and 
is  a  severe  arraignment  of  Sir  William  Howe  by  an  officer  who 
claims  to  have  been  most  unjustly  treated  by  him.  His  allega- 
tions are,  accordingly,  to  be  accepted  in  part  only,  and  as  indicat- 
ing views  held  in  British  military  circles.  Speaking  of  what 
occurred  on  June  17,  Maclean  says  (p.  26):  "  He  [Howe]  began 
...  by  the  fatal  attack  of  Bunker's  Hill,  where  he  exposed,  to 
certain  and  inevitable  destruction,  and  as  far  as  depended  on  him, 
to  Woeful  disgrace  and  dishonour,  such  a  number  of  the  best  troops 
in  the  whole  world  ;  before  the  face  of  an  open  intrenchment, 
that  might  have  been  attacked  in  the  rear  from  both  sides  of  the 
neck  of  land  on  which  it  was  drawn,  and  carried  without  risquing 
the  life  of  a  single  soldier." 

Such  were  contemporaneous  judgments  expressed  by  British 
officers  either  themselves  at  the  time  on  the  ground  or  informed 
by  participants  in  the  operations  ;  yet  in  the  extensive  subsequent 
historical  literature  relating  to  Bunker  Hill  only  here  and  there 
are  passing  references  to  be  found  to  the  strategic  situation 
and  tactical  conditions  involved ;  or  the  lessons  to  be  derived 
therefrom.  They  are  mentioned,  or  alluded  to,  in  an  incidental 
sort  of  way,  without  apparent  appreciation  of  possible  con- 
sequences, or  reflection  upon  those  on  both  sides  responsible 
for  what  occurred.  As  long  ago  as  August,  1789,  however, 
Jeremy  Belknap  wrote :  "I  have  lately  been  on  the  ground 
and  surveyed  it  with  my  own  eye,  and  I  think  it  was  a  most 
hazardous  and  imprudent  affair  on  both  sides.  Our  people  were 
extremely  rash  in  taking  so  advanced  a  post  without  securing  a 
retreat ;  and  the  British  were  equally  rash  in  attacking  them  only 
in  front,  when  they  could  so  easily  have  taken  them  in  the  rear." 


20  MILITARY  STUDIES 

(Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Coll.  Series  5,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  159).  Gordon  in  his 
history  (Vol.  II,  p.  51)  dwells  upon  the  topic,  passing  a  correct 
judgment  in  the  assertion  that  the  British  commander  " might 
have  entrapped  the  provincials  by  landing  on  the  narrowest  part 
of  Charlestown  Neck,  under  the  fire  of  the  floating  batteries  and 
ships  of  war."  But,  of  the  modern  writers,  Frothingham  scarcely 
alludes  to  the  subject;  while  Devens,  himself  a  soldier  of  ex- 
perience, only  refers  to  it  incidentally  and  in  a  passing  way  (Cen- 
tennial Anniversary,  p.  87).  Carrington's  criticism  (Battles  of  the 
American  Revolution,  p.  113)  is  of  the  most  meagre  possible  de- 
scription. Bancroft  devotes  to  it  three  lines.  Fiske  (The  Ameri- 
can Revolution,  I,  p.  138)  states  the  case  briefly,  but  clearly  and 
correctly. 

Perhaps,  however,  the  best  purely  military  criticism  is  that  in 
Stedman's  History  (Vol.  I,  128).  Stedman  was  not  in  Boston  or 
attached  to  the  British  army  at  the  time ;  but,  subsequently,  he 
had  access  to  the  most  reliable  sources  of  information,  and  was  in 
constant  personal  intercourse  with  participants  in  the  affair.  He 
also  wrote  in  the  light  of  a  wide  experience  in  later  operations 
during  the  same  war.  Stedman  describes  the  British  troops  as 
marching  up  to  the  assault  "in  the  middle  of  a  hot  summer's  day, 
incumbered  with  three  days'  provisions,  their  knapsacks  on  their 
backs,  which,  together  with  cartouche-box,  ammunition,  and  fire- 
lock, may  be  estimated  at  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  pounds 
weight,  with  a  steep  hill  to  ascend,  covered  with  grass  reaching  to 
their  knees,  and  intersected  with  the  walls  and  fences  of  various 
inclosures,  and  in  the  face  of  a  hot  and  well-directed  fire  .  .  . 
(from)  behind  a  breastwork,  and  defended  by  a  redoubt.  But, 
whatever  credit  may  be  due  to  the  valour  of  the  troops,  the  plan 
of  the  attack  has  been  severely  censured. 

"Had  the  Symmetry  transport,  which  drew  little  water,  and 
mounted  eighteen  nine-pounders,  been  towed  up  Mystic  channel, 
and  been  brought  to,  within  musket  shot  of  the  left  flank,  which 
was  quite  naked;  or  one  of  our  covered  boats,  musket-proof, 
carrying  a  heavy  piece  of  cannon,  been  towed  close  in ;  one  charge 
on  their  uncovered  flank,  it  was  said,  might  have  dislodged  them 
in  a  moment.  It  has  been  also  said,  that  the  British  troops  might 
have  been  landed  in  the  rear  of  the  provincial  intrenchment,  and 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BUNKER  HILL  21 

thereby  avoided  those  difficulties  and  impediments  which  they 
had  to  encounter  in  marching  up  in  front.  By  such  a  disposition, 
too,  the  breast-work  of  the  Americans  would  have  been  rendered 
useless,  and  their  whole  detachment,  being  inclosed  in  the  penin- 
sula, must  have  either  surrendered  at  discretion,  or  attempted,  in 
order  to  get  back  to  the  main  land,  to  cut  their  way  through  the 
British  line.  Further  still,  it  has  been  said,  that  the  success  of  the 
day  was  the  less  brilliant,  from  no  pursuit  being  ordered,  after  the 
provincials  had  begun  to  take  to  flight." 


II 

THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND1 

"The  dilatoriness  and  stupidity  of  the  enemy  saved  us," 
wrote  General  Charles  Lee  to  Washington  in  July,  1776, 
immediately  after  the  repulse  of  the  British  fleet  under  Sir 
Peter  Parker  by  the  guns  of  Fort  Moultrie  on  the  first 
attempt  at  the  occupation  of  Charleston,  South  Carolina. 
The  same  qualities  in  those  opposed  to  Washington,  com- 
bined with  an  almost  amazing  run  of  pure  luck,  saved  him 
and  the  cause  of  American  independence  at  New  York  less 
than  two  months  later.  Not  often  has  a  military  force 
on  which  great  results  depended  found  itself  in  a  more 
critical  position  than  did  the  patriot  army  then;  and 
seldom  has  any  commander  so  completely  in  the  toils  been 
afforded  equal  opportunities  for  extrication. 

Analyzed  from  any  thoughtful  as  well  as  military  point  of 
view,  it  was  a  strange  fiasco  that  enacted  in  and  about  what 
are  now  the  cities  of  Brooklyn  and  New  York  during  the 
months  of  August,  September  and  October,  1776  —  a 
fiasco  on  the  part  of  all  responsible  for  what  occurred, 
though  very  tragic  for  many  of  those  involved  on  the  Ameri- 
can side.  So  far  as  the  British  were  concerned,  the  failure 
of  those  in  command  then  to  avail  themselves  of  oppor- 

1  The  substance  of  this  paper  appeared  in  two  articles ;  the  first  printed 
in  the  American  Historical  Review,  Vol.  1,  pp.  650-670,  July,  1896;  the 
second,  in  the  Proceedings  of  the  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Vol.  XLIV,  pp.  233- 
253,  December,  1910.  These  articles  have  been  revised  and  largely  re- 
written. Where  not  given,  citations  to  authorities,  etc.,  can  be  found  by 
reference  to  the  original  publications. 

22 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND  23 

tunities  repeatedly  offered  both  is,  and  at  the  time  was,  so 
apparent  that  the  modern  tendency  is  to  attribute  what 
they  did,  or  failed  to  do,  to  secret  instructions  or,  perhaps, 
some  tacit  understanding;  military  advantages  were,  for 
some  occult  reasons  of  state,  not  to  be  pressed  too  far,  or 
to  any  decisive  result.  On  the  other  hand,  upon  the  Ameri- 
can side,  not  only  was  a  great  cause  put  in  extreme  jeopardy, 
but,  through  the  unskilful  pursuance  of  a  policy  altogether 
wrong,  many  and  valuable  lives  were  unnecessarily  sacri- 
ficed. 

Major  General  Howe,  afterwards  Sir  William  Howe, 
K.  C.  B.,  is,  as  an  historical  character,  of  no  great  moment, 
and  investigators  are  free  to  do  with  him  as  they  may  see 
fit ;  but  that  Washington  should  have  then  been  responsible 
for  grave  errors  of  judgment  which  ought  under  any  rea- 
sonable weighing  of  probabilities  to  have  ruined  the  Ameri- 
can cause  and  deprived  the  world  of  one  of  its  immortalities, 
—  that  he  should  have  involved  his  army  in  disaster  and 
disgrace  through  bad  judgment  and  because  of  frequent 
and  long  hesitations  at  a  time  when  quick  decision  was 
essential,  —  these  are  things  not  readily  now  to  be  admitted  ; 
nor  does  the  record  thus  in  any  way  so  read  in  the  pages  of 
the  distinctively  American  historian.  Though  manifestly 
not  in  accord  with  long-accepted  traditions,  or,  perhaps, 
even  with  the  everlasting  fitness  of  things,  such  seem, 
however,  to  be  the  only  inferences  fairly  to  be  drawn  from 
the  evidence  in  the  case,  when  that  evidence  is  studied  in 
a  cold  and  purely  critical  spirit,  uninspired  by  patriotism, 
and  devoid  of  sympathy  for  those  concerned  either  on  the 
one  side  or  the  other.  But,  so  studied,  the  necessary  conclu- 
sion would  seem  to  be  that  if  there  was  at  Bunker  Hill  gross 
military  blundering  on  both  sides,  before  Brooklyn  and  on 
Manhattan  Island  that  blundering  was  on  both  sides  fairly 


24  MILITARY  STUDIES 

outdone.  The  British  commander  there  almost  wantonly 
threw  away  the  certainty  of  a  decisive  and,  probably,  a 
final  victory;  while  not  even  the  "dilatoriness  and  stupidity 
of  the  enemy"  saved  the  patriots  from  disasters  and  from 
disgrace  which  in  no  way,  moral  or  otherwise,  could  be 
exploited  as  a  victory. 

The  course  of  events  leading  up  to  the  operations  referred 
to  were,  briefly,  as  follows.  The  British  evacuated  Boston 
on  the  16th  of  March.  By  those  in  charge  of  the  patriot 
cause  the  point  at  which  the  next  blow  would  be  struck 
could  only  be  surmised  ;  but  New  York  naturally  sug- 
gested itself.  Obviously  it  was  the  strategic  centre  of 
the  very  extensive  region  in  which  the  war  had  to  be  carried 
on;  and,  as  such,  invited  attack.  From  it  as  a  base,  and 
from  it  alone  of  American  Atlantic  seaports,  could  large  and 
intricate  combined  operations,  covering  all  the  Provinces,  be 
conducted.  A  movement  by  the  British  in  that  direction 
had  naturally  been  anticipated  by  the  American  leaders 
early  in  1776,  and  General  Charles  Lee  was,  accordingly, 
detached  from  the  army  before  Boston,  and  by  order  of 
Washington  repaired  to  New  York,  there  to  make  suitable 
provision  against  attack.  Arriving  on  the  4th  of  February, 
he  at  once  took  in  the  difficulties  of  the  situation.  "What 
to  do  with  this  city,"  he  wrote  to  Washington,  "I  own, 
puzzles  me-  It  is  so  encircled  with  deep  navigable  water, 
that  whoever  commands  the  sea  must  command  the  town." 
The  command  of  the  sea  being  manifestly  the  key  of  the 
situation,  that  the  British  held  that  key  was  no  less  manifest. 

Lee,  nevertheless,  proceeded  to  plan  such  a  system  of 
defences  as  seemed  practicable ;  but,  being  subsequently  as- 
signed by  Congress  to  the  command  of  the  Department  of 
the  South,  he  left  New  York  on  the  7th  of  March,  leaving 
Major  General  Lord  Stirling,  as  he  was  called,  in  temporary 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND         25 

charge.  Stirling,  shortly  after,  was  in  his  turn  superseded 
by  General  Israel  Putnam,  under  instructions  from  Wash- 
ington to  go  on  with  the  preparations  for  defence  in  accord- 
ance with  Lee's  plans.  On  the  13th  of  April,  Washington 
himself  arrived,  and  assumed  command. 

Washington  had  taken  it  for  granted  that,  after  its  evacu- 
ation of  Boston  in  March,  1776,  the  British  armament  would 
proceed  at  once  to  New  York;  but,  instead  of  so  doing,  it 
went  to  Halifax,  there  to  refit.  Not  until  June  29  did  the 
reenforced  expedition  reach  Sandy  Hook,  inside  of  which  it 
came  to  anchor;  and,  landing  his  army  on  Staten  Island, 
General  Howe  there  awaited  the  arrival  of  additional  ships 
and  still  further  reinforcements,  then  shortly  looked  for, 
under  command  of  his  brother,  Admiral  Lord  Howe.  These 
appeared  in  July. 

Washington  at  that  time  found  himself  in  command  of 
some  9000  so-called  effectives,  "2000  of  whom  were  entirely 
destitute  of  arms."  This  force  was  very  imperfectly  or- 
ganized. Insufficiently  armed,  clothed  and  equipped,  it 
was  largely  composed  of  unreliable  militia.  Without  ade- 
quate artillery,  it  had  no  cavalry  at  all.  Of  naval  support 
there  was  not  even  a  pretence.  How,  with  such  means,  to 
defend  a  place  at  the  command  of  whoever  controlled  the 
sea,  against  a  thoroughly  equipped  and  disciplined  force  twice 
the  size  of  his,  and  that  force  supported  by  a  powerful  fleet, 
was  the  problem  with  which  the  Commander-in-Chief  found 
himself  confronted.  For  two  whole  months  did  he  study 
his  problem  doubtless  in  its  every  aspect ;  and  not  once  in  all 
that  time  does  it  seem  to  have  occurred  to  him  that  it  was 
not  only  insoluble,  but  that  any  considerable  attempt  at 
its  solution  was  fraught  with  extreme  danger.  During  these 
months  he  wrote  many  letters  and  prepared  some  formal  re- 
ports ;  but  in  not  one  of  them  does  he  even  suggest  that  the 


26  MILITARY  STUDIES 

course  pursued  was  opposed  to  his  military  judgment  or  based 
on  incorrect  strategic  principles.  He  never  even  hints  that 
under  the  pressure  of  an  assumed  political  necessity  he  is 
taking  what  seems  to  him  a  dangerous  military  risk.  On 
the  contrary,  even  after  the  inevitable  disaster  had  befallen 
him,  he  truthfully  and  frankly  wrote  "Till  of  late,  I  had 
no  doubt  in  my  own  mind  of  defending  this  place." 

Yet  in  the  course  of  this  attempt  at  a  defence  Washing- 
ton was  compelled  to  violate,  and  did  violate,  almost  every 
recognized  principle  of  warfare.  To  defend  New  York  it 
was  absolutely  necessary  to  hold  the  heights  of  Brooklyn, 
opposite  the  city;  for  those  heights,  as  Bunker  Hill  in  the 
case  of  Boston,  commanded  New  York  within  easy  artillery 
range.  But  Brooklyn,  separated  from  New  York  by  deep 
navigable  water,  was  on  an  island.  Above  New  York,  on 
both  sides  east  and  west,  were  other  wide,  navigable  water- 
ways, which  also  had  to  be  covered  by  defences.  Again,  if, 
under  such  conditions,  successful  resistance  was  possible, 
it  was  only  possible  through  holding  to  a  policy  of  intrench- 
ments.  The  patriot  force  should  have  been  kept  within  the 
strongest  line  of  defence  possible  to  be  devised ;  and,  as  at 
Bunker  Hill,  prepared  to  resist  attack  in  front,  it  had  to 
trust  to  the  incompetence  of  its  opponents  that  the  attack 
would  indeed  be  in  front,  and  not  in  rear :  but  if,  perchance, 
the  attack  should  be  from  the  rear,  with  the  enemy  in  abso- 
lute control  of  the  water,  and  free  to  strike  when  and  where 
he  pleased,  the  American  army  manifestly  stood  in  imminent 
danger  of  destruction.  Precipitate  retreat  by  any  route  left 
open  could  alone  save  it. 

Under  these  circumstances  and  conditions,  Washington  not 
only  divided  his  inadequate  army,  but  when  his  opponent 
obliged  him  by  attacking  just  where  alone  he  could  hope  to 
resist  an  attack,  that  is,  in  full  front,  instead  of  awaiting 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND  27 

the  assault  within  his  lines;  as  did  Prescott  at  Bunker  Hill, 
Washington  actually  went  out  to  meet  it,  thus  challenging 
the  fate  which  befell  him.  Finally,  even  his  own  excellent 
management,  in  the  hour  of  disaster  he  had  thus  provoked, 
could  not  have  saved  the  patriot  cause  from  irretrievable 
ruin  and  himself  from  hopeless  failure  and  disgrace,  had  it 
not  been  combined  with  almost  miraculous  good  luck,  to 
which  the  "dilatoriness  and  stupidity  of  the  enemy "  most 
effectively  contributed.  This,  too,  at  the  very  juncture 
when  those  under  Howe  confidently  wrote  that  the  British 
commander  would  not  give  his  opponent  "time  to  breathe, 
but  push  his  successes  like  a  winning  gamester.' ' 

Though  General  Howe  had  come  to  anchor  inside  of  Sandy 
Hook  June  29,  and  been  joined  there  by  Lord  Howe  and  the 
fleet  July  1,  it  was  not  until  August  22  that  active  opera- 
tions on  Long  Island  began.  During  that  long  interval  of 
over  seven  weeks  of  the  best  campaigning  weather  of  the 
whole  year,  the  British  army  rested  quietly  in  its  summer 
camp  on  Staten  Island.  On  July  12  two  English  ships, 
respectively  of  forty  and  twenty  guns,  had  run  by  the 
North  River  defences  without  sustaining  any  injury,  and 
gone  up  the  Hudson  to  the  Tappan  Sea ;  where,  until  August 
18,  they  lay  in  apparent  perfect  security,  with  awnings 
stretched,  sleeping  in  the  summer  sunshine.  Altogether 
a  somewhat  contemptuous  demonstration  of  how  complete 
was  the  British  command  of  the  sea,  and  how  futile  were 
the  American  efforts  to  obstruct  the  navigable  channels. 
August  7  thirty  transports,  under  convoy  of  three  frigates, 
put  to  sea  with  the  design  of  going  around  Long  Island,  and 
so  threatening  New  York  from  the  Sound  and  East  River 
side.  The  line  of  American  retreat  from  Brooklyn  to  the 
mainland  was  imperilled.  All  this  time  the  two  Howes 
were  in  daily  communication  with    the  royalist  governor, 


28  MILITARY  STUDIES 

Tryon,  of  New  York,  who  was  on  board  one  of  the  English 
ships-of-war ;  and,  through  other  sympathizers  on  the  main- 
land and  Long  Island,  they  could  get  all  the  information 
they  chose  to  ask  for,  not  only  as  to  localities  and  roads,  but 
in  regard  to  the  movements  of  the  patriots.  Plentifully 
supplied  with  provisions,  the  invaders  lacked  neither  guides 
on  the  land  nor  pilots  by  water.  Under  these  circumstances, 
it  was  small  matter  of  surprise  that,  as  the  weeks  dragged 
on,  many  of  Washington's  ablest  advisers  looked  on  the 
situation  with  ever  increasing  uneasiness.  They  feared 
being  entrapped  "on  this  tongue  of  land,  where,"  as  one  of 
them  later  expressed  it,  "we  ought  never  to  have  been." 

Besides  the  fleet,  the  British  commander  had,  by  the 
middle  of  August,  an  army  30,000  strong  in  a  high  state 
of  efficiency,  with  a  large  park  of  artillery  and  a  small,  but 
completely  equipped,  body  of  cavalry.  Washington  at 
the  same  time  had  nominally  17,500  men,  of  whom  about 
14,000  were  reported  fit  for  duty.  With  a  few  pieces  of 
artillery,  he  still  had  no  mounted  force.  And  with  such 
means  at  his  command,  incredible  as  it  seems,  he  actually 
thought  he  could  defend  a  land  and  water  front  of  nearly 
thirty  miles,  open  to  attack  front,  flank  and  rear,  besides 
being  cut  in  two  by  a  navigable  channel  both  broad  and 
deep.  His  opponent,  meanwhile,  was  obviously  free  to 
concentrate  whatever  of  force  might  be  necessary  for  a 
decisive  blow  at  any  selected  point.  Neither  did  Washing- 
ton indulge  in  any  false  confidence  in  the  efficacy  of  his 
water-batteries  to  hold  in  check,  at  least  to  a  certain  degree, 
the  enemy's  maritime  supremacy;  on  the  contrary,  as  he 
himself  wrote  a  whole  month  before  actual  operations  against 
him  began,  he  "had  most  religiously  believed  that  a  vessel 
with  a  brisk  wind  and  strong  tide  cannot,  unless  by  a  chance 
shot,  be  stopped  by  a  battery." 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND  29 

The  interior  works  at  Brooklyn  alone  called  for  a  force  of 
at  least  8000  men  to  hold  them  with  any  prospect  of  success ; 
while  the  exterior  lines  before  Flatbush  required  an  equal 
number,  if  the  enemy  was  to  be  retarded  there  even  for  a 
day.  In  other  words,  if  Howe  was,  as  at  Bunker  Hill, 
obliging  enough  to  attack  full  in  front,  and  by  land  alone, 
the  position  on  Long  Island  Washington  had  undertaken 
to  defend,  seeking  no  cooperation  from  the  British  fleet 
and  leaving  his  opponent's  New  York  rear  quite  unmolested, 
—  even  in  this  case,  more  than  the  whole  force  of  the  patriot 
army  would  be  needed  for  the  defence  of  Brooklyn  alone. 

At  last,  everything,  after  weeks  of  apparently  needless 
procrastination,  being  in  readiness,  the  Howes  determined 
to  strike,  and  on  the  22d  of  August,  Sir  Henry  Clinton, 
with  15,000  men,  one  regiment  of  [cavalry,  and  forty  pieces 
of  artillery,  crossed  over  from  Staten  to  Long  Island  and 
landed,  unopposed,  at  Gravesend.  It  was  now  evident 
where  the  blow  by  land  was  to  be  looked  for.  Brooklyn 
was  the  enemy's  objective ;  or,  at  least,  one  of  his  objectives. 

Why  the  two  Howes  decided  on  this  plan  of  campaign 
is  not  apparent.  Strategically  considered,  Washington  had 
put  himself  in  a  position  exactly  similar  to  that  in  which 
Prescott  had  tactically  been  placed  fourteen  months  before 
at  Bunker  Hill.  With  his  opponent  in  undisputed  com- 
mand of  navigable  surrounding  and  intersecting  waters,  he 
was  in  a  trap.  The  true  policy  of  his  opponents  would  seem 
to  have  been  so  to  lay  their  plans  as,  not  to  drive  him  out 
of  the  trap,  but  to  spring  its  door,  so  catching  him.  This 
they  could  easily  have  done,  had  Howe  only  learned  thor- 
oughly his  17th  of  June  lesson.  He  had,  however,  done  so 
only  in  part.  He  had  derived  from  it,  as  will  presently  be 
seen,  a  wholesome  caution  as  to  bull-headed,  frontal  as- 
saults, but  the  far-reaching  significance  of  a  command  of 


30  MILITARY  STUDIES 

the  sea  under  certain  conditions  seems  quite  to  have  escaped 
his  intellectual  grasp,  at  best  limited.  Except  on  this 
assumption,  it  is  still  a  mystery,  why,  under  cover  of  the 
overwhelming  broadsides  of  his  brother's  fleet,  Howe  did 
not  go  up  the  comparatively  unobstructed  Hudson  to 
Bloomingdale,  landing  about  where  Sixtieth  Street  now  is, 
three  miles  above  the  outskirts  of  the  New  York  of  that 
day ;  and  then,  crossing  a  strong  division  of  his  army  to  the 
East  side,  sweep  down  on  Washington,  by  the  Boston  road, 
now  Third  Avenue,  forcing  him  into  the  East  River.  To 
counteract  such  a  movement  it  would  have  been  necessary 
for  the  Americans  precipitately  to  withdraw  their  forces 
from  the  Brooklyn  side  of  the  East  River,  and  concentrate 
them  at  the  point  of  British  attack.  This  movement 
would  have  consumed  much  important  time ;  if,  in  presence 
of  a  detachment  of  the  British  fleet  in  the  East  River, 
practicable  at  all.  The  combined  British  naval  and  mili- 
tary forces  could  have  effected  the  manucevre  with  cer- 
tainty and  ease,  the  broadsides  of  the  fleet  then  covering 
the  Bloomingdale,  or  Albany  road,  now  Broadway,  and 
demoralizing  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  patriots  just  as  they 
demoralized  and  broke  the  patriot  line  of  battle  a  fortnight 
later  at  Kips  Bay.  The  weight  of  attack  being  down  the 
East  side,  the  patriots  would  have  been  between  two  fires. 
From  both  the  strategic  and  the  tactical  points  of  view  the 
movement  was  so  obvious  and  its  success  so  certain  that  the 
failure  of  the  Howes  to  adopt  it  must  forever  remain  un- 
accountable. They  elected,  however,  to  attack  Washing- 
ton squarely  on  his  Brooklyn  front,  with  his  army  cut  in 
two  by  the  East  River,  and  his  means  of  communication 
uncovered  on  the  water  side.  Even  that  situation  was 
bad  enough  for  the  patriots;  in  fact  could  not  have  been 
from  the  purely  military  point  of  view  much  worse  or  more 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND  31 

ill-considered.  The  door  of  the  Brooklyn  trap  behind  them 
might  any  day  be  snapped. 

The  difficulties  of  his  situation,  not  to  say  its  impossi- 
bilities, must,  it  would  seem,  now  have  dawned  on  Wash- 
ington's mind.  As  he  himself  mildly  put  it,1  making  no 
allusion  to  a  hostile  fleet,  operating  in  the  broad  navigable 
waters  which  on  three  sides  compassed  him,  the  problem 
was  "to  oppose  an  army  of  30,000  experienced  veterans 
with  about  one- third  (10,514)  the  number  of  raw  troops,  and 
those  scattered  some  fifteen  miles  apart." 

Though  the  British  force  was  transferred  across  from 
Staten  Island  to  Gravesend  August  22,  it  was  not  until  the 
evening  (9  o'clock)  of  the  26th,  or  four  days  later,  that  a 
forward  movement  was  made.  Constant  skirmishing  had 
meanwhile  been  going  on,  and  the  Americans  had  thus  been 
allowed  ample  time  in  which  to  take  the  situation  in,  and 
make  preparations  accordingly.  In  the  enemy's  advance, 
there  was  no  element  of  surprise.  During  the  earlier  stages 
of  preparation  for  defence,  General  Nathanael  Greene  had 
been  in  charge  of  the  Brooklyn  wing  of  the  patriot  army; 
but  he,  taken  down  by  a  summer  fever,  had  some  time 
before  been  rendered  wholly  unfit  for  duty.  General 
Sullivan  succeeded  him  in  temporary  charge.  All  along, 
Washington  and  Greene  had  seen,  what  indeed  was  obvious, 
that,  with  the  means  at  their  disposal,  a  landing  of  the 
British  on  Long  Island  could  not  be  prevented ;  but,  if 
Brooklyn  was  once  occupied  by  the  enemy,  New  York 
became  untenable.  The  British  in  that  case  would  hold 
the  heights,  and  the  Americans  the  town  commanded  by  the 
heights.  The  problem  immediately  involved  was,  there- 
fore, the  defence  of  Brooklyn  against  an  attack  from  the 
land  side,  in  all  probability  supported  by  a  simultaneous 
1  Writings  (Sparks),  IV,  34. 


32  MILITARY  STUDIES 

attack  on  its  water  front,  and  the  American  rear.  Greene 
had,  accordingly,  sought  to  cover  Brooklyn  by  constructing 
a  line  of  intrenchments  and  redoubts  back  of  the  village 
from  Gowanus  Cove  on  the  south  to  Wallabout  Bay  on  the 
north,  presenting  to  an  enemy  approaching  from  the  south 
and  west  a  front  of  a  little  less  than  a  mile  in  extent,  well 
protected  by  creeks  and  morasses  on  either  flank,  and,  at 
its  centre,  about  one  mile  and  a  quarter  from  the  landing- 
place  of  the  East  River  ferry  across  to  New  York.  From 
these  intrenchments  to  Gravesend,  the  natural  landing- 
place  for  the  British,  was  some  eight  miles,  while  between 
the  two,  about  five  miles  from  Gravesend  and  three  from 
Brooklyn,  rose  a  difficult,  heavily  wooded  ridge,  forming  a 
natural  longitudinal  barrier  practically  passable  at  three 
points :  one  close  to  the  bay,  the  shore  road ;  the  second, 
three  miles  further  inland,  in  front  of  Flatbush,  being  the 
direct  and  ordinary  road  between  Gravesend  and  Brooklyn ; 
and  the  third  the  Jamaica  road,  two  miles  further  still  to 
the  east.  Under  these  circumstances,  assuming  that  they 
were  in  sufficient  force  and  resolved  to  hold  New  York,  the 
course  to  be  pursued  by  the  Americans  was  obvious.  As 
soon  as  the  landing  of  the  British  at  Gravesend  was  known, 
that  is,  on  August  22,  the  largest  force  available  ought  to 
have  been  concentrated  under  cover  of  the  Brooklyn  in- 
trenchments, while  strong  infantry  outposts  should  have 
been  put  at  each  of  the  three  passes,  the  roads  beyond  being 
constantly  watched  by  mounted  patrols.  To  do  this  work 
at  least  15,000  men,  with  adequate  artillery  and  cavalry, 
would  have  been  required,  a  certain  mounted  force  being 
on  such  extended  lines  indispensable  to  safety.  The  force 
actually  there  was  5500  infantry,  mostly  militia,  none  of 
whom  had  ever  been  in  battle,  with  six  pieces  of  light  field 
artillery,  and  no  cavalry  whatever. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND  33 

Under  these  circumstances,  instead  of  concentrating 
themselves  within  the  Brooklyn  intrenchments  when  the 
English,  after  four  days  of  delay,  began  to  advance,  the 
Americans  actually  went  out  in  force  to  meet  them  on  two 
of  the  roads,  leaving  the  third,  that  to  Jamaica,  not  only 
unprotected,  but  not  even  watched.  The  natural  result 
followed.  Taking  advantage  of  their  great  preponderance 
in  numbers,  and  excellent  information  and  guidance,  the 
British,  advancing  by  three  columns,  found,  to  their  great 
surprise,  the  Jamaica  road  unobstructed,  —  "a  route  we 
had  never  dreamed  of,"  as  an  American  officer  engaged 
innocently  wrote,  —  and,  by  means  of  it,  got  in  the  rear  of 
the  detachments  under  Stirling  and  Sullivan,  who  had  been 
either  posted  or  hurried  forward  to  defend  the  two  western, 
and  more  direct,  approaches ;  and  the  practical  destruction 
of  those  detachments  followed.  Both  commanders  were 
captured,  and  more  than  one-third  of  the  entire  force  dis- 
posable for  the  defence  of  Brooklyn  was  destroyed.  The 
American  loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  was  about 
1500,  out  of  a  total  engaged  probably  not  exceeding  3500. 
Contemporaneous  comments  are  sometimes  the  best,  and  it 
would  be  difficult  to  improve  on  those  upon  this  affair 
shortly  after  jotted  down  by  Captain  Stephen  Olney  of  the 
Rhode  Island  regiment  in  Stirling's  command.  They  cover 
the  case.  "  At  the  time,  I  did  not  pretend  to  know  or 
examine  the  generalship  of  posting  Sullivan's  and  Stirling's 
forces  as  they  were,  leaving  the  forts  but  poorly  manned 
with  sick  and  invalids.  It  must  be  on  the  supposition  that 
the  enemy  would  come  on  the  direct  road,  and  if  our  troops 
were  overpowered,  they  might  retreat  and  defend  the  fort. 
But  the  enemy  took  a  circuitous  route,  and  where  it  was 

said  Colonel had  neglected  to  guard,  and  arrived  in 

our  rear  without  notice.     Had  it  been  left  to  the  British 


34  MILITARY  STUDIES 

generals  to  make  a  disposition  of  our  troops,  it  is  a  chance 
if  they  would  have  made  it  more  advantageous  to  them- 
selves, and  but  for  their  tardiness  they  might  have  taken 
our  main  fort.  All  that  seemed  to  prevent  it  was  a  scare- 
crow row  of  palisades  from  the  fort  to  low  water  in  the  cove, 
which  Major  Box  had  ordered  set  up  that  morning."  1 

It  is  not  putting  it  too  strongly  to  say  that  Washington's 
position,  as  well  as  that  of  the  American  cause,  was  then 
desperate.  The  disaster  occurred  under  Washington's  eyes 
early  in  the  day ;  and  before  two  o'clock  the  fighting  had 
wholly  ceased.  With  an  inadequate  and  demoralized  com- 
mand, he  found  himself  isolated  from  the  body  of  his  army, 
such  as  it  was;  and,  while  a  largely  superior  force  flushed 
with  success  was  marshalled  before  him,  a  fairly  over- 
whelming naval  armament  threatened  the  ferry  in  his  rear. 
In  other  words,  he  had  got  himself  and  his  cause  into  a 
wholly  false  position.  Again,  luck  and  "the  dilatoriness 
and  stupidity  of  the  enemy"  saved  him. 

The  course  for  Howe  to  pursue  was  now  manifest.  Six 
good  hours  of  daylight  remained  after  the  commands  of 
Stirling  and  Sullivan  had  been  demolished.  During  those 
hours  he  should  have  followed  up  his  success,  striking  at 
once  and  with  all  his  force  at  Washington  himself.  Such 
was  the  decided  opinion  at  the  moment  of  Howe's  subordi- 
nates, while  the  body  of  the  British  army  was  so  flushed  by 
victory  and  absolutely  confident  of  success  that  it  could 
with  difficulty  be  restrained  from  immediate  assault;  on 
the  other  hand,  so  thoroughly  demoralized  were  the  defeated 
patriots  that  the  general  in  command  of  one  of  the  British 
divisions  subsequently  asserted,  "the  very  camp  women  who 
followed  his  regiment  took  them  prisoners."  American 
historians  have  since  asserted,  on  what  authority  does  not 
1  Battle  of  Long  Inland  (Long  Island  Historical  Society),  518. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND  35 

appear,  that  the  British  commander  was  then  wise  in  not 
pressing  his  advantage,  and  that  Washington  "  courted  a 
storm  in  which  he  was  almost  sure  to  be  victorious";  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  a  general  officer,  in  command  of  a  por- 
tion of  the  Brooklyn  lines,  described  them  at  the  time  as 
" unfinished  in  several  places"  and  "so  low  that  the  rising 
ground  immediately  without  it  would  have  put  it  in  the 
power  of  a  man  at  40  yards  Distance  to  fire  under  my 
Horse's  belly  whenever  he  pleased."  To  the  same  effect 
another  officer  then  present  afterwards  wrote,  describing  the 
line  in  front  of  where  he  was  posted  as  "low  and  unfavorable 
for  defence,"  and  "commanded  by  the  ground  occupied  by 
the  enemy,  who  entirely  enclosed  the  whole  of  our  posi- 
tion, at  the  distance  of  but  a  few  hundred  paces";  and,  he 
added,  "as  to  General  Howe,  I  have  scarcely  a  doubt  that 
he  might  have  carried  the  intrenchments  at  Brooklyn." 
And  such  works  as  these  it  has  since  been  confidently  as- 
serted could  have  been  victoriously  defended  by  militia, 
to  use  Washington's  official  language,  "timid  and  ready  to 
fly  from  their  own  shadows." 

At  Bunker  Hill,  Howe  had  been  overconfident ;  at  Brook- 
lyn he  was  too  cautious.  The  inference  is  natural  that 
August  27,  1776,  he  remembered  June  17,  1775;  and,  a 
burnt  child,  he  feared  the  fire.  In  any  event,  after  lying  for 
hours  with  his  advance  within  gunshot  of  Washington's 
lines,  which  his  scouts  approached  so  closely  as  to  report 
that  they  could  be  carried  almost  instantly  by  assault,  and 
which  his  subordinates  begged  leave  to  be  allowed  to  attack 
and  fairly  "stormed  with  rage  when  ordered  to  retire,"  — 
after  lying  here  for  hours  during  a  summer  noon,  he  declared 
that  enough  had  been  done  for  one  day,  and,  drawing  back, 
went  into  camp.  In  his  official  report  of  these  operations 
he  stated  that  in  his  judgment  the  works  could  have  been 


36  MILITARY  STUDIES 

stormed,  and  that  his  soldiers  were  so  eager  for  the  assault 
"that  it  required  repeated  orders  to  prevail  on  them  to 
desist";  but  as  it  was  apparent  the  opposing  lines  could  be 
carried  with  slight  loss  by  regular  approaches,  he  commanded 
a  halt. 

So  far  "the  dilatoriness  of  the  enemy"  had  saved  Wash- 
ington from  total  disaster.  The  element  of  luck  next  made 
itself  felt  in  his  favor.  The  British  fleet  was  lying  inside 
of  Sandy  Hook.  It  was  impossible  for  a  moment  to  suppose 
that  the  numerous  ships  of  the  line  and  frigates  there  idly 
anchored  were  not  to  cooperate  with  the  army  in  the  long- 
planned  and  carefully  prepared  operations.  They  might 
engage  the  batteries  on  the  North  River,  and  cover  a  land- 
ing there,  taking  the  enemy  in  the  rear ;  or,  most  fatal  move 
of  all,  they  might  run  the  batteries  on  the  East  River,  and, 
destroying  all  means  of  transportation  from  its  Brooklyn 
rear  to  the  New  York  side,  cut  the  American  army  hopelessly 
in  two.  It  was  now  the  close  of  August,  and  in  the  region 
of  New  York  the  prevailing  wind  at  that  season  is  from  the 
southwest.  Such  a  wind  may,  indeed,  almost  be  counted 
upon ;  and  unquestionably  was  counted  upon  by  the  British 
commanders  in  planning  their  operations.  A  wind  from 
the  southwest  and  a  favoring  tide  would  have  carried  the 
British  ships  swiftly  up  the  East  River,  under  full  sail. 
Chance  ordered  otherwise.  While  General  Howe  was  de- 
stroying the  commands  of  Stirling  and  Sullivan,  and  threat- 
ening Washington's  entrenchments,  a  strong  northeast  wind 
was  blowing,  against  which,  and  the  tide,  five  ships  of 
the  line,  under  command  of  Sir  Peter  Parker,  in  vain  en- 
deavored to  work  into  the  positions  assigned  them  in  the  pro- 
gramme. One  ship  of  smaller  size  alone  succeeded  in  work- 
ing up  sufficiently  far  to  open  with  its  guns  on  the  wholly 
inadequate  battery  the  Americans  had  established  at  Red 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND  37 

Hook,  on  the  western  extremity  of  their  Brooklyn  lines; 
and  the  fire  of  even  this  single  ship  sufficed  sadly  to  injure 
the  breastworks,  and  dismount  some  of  the  guns.  If  this 
was  so,  the  effect  of  the  broadsides  of  the  fleet  may  be  sur- 
mised. That  exceptional  northeast  wind  in  August  was  for 
Washington  a  stroke  of  luck  of  the  description  sometimes 
classified  as  " providential." 

The  American  historians  next  lay  much  stress  on  the 
sufferings  of  the  patriot  army  due  to  the  inclemency  of  an 
August  storm,  —  the  wet  and  cold  to  which  the  men  were 
subjected,  and  the  privations  to  which  they  were  compelled 
to  submit.  Active  campaigning  is  at  no  season  a  holiday 
business;  and,  to  those  at  all  familiar  with  its  details, 
alternately  monotonous  and  terrible,  it  cannot  but  be  open 
to  question  whether  a  cold  midsummer  storm,  accompanied 
with  mist,  or  even  rain,  could  well  in  the  latitude  of  New 
York  afford  a  sufficient  excuse  for  military  inactivity,  much 
less  for  demoralization.  But  whether  it  could  or  no,  that 
cold,  August,  northeasterly  storm  and  mist,  if  it  did  wet 
and  chill  the  patriot  army,  also  shrouded  it  and  saved  it. 
It  prevented  Admiral  Lord  Howe  from  getting  between 
Brooklyn  and  New  York ;  and  it  seems  to  have  kept  General 
Howe  snug  in  his  temporary  quarters. 

The  most  reliable  regiments  of  the  patriot  army  had  been 
destroyed  on  the  27th  in  the  commands  of  Sullivan  and 
Stirling.  Thus  during  the  afternoon  of  the  27th  and  the 
morning  of  the  28th  the  position  of  the  patriots  was  even  more 
dangerous  than  it  was  forlorn.  Militia  —  wet,  cold,  hungry, 
and  demoralized  by  a  spectacle  of  defeat  —  are  not  to  be 
depended  on  at  any  hour  of  the  day ;  least  of  all  in  a  four- 
o'clock-in-the-morning  assault:  and  had  Howe  ordered 
Clinton  or  Cornwallis  to  carry  the  works  before  them  by  a 
vigorous   assault   at  daybreak   of   the   28th;   there   is,    our 


38  MILITARY  STUDIES 

patriotic  historians  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding,  hardly 
room  for  reasonable  doubt  that  the  course  of  American 
history  would  have  been  other  than  it  has  been.  It  was 
again  the  "dilatoriness  of  the  enemy,"  and  not  this  time  the 
intervention  of  Providence,  which  saved  the  cause  of  inde- 
pendence. 

Washington  realized  fully  the  nature  of  the  situation. 
With  between  seven  and  eight  thousand  undisciplined  men, 
beaten  and  demoralized  at  that,  he  was  cooped  up  with  an 
uncovered  rear.  Immediate  retreat  was  impossible,  and  a 
successful  resistance  hardly  to  be  hoped ;  so,  like  a  good  and 
vigilant  commander,  he  was  in  the  saddle  before  break 
of  day  of  the  28th,  going  the  rounds  of  the  works  and  seek- 
ing to  encourage  his  followers.  The  morning  broke,  lower- 
ing and  dreary,  only  to  reveal  to  the  patriots  the  great 
superiority  of  the  force  opposed  to  them.  It  was  a  case  of 
four  to  one.  Fortunately  the  enemy  did  not  move.  As 
the  day  advanced  they  did,  indeed,  open  with  their  artillery, 
and  the  usual  irregular  fire  of  sharp-shooters  went  on  be- 
tween the  lines;  but  presently  a  drenching  rain  set  in,  by 
which  the  historians  tell  us  the  combatants  were  "  driven 
into  their  tents,"  where  they  kept  themselves  until  the  latter 
hours  of  the  day.  There  is  almost  a  touch  of  humor  at  this 
point  in  the  narrative,  and  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  it  is 
one  of  actual  warfare.  Yet  the  career  of  Washington  and 
the  cause  of  American  independence  actually  hung  in  the 
balance,  with  an  August  rain  the  controlling  factor!  But, 
when  it  came  to  "dilatoriness,"  Sir  William  Howe  always 
proved  himself  equal  to  any  occasion. 

Presently,  while  it  was  still  early  in  the  day,  the  Brooklyn 
situation  was  in  a  way  and  to  a  certain  extent  improved  by 
the  arrival  of  reinforcements  under  General  Mifflin.  This 
addition  to  the  force  consisted  of  three  regiments  considered 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND  39 

as  good  as  any  in  the  army,  though  so  reduced  by  sick- 
ness and  other  causes  that  they  numbered  all  together  but 
1300  men.  One  of  those  regiments,  however,  was  Glover's 
of  Marblehead,  mostly  sailors  and  fishermen.  Their  coming 
was  at  least  opportune  ;  for,  with  a  wide  and  swift-flowing 
channel  between  him  and  his  only  possible  line  of  retreat, 
Washington,  as  the  result  showed,  then  stood  in  quite  as 
great  need  of  men  who  could  trim  a  sail  and  pull  an  oar  as 
of  those  who  could  handle  musket  or  shovel.  Mifflin's 
command  was  marched  at  once  into  the  weakly  defended 
intrenchments  on  the  left  of  the  line,  opposite  Clinton. 

Now  one  of  the  most  extraordinary  incidents  of  this 
singularly  conducted  campaign  is  said  to  have  occurred.  It 
sounds  so  like  a  travesty  of  war  that  it  has  to  be  told  in  the 
words  of  the  apparently  unconscious  historian.  A  dense 
fog  was  hanging  over  the  bay  and  island.  A  group  of 
officers,  among  whom  were  Mifflin  and  Reed,  Washington's 
adjutant-general,  rode  out  to  take  a  look  about.  As  they 
were  on  the  high  ground  at  the  western  extremity  of  the 
lines  facing  towards  Staten  Island,  a  light  breeze  lifted  the 
fog,  disclosing  to  them  the  British  ships  of  war.  The  his- 
torian then  goes  on:  "Some  movement  was  apparently 
in  agitation.  The  idea  occurred  to  the  reconnoitring  party 
that  the  fleet  was  preparing,  should  the  wind  hold  and  the 
fog  clear  away,  to  come  up  the  bay  at  the  turn  of  the  tide, 
silence  the  feeble  batteries  at  Red  Hook  and  the  city,  and 
anchor  in  the  East  River.  In  that  case,  the  army  on  Long 
Island  would  be  completely  surrounded  and  entrapped.  .  .  . 
Other  ships  had  passed  round  Long  Island,  and  were  at 
Flushing  Bay  on  the  Sound.  Those  might  land  troops  on 
the  east  side  of  Harlem  River  and  make  themselves  masters 
of  King's  Bridge;  that  key  to  Manhattan  Island."  These 
facts,  as  military  considerations,  might,  it  would  seem,  for 


40  MILITARY  STUDIES 

several  days,  if  not  weeks,  have  been  obvious ;  but,  according 
to  the  American  historians,  they  would  appear  to  have  now 
for  the  first  time  dawned  on  the  minds  of  the  reconnoitring 
officers,  for,  "alarmed  at  this  perilous  probability,  they 
spurred  back  to  headquarters,  to  urge  the  immediate  with- 
drawal of  the  army  (and)  as  this  might  not  be  acceptable 
advice,  Reed,  emboldened  by  his  intimacy  with  the  com- 
mander-in-chief, undertook  to  give  it."  It  is  curious  to 
consider  what  the  writer  meant  by  the  words  "this  might 
not  be  acceptable  advice." 

And  it  is  of  such  material  that  what  is  called  history  is 
fabricated  !  This  story  passed  into  all  the  earlier  accounts 
of  the  operations  on  Long  Island,  and,  though  now  rejected 
by  better  authorities,1  is  still  the  popular  legend.  The  inci- 
dent is  said  to  have  occurred  on  the  morning  of  the  29th; 
the  disaster  in  front  of  Flatbush  had  occurred  on  the  27th ; 
and  it  is  safe  to  say  that  not  for  one  moment  during  the  slow 
intervening  hours  had  the  direction  of  the  wind  and  the 
movements  of  the  British  fleet  been  absent  from  the  mind 
not  only  of  Washington,  but  of  every  intelligent  officer  or 
man  within  the  Brooklyn  lines.  Their  fate  hung  in  the 
balance.  The  reconnoitring  party  may  have  ridden  down 
to  Red  Hook  in  the  way  described  —  probably  did  ride 
down  there ;  but  what  those  composing  it  there  saw  could 
have  suggested  nothing  new  either  to  themselves  or  to  Wash- 
ington. It  could  only  have  emphasized  the  peril  of  the 
situation,  and  the  necessity  of  immediately  extricating  them- 
selves from  it  —  if  they  could  ! 

Up  to  this  point  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  military  opera- 
tions could  have  been  carried  on  less  skilfully  on  the  side  of 
the  Americans.     Neither  the  plan  of  defence,  nor  the  execu- 

1  Bancroft.  Note  to  Chapter  V  of  Epoch  Fourth,  containing  account 
of  the  retreat  from  Long  Island. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND  41 

tion  of  that  plan,  presents  points  for  commendation ;  and 
for  all  that  had  been  done,  the  record  seems  to  show  that 
Washington  was  responsible.  In  scope  and  detail,  it  was 
his  plan;  and  he  had  personally  superintended  the  opera- 
tions involved  in  it.  The  resulting  situation  was  to  the  last 
degree  perilous.  But  it  is  just  situations  of  this  sort  which 
bring  out  great  qualities;  and  those  of  Washington  were 
now  revealed.  He  showed  the  mens  cequa  in  arduis! 
Calm  in  outward  aspect  and  with  cool  prescient  mind,  he 
looked  the  situation  in  the  face,  recognized  the  mistake  he 
had  made,  and  prepared  to  extricate  himself  from  the  conse- 
quences of  it,  if,  indeed,  extrication  was  yet  possible.  The 
chances  were  immensely  against  him.  The  withdrawal  of 
the  patriot  army  from  Brooklyn,  across  the  East  River  to 
New  York,  now  accomplished,  has  commonly  been  referred 
to,  especially  by  the  "standard"  American  authorities 
as  a  feat  displaying  remarkable  military  capacity  on  the 
part  of  Washington.  Fiske,  for  instance,  becomes  enthu- 
siastic over  it  as  a  " brilliant  incident,"  displaying  " extraor- 
dinary skill." 1  On  this  point  something  will  presently 
be  said.  Meanwhile,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  American 
historical  writers  have  availed  themselves  to  the  utmost  of 
the  opportunity  thus  afforded.  As  Trevelyan  truly  ob- 
serves, "it  may  be  doubted  whether  any  great  national 
deliverance,  since  the  passage  of  the  Red  Sea,  has  ever  been 
more  loudly  acclaimed,  or  more  adequately  celebrated." 
For  instance,  one,  a  man  himself  not  without  military 
experience,  thus  dilates  upon  it:  -"The  retreat  from  Brook- 
lyn was  a  signal  achievement,  characteristic  of  Washington's 
policy  and  of  the  men  who  withdrew  under  his  guidance 
.  .  .  their  Commander-in-Chief  had  his  own  plan,  as  be- 
fore Boston,  which  he  did  not  reveal  to  his  officers  until  it 
1  American  Revolution,  I,  211,  212. 


42  MILITARY  STUDIES 

was  ripe  for  execution."  Early  on  the  morning  of  August 
29,  orders  were  issued  to  General  Heath,  quartermaster- 
general,  instructing  him  "'to  impress  every  craft,  on  either 
side  of  New  York,  that  could  be  kept  afloat,  and  had  either 
oars,  or  sails,  or  could  be  furnished  with  them,  and  to  have 
them  all  in  the  East  River  by  dark.'  The  response  to  these 
orders  was  so  promptly  made  that  the  boats  reached  the 
foot  of  Brooklyn  Heights  just  at  dusk  that  afternoon."  x 

It  is  almost  needless  to  say  that,  from  any  exact  military 
point  of  view,  this  statement  is  both  inaccurate  and  mis- 
leading. Yet  Trevelyan  repeats  it  and  Fiske  dilates  upon  it. 
Washington  was  not,  however,  the  utter  military  simpleton 
such  ill-considered  admiration  would  indicate.  He  had  not 
put  himself  and  his  army  into  a  most  dangerous  position 
depending  wholly,  or  in  chief,  on  some  suddenly  improvised 
means  of  extrication.  The  order  to  Heath  was,  it  is  true, 
issued,  and  a  certain  amount  of  transportation,  undoubtedly 
collected  in  obedience  to  it,  was  concentrated  at  the  ferry; 
but  the  bulk  of  the  means  of  transfer  required  was  already 
at  the  point  where  it  was  needed.  For  weeks  Washington 
had  been  moving  troops,  munitions,  and  supplies  across  the 
river,  —  1300  men,  for  instance,  on  the  day  previous  to 
the  withdrawal,  that  following  the  disastrous  Flatbush 
affair.  The  transportation  thus  hurriedly  gathered  together 
was,  therefore,  merely  supplementary.  The  mass  of  what 
was  required  had  already  long  before  been  provided. 

Our  narrative  then  proceeds  as  follows :  — 

From  about  nine  o'clock  until  nearly  midnight,  through  wind 
and  rain,  —  company  by  company,  —  sometimes  grasping  hands 
to  keep  companionship  in  the  dense  gloom,  —  speechless  and 
silent,  so  that  no  sound  should  alarm  the  enemy,  —  feeling  their 
way  down  the  steep  steps  then  leading  to  Fulton  ferry,  and  feeling 

1  Carrington,  Washington  the  Soldier,  110. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND  43 

their  way  as  they  were  passed  into  the  waiting  water-craft,  these 
drenched  and  weary  men  took  passage  for  New  York.  The  wind 
and  tide  were  so  violent  that  even  the  seamen  soldiers  of  Massa- 
chusetts could  not  spread  a  close  reefed  sail  upon  a  single  vessel ; 
and  the  larger  vessels,  upon  which  so  much  depended,  would  have 
been  swept  to  the  ocean  if  once  intrusted  to  the  current.  For 
three  hours  all  the  boats  that  could  be  thus  propelled  had  to 
depend  upon  muffled  oars.  The  difficulties  of  such  a  trip,  on  such 
a  night,  can  be  realized  better  by  a  moment's  reflection.  There  is 
no  record  of  the  size  of  the  waves,  or  of  narrow  escapes  from  upset, 
no  intimation  that  there  was  competition  in  entering  the  boats  and 
rivalry  in  choice  of  place  —  that  each  boat-load  was  landed  hastily 
and  that  the  boats  themselves  were  leaky  and  unsafe;  but  any 
person  who  proposes  to  himself  an  imaginary  transit  over  the  East 
River  under  their  circumstances,  can  supply  the  data  he  may  need 
to  appreciate  the  process.1 

Re-writing  this  account  for  another  edition  of  his  work, 
many  years  later,  the  same  authority  modified  it  in  this 
wise :  — 

As  early  as  nine  o'clock,  and  within  an  hour  after  the  "  general 
beat  to  arms,"  the  movement  began,  —  systematically,  steadily, 
company  by  company,  as  orderly  as  if  marching  in  their  own  camp. 
A  fearful  storm  still  raged.  Drenched  and  weary,  none  com- 
plained. It  was  Washington's  orders.  Often  hand-in-hand,  to 
support  each  other,  these  men  descended  the  steep,  slippery  slopes 
to  the  water's  edge,  and  seated  themselves  in  silence;  while 
increasing  wind  and  rain,  with  incessant  violence,  constantly 
threatened  to  flood,  or  sink,  the  miserable  flat-boats  which  were 
to  convey  them  to  the  city,  only  a  few  hundred  yards  away.  And 
thus  until  midnight.  At  that  hour  the  wind  and  tide  became  so 
violent  that  no  vessel  could  carry  even  a  closely  reefed  sail.  The 
larger  vessels,  in  danger  of  being  swept  out  to  sea,  had  to  be  held 
fast  to  shore ;  dashing  against  each  other,  and  with  difficulty  kept 
afloat.  Other  boats,  with  muffled  oars,  were  desperately  but 
slowly  propelled  against  the  outgoing  tide.     A  few  sickly  lanterns 

1  Carrington,  Battles  of  the  American  Revolution  (3d  ed.),  217. 


44  MILITARY  STUDIES 

here  and  there  made  movement  possible.  The  invisible  presence 
of  the  Commander-in-Chief  seemed  to  resolve  all  dangers  and 
apparent  confusion  into  some  pervasive  harmony  of  purpose 
among  officers  and  men  alike,  so  that  neither  leaking  boats  nor 
driving  storm  availed  to  disconcert  the  silent  progress  of  embark- 
ing nearly  ten  thousand  men. 

Just  after  midnight,  both  wind  and  tide  changed.  The  storm 
from  the  north  which  had  raged  thus  long,  kept  the  British  fleets 
at  their  anchorage  in  the  lower  bay.  At  last,  with  the  clearing 
of  the  sky  and  change  of  wind,  the  water  became  smooth,  and  the 
craft  of  all  kinds  and  sizes,  loaded  to  the  water's  edge,  made  rapid 
progress.  Meanwhile  strange  to  relate,  a  heavy  fog  rested  over 
the  lower  bay  and  island,  while  the  peninsula  of  New  York  was 
under  clear  starlight.1 

No  authorities  are  referred  to  for  the  somewhat  highly 
wrought  statements  here  so  precisely  and  positively  made. 

The  real  weather  conditions  prevailing  on  the  night  in 
question  are  in  vain  sought  for.  The  author  whose  work 
has  been  quoted  says  that  the  American  and  British  archives 
and  biography  are  full  of  contemporaneous  data  which  it 
would  require  volumes  to  quote.  A  fairly  careful  search, 
on  the  contrary,  discloses  no  detailed  and  reliable  meteoro- 
logical statement  of  the  conditions  hour  by  hour  prevailing 
during  the  three  days  of  the  Brooklyn  operations,  and, 
more  especially,  during  the  night  referred  to  in  the  foregoing 
extract. 

The  elementary  and  fundamental  facts  in  the  case  are 
simple  enough.  Trevelyan  says  that  on  the  morning  of  the 
27th,  the  day  of  Howe's  advance  and  the  battle  before 
Brooklyn,  "the  sun  rose  with  a  red  and  angry  glare."  A 
summer  storm  was  brewing;  and  the  wind,  veering  to  the 
north  from  the  east,  must  have  been  strong,  for  Lord  Howe 
reports  that  "the  ships  could  not  be  worked  up  to  the  dis- 

Washington  the  Soldier  (ed.  1898),  111. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND  45 

tance  proposed."  Though  the  historians  are  silent  on  the 
point,  it  was,  as  already  suggested,  probably  a  knowledge 
of  this  fact  and  the  consequent  failure  of  the  proposed  naval 
cooperation,  which  caused  General  Howe  to  desist  from 
following  up  his  early  success.  Never  to  follow  up  a  success 
on  the  field  energetically  was  characteristic  with  him,  —  he 
failed  so  to  do  at  Bunker  Hill,  on  Manhattan  Island  and  in 
New  Jersey,  and  again  at  Brandywine  and  during  the  Valley 
Forge  winter;  but  on  Long  Island  he  could  hardly  have 
helped  so  doing  had  he  heard  his  brother's  guns  in  the  East 
River.  He  must  then  have  gone  forward,  and  finished  up 
the  job.  All  that  day  (27th)  the  storm  seems  to  have  been 
gathering.  The  next  day  we  know  it  blew  and  rained ;  but 
while  the  rain  apparently  halted  the  work  in  the  trenches 
and  kept  the  soldiers  in  their  huts,  the  sea  was  not  so  rough 
as  to  interfere  with  the  operations  of  the  ferry,  or  prevent  the 
transfer  of  one  whole  brigade  of  Washington's  army  from 
the  New  York  side  to  the  Brooklyn  lines.  The  bringing  it 
over  was  an  inexplicable  mistake;  they  were  simply  so 
many  more  to  get  back  again,  or  to  be  made  prisoners  when 
the  wind  worked  into  the  west  —  to-morrow,  perhaps ; 
certainly  within  a  few  days.  The  atmospheric  conditions 
this  day  (28th)  seem  to  have  culminated ;  for  in  the  afternoon 
"a  great  rain  and  hail  storm  came  on,  attended  with  thunder 
and  lightning."  By  the  morning  of  the  29th  the  quite 
abnormal  conditions  had  worn  themselves  out;  "a  dense 
fog  covered  land  and  sea,"  consequently  there  could  have 
been  no  heavy  rain  nor  driving  wind.  This  seems  to  have 
continued  pretty  much  all  that  day,  necessarily  holding 
Lord  Howe's  ships  at  their  anchorage.  Cooperation  by 
land  and  sea  was  not  yet  possible ;  so  General  Howe  waited. 
The  succeeding  night  Washington  got  away. 

During  that  night  what  weather   conditions   prevailed? 


46  MILITARY  STUDIES 

On  this  interesting  topic  the  historians  are  curiously  at  odds 
among  themselves.  On  no  single  point  do  they  seem  to 
agree;  not  even  on  the  one  astronomically  ascertainable 
point,  —  the  age  of  the  moon,  and  the  consequent  luminous 
character  of  the  atmosphere.  One  writer,  already  cited, 
says  it  was  so  pitchy  dark  that  the  men  had  to  feel  their 
way  down  to  the  ferry  and  into  the  boats ;  another  says  that 
" during  the  night  the  moon  shone  brightly."  But  a  third 
comes  with  the  assertion  that,  though  it  was  the  night  of  the 
full  moon,  these  moonlit  hours  were  marked  by  "a  heavy 
rain  and  continued  adverse  wind."  According  to  a  fourth 
authority,  " there  was  a  strong  wind  from  the  northeast," 
but  a  " dense  fog  prevailed";  a  most  improbable  meteoro- 
logical combination,  considering  that  "the  atmosphere  was 
clear  on  the  New  York  side  of  the  river."  We  are  then 
informed  that  the  strong  "adverse  wind"  most  opportunely 
died  away  and  a  "favoring  breeze,"  from  the  opposite 
direction  "sprang  up."  Not  without  reason  is  it  declared 
that  these  somewhat  surprising  and  altogether  conflicting 
conditions  "seemed  almost  providential."  If  they  ever 
actually  occurred,  as  is  altogether  improbable,  they  were 
distinctly  and  indisputably  providential.  Nothing  at  all 
resembling  them  is  to  be  found  in  the  prosaic  records  of  the 
modern  weather  bureau ;  the  single  authenticated  precedent 
is  biblical. 

Putting  aside  this  fantastic  combination  —  Egyptian 
darkness  in  a  night  of  the  full  moon,  a  dense  fog  prevailing 
in  the  face  of  a  driving  tempest,  a  drenching  rain  on  one  side 
of  a  narrow  river  with  a  starlit  sky  on  the  other,  a  favoring 
breeze  following  immediately  on  the  dying  away  of  an  ad- 
verse wind  —  putting  all  this  aside,  is  it  possible  to  ascer- 
tain the  real  state  of  the  weather  during  the  night  of  August 
29-30,  1777?     One  fact  is  scientifically  demonstrable.     It 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND  47 

was  the  night  of  the  full  moon.1  The  two  days'  storm  — 
an  August  northeaster  —  had  culminated  with  thunder, 
lightning,  and  hail  on  the  28th.  The  conditions  then  appar- 
ently prevailed  which  ordinarily  attend  the  dying  out  of  a 
late  summer  storm,  and  which  precede  a  change  to  season- 
able weather.  The  day  of  the  29th  was  foggy  and  chill, 
with  a  light  draft  of  air  from  the  north  and  east.  The 
cooperative  movement  on  the  part  of  Admiral  Lord  Howe 
was  still  delayed,  inasmuch  as  ships  leaving  their  anchorage 
drifted,  not  having  a  sufficiency  of  wind  to  enable  them  to 
stem  the  tide ;  at  times  the  mist  lifted,  and  at  times  thick- 
ened. Later  the  night  was  still,  the  water  quiet,  the  atmos- 
phere luminous ;  a  fog  settled  on  the  bay  towards  morning ; 
every  atmospheric  condition  aided  the  patriots,  and,  at  the 
proper  stage  of  the  tide,  the  boats  passed  to  and  fro,  favored 
by  a  light  west  breeze,  and  loaded  to  the  gunwale.  Not  a 
single  case  of  swamping  or  collision  was  recorded,  or  is 
known  to  have  occurred.  Not  a  boat  upset;  not  a  life  was 
lost.  These  facts  are  under  the  conditions  given  conclusive 
as  to  the  absence  of  wind,  the  quietude  of  the  water,  and  the 
luminous  character  of  the  atmosphere. 

That  Washington,  throughout  these  trying  days,  bore 
himself  courageously  and  with  great  outward  calmness  in 
presence  of  imminent  danger  does  not  admit  of  question. 
On  the  other  hand,  divested  of  all  gush,  patriotism,  hero 
worship  and  rhetoric  generally,  the  cold  historical  truth 
would  seem  to  be  that,  aided  by  a  most  happy  fortuitous 

1  This  point  was,  at  the  request  of  the  writer  of  the  present  paper,  re- 
ferred for  settlement  to  Professor  Pickering  of  the  Harvard  University- 
Observatory.  Under  date  of  December  5,  1910,  Professor  Pickering 
replied :  — 

"The  full  moon  occurred  on  August  28,  1776,  at  19 h.  59  m.  As  this  is 
Greenwich  astronomical  time,  the  corresponding  civil  date  at  Greenwich 
was  7  h.  59  m.  of  the  morning  of  August  29.  At  Boston  the  local  civil  time 
would  have  been  about  4  h.  44  m.  earlier.'* 


48  MILITARY  STUDIES 

concurrence  of  circumstances  and  the  extreme  supineness 
of  his  opponents,  he  on  this  occasion,  keeping  his  head 
under  wearing  conditions  and  taking  advantage  of  all  the 
resources  at  his  command,  extricated  himself  and  his  army, 
at  a  most  critical  juncture,  from  an  inherently  false  position 
into  which  neither  he  nor  they  ever  should  have  either  put 
themselves,  or  allowed  themselves  to  be  put.  As  respects 
skill,  discipline,  or  careful  organization  of  movement,  if  they 
were  markedly  in  evidence,  the  fact  nowhere  appears  in  the 
record.  That  the  British  commanders,  both  military  and 
naval,  made  the  transfer  possible,  and  facilitated  it  in  every 
conceivable  way,  is  indisputable.  They  evinced  neither 
enterprise  nor  alertness.  No  patrol  boats  lurked  in  the  fog 
which  overhung  the  harbor,  veiling  their  whereabouts  from 
the  land  batteries;  the  opposing  lines  were  not  pried  into 
by  inquisitive  or  adventurous  pickets.  Even  a  negro, 
despatched  by  a  female  Tory  sympathizer,  one  Mrs.  Rapalye, 
to  warn  the  British  of  the  withdrawal  in  progress,  fell  into 
the  hands  of  a  Hessian  picket,  who,  unable  to  make  anything 
out  of  what  he  said  to  them,  retained  him  till  morning.1  On 
the  other  hand,  that  the  "speechless  and  silent"  embarka- 
tion which  nothing  availed  to  disconcert  was  in  fact 
marked  by  much  confusion  is  established  on  the  best 
possible  authority  —  that  of  Washington  himself.  It  is 
even  stated  that  the  lack  of  discipline  was  such  that  men 
absolutely  tried  to  climb  over  each  other's  shoulders,  the 
sooner  to  reach  the  boats.  In  the  matter  of  transfer  the 
boats  themselves,  meanwhile,  were  handled  by  perhaps  as 
skilful  a  lot  of  men  as  could  anywhere  have  been  found,  — 
Glover's  regiment  of  Marblehead  fishermen. 

This  paper  relates  merely  to  the  1776  operations  on  Long 
Island,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  follow  the  American  army 
1  Irving,  Washington,  II,  390. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND  49 

through  its  subsequent  unfortunate  experiences  on  the 
adjacent  mainland.  From  a  purely  military  point  of  view 
the  further  occupation  of  New  York  was,  after  the  British 
got  possession  of  Brooklyn  Heights,  not  only  useless,  but  it 
involved  risk  of  serious  disaster.  With  an  enemy  in  undis- 
puted control  of  the  surrounding  waters,  the  situation  was 
one  from  which  it  was  impossible  to  escape  too  soon.  Greene 
saw  clearly  the  uselessness  as  well  as  danger  of  the  strategic 
situation,  and  volunteered  his  advice  to  Washington,  point- 
ing out  that  "the  only  eligible  plan  to  oppose  the  enemy 
successfully,  and  secure  ourselves  from  disgrace  was  to 
evacuate  Manhattan  Island  at  once  " ;  adding  that,  if  the 
Americans  continued  to  hold  it,  "we  must  hold  it  at  great 
disadvantage."  This  was  on  the  5th  of  September,  and  the 
views  thus  set  forth  were  shared  by  others  who  also  gave  to 
them  official  expression.1  Among  these  was  John  Jay,  then 
active  and  influential  as  a  member  of  the  New  York  Con- 
vention, the  provisional  body  which  had  locally  assumed 
direction  of  affairs.  Though  essentially  a  civilian,  Jay  now 
evinced  the  possession  of  true  military  instinct.  He  took  in 
the  situation.  The  policy  he  outlined  and  advocated,  if 
severe  and  cruel,  was  at  least  efficacious;  and  it  was  the 
exact  policy  followed  by  Fabius  two  thousand  years  before, 
as  by  Wellington  thirty-five  years  later.  Of  the  former  it  is 
unnecessary  to  speak,  his  method  of  warfare  has  passed  into 
a  proverb;  but  Wellington's  example  is  very  apposite. 
When,  in  October,  1810,  he  found  himself  confronted  by 
Messena  at  the  head  of  an  overwhelmingly  superior  army, 
he  coldly  proceeded  to  devastate  all  the  region  the  defence  of 
which  he  abandoned,  and  withdrew  within  the  famous  lines 
of  Torres  Vedras.  This  very  policy  then  ruthlessly  adopted 
and  successfully  pursued  in  Portugal,  Jay  now  clearly  and 
1  General  Scott  to  John  Jay.     Jay's  Works,  I,  p.  32. 


50  MILITARY  STUDIES 

forcibly  outlined  for  adoption  in  New  York.  Writing  to 
Edward  Rutledge,  of  the  Board  of  War,  and  Gouverneur 
Morris,  chairman  of  a  special  committee,  he  said :  — 

I  wish  our  army  well  stationed  in  the  Highlands,  and  all  the 
lower  country  desolated;  we  might  then  bid  defiance  to  all  the 
further  efforts  of  the  enemy  in  that  quarter.  Had  I  been  vested 
with  absolute  power  in  this  State,  I  have  often  said,  and  still  think, 
that  I  would  last  spring  have  desolated  all  Long  Island,  Staten 
Island,  the  city  and  county  of  New  York,  and  all  that  part  of  the 
county  of  Westchester  which  lies  below  the  mountains.  I  would 
then  have  stationed  the  main  body  of  the  army  in  the  mountains 
on  the  east,  and  eight  or  ten  thousand  men  in  the  Highlands  on 
the  west  side  of  the  river.  I  would  have  directed  the  river  at  Fort 
Montgomery,  which  is  nearly  at  the  southern  extremity  of  the 
mountains,  to  be  so  shallowed  as  to  afford  only  depth  sufficient 
for  an  Albany  sloop,  and  all  the  Southern  passes  and  defiles  in  the 
mountains  to  be  strongly  fortified.  .  .  .  According  to  this  plan 
of  defence  the  State  would  be  absolutely  impregnable  against  all 
the  world,  on  the  seaside,  and  would  have  nothing  to  fear  except 
from  the  way  of  the  lake.  Should  the  enemy  gain  the  river, 
even  below  the  mountains,  I  think  I  foresee  that  a  retreat  would 
become  necessary,  and  I  can't  forbear  wishing  that  a  desire  of 
saving  a  few  acres  may  not  lead  us  into  difficulties. 

Such  a  policy  as  that  here  outlined  would  have  been  truly 
Fabian;  that  actually  adopted  was  such  only  in  name.  As 
Charles  Lee  at  the  time  impetuously  and  despairingly  wrote 
Washington:  "For  my  part,  I  would  have  nothing  to  do 
with  the  islands  to  which  you  have  been  clinging  so  perti- 
naciously.    I  would  give  Mr.  Howe  a  fee-simple  of  them." 

"Mr.  Howe's"  successor  in  command,  Sir  Henry  Clinton, 
subsequently  held  those  islands  in  strategic  "fee  simple" 
from  after  Monmouth  (June,  1778)  until,  three  years  later, 
Washington  broke  camp  at  Tarry  town  (August,  1781)  to 
march  his  now  solidified  army  to  Yorktown.  During  those 
three  years  his  tactics  had  been  exactly  those  outlined  and 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND  51 

counselled  by  Jay  in  1776,  and  which  at  that  time  Wash- 
ington did  not  adopt. 

Returning  to  September,  1776,  it  was  on  the  5th  of  that 
month  that  Greene  from  his  bed  of  sickness  wrote  to  Wash- 
ington urging  him  to  adopt  a  policy  similar  to  that  suggested 
to  Rutledge  by  Jay.  Three  days  later  Washington,  acting 
on  the  divided  opinion  of  a  Council  of  War,  adopted  that 
most  dangerous  thing  in  military  operations,  a  middle  course 
"between  abandoning  [Manhattan  Island]  totally  and  con- 
centrating our  whole  strength  for  its  defence."  His  letters 
to  Congress  reveal  a  painful  state  of  indecision.1  Alive  to 
the  difficulties  of  his  situation  and  conscious  of  his  want  of 
experience  in  military  operations  on  a  large  scale  and  of  his 
limited  theoretical  knowledge,  there  was,  as  he  subsequently 
admitted,  at  this  time  "warfare  in  my  mind  and  hesitation." 
That  this  was  apparent  to  those  around  him  is  shown  by 
the  impatient  exclamation  of  Reed  in  his  letter  to  Lee 
written  two  months  later:  "Oh!  General,  an  indecisive 
mind  is  one  of  the  greatest  misfortunes  that  can  befall  an 
army;  how  often  have  I  lamented  it  this  campaign."2 
The  natural  result  followed. 

Brooklyn  was  abandoned  on  the  29th  of  August;  but 
Washington  lingered  on  Manhattan  Island  with  his  now 
wholly  demoralized  army  until  the  15th  of  September, 
when  his  dilatory  opponent  attacked  him,  again  in  leisurely 
fashion.  Then  followed  the  shocking  affair  of  Kips  Bay,  at 
which  the  same  militia  who  had  manned  the  entrenchments 
at  Brooklyn  when  Howe  restrained  his  men  from  assaulting 
them,  ran  away,  abandoning  their  lines  at  the  first  indica- 
tions of  an  attack.     As  Greene,  ten  days  before,  had  written 

1  See  letters  to  the  President  of  Congress  of  2,  8,  11  and  16  September, 
1776,  in  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  Vol.  IV,  72,  80,  91. 

2  Life  and  Correspondence  of  President  Reed,  I.  256. 


52  MILITARY  STUDIES 

—  "it  will  be  difficult  to  get  such  troops  to  behave  with 
proper  spirit  in  time  of  action,  if  we  should  be  attacked." 
In  point  of  fact,  they  scurried  off  like  a  pack  of  frightened 
sheep;  but,  this  time,  it  was  the  lunch  hour  of  the  enemy 
which  saved  the  American  cause.1  That  day,  under  Wash- 
ington's orders,  Putnam  abandoned  New  York  "  leaving 
behind  him  a  large  quantity  of  provisions  and  military  stores, 
and  most  of  the  heavy  cannon."  By  pure  good  luck,  com- 
bined once  more  with  "the  dilatoriness  of  the  enemy,"  he 
saved  himself  and  the  force  under  his  command  from  cap- 
ture. This  disaster  was  the  natural,  and,  indeed,  logical  out- 
come of  the  attempt  to  occupy  a  useless  position  for  more 
than  two  weeks  after  it  became  obviously  untenable.  It 
is  difficult  to  see  why  that  policy  did  not  involve  a  serious 
military  blunder;  and  the  friendly  American  historian  has 
good  cause  to  ask:  "What  could  be  the  reason  of  this 
supineness  on  the  part  of  Sir  William  Howe?"  The  answer 
to  this  somewhat  simple  query  is  perhaps  best  given  in  the 
words  of  a  British  naval  commander  then  on  the  spot.  His 
amazement  and  disgust  at  Howe's  methods  of  warfare  found 
expression  at  the  time  in  bitter  irony,  and  Sir  George  Collier, 
who  commanded  the  frigate  Rainbow,  —  the  single  British 
ship  which  on  the  27th  of  August  had  worked  within  range 
of  the  Red  Hook  battery,  —  Sir  George  Collier  wrote : 
"The  having  to  deal  with  a  generous,  merciful,  forbearing 
enemy,  who  would  take  no  unfair  advantages,  must  surely 

1  The  sober  account  of  these  operations  reads  like  a  travesty.  The 
English  military  historian  of  the  war  remarks  with  apparent  unconscious 
gravity  :  "As  soon  as  the  English  had  taken  possession  of  New  York, 
General  Howe,  and  some  other  general  officers,  repaired  to  the  house  of  a 
Mrs.  Murray,  with  whom  they  remained  in  conversation  so  long,  that 
General  Putnam,  with  3500  men,  was  enabled  to  make  good  his  retreat 
to  the  main  body  of  the  American  army."  (Stedman,  I,  207.)  The  officers 
in  question  took  lunch  with  Mrs.  Murray,  and,  during  the  hour  devoted 
to  lunch,  active  military  operations  would  seem  to  have  been  suspended. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND  53 

have  been  highly  satisfactory  to  General  Washington,  and 
he  was  certainly  very  deficient  in  not  expressing  his  grati- 
tude to  General  Howe  for  his  kind  behavior  towards  him. 
Far  from  taking  the  rash  resolution  of  hastily  passing  over 
the  East  River  after  Gates,  and  crushing  at  once  a  frightened, 
trembling  enemy,  he  generously  gave  them  time  to  recover 
from  their  panic,  —  to  throw  up  fresh  works,  —  to  make 
new  arrangements,  —  and  to  recover  from  the  torpid  state 
the  rebellion  appeared  in  from  its  late  shock/'1 

And  in  truth  the  simple  fact  seems  to  be  that,  time  and 
again,  between  August  20  and  September  20,  the  errors  of 
judgment  of  the  American  commander-in-chief  exposed  his 
army  and  the  cause  he  had  to  defend  to  great  and  unneces- 
sary peril ;  and  America  owes  its  liberty  and  the  world 
an  immortality  to  the  incapacity,  or  supineness,  of  Major- 
General  William  Howe. 

None  the  less  in  narrating  these  events  and  describing 
the  situation  resulting  therefrom,  one  of  the  most  popular 
and  widely  read  of  the  more  recent  narrators  of  the  distinc- 
tively American  school,  finds  in  them  frequent  indications 
of  Washington's  "subtle  strategy,"  and  "evidence  of  mili- 
tary genius  such  as  has  seldom  been  surpassed  in  the  history 
of  modern  warfare."  The  term  "modern  warfare"  is  some- 
what vague,  but  it  would  currently  be  supposed  to  include 


1  "But  delay  is  not  the  only  error  imputable  to  the  commander-in-chief 
(Howe)  in  this  transaction.  It  has  been  mentioned  that  the  American 
army  was  posted  at  Haarlem  and  King's  Bridge :  Its  position  at  this 
latter  place  was  for  the  purpose  of  securing  a  retreat  to  the  continent, 
should  the  pressure  of  affairs  render  such  a  step  necessary.  Instead, 
therefore,  of  directing  his  attention  to  New  York,  Sir  William  Howe, 
(supported  by  the  fleet)  ought  to  have  thrown  his  army  round  King's 
Bridge,  by  which  means  he  would  have  hemmed  in  the  whole  American  army ; 
and  such  a  step  was  not  at  all  impracticable  when  we  consider  the  extent 
of  the  naval  and  military  resources  subservient  to  his  will."  —  Stedman, 
I,  207-208. 


54  MILITARY  STUDIES 

the  operations  of  Frederick  as  well  as  those  of  Napoleon,  of 
Moltke  and  of  Sherman,  as  well  as  of  Lee. 

Returning  to  the  operations  on  Long  Island  and  the 
errors  of  strategy  into  which  both  Washington  and  Howe 
there  fell,  it  is  interesting  to  attempt  to  explain  the  motives 
which  actuated  each.  In  so  doing  we  now  have  all  the  facts 
before  us,  and  see  our  way  clearly ;  Washington  and  Howe, 
with  only  partial  information,  groped  their  way  in  doubt. 

In  the  first  place,  what  induced  Washington,  with  the 
meagre  resources  both  in  men  and  material  at  his  command, 
to  endeavor  to  hold  certain  of  the  islands  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Hudson  against  such  an  armament  as  he  well  knew  the 
British  could  then  bring  to  bear?  He  necessarily  aban- 
doned to  them  Staten  Island ;  and  we  now  see  that  the 
attempt  to  retain  a  footing  on  Long  Island,  and  to  hold 
Manhattan,  was  not  only  hopeless  from  the  start,  but  in 
reality  there  was,  from  a  military  point  of  view,  nothing  to 
be  said  in  its  favor.  As  Lee,  who  had  in  March  pointed  out 
the  difficulties,  subsequently  wrote  in  September  in  words 
already  quoted:  "I  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  the 
islands  to  which  you  have  been  clinging  so  pertinaciously. 
I  would  give  Mr.  Howe  a  fee-simple  of  them."  In  this  con- 
clusion, charlatan  though  he  was,  Lee  unquestionably  was 
right. 

The  campaign  of  Long  Island  was  in  reality  Washington's 
first  experience  of  active  field  movement  in  which  he  held 
chief  command.  That  he  profited  greatly  by  it  was  subse- 
quently apparent.  He  learned  through  his  mistakes;  but, 
indisputably,  those  mistakes  were  both  gross  and  his.  For, 
in  doing  what  he  then  did,  it  cannot  fairly  be  claimed  that 
the  American  commander  was  impelled  to  a  course  his 
judgment  did  not  approve  by  popular  insistence  and  con- 
gressional pressure.     These  doubtless  were  great,  and  had 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND  55 

their  influence;  but,  both  before  and  after  the  well-nigh 
inevitable  catastrophe,  he  put  himself  on  record  as  believ- 
ing his  plan  of  defence  reasonably  practicable,  and  he  clung 
to  it  to  the  last  moment.  Nowhere  did  he  point  out  the 
excessive  dangers  the  plan  involved,  or  enter  protest  against 
it,  or  even  express  a  preference  for  a  radically  different  and 
safer  plan. 

Neither  can  it  be  claimed  that  the  disaster  at  Flatbush 
was  due  to  the  illness  of  Greene  and  the  incompetence  of 
Putnam,  who  succeeded  Greene  on  the  eve  of  the  engage- 
ment. Greene  relinquished  the  active  command  at  Brooklyn 
August  16;  and  it  was  on  the  22d  of  August  that  the 
British  landed  at  Gravesend.  Sullivan  was  then  acting  in 
Greene's  stead.  Four  days  later,  on  the  evening  of  the  26th, 
Clinton  began  his  forward  march,  and  on  the  morning  of  the 
27th  he  seized  the  unprotected  Jamaica  road,  and  so  got  in 
the  rear  of  Sullivan  and  Stirling.  On  the  24th,  Washington 
himself  passed  the  day  at  Brooklyn,  and,  not  until  his  return 
to  New  York  in  the  afternoon  of  that  day  did  he  appoint 
Putnam  to  take  command  on  the  Brooklyn  side,  at  the  same 
time  giving  him,  as  the  result  of  his  (Washington's)  personal 
examination  of  the  ground,  specific  written  instructions  in 
which  he  outlined  the  plan  of  operations  to  be  pursued, 
especially  on  the  point  which  led  to  disaster,  —  that  of 
going  out  to  meet  the  enemy  with  the  best  troops,  leav- 
ing only  militia  in  the  interior  works.  "The  militia,  or 
the  most  indifferent  troops,"  he  wrote,  "will  do  for  the 
interior  works;  whilst  your  best  men  should  at  all  hazards 
prevent  the  enemy's  passing  the  woods  and  approaching 
your  works."  This,  too,  though  Washington  had  himself 
that  day  observed  with  alarm  the  confusion  and  lack  of 
cooperation  among  commands  which  prevailed  on  Long 
Island,  and  knew  perfectly  that  there  was  no  mounted  force 


56  MILITARY  STUDIES 

there  to  do  outpost  work.  His  idea,  as  that  of  Greene, 
seems  to  have  been  to  inflict  severe  punishment  on  the 
enemy  in  the  wooded  hills  between  Gravesend  and  Brooklyn ; 
and  then  to  have  the  forces,  withdrawn  from  before  the 
enemy,  take  refuge  in  the  Brooklyn  entrenchments.  But 
this  was  a  hazardous  game  to  play.  To  play  it  suc- 
cessfully required  a  skilful  commander  on  the  spot,  an 
efficient  staff,  cool,  well-seasoned  troops,  and  perfect  co- 
operation between  commands;  and  not  one  of  these  essen- 
tials, as  no  one  knew  better  than  Washington,  did  the 
Americans  enjoy. 

Take,  for  instance,  the  matter  of  artillery  and  cavalry. 
To  defend  with  effective  results  such  an  extended  advance 
line  required  good  outpost  work,  reliable  courier  service, 
and  adequate,  well-handled  artillery.  Clinton  advanced 
with  forty  field  pieces:  the  entire  American  equipment 
consisted  of  six  pieces,  —  one  five-and-a-half-inch  howit- 
zer, four  six-pounders  and  one  three-pounder !  As  respects 
cavalry,  the  case  was  still  worse. 

But  if  it  is  curious  to  observe  the  influence  of  Bunker  Hill 
and  Dorchester  Heights  on  the  mind  of  Washington  while 
trying  to  defend  New  York,  it  is  at  least  as  curious  to  notice 
the  similar  influence  of  Concord  and  Fort  Moultrie  on  the 
minds  of  the  two  Howes  when  they  planned  to  attack  New 
York.  The  extreme  of  rashness  had  given  place  to  a  cau- 
tion as  extreme.  Yet  in  his  operations  on  Long  Island, 
Sir  William  Howe  made  the  same  mistake  which  cost  him 
so  dear  at  Bunker  Hill.  Again,  instead  of  attacking  his 
enemy  full  in  front  and  just  where  he  wanted  to  be  attacked, 

—  driving  him  out  of  the  trap  in  which  he  had  got  himself, 

—  Howe's  effort  should  have  been*to  operate  on  Washing- 
ton's rear,  seize  his  lines  of  retreat,  and  "bag"  him  and  his 
army.     No  better  opportunity  for  so  doing  could  have  been 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND  57 

offered,  as  was  obvious  at  the  time,  and  has  since  frequently 
been  pointed  out. 

So  much  for  the  land  operations  of  the  British.  It  was  the 
same  on  the  water.  On  the  28th  of  June,  just  two  months 
before  Flatbush,  the  squadron  under  Sir  Peter  Parker  was 
severely  repulsed  in  its  attempt  on  Fort  Moultrie.  The 
influence  of  this  experience  was  manifest  in  the  handling  of 
the  British  ships  at  New  York  in  August.  Parker  was 
himself  in  command  of  the  ships  which  attempted  to  co- 
operate with  General  Howe  on  the  27th  of  August,  and 
failed  to  work  into  position.  While  the  Americans  seem 
to  have  felt  an  inordinate  degree  of  confidence  in  the  effi- 
cacy of  their  land  batteries  to  resist  attack  on  their  sea  side, 
the  inertness  and  even  timidity  of  the  British  naval  com- 
manders throughout  the  operations  were  most  noticeable 
and  almost  inexplicable.  In  them  there  was  no  indica- 
tion of  the  great  traditions  of  the  British  navy.  Instead  of 
attempting  what  Blake  did  at  Santa  Cruz  de  Teneriffe  in 
1657,  and  Hawke  at  Belle  Isle  in  1739 ;  or  what  Nelson  a  few 
years  later  did  at  Aboukir  in  1798,  and  again  at  Copenhagen 
in  1801,  —  all  under  circumstances  of  far  greater  difficulty 
and  danger,  —  instead  of  attempting  any  operation  of  this 
sort,  which  would  then  and  there  have  gone  far  to  finish  the 
war,  the  commanders  of  the  British  fleet  hardly  made  its 
presence  felt. 

That  Washington  sustained  himself  and  retained  the  con- 
fidence of  the  army  and  of  Congress  in  the  face  of  that  series 
of  disasters  for  which  he  was  so  largely  responsible,  is  ex- 
traordinary, and  stands  the  highest  tribute  which  could 
have  been  paid  to  his  character  and  essential  qualities.  Yet, 
in  spite  of  what  historians  have  since  asserted,  his  prestige 
at  the  time  was  greatly  diminished,  and  his  control  of  the 
situation  imperilled.     All  eyes  turned   at  the  moment  to 


58  MILITARY  STUDIES 

General  Charles  Lee,  just  back  from  Charleston,  resplendent 
with  the  halo  of  the  victory  which  those  who  fought  the 
guns  of  Moultrie  had  won  for  him ;  and  won  in  his  despite. 
He  was  " hourly  expectant"  by  Washington's  demoralized 
army  "as  if  from  Heaven,  —  with  a  legion  of  flaming  swords- 
men"; or,  as  another  expressed  it,  "The  army  is  con- 
tinually praying  most  ardently  for  the  arrival  of  General 
Lee  as  their  Guardian  Angel."1  Even  John  Jay  wrote  to 
Rutledge:  "If  General  Lee  should  be  at  Philadelphia, 
pray  hasten  his  departure  —  he  is  much  wanted  in  New 
York."  Lee  arrived  in  the  midst  of  disaster,  and  was  un- 
sparing in  criticism  of  the  defective  strategy  which  had  led 
to  it.  There  was  for  a  time  no  inconsiderable  danger  that 
he,  the  most  wretched  charlatan  of  a  war  not  otherwise 
devoid  of  charlatans,  might  supplant  Washington  in  the 
confidence  of  the  army.  He  certainly  did  greatly  embarrass 
his  superior,  and  thwart  his  combinations.  But  in  view  of 
what  then  occurred  and  has  since  taken  place,  it  is  curious 
to  reflect  how  different  the  whole  course  of  history  would 
have  been  had  "the  omnipotence  of  Luck  in  matters  of 
War"  entered  a  little  differently  than  it  did  into  the  events 
of  June,  1775,  and  August,  1776.  It  is  not  easy  to  imagine 
a  state  of  affairs  during  the  nineteenth  century  in  which  the 
United  States  might  have  continued  to  be  what  the  Domin- 
ion of  Canada  now  is,  and  from  which  the  career  and  memory 
of  Washington  would  have  been  obliterated. 

1  General  Scott  to  John  Jay,  September  6,  1776.     Correspondence  and 
Public  Papers  of  John  Jay,  1,'.82. 


Ill 

WASHINGTON  AND   CAVALRY  * 

Yesterday,2  the  long-delayed  equestrian  statue  of  Count 
Casimir  Pulaski  was  with  suitable  ceremony  unveiled  at 
Washington.  Mortally  wounded,  October  9,  1779,  in  an 
assault  on  the  works  protecting  Savannah,  then  occupied  by 
the  British  forces,  Count  Pulaski  died  two  days  later. 
Subsequently,  by  a  vote  passed  by  the  Continental  Congress 
November  29,  1779,  the  memorial  only  now  unveiled 
was  ordered  to  be  erected.  Over  a  hundred  and 
thirty  years  thus  elapsed  between  the  providing  for  this 
memorial  and  its  actual  dedication  at  a  central  point  on 
the  main  thoroughfareof  a  city  now  the  capital  of  a  nation, 
the  ground  covered  by  which  was  at  the  time  of  Pulaski's 
death  quite  uninhabited. 

The  incident  referred  to  has  a  peculiar  interest  in  con- 
nection with  the  present  paper ;  for,  a  forgotten  historic  fact, 
it  so  chanced  that  Casimir  Pulaski  was  the  first  Chief  of 
Cavalry  in  the  army  of  the  United  States.  Commissioned 
by  Congress  a  brigadier-general,  September  13,  1777,  he 
was  immediately  afterwards  assigned  by  Washington  to  the 
general  command  of  what  composed  the  mounted  force  of 
the  patriot  army;  at  that  time,  though  the  war  was  then 
far  advanced  in  its  third  year  of  active  operations,  a  quite 
inchoate  branch  of  the  service.  It  thus  devolved  on  a  Pole 
and  an  exile  to  make  the  first  serious  attempt  to  give  form 
1  See  infra,  p.  109.  2  Wednesday,  May  10,  1910. 


60  MILITARY  STUDIES 

to  a  systematic  American  cavalry  organization  for  actual 
use  in  practical  warfare.  Of  him  and  it  more  will  presently 
be  said. 

Fifteen  years  ago  I  was  accidentally  led  into  a  somewhat 
careful  as  well  as  critical  examination  of  the  actual  facts  of 
two  Revolutionary  battles,  as  contradistinguished  from  the 
accounts  thereof  contained  in  our  books  of  history  accepted 
as  "standard,"  —  the  two  battles  were  that  at  Bunker  Hill, 
on  the  17th  of  June,  1775,  and  that  before  Brooklyn,  N.Y., 
known  as  the  Battle  of  Long  Island,  fought  August  27  of  the 
following  year,  1776.  In  connection  with  the  second  of 
these  engagements,  that  on  Long  Island,  my  attention  was 
particularly  drawn  to  the  curious  fact,  which  I  did  not 
remember  ever  to  have  seen  noticed,  that  Washington,  in 
the  operations  he  then  conducted,  had  apparently  no  con- 
ception of  the  use  to  be  made  of  cavalry,  or  mounted  men, 
in  warfare.  His  idea  of  an  effective  military  organization, 
at  least  for  the  work  then  cut  out  for  him  to  do,  appeared 
to  be  a  command  consisting  of  infantry  of  the  line,  with  a 
suitable  artillery  contingent.  He  did  not  seem  at  all  to 
grasp  the  idea  of  some  mounted  force  as  an  instrument 
essential  to  ascertaining  the  whereabouts  and  movements  of 
his  opponent,  or  concealing  his  own  movements;  or,  if  it 
occurred  to  him,  it  was  in  a  theoretical  way,  and  not  as 
something  to  assume  shape  out  of  material  at  command,  to 
meet  a  present  exigency. 

Those  who  have  undertaken  to  tell  the  story  of  our  War 
of  Independence  have  almost  without  exception  been  civil- 
ians, men  of  the  library;  and  it  is  accordingly  in  no  way 
surprising  that  in  reading  their  narratives  it  is  constantly 
apparent  that,  even  less  than  Michael  Cassio,  had  they  ever 
"  set  a  squadron  in  the  field";  nor,  consequently,  did  they 
the  "division  of  a  battle"  know  in  connection  with  the  use 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  61 

therein  to  be  made  of  the  "  squadron. "  Indeed,  if  ques- 
tioned on  the  point,  it  would  probably  have  become  apparent 
that  " squadron' '  was  in  the  minds  of  not  a  few  of  them  a 
naval  term,  and  one  in  no  way  applicable  to  military  organiza- 
tions. 

This,  of  course,  would  not  be  true  of  many  of  the  older 
writers;  for,  in  the  library  of  Revolutionary  literature, 
besides  the  so-called  standard  narratives,  we  have  the 
Memoirs,  left  by  various  participants,  such  as  "  Light- 
Horse  Harry"  Lee,  Graydon,  Tarleton,  and  Stedman,  all 
of  whom  were  in  a  way  experts  from  the  military  point  of 
view;  though,  when  they  wrote  from  memory,  perhaps 
long  after  the  event,  their  statements  are,  of  course,  open 
to  the  suspicion  which  proverbially  attaches  to  evidence 
of  that  character.  It  would  not,  however,  be  easy  at  once 
to  recall  any  more  recent  general  historical  narrative  relating 
to  persons  or  events  of  the  Revolutionary  struggle  which  in- 
dicates on  the  part  of  the  narrator  any  direct  personal  famil- 
iarity with  military  operations;  and,  in  many  of  them,  the 
absence  of  that  familiarity  is  almost  painfully  noticeable. 
John  Fiske  is  a  case  in  point.  Not  only  is  his  most  readable 
work  marred  and  made  unreliable  by  a  spirit  of  adulatory 
and  indiscriminating  hero-worship  wherever  Washington  is 
concerned,  but,  while  he  has  composed  an  interesting  story, 
the  absence  of  anything  indicative  of  either  military  experi- 
ence or  strategic  instinct  is  conspicuous.  He  tells  the  tale ; 
but  he  does  not  understand  its  details,  nor,  from  the  mili- 
tary point  of  view,  their  significance.  In  connection  with 
Washington,  another  instance  readily  suggests  itself.  As  a 
contribution  to  history,  and  the  great  literary  reputation  of 
its  author,  Irving's  Washington  naturally  recalls  Sir  Wal- 
ter Scott's  Life  of  Napoleon;  but,  in  referring  to  the 
latter,  Napier  in  his  Peninsular  War  does  not  hesitate  to 


62  MILITARY  STUDIES 

allude  to  "that  intrepidity  of  error  which  characterizes  the 
work." 

Kecurring,  however,  to  the  subject  of  this  paper,  there  is 
in  our  distinctive  and  " standard"  American  histories  a 
noticeable  absence  of  all  reference  to  the  employment  of 
cavalry  in  Washington's  strategy  and  tactics,  or  rather  to 
the  failure  to  develop  as  a  factor  therein  what  may  best  be 
described  as  an  adequate  mounted  service.  Especially  is 
this  noticeable  to  any  reader  who  may  chance  to  have  had 
some  practical  experience  in  warfare,  and  most  of  all  to  one 
who  has  seen  actual  cavalry  service.  The  recently  published 
narratives  of  Sir  George  Trevelyan  and  Sydney  G.  Fisher 
are,  it  is  true,  less  open  to  this  criticism  than  those  of  an 
earlier  date;  but,  judging  by  our  American  histories  taken 
as  a  whole,  whether  scholarly,  popular,  or  school,  it  never 
seems  to  have  occurred  to  the  writers  thereof  that  in  1776 
and  later  the  seat  of  warfare  in  America,  especially  between 
the  Hudson  and  the  Potomac,  —  the  field  in  which  Wash- 
ington conducted  his  operations, — was  one  singularly  adapted 
to  irregular  cavalry  operations.  As  the  records  show, 
it  was  a  region  full  of  horses,  while  every  Virginian  and  nearly 
every  inhabitant  of  Pennsylvania  and  the  Jerseys  was  ac- 
customed to  the  saddle.  Then,  as  later  in  the  Confederacy 
during  our  War  of  Secession,  people  owned  their  mounts. 
Every  farming  lad  and  every  son  of  a  farmer  was,  in  a  rude 
way,  an  equestrian ;  the  doctors  made  their  rounds  on  horse- 
back ;  the  lawyers  rode  the  circuits ;  in  fact  the  whole  social 
and  business  life  of  the  community  was  in  a  more  or  less 
direct  way  connected  with  the  saddle  and  the  pillion.  The 
horses,  also,  were  of  fairly  good  breed;  and,  when  brought 
into  military  use,  showed  solid  powers  of  endurance,  es- 
pecially those  raised  in  Virginia.  Under  such  circum- 
stances,  subsequent  experience  in  our  own  civil  troubles 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  63 

should,  it  would  seem,  lead  the  modern  critic  and  student 
of  military  operations  to  assume  that  the  patriot  force 
would  naturally  have  drifted  into  that  irregular  mounted 
service  which  was  so  large  and  picturesque  a  feature  both 
in  earlier  and  later  warfare,  —  not  less  in  the  operations 
under  Prince  Rupert  in  Cromweirs  day  than  more  recently 
in  South  Africa. 

The  omission  referred  to  first  becomes  noticeable  in  con- 
nection with  the  narrative  of  events  in  the  second  year  of 
the  war,  —  the  operations  in  and  about  New  York  during 
the  latter  half  of  1776.  Prior  to  that  time  it  may  safely 
be  asserted  that  warfare  as  carried  on  in  America  had,  as 
the  unfortunate  Braddock  found  to  his  cost,  been  waged 
on  principles  and  bf  methods  neither  recognized  by  Euro- 
pean students  nor  understood  by  its  professionals.  It  was 
in  every  sense  of  the  term  distinctly  irregular.  Carried  on 
almost  necessarily  in  heavily  wooded  regions,  it  was  a 
conflict  between  individuals,  —  a  struggle  in  which  the 
ranger  and  rifleman  was  pitted  against  the  savage  or  the 
Frenchman.  In  its  operations,  except  as  couriers,  the 
mounted  man  played  no  part.  Scouting  even  was  im- 
practicable in  a  wilderness  where  an  opponent  might  be 
lurking  behind  every  cover.  This  held  good  through  all 
the  earlier  Revolutionary  operations  from  Concord  and  Lex- 
ington to  the  transfer  of  the  scene  of  operations  from  the 
neighborhood  of  Boston  to  that  of  New  York.  Paul  Revere, 
for  instance,  was  mounted ;  but,  when  arrested  in  his  ride, 
he  was  acting  as  a  courier.  Montgomery  and  Arnold  led 
detachments  into  Canada,  seizing  Montreal  and  threatening 
Quebec;  but  their  movements,  when  not  by  canoe,  were 
made  through  a  wilderness,  pathless,  and  for  the  mounted 
man  impracticable.  So,  from  the  beginning  of  American 
civilization  down  to  August,  1776,  it  may  be  said  generally 


64  MILITARY  STUDIES 

that,  except  as  a  pack  animal  or  for  draft  and  courier  pur- 
poses, the  horse  found  no  place  in  military  operations. 
Cavalry  was  not  a  recognized  branch  of  the  service.  Such 
being  immemorially  the  case,  in  the  early  months  of  1776 
the  seat  of  active  Revolutionary  warfare  was  transferred 
from  Boston  and  its  immediate  neighborhood  to  the  mouth 
of  the  Hudson. 

As  already  and  elsewhere  pointed  out,1  it  is  now,  and 
to  us,  apparent  that,  to  advance  the  patriot  cause,  a  wholly 
new  system  of  both  strategy  and  tactics  had  at  this  juncture 
become  advisable.  The  mouth  of  the  Hudson  did  not,  under 
existing  conditions,  admit  of  successful  defence.  The  true 
policy  to  be  pursued  was  to  abandon  it  to  the  enemy ;  and 
then  to  draw  that  enemy  away  from  his  base,  and  into  the 
interior,  where  recourse  against  him  could  be  had  to  the 
tactics  of  Lexington  and  Concord.  Away  from  New  York, 
he  would  have  no  strategic  objective,  and  he  could  be 
harassed  day  and  night,  and  from  behind  every  tree  and 
stone  wall.  Holding  only  the  ground  on  which  he  camped, 
the  more  country  he  tried  to  cover  the  more  vulnerable  he 
would  have  become. 

Under  these  conditions,  not  yet  developed  fully,  during 
the  early  days  of  July,  and  seven  weeks  before  Sir  William 
Howe  showed  any  signs  of  activity,  Governor  Trumbull  of 
Connecticut  sent  a  detachment  of  "  light-horse, "  as  they  were 
called,  to  New  York.  Some  four  or  five  hundred  in  number, 
they  were  a  body  of  picked  men,  —  as  Washington  wrote, 
"most  of  them,  if  not  all,  men  of  reputation  and  property." 
Yet,  on  the  score  of  expense,  he  refused  to  allow  them  to 
keep  their  horses,  and,  when  they  declined  to  do  infantry 
duty,  he  roughly  sent  them  home,  writing  to  their  com- 
mander, "they  can  no  longer  be  of  use  here,  where  horses 
1  Supra,  14-16  ;  infra,  122. 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  65 

cannot  be  brought  into  action,  and  I  do  not  care  how  soon 
they  are  dismissed."  It  is  not  easy  to  understand  how  a 
commander  of  even  Washington's  experience  could  under 
the  conditions  then  manifestly  confronting  him  have  reached 
such  a  conclusion,  much  less  have  expressed  it  so  bluntly 
and  in  writing.  In  the  first  place,  what  had  he  in  mind 
when  he  asserted  that  his  operations  were  necessarily  con- 
ducted " where  horses"  could  not  "be  brought  into  action"  ? 
It  is  obvious  that  both  New  York  and  Brooklyn  then  were, 
as  they  now  are,  on  islands ;  but,  that  fact  notwithstanding, 
the  field  of  operations  included  in  those  islands  afforded 
ample  space  as  well  as  constant  occasion  for  the  employment 
of  any  arm  of  the  service,  —  engineers,  infantry,  artillery  or 
cavalry.  In  the  second  place,  to  hold  the  town  of  New 
York  it  was  necessary  to  occupy  Brooklyn,  and  the  occupa- 
tion of  Brooklyn  implied  at  least  a  dozen  miles  of  uncovered 
front,  or  avenues  of  approach,  to  be  vigilantly  guarded  and 
unceasingly  patrolled.  As  an  historical  fact,  it  was  by 
means,  of  one  of  these  avenues  of  approach  to  Brooklyn, 
wholly  unguarded,  —  though  some  four  or  five  miles  only  to 
the  eastward  of  the  direct  road  from  the  place  where  Howe 
landed  his  army,  —  that,  a  little  later  on,  a  sufficient  detach- 
ment of  the  British  force  worked  its  way  by  a  flanking 
movement  to  the  rear  of  Washington's  outlying  right  wing, 
and  inflicted  on  it  and  him  crushing  disaster.  Yet  Long 
Island  then  was  full  of  forage,  which  afterwards  was  either 
destroyed  or  fed  the  horses  of  the  British  cavalry  and  artil- 
lery ;  and  so  shockingly  deficient  was  the  American  mounted 
service  that  on  the  very  day  when  Clinton  turned,  in  the  way 
referred  to,  the  American  flank,  Heath,  the  acting  quarter- 
master-general of  the  patriot  army,  was  writing  from  King's 
Bridge,  a  few  miles  away  on  Manhattan  Island,  to  Mifflin, 
about  to  cross  his  command  over  the  East  River  to  Brook- 


66  MILITARY  STUDIES 

lyn,  —  "We  have  not  a  single  horse  here.  I  have  written 
to  the  General  [Washington]  for  two  or  three.' '  1  To  a  mili- 
tary critic,  the  attempt  to  hold  the  outer  Long  Island  line 
under  such  circumstances  seems  little  short  of  ineptitude. 
General  Sullivan,  who  was  in  command  of  that  line,  and  who, 
together  with  Stirling,  his  next  in  command,  was  captured 
when  his  flank  was  turned,  afterward  claimed  that  he  had  all 
along  felt  uneasy  about  the  Bedford  road  —  that  by  which 
Howe  effected  his  turning  movement  —  and  "had  paid  horse- 
men fifty  dollars  for  patrolling  [it]  by  night,  while  I  had 
command,  as  I  had  no  foot  for  the  purpose."  2  The  plain 
inference  would  seem  to  be  that  none  of  the  American  com- 
manders, from  Washington  down,  had  at  this  stage  of  the 
war  any  understanding  of  the  use  and  absolute  necessity  of 
mounted  men  in  field  operations.  A  cavalry  patrol  fifty 
strong  only,  on  the  flank  of  the  American  advanced  line  on 
Brooklyn's  right  front,  and  patrolling  the  approaches, 
might,  and  probably  would,  by  giving  timely  notice,  have 
saved  the  commands  of  Sullivan  and  Stirling  from  the  dis- 

1  "  We  suffer  here  extremely  for  horses ;  not  a  single  one  at  this  Post  to 
send  on  Express.  General  Mifflin  acquaints  me  that  he  cannot  spare 
either  horse  or  waggon  from  that  Post.  I  beg  that  two  or  three  may  be 
ordered  here." — Heath  to  Washington,  August  27,  1776,  Heath  Papers. 
At  this  very  time  General  Howe's  light-horse  were  pillaging  and  intimidat- 
ing the  inhabitants  of  Long  Island,  offering  an  example  of  mobility  and 
effectiveness. 

2Amory,  Life  of  John  Sullivan,  28.  Stedman  says:  "This  pass  the 
enemy  had  neglected  to  secure  by  detachments,  on  account  of  its  great 
distance.  In  order  to  watch  it,  however,  they  sent  out  occasional  patroles 
of  cavalry  :  But  one  of  these  being  intercepted  by  a  British  advanced  guard, 
the  pass  was  gained  without  any  alarm  being  communicated  to  the  Ameri- 
cans." —  History  of  the  American  War,  I,  195.  The  "great  distance"  in 
this  case  was  a  short  two  miles,  and  the  route  the  British  took  to  get  into 
Sullivan's  rear  ran,  according  to  the  excellent  map  in  Stedman's  History, 
just  about  a  half  a  mile  from  Sullivan's  extreme  left  flank.  That  such  a 
route  should  not  have  been  constantly  patrolled  seems,  under  the  circum- 
stances, simply  inexplicable. 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  67 

aster  of  August  27;  and  yet,  a  few  weeks  before,  the  four 
hundred  Connecticut  mounted  men  had  been  sent  home  by 
Washington  for  the  reason  that  cavalry  could  be  of  no 
service  in  military  operations  conducted  "here,  where  horses 
cannot  be  brought  into  action"  ! 1  But,  American  or  British, 
it  was  all  of  a  piece ;  and  the  whole  story  of  what  occurred 
August  27-30,  1776,  on  Long  Island,  is  on  both  sides  sug- 
gestive only  of  a  badly  played  game  of  chess;  as  the  result 
of  which  the  losing  party  escaped  a  checkmate  only  through 
the  quite  unaccountable  procrastination  of  his  opponent  on 
land,  and  the  inactivity  of  that  opponent  on  the  water. 

All  these  happenings,  as  well  as  the  subsequent  transfer  of 
the  patriot  army  from  Brooklyn  across  the  East  River  to 
New  York,  occurred  during  the  closing  days  of  August. 
Four  months  later  the  affairs  at  Trenton  and  Princeton  closed 
the  campaign  of  1776,  and  Washington's  army  went  into  its 
winter  quarters  at  Morristown. 

For  present  purposes,  it  is  not  necessary  even  to  pass  in 
rapid  review  the  incidents  of  that  melancholy  campaign  or 
its  redeeming,  and  even  brilliant,  close  in  the  Christmas  week 
of  1776.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  throughout  those  opera- 
tions, from  the  ignominious  Kip's  Bay  panic  on  September  15 
to  the  splendid  closing  rally  at  Princeton  on  New  Year's  day, 
1777,  there  is  nowhere  any  indication  of  the  presence  of 
mounted  men  connected  with  the  patriot  army,  much  less  of 
any  organized  auxiliary  cavalry  service;  nor  is  it  easy  to 
see  how  the  necessary  courier  and  orderly  work  was  done. 
Of  patrol  work,  picket  duty,  and  scouting  service  there  was 
no  pretence  on  either  side.  Indeed,  it  was  to  this  fact,  and 
the  neglect  on  the  part  of  the  British  of  the  most  ordinary 
military  precautions  against  surprise,  that  Washington  owed 
his  success  at  both  Trenton  and  Princeton.     Yet  the  second 

1  See  closing  paragraph,  Chap.  XXXI,  Irving,  Washington,  II,  382. 


68  MILITARY  STUDIES 

year  of  active  operations  was  drawing  to  a  close ;  and,  cer- 
tainly, operations  during  the  last  four  months  of  that  second 
year  were  not  conducted  "where  horses "  could  not  "be 
brought  into  action." 

It  is  narrated  of  Frederick  the  Great  that,  after  his  first 
experience  in  active  warfare  in  the  fortunate,  but  for  him 
personally  inglorious  and  somewhat  mortifying  Moll witz  cam- 
paign, he  subjected  himself  to  sharp  self-examination  as  to 
the  errors  and  oversights  for  which  he  felt  himself  to  have 
been  personally  responsible;  and  especially  he  "meditated 
much  on  the  bad  figure  his  cavalry"  cut  at  Mollwitz.  And, 
thereafter,  he  strove  incessantly  to  improve  that  branch  of 
the  Prussian  service,  "till  at  length  it  can  be  said  his  suc- 
cess became  world-famous,  and  he  had  such  Seydlitzes  and 
Ziethens  as  were  not  seen  before  or  since." 

If  Washington,  in  his  Morristown  winter  quarters,  sub- 
jected himself,  as  he  doubtless  did,  to  a  similar  rigid  intro- 
spection, the  first  and  most  necessary  requirement  of  the 
situation  which  suggested  itself  to  him,  must,  it  would  seem, 
have  been  an  adequate  mounted  force  of  some  kind,  attached 
to  his  command,  at  once  his  army's  eyes  and  ears,  its  safe- 
guard against  surprise  and  his  most  ready  weapon  of  offence. 
And,  as  respects  safeguard  against  surprise,  Major-General 
Charles  Lee,  then  second  in  command  in  the  patriot  army, 
furnished  at  this  juncture  and  in  his  own  person  an  illustra- 
tion most  opportune,  though  somewhat  ludicrous  as  well  as 
forcible.  Of  Lee  it  is  unnecessary  to  speak;  both  as  man 
and  soldier  he  stands  condemned.1     But,  in  the  course  of 

xLee  did  appreciate  the  value  of  cavalry.  ''For  God's  sake,  my  dear 
General,  urge  the  Congress  to  furnish  me  with  a  thousand  cavalry.  With 
a  thousand  cavalry  I  could  insure  the  safety  of  these  Southern  Provinces ; 
and  without  cavalry  I  can  answer  for  nothing.  I  proposed  a  scheme  in 
Virginia  for  raising  a  body  almost  without  any  expense.  The  scheme  was 
relished  by  the  gentlemen  of  Virginia,  but  I  am  told  the  project  was  cen- 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  69 

these  operations,  Howe  had  sent  out  Colonel  Harcourt  with 
a  detachment  apparently  of  the  Seventeenth  Light  Dragoons 
to  obtain  information  as  to  Lee's  movements.  This  detail 
seems  to  have  roamed  about  at  will ;  and  finally  Colonel 
Harcourt  not  only  learned  of  General  Lee's  whereabouts, 
but  also  got  full  information  as  to  how  he  was  accom- 
panied through  an  important  intercepted  letter  of  Lee's, 
the  carriage  and  delivery  of  which,  no  mounted  force 
being  available  for  courier  service  even,  had  been  entrusted 
to  "a  countryman."  Stedman  says  that  the  Ameri- 
can commander  had  gone  out  "in  order  to  reconnoitre," 
and  "stopped  at  a  house  to  breakfast."  Fiske  asserts  that 
Lee  had  "foolishly  taken  up  his  quarters"  at  the  house  in 
question,  and  had  there  slept.  However  this  may  be,  on 
the  morning  of  the  13th  of  December,  a  fortnight  to  a  day 
before  the  affair  at  Trenton,  a  mere  squad  of  British  cavalry, 
thirty  strong  only,  swooped  down  on  White's  Tavern,  near 
Baskingridge,  —  halfway  across  the  State  of  New  Jersey, 
—  and,  in  leisurely  fashion,  carried  Lee  off  in  slippers  and 
dressing-gown,  a  prisoner  of  war.  Another  point  of  interest 
in  connection  with  this  somewhat  opera  bouffe  performance 
was  the  presence  in  it,  as  a  participant,  of  Banastre 
Tarleton,  then  a  cornet  of  light-horse, —  the  Tarleton  who 
subsequently  gained  so  great  notoriety  as  an  active  and 
enterprising  cavalry  officer  in  the  Southern  Department. 
The  capture  of  Charles  Lee  does,  however,  reveal  the  fact 

sured  by  some  members  of  the  Congress  on  the  principle  that  a  military- 
servant  should  not  take  the  liberty  to  propose  anything.  .  .  .  From  want 
of  this  species  of  troops,  we  had  infallibly  lost  this  Capital,  but  the  dila- 
toriness  and  stupidity  of  the  enemy  saved  us."  — To  Washington,  July  1, 
1776,  Correspondence  of  the  Revolution  (Sparks),  I,  246.  He  had  already 
written  to  the  Virginia  Committee  of  Secrecy:  "Your  resolution  to  raise 
a  body  of  light-horse  is,  in  my  opinion,  most  judicious.  It  is  a  species 
of  troops  without  which  an  army  is  a  defective  and  lame  machine.''  See 
also  Lee  Papers,  II,  15,  100;  IV,  102,  119. 


70  MILITARY  STUDIES 

that  Howe's  army  in  this  campaign  did  boast  a  small  force 
of  regular  cavalry,  designated  by  Stedman  " light  dragoons' ' 
or  " light-horse/'  and  mention  is  from  time  to  time  made  of 
it;  but  its  only  noticeable,  or  even  recorded,  performance 
was  this  bagging  of  Charles  Lee.  It  is  none  the  less  ap- 
parent that,  with  a  sufficient  and  effective  auxiliary  mounted 
force,  such  as  Tarleton  subsequently  had  under  him  in  the 
Carolinas,  the  advantages  gained  in  the  operations  about 
New  York  during  the  autumn  months  of  1776  by  Howe  and 
Cornwallis  could  easily  have  been  followed  up  later,  and 
Washington's  straggling  and  demoralized  army  might  have 
been  effectually  dispersed.  On  the  other  hand,  while  the 
British,  from  the  lack  of  a  mounted  force  adapted  to  irregu- 
lar service  and  American  conditions,  did  not,  and  could  not, 
follow  up  their  successes,  the  Americans,  for  the  same  reason, 
were  wholly  unable  to  harass  their  enemy  and  retard  his 
advance.  They  could  not  even  keep  informed  as  to  that 
enemy's  position  and  movements,  much  less  cut  off  his  sup- 
plies, or  exhaust  and  distract  him  by  continually  beating  up 
his  cantonments,  —  a  system  of  tactics  subsequently  most 
successfully  employed  in  the  Carolina  campaigns  under  even 
less  advantageous  conditions.  That  during  the  earlier  stages 
of  that  seven  years'  struggle,  the  British  failed  to  " catch  on," 
so  to  speak,  to  this  somewhat  novel  feature  in  warfare,  as 
then  conducted,  is  perhaps,  considering  the  national  char- 
acteristics, no  matter  for  surprise.  At  best  the  British  sol- 
dier is  not  peculiarly  adaptive ;  and,  fighting  in  a  new  coun- 
try under  wholly  unaccustomed  conditions,  a  Prince  Rupert 
was  not  at  once  developed.  The  curious  and  hardly  expli- 
cable fact,  however,  is  that,  later,  they  did  " catch  on"  more 
quickly  than  Washington,  who  was  to  the  manner  born,  and 
they  did  develop,  in  advance  of  the  Americans,  a  substitute 
for  Prince  Rupert,  and  a  tolerably  good  one  also,  in  the  person 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  71 

of  Tarleton.  But,  with  material  directly  at  hand  in  the  way 
of  both  horses  and  riders,  it  is  fairly  matter  of  wonder  that 
no  American  Mosby  developed  anywhere  or  at  any  time 
within  the  field  of  operations  presided  over  by  Washington. 
Further  south  the  partisan  leader  and  the  mounted  rifleman 
appeared,  as  if  by  spontaneous  generation,  almost  imme- 
diately after  interior  operations  began ;  for  Marion,  Sumter, 
Pickens  and  the  two  Horrys  were  the  Forrests  and  Mosbys 
of  the  earlier  struggle.  But  north  of  the  Chesapeake, 
where  the  initiative  and  personal  influence  of  Washington 
set  the  gait,  so  to  speak,  any  trace  of  this  aggressive  indi- 
vidual enterprise  is  looked  for  in  vain.  Washington  sub- 
sequently had  recourse  to  what  was  at  the  time  altogether 
inappropriately  termed  a  system  of  Fabian  tactics;  but  the 
Parthian  system  was  quite  as  well  established  historically  as 
the  Fabian,1  and  all  the  conditions  lent  themselves  admirably 
to  a  recourse  to  the  first  named.  The  men  were  there;  the 
horses  were  there;  the  forage  was  there:  all  in  abundance. 
The  organization  and  leaders  only  were  lacking;  nor  were 
the  leaders  far  to  seek.  Daniel  Morgan,  of  Virginia,  was 
there,  Jersey-born,  but  of  Welsh  stock,  no  less  a  born  com- 
mander of  irregular  horse  than,  eighty  years  later  in  the  War 
of  Secession  was  Forrest,  of  Tennessee,  a  man  of  exactly  simi- 
lar type,  instinctively  a  strategist  and  cavalry  leader.  And 
again  another  instance:  from  the  very  commencement  of 
hostilities,  Benedict  Arnold  gave  unmistakable  evidence  of 
the  possession  of  every  quality  which  went  to  make  up  the 
dashing  cavalry  commander. 

Contrasting  him  with  well-known  characters  familiar  to  a 
later  generation,  Washington  seems,  on  the  contrary,  to  have 
had  more  traits  in  common  with  George  H.  Thomas  than 

1  t'The  ne'er  yet  beaten  horse  of  Parthia 

We  have  jaded  out  o'  the  field."  —  Antony  and  Cleopatra,  iii,  1. 


72  MILITARY  STUDIES 

with  either  Sherman  or  Sheridan.  To  the  military  critic,  he 
is  something  of  a  puzzle ;  for,  though  ordinarily  cautious  and 
even  slow,  he  at  times  was  wonderfully  alert,  and  at  other 
times  actually  audacious.  In  the  operations  in  and  about 
New  York  during  the  autumn  of  1776  he  failed  to  grasp  the 
strategic  situation,  and  vacillated  in  presence  of  his  opponent 
in  a  way  which  should  have  led  to  his  destruction.  The 
decision,  alertness  and  energy  displayed  by  him  at  Princeton 
and  Trenton  were,  on  the  other  hand,  remindful  of  Wolfe  at 
Quebec,  and  of  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia  at  Haverswerda, 
thirteen  days  only  after  Quebec.1  The  next  year,  also,  at 
Brandywine  and  Germantown,  the  audacity,  not  to  say  rash- 
ness, with  which  Washington  challenged  battle  with  an  op- 
posing force  which,  not  only  in  organization  and  equipment 
but  numerically  even,  completely  outclassed  his  own,  was, 
and  is,  simply  confounding. 

Returning,  however,  to  the  subject  under  immediate  con- 
sideration, —  the  organization  of  a  mounted  service  and  its 
effective  use  in  the  Revolutionary  operations,  —  Washington 
did  not  evince  mental  alertness.  On  the  contrary,  while  his 
correspondence  and  reports  reveal  no  trace  of  the  conscious- 
ness of  an  unsupplied  necessity  in  this  direction,  he,  in  the 
field,  showed  himself  distinctly  lacking  in  what  may,  for 
present  purposes,  be  well  enough  described  as  the  cavalry 
flair,  so  conspicuous  in  Cromwell  and  Frederick.  There  is  in 
Sheridan's  Memoirs  a  passage  curiously  illustrative  of  this 
divergence  of  view,  chiefly  attributable  to  character  and  tem- 
perament, but  in  part  due  to  training  and  vocation.  Sheri- 
dan was  essentially  a  cavalry  officer,  —  a  sabreur.  General 
George  G.  Meade,  the  victor  of  Gettysburg,  originally  as- 
signed to  the  artillery,  later  served  in  the  engineer  corps  until 

1  Infra,  143.  The  legend  of  Frederick's  admiration  of  Washington's 
Trenton-Princeton  operation  has  long  been  disproved ;  see  Greene,  The 
Revolutionary  War,  73  n. 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  73 

August,  1861,  when  he  was  put  in  command  of  a  brigade  of 
Pennsylvania  infantry  then  being  organized.  Both  were  in 
their  respective  ways  excellent  officers,  but  Sheridan  says 
of  Meade  (Memoirs  I.  355) :  "He  was  filled  with  the  preju- 
dices that,  from  the  beginning  of  the  war,  had  pervaded  the 
army  regarding  the  importance  and  usefulness  of  cavalry. 
General  Scott  then  predicted  that  the  contest  would  be  set- 
tled by  artillery,  and  thereafter  refused  the  services  of  regiment 
after  regiment  of  mounted  troops.  General  Meade  deemed 
cavalry  fit  for  little  more  than  guard  and  picket  duty." 
Sheridan,  on  the  contrary,  regarding  the  problem  from  the 
cavalry  point  of  view,  grasped  the  possibilities,  and  wanted 
to  weld  that  arm  of  the  service  into  an  effective,  and  even 
deadly,  weapon  of  offence.  Throughout  the  Revolutionary 
operations,  Washington  seems  to  have  looked  upon  cavalry 
much  as  did  Scott  and  Meade  in  the  later  struggle ;  and,  in 
the  Revolution,  no  Sheridan  forged  to  the  front. 

The  campaign  of  1777  —  Washington's  third  —  was 
marked  by  Burgoyne's  invasion  from  Canada,  and  the  ill- 
considered  and  altogether  aimless  movement  of  Sir  William 
Howe  on  Philadelphia.  The  northern  campaign  began  in 
the  middle  of  June,  and  closed  with  the  Saratoga  surrender 
on  the  17th  of  October.  Burgoyne  was  a  cavalry  o nicer, 
and  had  won  such  distinction  as  he  enjoyed  by  organizing 
the  so-called  "light-horse"  as  an  arm  of  the  English  military 
service.  Now,  however,  he  was  called  upon  to  conduct 
operations  in  a  well-nigh  primeval  wilderness,  through  which 
he  should  have  moved  by  water  whenever  it  was  possible  so 
to  do,  but  elected  to  march  by  land.  Accordingly,  men, 
and  Germans  in  some  cases  at  that,  accustomed  to  Euro- 
pean roads,  found  themselves  following  woodland  trails 
through  a  country  intersected  by  creeks,  and  consisting  in 
great  part  of  impassable  morasses.     Under  such  conditions. 


74  MILITARY  STUDIES 

a  mounted  force  would  have  been  simply  an  additional  en- 
cumbrance. Accordingly,  in  the  Saratoga  campaign,  cavalry 
cut,  and  could  cut,  no  figure ;  and,  as  will  presently  be  seen, 
a  mistaken  inference  drawn  by  Gates  from  this  chapter  in 
his  earlier  experience  led  a  year  later  to  his  final  undoing. 

But  if  there  was  no  obvious  use  to  be  made  of  cavalry, 
or  rather  of  an  improvised  force  of  mounted  rangers,  in  the 
swampy  wilderness  at  the  head  of  Lake  George  and  about 
Saratoga,  it  was  quite  otherwise  in  Maryland  and  southern 
and  eastern  Pennsylvania,  the  region  which  Howe  selected 
as  the  field  for  his  operations ;  and  that  in  which  Washing- 
ton next  had  to  figure. 

During  the  earlier  months  of  that  summer,  there  had  been 
some  desultory  movements  on  the  part  of  Howe,  from  New 
York  as  a  base,  which  Washington  had  contented  himself 
with  observing.  He  was  at  this  juncture  pursuing  a  true 
Fabian  policy.  He  was,  also,  wise  in  so  doing ;  for,  in  every 
branch  of  the  service,  —  infantry,  artillery,  or  even  cavalry, 
—  the  force  opposed  to  him  was  incomparably  superior  to 
anything  he  could  put  in  motion.  These  operations  were 
at  the  time  not  inaptly  referred  to  in  England  as  Howe's 
"two  weeks'  fooling  in  New  Jersey" ;  and  it  is  surely  need- 
less to  point  out  how  valuable  any  mounted  force,  regular 
or  irregular,  would  have  been  to  the  patriot  commander 
while  they  were  in  process.  Indeed,  it  is  not  easy  to  see 
how,  without  even  the  pretence  of  such  an  arm  to  his  ser- 
vice, he  contrived  to  keep  in  the  field.  His  opponent 
must,  apparently,  have  been  singularly  devoid  of  anything 
even  remotely  resembling  aggressive  alertness.  Presently 
Howe  moved  his  army  back  to  Staten  Island,  and,  loading 
it  on  transports,  disappeared  from  view  until  the  last  days 
of  July,  when  he  turned  up,  so  to  speak,  at  the  entrance  of 
Delaware  Bay.     Washington  at  once  hurried  his  ill-organized 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  75 

command  to  the  new  field  of  operations.  On  his  way  he 
passed  through  Philadelphia,  where  the  Continental  Con- 
gress was  then  holding  its  sittings ;  and,  from  a  letter  written 
by  John  Adams  to  his  wife,  we  get  a  glimpse  of  a  more  or 
less  nebulous  cavalry  contingent  as  a  component  part  of  the 
patriot  army.  John  Adams  wrote:  "Four  regiments  of 
light-horse,  Bland's,  Baylor's,  Sheldon's,  and  Moylan's. 
Four  grand  divisions  of  the  army,  and  the  artillery  with  the 
matrosses.  They  marched  twelve  deep,  and  yet  took  up 
above  two  hours  in  passing  by.  General  Washington  and 
the  other  general  officers  with  their  aides  on  horseback. 
The  Colonels  and  other  field-officers  on  horseback."  No 
mention  is  in  this  letter  made  of  the  First  Troop, 
Philadelphia  City  Cavalry,  though  that  body  acted  as 
Washington's  escort  when  he  passed  through  the  city.1 

1  The  Philadelphia  City  Troop  is  probably  the  oldest  distinctively 
cavalry  organization  in  America,  and  its  record,  both  independently  and 
as  a  school  for  officers  of  the  national  mounted  service,  has  been  notice- 
ably creditable.  A  detailed  and  elaborate  history  of  the  Troop,  from  its 
organization  in  November,  1774,  to  1874,  was  prepared  and  published  in 
the  latter  year.  A  record  of  its  service  also  is  to  be  found  in  the  Annual 
Report  of  the  Adjutant-general  of  Pennsylvania  for  the  year  ending 
December  31,  1907.  This  Troop  served  under  Washington's  immediate 
command  as  a  species  of  headquarters  escort,  not  only  at  Trenton  and 
Princeton  but  subsequently  at  Brandywine.  Repeatedly  in  action,  it 
took  part  in  such  scouting  and  picketing  as  was  then  done.  Its  record 
was  in  every  way  creditable ;  but,  none  the  less,  the  detailed  history  of 
the  Troop  confirms  the  statements  in  the  text,  and  forcibly  illustrates  the 
quite  disorganized  and  wholly  unreliable  character  of  the  mounted  force 
attached  to  Washington's  army  throughout  the  operations  described. 
Those  in  command  had  apparently  no  conception  of  an  organized  cavalry 
force,  operating  as  such  and  as  an  independent  unit.  The  service  rendered 
by  the  Troop  was  for  no  particular  or  extended  term,  and  consisted 
chiefly  of  courier  duty,  attendance  at  headquarters,  and  somewhat  in- 
effective scouting,  generally,  it  would  appear,  by  individuals  or  small 
details. 

Not  impossibly,  the  usefulness  of  a  small  cavalry  body  constituted  and 
serving  after  the  manner  of  the  Troop,  may  have  suggested  the  special 
appeal  issued  by  Congress  on  March  2,  1778,  in  which  the  desire  was 


76  MILITARY  STUDIES 

Presently,  the  British  expedition  made  its  appearance  in 
Chesapeake  Bay;  and,  finally,  a  landing  was  effected  near 
Elkton.  Philadelphia,  it  was  plain,  was  now  the  British 
objective,  and  Washington  proceeded  to  plant  himself  in 
Howe's  path.  With  a  force  some  eleven  thousand  strong, 
only  half-disciplined  and  wretchedly  equipped,  while  Howe 
had  eighteen  thousand  regulars,  with  an  artillery  contingent, 
this  was  distinctly  audacious.  Going  by  sea,  Howe,  of 
course,  could  not  have  had  any  considerable  force  of  mounted 
men,  probably  only  a  squadron  or  two.1 

What  now  ensued  illustrated  most  strikingly  the  absence 
of  cavalry  on  either  side.  To  one  trained  practically  in  the 
methods  of  modern  warfare  it  reads  like  a  burlesque,  exciting 
a  sense  of  humor  as  well  as  a  feeling  of  amazement.  While 
Howe's  army  lay  at  Elkton,  preparing  in  a  leisurely  way  to 
take  up  its  line  of  march  to  Philadelphia,  Washington,  it  is 
said,  accompanied  by  Greene  and  Lafayette,  with  a  few  aids, 

expressed  that  a  number  of  like  organizations  might  be  formed  in  all  the 
States.  It  was  urged  that  it  was  "the  duty  of  those  who  enjoy  in  a  pecul- 
iar degree  the  gifts  of  fortune  and  of  a  cultivated  understanding,  to  stand 
forth  in  a  disinterested  manner  in  defence  of  their  country  and  by  laudable 
example  to  rouse  and  animate  their  countrymen  to  deeds  worthy  of  their 
brave  ancestors,  and  of  the  sacred  cause  of  freedom."  To  "the  young 
men  of  Property  and  Spirit"  in  the  several  States  it  was  earnestly  recom- 
mended that  within  their  respective  States  they  constitute  ! '  a  Troop  or 
Troops  of  Light  Cavalry  to  serve  at  their  own  expense  (except  in  the  ar- 
ticle of  provisions  for  themselves  for  forage  for  their  horses)  until  the  31st 
of  December  next." 

xStedman  says  (I.  289)  that  Howe's  army,  including  "a  regiment  of 
light-horse,"  embarked  at  New  York  on  the  5th  day  of  July,  "  where  both 
foot  and  cavalry  remained  pent  up,  in  the  hottest  season  of  the  year,  in 
the  holds  of  the  vessels,  until  the  23d,  when  they  sailed  from  Sandy  Hook." 
It  was  the  24th  of  August  before  the  expedition  reached  its  landing-place, 
at  the  Head  of  Elk.  Not  until  the  8th  of  September  was  the  entire 
force  concentrated  and  put  in  motion  towards  Philadelphia.  Such  of  the 
horses  of  the  expedition  as  survived  were  thus,  during  the  most  trying 
period  of  the  American  summer,  kept  exactly  seven  weeks  in  the  holds  of 
the  transports. 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  77 

went  forward  to  reconnoitre.  In  other  words,  the  two 
generals,  most  prominent  in  the  army  and  necessary  to  its 
preservation  as  well  as  effectiveness,  accompanied  by  a  dis- 
tinguished foreign  guest,  actually  went  out  in  person  on  a 
scout.  In  the  early  days  of  our  Civil  War,  a  prominent 
politician  freshly  made  a  general  distinguished  himself  by 
attempting  a  close  reconnoissance  on  a  railroad  train;  and, 
in  South  Africa,  on  one  memorable  occasion,  an  English  com- 
mander undertook  to  ascertain  the  whereabouts  of  the  enemy 
by  utilizing  a  park  of  artillery  as  a  skirmish  line:  but  no 
case  except  this  of  Washington  is  recorded  of  a  command- 
ing general  going  on  an  overnight  scout  himself  because, 
apparently,  he  could  in  no  other  way  get  information  of  a 
kind,  to  say  the  least,  highly  desirable. 

Riding  forward  to  certain  elevations,  from  which  they  got 
a  glimpse  of  a  few  tents  in  the  distance,  Washington  and  his 
companions  were  caught  on  their  return  in  a  heavy  rain,  and 
took  shelter  for  the  night  in  a  farm-house  which  chanced  to 
be  owned  and  occupied  by  a  loyalist.  They  seem  to  have 
been  without  escort  and  ran  as  great  a  risk  of  being  gobbled 
up  as  did  Lee,  eight  months  before.  Judging  by  Lafayette's 
long  subsequent  account  of  this  performance,  Washington's 
companions  passed,  that  night,  some  anxious  hours.  Sub- 
sequently a  friendly  warning  was  received  from  Virginia, 
to  the  effect  that  greater  caution  on  the  part  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief would  in  future  be  expedient. 

It  next  devolved  upon  the  patriot  army  to  cover  Philadel- 
phia. Howe  was  perfectly  advised  as  to  the  composition  of 
the  force  opposed  to  him,  the  inadequacy  of  its  equipment, 
its  lack  of  cavalry  or  any  mounted  service,  and  its  consequent 
inability  to  secure  early  and  correct  information  as  to  his  own 
whereabouts  and  tactics.  He  acted  accordingly,  preparing 
a  flank  movement  almost  exactly  similar  to  that  so  success- 


78  MILITARY  STUDIES 

fully  employed  on  Long  Island  a  year  previous,  and  at  both 
Chancellorsville  and  Sadowa  in  the  following  century.  The 
lesson  administered  by  Clinton  at  Flatbush,  on  Long  Island, 
had,  it  would  appear,  not  been  sufficiently  taken  to  heart ; 
so  Cornwallis  proceeded  to  administer  it  again  at  Bir- 
mingham meeting-house,  on  the  Brandywine.  The  complete 
absence  of  any  effective  mounted  force  was  once  more  ap- 
parent, as  well  as  the  utter  impracticability  of  successfully 
conducting  military  operations  in  a  fairly  open  country  with- 
out the  assistance  of  such  a  force.  Both  propositions  received 
added  and  unmistakable  illustration  in  each,  changing  phase 
of  an  anxious  day,  and  at  every  stage  of  its  not  very  com- 
plicated movements.  It  is  even  now  instructive  to  follow 
them  in  detail.  Cornwallis,  in  immediate  command  of  one 
of  the  two  divisions  into  which  Howe  had,  for  this  occasion, 
divided  his  army,  proceeded  to  move  around  Washington's 
unsuspecting  right,  just  as  " Stonewall"  Jackson  eighty-five 
years  later,  and  less  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  further 
south,  circled  Hooker's  right.  Trevelyan  says  (Pt.  Ill,  228) 
that  the  reports  which  now  reached  Washington  "were  in  a 
high  degree  confused  and  contradictory.  He  had  not  the 
means  of  getting  at  the  positive  truth,  because  he  was  very 
weak  in  cavalry";  and  so  the  morning  of  a  momentous  day 
wore  away  "  amidst  distracting  doubts  and  varying  counsels." 
Presently,  as  the  result  of  a  reconnoissance  made  by  a  single 
horseman  sent  out  to  explore  by  Sullivan,  who  commanded 
the  American  right,  Washington  was  erroneously  advised  as  to 
his  opponent's  probable  plan  of  operations,  and  set  his  forces 
in  motion  for  an  attack  on  that  portion  of  Howe's  army  in 
his  own  immediate  front.  Other  and  more  correct  informa- 
tion then  at  last  reaching  him,  he  again  changed  his  plan ; 
but  it  was  now  too  late.  Howe's  flanking  movement  had 
been  completely  and  successfully  carried  out;    and  it  only 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  79 

remained  for  the  historian  to  record  that  the  disaster  which 
a  few  hours  later  overwhelmed  the  patriot  cause  was  due  to 
the  fact  that  those  in  charge  of  it  could  obtain  "no  reliable 
information  from  the  inhabitants,  and  had  so  few  and  in- 
sufficient cavalry  that  they  could  make  no  extended  and  rapid 
explorations.'7  A  year  almost  to  a  day  had  elapsed  since 
this  same  Sullivan  had  found  himself  the  victim  of  a  precisely 
similar  movement  on  Long  Island,  his  opponent  getting  in 
his  rear  by  a  perfectly  obvious  roundabout  route,  but  one 
over  which  an  enemy's  approach  was  never  " dreamed  of." 
On  that  occasion  Sullivan,  having  no  men  at  his  disposal  to 
watch  the  road,  had,  it  will  be  remembered,  "paid  horsemen 
fifty  dollars  for  patrolling  it  by  night"  ;  and  now,  under  very 
similar  conditions,  he  wrote,  "I  have  never  had  any  light- 
horse  with  me  since  I  joined  the  army.  I  found  four  when 
I  came  to  Brentford's  Ford,  two  of  whom  I  sent  off  with 
Captain  Hazen  to  Jones's  Ford."  In  such  a  state  of  affairs, 
with  an  overpowering  hostile  force  creeping  around  the 
army's  right  wing,  the  question  naturally  suggests  itself, 
where  were  "Bland's,  Baylor's,  Sheldon's,  and  Moylan's  four 
regiments  of  light-horse"?  x  Of  them  and  their  movements 
no  mention  is  made.  Howe  now  had  Washington  exactly 
where  a  vigorous  and  energetic  commander  likes  to  get  his 
opponent.  Demoralized  and  exhausted,  the  patriot  army 
was  driven  into  a  cul-de-sac  formed  by  the  junction  of  the 
Schuylkill  with  the  Delaware.  Ruthlessly  pursued,  there 
was  no  escape  for  it.     As  the  alternative  to  surrender  it 

1  Fisher  remarks  (II.  27)  :  "  This  Sullivan  who  learned  of  the  flanking 
movement  too  late  at  Brandywine,  was  the  same  Sullivan  who  had  failed 
to  know  of  the  flanking  movement  in  time  at  Long  Island.  His  forte  did 
not  lie  in  protecting  an  army's  flank."  This,  possibly,  is  true.  It  is, 
however,  equally  true  that  on  a  previous  notable  historical  occasion  the 
forte  of  the  children  of  Israel  did  not  lie  in  the  making  of  bricks  without 
straw. 


80  MILITARY  STUDIES 

would  have  been  hustled  into  the  river.  But  now  the  ab- 
sence of  any  cavalry  contingent  in  Howe's  army  became 
equally  apparent.  An  effective  mounted  force,  energetically 
led,  if  then  flung  on  Washington's  disordered  and  retreating 
masses,  could  hardly  have  failed  to  convert  the  rout  into  a 
panic;  and  Washington  might  now  have  undergone  the 
same  experience  at  the  hands  of  Cornwallis  which  Gates 
almost  exactly  three  years  later  underwent  at  his  and  Tarle- 
ton's  hands  at  Camden.  Washington  owed  his  salvation 
to  the  absence  of  a  British  cavalry  contingent,  combined 
perhaps  with  the  constitutional  inertness  of  an  opponent 
who  never  saw  any  occasion  for  following  up  an  advantage. 
Having  won  what  could  easily  have  been  made  a  decisive 
victory,  Sir  William  Howe  showed  no  disposition  to  assume 
an  active  aggressive,  but  lay  for  two  weeks  in  camp  in  an 
agreeable  situation  in  a  healthy  high  position  within  a  few 
miles  of  his  altogether  successful  battle-field. 

During  this  inexplicable  interval  in  active  operations,  the 
absence  on  the  patriot  side  of  any  eyes  and  ears  of  an  army 
received  further  forcible  illustration  in  the  so-called  Paoli 
" massacre"  of  September  20,  through  which  "Mad  An- 
thony" Wayne  got  a  rough  lesson  in  warfare.  When  Wash- 
ington, after  the  disaster  on  the  Brandywine,  withdrew  across 
the  Schuylkill,  he  left  a  small  force,  some  fifteen  hundred 
strong,  on  its  further  side,  under  Wayne,  to  watch  Howe,  and, 
it  is  said  to  "harass  his  rear"  if  he  moved  forward.  The 
reason  thus  given  for  such  a  risky  division  of  a  force,  insuffi- 
cient at  best,  is  not  over  and  above  intelligible;  and,  cer- 
tainly, infantry  were  here  left  to  do  what  was  plainly  the  work 
of  cavalry.  Wayne  also  was,  like  Sullivan  on  the  Brandy- 
wine,  without  the  means  of  effective  outpost  service.  Ap- 
parently he  had  a  few  very  inefficient  mounted  men  posted 
as  videttes,  who  failed  to  give  timely  notice  of  the  enemy's 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  81 

approach.1  The  natural  result,  a  night  surprise,  followed. 
At  about  one  o'clock  in  the  morning  Wayne's  camp  was 
rushed,  and  he  lost  about  a  fifth  of  his  command,  —  lives 
thrown  away.  But  historically  the  affair  has  its  lesson ;  for 
the  different  eyes  with  which  historians  regard  it  and  state 
the  facts  connected  with  it  are  suggestive.  In  Trevelyan's 
narrative  only  is  there  any  comment  on  the  absence  of  organ- 
ization which  made  such  a  foot-surprise  practicable,  —  the 
single  military  lesson  to  be  learned  from  it :  but  one  historian 
says  of  the  British  commander,  Major-General  Grey,  his 
"only  distinction  in  the  war  was  in  prisoner-killing";  and, 
in  this  case,  he  "  committed,  it  is  said,  most  ruthless  slaughter 
with  sword  and  bayonet  on  those  he  first  came  upon.  .  .  . 
Wayne  was  not  surprised,  as  has  been  generally  supposed. 
...  He  was  accordingly  well  prepared,  resisted  gallantly, 
and  was  able  to  retire,  saving  his  artillery  and  stores."  2  The 
other  historian  then  tells  us :  "The  best  officer  in  Howe's  army, 
short  of  Cornwallis,  was  Charles  Grey,  who  died  Earl  Grey 
of  Howick  in  Northumberland,  and  who  was  the  father  of  the 
celebrated  Whig  prime-minister.  It  once  was  the  fashion  in 
America  to  write  about  General  Grey  as  if  he  was  a  pair  with 
Governor  Tryon;  but,  in  truth,  he  was  a  high-minded  and 
honorable  gentleman,  and  a  soldier  every  inch  of  him.  .  .  . 
It  was  as  complete  a  surprise,  and  as  utter  a  rout,  as  ever 
occurred  in  modern  warfare."  3  On  this  disputed  point  it 
can  only  be  observed  that,  if  the  American  commander  was 
at  Paoli  not  surprised  and  was  "well  prepared"  against  a 
midnight  attack,  the  outcome  thereof  called  for  a  great  deal 
of  explanation  on  his  part.  A  loss  of  between  three  and  four 
hundred  sustained  by  his  command  was  counterbalanced  by 
"precisely   a  dozen   casualties  in  the  English  ranks."     If 

"well  prepared"  for  him,  Wayne  certainly  failed,  on  that 
*  Stillfi's  Wayne,  86.  2  Fisher,  II,  33.  3  Trevelyan,  Pt.  Ill,  233. 


82  MILITARY  STUDIES 

occasion,  to  give  his  opponent  what  is  in  warfare  known  as  a 
warm  reception.  At  the  bar  of  history  the  burden  of  further 
proof  would  appear  to  rest  on  the  American  investigator. 

During  the  previous  winter  Congress,  presumably  on  the 
suggestion  of  Washington,  had  given  some  more  or  less  shad- 
owy consideration  to  the  idea  of  organizing  a  body  of  what 
was  termed  "light  cavalry,"  in  apparent  distinction  to  the 
severely  drilled  and  heavily  accoutred  dragoon ;  for,  stated  in 
general  terms,  in  Europe  the  dragoon  constituted  the  more 
solid  mounted  arm  of  the  service,  equipped  with  carbines, 
while  the  hussar  and  lancer,  lighter  and  more  dashing,  de- 
pended on  the  sabre  and  lance.  Both  were  quite  unfitted  to 
the  essential,  but  little  understood,  conditions  of  practical 
warfare  in  America ;  and  glimpses  of  the  grotesque  proposi- 
tions at  this  stage  of  the  struggle  gravely  pressed  on  the 
attention  of  the  Congress  are  here  and  there  obtainable 
through  the  correspondence  of  the  time.  The  following,  for 
example,  is  from  an  unpublished  letter  of  John  Adams, 
written  to  James  Warren  of  Massachusetts  from  Philadel- 
phia in  June,  1775,  nor  would  it  be  easy  to  imagine  a 
greater  contrast  than  that  between  the  stagey  apparition 
here  described,  and  the  actual  American  irregular  mounted 
force  which,  naturally  evolved,  rendered  such  effective  ser- 
vice under  Lee  and  Tarleton,  in  the  later  stages  of  the  war. 
"A  few  minutes  past"  wrote  Adams,  "a  curious  Phenome- 
non appeared  at  the  Door  of  our  Congress,  —  a  German 
Hussar,  a  veteran  in  the  Wars  in  Germany,  in  his  Uniform, 
and  on  Horse  back,  a  forlorn  Cap  upon  his  Head,  with  a 
Streamer  waiving  from  it  half  down  to  his  Waistband,  with 
a  Deaths  Head  painted  in  Front,  a  beautiful  Hussar  Cloak 
ornamented  with  Lace  and  Fringe  and  Cord  of  Gold,  a 
Scarlet  Waist  coat  under  it,  with  shining  yellow  metal 
Buttons  —  a  Light  Gun  strung  over  his  shoulder,  —  and  a 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  83 

Turkish  Sabre,  much  Superior  to  an  high  Land  broad  sword, 
very  large  and  excellently  fortifyed  by  his  side-Holsters 
and  Pistols  upon  his  Horse  —  in  short  the  most  warlike  and 
formidable  Figure,  I  ever  saw.  He  says  he  has  fifty  such 
Men  ready  to  enlist  under  him  immediately  who  have  been 
all  used  to  the  Service  as  Hussars  in  Germany,  and  desirous 
to  ride  to  Boston  immediately  in  order  to  see  Burgoignes 
light  Horse/ ' 

During  the  winter  of  1776-1777  Congress  once  more 
authorized  the  formation  of  a  mounted  force ;  but  whether 
any  such  force  ever  really  came  into  existence,  even  on 
paper,  is  questionable.  The  historians  make  no  mention  of 
it.  Meanwhile,  Count  Pulaski  had  now  been  for  some  time 
in  the  country  and  attached  to  Washington's  headquarters 
as  a  member  of  his  military  family.  Bancroft,  in  his  not 
very  satisfactory  or  intelligible  account  of  the  Brandywine 
operations,  enigmatically  says,  "on  that  day  [Pulaski] 
showed  the  daring  of  adventure  rather  than  the  qualities  of  a 
commander";  but,  apparently  because  of  his  dashing  con- 
duct, Congress,  on  the  recommendation  of  Washington,  com- 
missioned him  as  brigadier-general.1    This  was  done,  the  his- 

1  Pulaski  held  no  appointment  at  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Brandywine. 
He  had  a  high  opinion  of  his  own  qualities,  for  he  asked  "such  rank  and 
command  in  the  army  of  these  united  states  as  will  leave  him  subordi- 
nate to  the  Commander  in  Chief  alone,  or  to  him  and  the  Marquis  de 
Lafayette."  —  Journals,  VIII,  673. 

Washington's  view  of  the  cavalry  may  be  measured  by  his  recom- 
mendation of  Pulaski:  "This  department  is  still  without  a  head;  as 
I  have  not,  in  the  present  deficiency  of  Brigadiers  with  the  army,  thought 
it  advisable  to  take  one  from  the  foot  for  that  command.  The  nature  of 
the  horse  service  with  us  being  such,  that  they  commonly  act  in  detach- 
ment, a  general  officer  with  them  is  less  necessary  than  at  the  head  of 
the  Brigades  of  infantry.  .  .  .  But  though  the  horse  will  suffer  less  from 
the  want  of  a  general  officer  than  the  foot,  a  man  of  real  capacity,  ex- 
perience, and  knowledge  in  that  service,  might  be  extremely  useful." 
Franklin,  in  his  indorsement  of  Pulaski,  said  nothing  of  his  special  fitness 
for  the  cavalry  service,  and  Washington  doubtless  only  repeated  the  Polish 


84  MILITARY  STUDIES 

torian  informs  us,  "in  order  to  encourage  and  develop  that 
arm  which  heretofore  had  amounted  to  little  or  nothing  in 
the  patriot  service. "  * 

It  is,  of  course,  easy  to  be  wise  after  the  event,  nor,  in  the 
full  light  of  subsequent  occurrences,  does  it  imply  much 
perspicacity  to  see  what  ought  to  have  been  done,  or  left 
undone,  at  any  given  crisis  of  human  affairs.  Premising 
all  this,  it  is  yet  difficult  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  if, 
in  the  autumn  and  winter  of  1777,  the  organization 
and  development  of  an  effective  mounted  force  in  the 
American   Continental    army    was    the   end    in   view,    the 

adventurer's  own  claims  when  he  told  Congress  that  '/as  the  principal 
attention  in  Poland  has  been  for  some  time  past  paid  to  the  cavalry,  it 
is  to  be  presumed  this  gentleman  is  not  unacquainted  with  it. "  —  Writings 
of  Washington  (Ford),  VI,  57n.  He  was  appointed  to  command  the 
horse,  with  the  rank  of  brigadier-general,  but  the  experiment  was  short  and, 
apparently,  the  reverse  of  fortunate.  He  resigned  his  command  in  March, 
1778,  to  raise  an  independent  mixed  force  of  horse  and  foot,  known  in 
Revolutionary  annals  as  "Pulaski's  Legion."  —  Journals,  X,  312. 

1  Pulaski,  some  months  after  his  appointment,  complained  of  the  "in- 
effective state"  of  the  cavalry.  "It  cannot  be  appropriated  to  any  other 
service  than  that  of  orderlies  or  reconnoitring  the  enemy's  lines,  which 
your  Excellency  must  be  persuaded  is  not  the  only  service  expected  from  a 
corps,  which,  when  on  a  proper  footing,  is  so  very  formidable.  Although 
it  is  the  opinion  of  many,  that,  from  the  construction  of  the  country,  the 
cavalry  cannot  act  to  advantage,  your  Excellency  must  be  too  well  ac- 
quainted with  the  many  instances  wherein  the  cavalry  have  been  decisively 
serviceable,  to  be  of  this  opinion,  and  not  acknowledge  that  this  corps  has 
more  than  once  completed  victories.  .  .  .  What  has  greatly  contributed 
to  the  present  weak  state  of  the  cavalry  was  the  frequent  detachments 
ordered  to  the  suite  of  general  and  other  officers,  while  a  colonel  com- 
manded, which  were  appropriated  to  every  use,  and  the  horses  drove 
at  the  discretion  of  the  dragoons."  —  Correspondence  of  the  Revolution 
(Sparks),  II,  53.  Again,  in  December,  1777,  he  wrote:  "While  we  are 
superior  in  cavalry,  the  enemy  will  not  dare  to  extend  their  force,  and,  not- 
withstanding we  act  on  the  defensive,  we  shall  have  many  opportunities  of 
attacking  and  destroying  the  enemy  by  degrees ;  whereas,  if  they  have  it 
in  their  power  to  augment  their  cavalry,  and  we  suffer  ours  to  diminish  and 
dwindle  away,  it  may  happen  that  the  loss  of  a  battle  will  terminate 
in  our  total  defeat.  Our  army,  once  dispersed  and  pursued  by  their  horse, 
will  never  be  able  to  rally."  —  lb.  57. 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  85 

selection  of  Pulaski  as  the  officer  to  effect  that  result  was 
in  no  way  happy. 

A  showy,  dashing  Polish  horseman,  and,  as  the  end  showed, 
a  most  generous  and  gallant  young  fellow,  Pulaski,  as  Chief  of 
Cavalry  for  the  somewhat  inchoate  Continental  army  of  1778, 
labored  under  difficulties  which  were  in  fact  insuperable. 
With  a  quick  temper  and  impatient  disposition,  he  could  not 
make  himself  understood  in  English;  and,  a  stranger  in  a 
strange  land,  his  whole  former  military  experience  was, 
among  Americans  and  under  American  conditions,  a  positive 
drawback.  He  submitted  to  Washington  a  sensible  memo- 
rial in  which  he  pointed  out  clearly  the  pressing  necessity 
of  an  organized  and  improved  cavalry  service;  and,  subse- 
quently, he  forwarded  several  reports  setting  forth  in  most 
imperfect  English  the  difficulties  he  encountered.  These 
undoubtedly  were  both  great  and  irritating,  if,  indeed,  ap- 
proached in  the  way  proposed,  they  were  not  insurmountable. 
But,  while  Pulaski  addressed  himself  with  zeal  to  the  task  he 
sought  for  and  which  was  assigned  him,  he  plainly  did  not  go 
at  it  in  the  right  way,  —  in  the  way  in  which,  for  instance, 
Morgan  would  probably  have  gone  at  it.  In  other  words,  he 
did  not  understand  America,  and  had  no  correct  idea  as  to 
conditions.  Consequently,  as  Sparks  very  well  puts  it,  "the 
officers  of  the  several  regiments,  who  had  heretofore  been  in 
a  measure  independent,  were  not  easily  reconciled  to  the 
orders  of  a  superior,  particularly  of  a  foreigner  who  did  not 
understand  their  language,  and  whose  ideas  of  discipline,  ar- 
rangement, and  manoeuvres  were  different  from  those  to 
which  they  had  been  accustomed." *  The  result  naturally  to 
be  expected  in  due  time  ensued.  Thus  the  first  attempt  at  a 
Continental  cavalry  organization  failed ;  nor  can  the  respon- 
sibility for  its  failure  be  attributed  exclusively  to  the  inju- 
1  Life  of  Count  Pulaski,  Sparks'  American  Biography,  New  Series,  IV. 


86  MILITARY  STUDIES 

dicious  interference  of  an  intractable  Congress.  It  failed 
because  it  was  in  no  way  American,  or  entered  upon  with  a 
correct,  because  instinctive,  appreciation  of  existing  poten- 
tialities. And  so  the  brave  and  unfortunate  Pulaski  passed 
on  to  his  early  death.  It  was  merely  another  case  of  a  square 
peg  in  a  round  hole.  But  the  question  still  presents  itself  — ■ 
Who  put  the  peg  in  that  particular  hole?  —  and  did  the  per- 
son making  the  assignment  exactly  understand  either  the 
nature  of  the  hole  or  the  adaptation  of  the  peg  to  it? 

And  this  query  leads  to  the  very  heart  of  the  historical 
topic  now  under  consideration.  Stated  broadly  and  as  an 
abstract  military  proposition,  there  is  no  branch  of  the 
service  in  which  a  familiar  acquaintance  with  the  country 
to  be  operated  in,  and  its  conditions,  is  so  essential  to  a 
commander's  success,  as  in  the  cavalry.  To  any  one  experi- 
enced in  warfare,  this  proposition  is  elementary.  A  man  not 
to  the  manner  born  may  be  a  good  officer  of  infantry  or  of 
artillery,  and  an  excellent  engineer,  even  though  he  speaks 
but  indifferently  the  language  of  his  soldiers ;  not  so  the  effi- 
cient commander  of  horse.  To  be  really  effective,  he  must 
be  of  his  command ;  his  troopers  must  see  in  him  one  of  them- 
selves. Especially  is  this  so  in  a  new  country,  such  as  the 
United  States  in  all  respects  was  during  the  last  half  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  In  America  and  in  Europe,  engineer- 
ing and  artillery  were  in  essentials  the  same.  That  European 
infantry  at  times  found  themselves  out  of  place  under  Ameri- 
can conditions  had  been  demonstrated  before  Fort  Du  Quesne 
and  again  at  Bunker  Hill ;  but  still  the  European  battalion 
and  officers  could  do  good  work  when  in  the  open  and  out 
of  the  reach  of  rangers  and  riflemen.  With  cavalry  it  was 
altogether  otherwise.  American  conditions  called  for  a 
species  of  mounted  service  peculiar  to  themselves ;  and,  in 
organizing  and  commanding  it,  a  European  had  first  to  un- 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  87 

learn  everything  he  had  ever  been  taught,  and  start  fresh. 
He  must  understand  the  country,  its  people  and  their  speech ; 
he  must  be  familiar  with  its  breed  of  horses,  its  roads  and 
its  forage.  In  a  word,  no  less  in  Revolutionary  times  than 
during  our  War  of  Secession,  if  a  leader  is  going  to  prove  a 
cavalry  success,  he  must  be  a  Daniel  Morgan  and  not  a 
Casimir  Pulaski. 

To  the  closet  historian,  all  this  may  at  best  be  news,  or  at 
worst  seem  quite  immaterial ;  but  any  man  who  in  America 
has  himself  ever  "set  a  squadron  in  the  field"  in  presence  of 
an  enemy  will  see  in  it  not  only  the  alphabet,  but  the  very 
crux  itself,  of  his  calling.  And  after  two  whole  years  of 
campaigning  in  the  Jerseys  and  Pennsylvania,  Washington,  it 
might  not  unreasonably  be  assumed,  would  have  grasped  this 
elementary  proposition.  That  he  did  so  grasp  it,  there  is 
no  evidence  whether  in  his  operations  or  his  correspondence. 
Yet  the  third  year  of  active  warfare  was  now  drawing  to  its 
end,  and  while  poor  Pulaski  was  struggling  in  vain  with  the 
English  language  and  a  "Legion"  cavalry  organization 
at  once  inchoate,  ill-considered  and  insubordinate,  both 
Morgan  and  Arnold  were  in  command  of  men  who  ought 
to  have  been  on  horseback  with  rifles  on  their  saddle- 
bows, but  who  still  marched  and  fought  on  foot  with 
musket  and  bayonet. 

To  return,  however,  to  the  Brandywine  and  the  course 
of  military  events.  The  battle  was  fought  September  1 1 ; 
and  towards  the  close  of  that  month,  Howe,  skilfully  out- 
manoeuvring Washington,  threw  his  army  across  the 
Schuylkill,  and  occupied  Philadelphia.  This  has  been  pro- 
nounced "the  cleverest  piece  of  work"  ever  accomplished 
by  him,  but  his  success  in  it  was  again  entirely  due  to 
Washington's  absolute  lack  of  any  approach  to  an  effective 
outpost  service. 


88  MILITARY  STUDIES 

The  battle  of  Germantown  followed,  involving,  of  course, 
the  continued  occupation  of  Philadelphia  by  the  British. 
An  audacious  conception,  and  well  planned,  it  came  near 
being  a  brilliant  success.  Unfortunately,  there  was,  as  the 
historians  say,  no  possibility  of  quick  communication  on  the 
field;  owing  to  the  prevalence  of  dense  fog  the  position  of 
the  enemy  could  not  be  correctly  ascertained ;  and  the  small 
mounted  force  available,  amounting  in  all  perhaps  to  some 
400  men,  was  divided  up  among  the  several  commands  for 
headquarter  and  orderly  service.  But,  considering  the 
nature  of  the  locality,  and  the  atmospheric  conditions  which 
that  morning  prevailed,  it  is  at  least  questionable  whether 
at  Germantown  any  opportunity  presented  itself  for  the 
effective  use  of  horse.  The  force  there  present,  is,  however, 
referred  to  in  the  accounts  of  the  affair  as  "  Pulaski's  cav- 
alry"; and  this,  so  far  as  appears,  is  the  first  recognition  of 
the  mounted  man  as  a  distinctive  branch  of  American  army 
organization. 

Such  was  the  close  of  the  campaign  of  1777.  Valley  Forge 
followed ;  for,  on  the  19th  of  December,  Washington  led  his 
now  wholly  demoralized  following,  an  army  in  name  only, 
along  the  western  bank  of  the  Schuylkill  to  their  doleful 
winter  quarters. 

Summarizing  the  campaign  of  1777,  so  far  as  the  operations 
conducted  by  Washington  in  person  were  concerned,  Trevel- 
yan  says  that  if  Washington  had  "  begun  the  campaign  with 
a  respectable  force  of  cavalry,  numerous  enough  to  cover 
his  own  front  and  watch  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  his 
advance  guard  need  never  have  been  surprised  at  Paoli, 
and  even  Brandy  wine  might  have  told  another  tale."  He 
then  adds  that  Washington,  during  the  Valley  Forge  winter, 
gave  much  of  both  time  and  thought  to  the  creation  of  such  a 
force.     The  organization  of  what  was  subsequently  known  as 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  89 

"Lee's  Legion"  resulted.1  Though  doubtless,  as  Trevelyan 
says,  Washington  gave  closest  attention  to  everything  which 
concerned  the  enlistment,  the  equipment,  and  above  all,  the 
mounting  of  the  troopers  composing  this  body,  yet  that  very 
corps,  famous  as  it  subsequently  became  in  Revolutionary 
annals,  and  brilliant  and  effective  as  the  work  done  by  it  un- 
questionably was,  emphasizes  forcibly  Washington's  limita- 
tions as  a  cavalry  leader,  and  his  failure  to  grasp  in  a  large 
way  the  part  which  a  sufficient  and  effective  mounted  service, 
both  might  and  should  have  played  in  the  general  field  of  the 
operations  which  it  devolved  on  him  to  conduct.  Trevelyan 
says  truly  enough,  "The  American  cavalry  had  small  begin- 
nings and  never  attained  very  large  dimensions ;  but  it  was 
a  serviceable  instrument  of  war  from  the  first  moment,  and 
ultimately  it  played  a  memorable  part  in  deciding  the  cam- 
paign which  preserved  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas  to  the 
Union."  But,  while  this  is  undeniable  so  far  as  it  goes,  it  is 
suggestive  of  more,  —  a  good  deal  more,  —  to  be  said  on  the 
same  topic. 

Why  was  all  this  thus?  "Lee's  Legion,"  modelled,  by  the 
way,  apparently  on  Pulaski's  ill-conceived  idea  of  an  effective 
American  cavalry  service,  consisted  of  some  three  hundred 
men,  one-half  only  of  whom  were  mounted.  Instead  of  or- 
ganizing a  cavalry  command  of  such  wholly  inadequate  pro- 
portions, why  was  King's  Mountain  not  anticipated,  and  a 
call  sent  out  for  the  frontiersmen  and  rangers  of  Virginia  and 
Pennsylvania  to  come  riding  in  on  their  own  horses?  Why 
were  not  Morgan's  riflemen  jerked  into  the  saddle,  where  they 
would  have  felt  far  more  at  home  than  on  their  feet?  2 

1  Journals,  XI,  545. 

2  In  the  paper  laid  before  the  Committee  of  Congress,  in  camp,  January, 
1778,  Washington  said :  — 

"The  benefits  arising  from  a  superiority  of  horse  are  obvious  to  those 
who  have  experienced  them.     Independent  of  such  as  you  may  derive 


90  MILITARY  STUDIES 

In  view  of  what  subsequently  took  place  during  the  War  of 
Secession  in  this  country/  and  what  took  place  in  South 
Africa  more  recently,  under  conditions  strikingly  similar  to 
those  which  obtained  here  during  our  Revolution,  it  is  useless 
to  say  that  this  was  impracticable;  and  the  question  next 
naturally  presents  itself  —  Who  was  responsible  for  this 
strategic  and  military  shortcoming?  The  unavoidable  an- 
swer suggests  itself.  And  yet  Trevelyan  in  a  footnote  to  the 
very  page  in  his  narrative  from  which  quotation  has  just 


from  it  in  the  field  of  battle,  it  enables  you  very  materially  to  control  the 
inferior  and  subordinate  motions  of  an  enemy,  to  impede  their  knowledge 
of  what  you  are  doing,  while  it  gives  you  every  advantage  of  superior 
intelligence,  and  consequently  facilitates  your  enterprise  against  them 
and  obstructs  theirs  against  you.  In  a  defensive  war,  as  in  our  case,  it  is 
peculiarly  desirable,  because  it  affords  great  protection  to  the  country, 
and  is  a  barrier  to  those  inroads  and  depredations  upon  the  inhabitants, 
which  are  inevitable  when  the  superiority  lies  on  the  side  of  the  invaders. 
The  enemy,  fully  sensible  of  the  advantages,  are  taking  all  the  pains  in 
their  power  to  acquire  an  ascendancy  in  this  respect,  to  defeat  which,  I  would 
propose  an  augmentation  of  the  cavalry."  It  was  at  this  very  time  Wash- 
ington was  discussing,  in  the  way  described  by  Trevelyan,  the  formation 
of  Lee's  Legion,  and  he  would  still  have  only  four  regiments  of  cavalry. 
—  Works  of  Alexander  Hamilton  (1850),  II,  144. 

That  the  experience  was  not  entirely  wasted  on  Hamilton  is  shown  by 
his  opinion  given  to  Pickering  in  1797 :  "I  am  much  attached  to  the  idea 
of  a  large  corps  of  efficient  cavalry,  and  I  can  not  allow  this  character  to 
militia.  It  is  all-important  to  an  undisciplined  against  a  disciplined  army. 
It  is  a  species  of  force  not  easy  to  be  brought  by  an  invader,  by  which 
his  supplies  may  be  cut  off,  and  his  activity  extremely  checked.  Were  I 
to  command  an  undisciplined  army,  I  should  prefer  half  the  force  with  a 
good  corps  of  cavalry  to  twice  the  force  without  one."  —  lb.  VI,  249. 

1  The  most  recent  (1910)  foreign  critic  on  the  American  Civil  War  and 
its  results  thus  expresses  himself  on  this  point :  — 

"Perhaps  the  principal  military  lesson  (to  be  derived  from  a  study  of 
that  war)  is  in  the  use  of  Cavalry.  The  problem  of  getting  Cavalry  to  fight 
well  on  foot,  without  losing  its  Cavalry  Spirit,  is  often  spoken  of  now-a-days 
as  a  sort  of  ideal  to  be  approached  rather  than  attained;  but  Sheridan, 
Stuart,  and  Forrest  all  solved  it  to  perfection,  using  mounted  and  dis- 
mounted action  indifferently,  though  the  two  latter  had  few  real  cavalry 
in  proportion  to  the  size  of  their  commands."  —  J.  Formby,  The  American 
Civil  War,  484. 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  91 

been  made,  says  that  when  Stuart  was  taking  Washington's 
portrait,  wishing  to  interest  his  sitter,  he  wrote,  "I  began  on 
the  revolution,  the  battles  of  Monmouth  and  Princeton,  but 
he  was  absolutely  dumb.  After  a  while  I  got  on  horses.  I 
had  touched  the  right  chord."  Washington  was  at  that 
time  {circa  1794)  President,  and  living  in  Philadelphia. 
Trevelyan  adds  he  then  had  twenty-six  horses  in  his 
stable. 

The  explanation  seems  obvious.  Washington  began  his 
military  career  as  a  backwoods  Indian  fighter ;  and  he  never 
forgot  the  lessons  then  learned,  nor  outgrew  that  experience. 
In  the  wooded  wildernesses  of  the  Alleghanies  cavalry  could 
not  operate.  All  he  knew  of  it  was  from  hearsay,  and  reading 
the  news-letter  accounts  of  the  campaigns  and  battles  of 
Frederick.  And  so,  Virginian  though  he  was,  from  the  be- 
ginning to  the  end  of  his  military  life,  there  is,  so  far  as  can  be 
discovered,  no  indication  of  any  adequate  conception  of  the 
value  and  importance  of  the  mounted  man  in  military  opera- 
tions, and  more  especially  in  that  particular  form  of  military 
operation  which  it  devolved  upon  him  to  conduct.  Yet  it  is 
the  first  business  of  any  great  soldier  both  to  appreciate  and 
study  the  nature  of  the  weapons  at  his  command,  and  then  to 
make  full  and  effective  use  of  them. 

In  the  employment  of  the  several  recognized  arms  of  the 
service  in  the  Revolutionary  struggle,  the  British  enjoyed  a 
great,  and  for  the  patriots  an  insuperable,  advantage  as  re- 
spects infantry  and  artillery  —  what  is  known  as  the  line-of- 
battle  organization.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Americans, 
from  the  outset,  found  compensation  in  their  superior  mark- 
manship,  individuality  and  mobility.  Recourse  should, 
accordingly,  have  been  had  to  the  rifle  and  the  horse.  From 
Lexington  to  King's  Mountain,  with  Bennington  by  the  way, 
the  opponent  the  British  officer  most  dreaded  the  sight  of 


92  MILITARY  STUDIES 

was  the  leather-clad  ranger ; *  and,  of  all  descriptions  of  rang- 
ers, the  organized  mounted  ranger  was  the  most  potentially 
formidable. 

It  is  useless  to  object  that  in  1777  the  use  made  of 
mounted  men  and  irregular  cavalry  in  modern  warfare  had  not 
yet  been  developed.  In  the  first  place,  such  is  not  the  fact. 
It  had  been  developed  even  in  Roman  times ;  and,  as  already 
pointed  out,  Parthian  tactics  were  quite  as  proverbially  fa- 
miliar as  Fabian.  By  the  same  token,  in  Virginia  the  name 
of  Rupert  was  always  one  to  conjure  with.  In  the  next 
place,  if  the  use  that  could  be  made  of  mounted  men  in 
American  open  country  warfare  had  not  previously  been 
developed,  it  was  the  province  of  Washington  then  to 
develop  it.  That  is  what  he  was  there  for;  and  a  little 
later,  at  King's  Mountain  and  Cowpens,  the  instinct  of  his 
people  developed  it  for  him. 

The  obvious  objection  will,  of  course,  next  be  advanced 

that  the  keep  of  horses  is  costly,  and  Washington,  when  not 

wholly  destitute,  was  always  short  of  funds.     This  hardly 

merits  attention.     The  Connecticut  cavalry  were  dismissed 

and  sent  home  on  the   specific   ground   that  horses  were 

thought  to  be  of  no  use  in  the  operations  then  in  hand. 

1  Trevelyan,  Pt.  Ill,  259,  375;  Fisher,  II,  92.  While  the  rifle  as  an  im- 
plement in  warfare  seems  to  have  been  wholly  unknown  in  the  British  ser- 
vice of  the  Revolutionary  period,  marksmanship  was  neither  taught  nor 
practised ;  and,  as  early  as  during  the  siege  of  Boston,  Sir  William  Howe 
wrote  home  telling  of  the  "terrible  guns  of  the  rebels."  Finally  he  suc- 
ceeded in  capturing  a  ranger,  and  "sent  him  to  England,  rifle  and  all,  and 
the  marksman  was  made  to  perform  there  and  exhibited  as  a  curi- 
osity." Some  six  hundred  of  the  Germans  sent  to  America  were  riflemen, 
known  as  "  Jagers" ;  and,  in  the  negotiations  with  the  landgraves,  it  was 
stipulated  that  as  many  of  the  recruits  as  possible  should  be  riflemen.  — 
Sawyer,  Firearms  in  American  History,  81-83,  140.  Referring  to  the  so- 
called  "massacre"  at  Paoli,  Trevelyan  justly  observes  (Pt.  Ill,  236): 
"Men  always  attach  the  idea  of  cruelty  to  modes  of  warfare  in  which  they 
themselves  are  not  proficient ;  and  Americans  liked  the  bayonet  as  little 
as  Englishmen  approved  of  taking  deliberate  aim  at  individual  officers." 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  93 

The  riders  were  invited  to  serve  on  foot.  Yet  only  a  month 
later,  because  of  the  lack  of  even  a  pretence  of  a  mounted 
service,  Washington's  advanced  line  was  flanked,  and  the 
very  flower  of  his  army  needlessly  sacrificed.  A  thousand 
men  were  there  lost.  They  represented  the  price  of  the 
keep  of  a  few  hundred  horses  for  one  month ;  while,  at  that 
very  time,  the  majority  of  the  dwellers  on  Long  Island  were 
Tories,  whose  fields  were  heavy  with  forage.  In  the  next 
place,  Washington  did  not  then,  nor  afterwards,  cry  aloud 
for  eyes  and  ears  for  his  army,  and  have  them  denied  him 
on  the  score  of  cost.  On  the  contrary,  until  Valley  Forge 
he  does  not  seem  to  have  been  conscious  of  the  absence 
from  it  of  eyes  and  ears ;  at  least,  no  allusion  to  the  want  is 
found  in  his  writings.  Finally,  later  on,  the  item  of  cost  did 
not,  in  1780  to  1782,  prove  an  insuperable  obstacle  in  the 
way  of  the  development  of  a  most  effective  mounted  service 
in  the  Southern  Department;  though,  compared  with 
Greene's,  Washington's  camp  chest  was  a  purse  of  Fortunatus. 
As  respects  the  argument  from  cost,  however,  once  for  all  it 
should  be  premised  that  war,  effectively  conducted,  is  a  grim 
reality,  and  in  no  way  a  dilettante,  delicately  handled  pas- 
time. In  it  men  must  be  armed  and  equipped,  somehow; 
horses  must,  in  some  way,  be  had  and  fed.  The  Confederates 
had  no  great  supply  of  money  between  1862  and  1865,  but 
they  had  a  most  effective  mounted  service;  likewise,  the 
South  African  Boers  in  a  more  recent  struggle.  In  practical 
warfare  the  formation  of  a  cavalry  force  is  not  so  much  a  ques- 
tion of  money  as  of  the  existence  of  an  adequate  supply  of 
horses,  of  forage  and  of  men  accustomed  to  the  saddle.  Of  all 
these,  and  of  the  best,  the  America  of  the  Revolutionary 
period  possessed  abundance.  At  King's  Mountain,  the  pro- 
spective cost  of  horse-keep  was,  so  far  as  appears,  not  taken 
into  consideration. 


94  MILITARY  STUDIES 

If  this  limitation  of  Washington's  military  capacity  was 
obvious  in  the  two  campaigns  of  1776  and  1777,  that  of  1778 
emphasized  the  deficiency.  The  campaign  opened,  inaus- 
piciously  enough,  with  the  somewhat  inexplicable  Barren  Hill 
performance,  under  the  leadership  of  a  boy  of  twenty,  for 
Lafayette  at  that  time  still  lacked  six  months  of  attaining 
his  majority.  Though  May  was  well  advanced,  active  opera- 
tions had  not  yet  begun.  The  British  army,  still  under  the 
command  of  Sir  William  Howe  (though  being  superseded  by 
Clinton,  he  was  about  to  sail  for  England)  occupied  Philadel- 
phia ;  while  the  patriots,  just  again  gathering  strength  after 
their  terrible  winter  experience,  remained  at  Valley  Forge. 
Washington  determined  to  feel  the  enemy;  and,  with  that 
end  in  view,  sent  out  (May  18)  a  detachment,  some  fifteen 
hundred  strong,  of  his  best  troops,  with  Lafayette  in  com- 
mand. It  was,  in  fact,  a  reconnoissance  in  force;  and,  as 
such,  should  have  been  composed  in  the  main  of  cavalry, 
with  a  strong  infantry  support  and  artillery  contingent.  The 
patriot  army,  however,  had  no  cavalry  to  speak  of,  so  La- 
fayette marched  off  with  a  command  composed  almost  exclu- 
sively of  foot.  Crossing  the  Schuylkill  by  a  ford  some  two 
hours'  march  only  from  Valley  Forge,  he  advanced  to  Barren 
Hill,  within  twelve  miles  of  Philadelphia,  and  there  went 
into  camp.  What  ensued  illustrates  several  things :  among 
them,  more  especially,  the  extreme  danger  of  attempting 
without  cavalry  a  close  reconnoissance  of  an  enemy  of 
superior  force ;  and,  next,  the  utter  impossibility  of  effect- 
ing an  intelligible  agreement  between  any  two  accounts  of 
an  outpost  affair. 

Fully  informed  as  to  the  movement,  the  British  arranged 
to  bag  Lafayette  and  his  command.  By  merest  chance,  com- 
bined with  the  dull  incompetence  of  Major-General  Grant, 
who  commanded  one  of  the  British  columns,  the  bagging  plan 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  95 

failed  by  the  narrowest  of  margins;  but  it  is  instructive 
to  read  of  the  affair  in  the  accounts  of  Tower,1  of  Fisher 2  and 
of  Stedman.3  They  agree  in  hardly  any  detail ;  and  Sted- 
man  only  of  the  three,  the  one  participant  and  military  writer, 
gives  a  map  of  the  field  of  operations  and  makes  mention  of 
the  "  confused  galloping  of  some  of  the  enemy's  horsemen/' 
through  whose  panicky  performances  Lafayette  probably 
received  his  first  intimation  of  impending  danger;  while 
"a  corps  of  [British]  cavalry  took  possession  of  a  hill"  which 
was  not  defended,  instead  of  being  thrown  forward  to  seize 
the  ford  by  which  alone  could  Lafayette's  frightened  foot 
effect  an  escape.  The  whole  episode  afforded  an  interesting 
example  both  of  the  absence  and  misuse  of  the  weapons 
essential  to  success  in  warfare.  According  to  Fisher,  how- 
ever, Washington  did  profit  by  the  experience,  for  he  "was 
careful  to  risk  no  more  valuable  detachments  to  watch  for 
the  evacuation  of  Philadelphia."  In  other  words,  having 
no  cavalry  to  send,  he  sent  out  no  more  infantry  to  do 
cavalry  work. 

All  this  was  preliminary ;  and  it  was  not  until  a  month  later 
(June  18)  that  the  campaign  really  opened.  During  that 
month  Washington  was  observing  Clinton  closely,  know- 
ing well  that  the  British  army  must,  move,  but  in  natural 
doubt  as  to  the  direction  of  movement.  It  would  seem 
that  the  utmost  degree  of  mobility  on  his  own  part 
should  then  have  been  present  to  his  mind  as  the  great 
necessity  of  the  hour.  If  such  was  the  case,  the  thought  took 
no  outward  form,  and  remained  unexpressed  in  correspond- 
ence. June,  1778,  witnessed  at  last  the  withdrawal  of  the 
British  army  from  Philadelphia,  and  its  somewhat  inglorious, 

1  Lafayette  in  the  American  Revolution  (1895),  I,  326-338. 

2  The  Struggle  for  American  Independence  (1908),  II,  146-148. 

3  History  of  the  American  War  (1794),  I,  376-379. 


96  MILITARY  STUDIES 

but  successful,  transfer  across  New  Jersey  to  New  York.  To 
the  absence  of  cavalry  as  a  factor  of  efficiency  in  the  patriot 
army,  its  escape  from  total  destruction  was  then  largely  due. 

Why,  at  this  advanced  stage  of  the  war,  it  should  have  been 
thus  lacking  is  not  apparent.  For  Trevelyan  also  tells  us 
that  when  Clinton  set  out  on  his  march  from  Philadelphia  to 
New  York,  his  army  had  at  its  disposition  no  less  than  five 
thousand  horses,  "  almost  all  of  which  had  been  collected  by 
requisition  or  purchase,  during  Sir  William  Howe's  occupa- 
tion of  Pennsylvania. " 

To  a  like  effect,  the  same  excellent  authority  asserts 
that  General  Greene,  Washington's  quartermaster,  had  dur- 
ing the  same  period  "  secured  a  vast  quantity  of  horses  for  the 
artillery  and  transport"  of  the  patriot  army.  Pennsylvania, 
as  well  as  Virginia,  it  would  seem,  was  well  supplied  with 
mounts;  and,  with  Virginia  only  the  other  side  of  the  Po- 
tomac, troopers  would  naturally  not  have  been  far  to  seek. 

Sir  Henry  Clinton  had  now  succeeded  Sir  William  Howe. 
For  good  and  sufficient  reasons,  when  his  position  at  Phila- 
delphia had  become  difficult  as  well  as  objectless,  he  decided 
to  transfer  himself  to  New  York.  It  was  in  fact  a  withdrawal 
from  a  position  no  longer  tenable.  For  equally  satisfying 
reasons,  practical  as  well  as  strategic,  it  was  determined  to 
make  the  transfer  by  a  land  march.  When  the  British  army 
started  on  its  return,  the  movement  was  not  unanticipated  on 
the  part  of  Washington;  and  it  is  curious  in  reading  the 
narratives  to  note  through  incidental  mentionings  how  very 
gradually  it  was  that  the  use  of  mounted  men  in  the  kind  of 
warfare  they  were  then  engaged  in  dawned  on  the  patriot 
leaders.  While,  for  instance,  Clinton's  troops  passed  out  of 
Philadelphia  and  crossed  the  river  at  dawn,  six  hours  later, 
Trevelyan  tells  us,  a  part  of  Major  Lee's  dragoons  galloped 
down  to  the  quay  in  time  to  see  the  English  rear  guard  off,  as 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  97 

it  ferried  the  Delaware.  To  the  same  effect,  Fisher  says  that 
Allan  McLane  with  his ' '  rough  riders  "  was  the  first  who  entered 
the  town.  Fisher  further  notes  that  during  the  Valley  Forge 
winter  this  Allan  McLane,  "a  rough  rider  and  freebooter  of 
the  most  gallant  type,  had  scouted  between  the  Delaware  and 
the  Schuylkill,  makingdashes  up  to  the  gates  of  the  redoubts," 
which  had  been  thrown  up  for  the  protection  of  Philadel- 
phia. Finally,  he  says  that  Washington  during  the  season 
had  troops  between  the  Delaware  and  the  Schuylkill,  who, 
being  rough  riders  and  acting  in  small  bands,  obtained  in- 
formation and  watched  the  movements  of  the  British.  Pre- 
sumably there  were  thus  attached  to  the  patriot  army  the 
initial  germs  of  such  a  mounted  organization  as  the  situation 
called  for.  It  is  obvious,  however,  it  had  not  been  organized 
on  any  large  scale  or  comprehensive  plan,  and  was  not  in 
such  force  as  enabled  it  materially  to  effect  subsequent 
strategic  operations. 

One  thing,  however,  stands  plainly  out,  —  undeniable.  No 
military  movement  could  possibly  have  been  much  more  open 
to  fatal  disaster  through  an  application  of  Parthian  tactics 
than  that  march  of  the  British  army  from  Philadelphia  to 
Sandy  Hook,  in  June,  1778.  "When  the  British  reached 
their  second  halting-place,  the  rain  poured  down  for  fourteen 
consecutive  hours,  ruining  the  highways,  soaking  the  bag- 
gage, spoiling  the  ammunition  and  provisions,  and  drenching 
the  soldiers  to  the  skin."  Under  such  conditions  Clinton's 
progress  was  inordinately  slow,  and  he  "consumed  a  full 
week  over  the  first  forty  miles  of  his  journey."  The  heat 
then  became  intense,  and  Trevelyan  says  that  the  British 
infantry,  "burdened  like  pack  horses,"  were  preceded  by  a 
train  of  carts  "a  dozen  miles  in  length  and  frequently  com- 
pelled to  travel  on  a  single  causeway."  The  whole  country- 
side was  up  in  arms,  bent  on  impeding  his  progress ;  and  Sir 


98  MILITARY  STUDIES 

Henry  Clinton  had  no  cavalry.  All  the  bridges  over  which 
the  column  had  to  pass  were  broken  down ;  the  road,  such  as 
it  was,  "was  execrable,  and  the  heat  like  the  desert  of  Sa- 
hara." When  the  retreating  army  got  in  motion,  on  the 
torrid  morning  of  the  eleventh  day,  Trevelyan  adds,  "innu- 
merable carriages  gradually  wound  themselves  out  of  the 
meadows  where  they  had  been  parked,  and  covered  in  un- 
broken file  the  whole  of  the  eleven  miles  of  highway  which 
led  northward  from  Monmouth  Court  House  to  the  village  of 
Middletown."  It  was  here  that  the  American  infantry, 
under  General  Charles  Lee,  struck  the  retreating  column. 
Though  since  Washington's  unhappy  experience  on  Long 
Island  in  August,  1776,  he  had  struggled  through  nearly  two 
entire  years  of  campaign  work,  at  once  active  and  disastrous, 
Charles  Lee  now  found  himself  as  respects  mounted  men  and 
field  intelligence  almost  exactly  in  the  position  of  Sullivan 
before  Brooklyn  and  on  the  Brandywine.  It  seems  incred- 
ible, but  so  wholly  without  cavalry  was  the  general  in  charge 
of  Washington's  leading  division  in  the  advance  to  Monmouth, 
that  at  seven  o'clock  on  the  evening  before  the  battle,  unable 
to  get  any  precise  information  as  to  his  enemies'  whereabouts, 
Lee  hurriedly  wrote  to  Washington  —  "  The  people  here  are 
inconceivably  stupid.  I  have  sent  two  lively  young  foot 
men,  for  they  have  no  horses,  to  reconnoitre."  Then  he 
added  in  a  postscript,  "I  wish  your  Excellency  would  order 
me  two  or  three,  if  they  can  be  spared,  active,  well-mounted, 
light-horsemen." 

From  such  a  revelation,  it  is  curious  to  reflect  on  what 
might,  under  the  general  conditions  of  time,  place,  season, 
topography  and  movement,  have  been  the  result  had  the 
Americans  at  this  stage  of  the  war  resorted  to  Parthian 
tactics  —  anticipated  the  methods  of  the  Boers  instead  of 
constantly  recurring  to  the  traditions  and  practice  of  Marl- 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  99 

borough  and  Frederick,  —  traditions  and  practice  wholly 
misleading  in  America.  The  military  as  well  as  historic 
truth  is  that,  on  this  as  on  other  occasions,  Washington 
measured  himself  and  his  army  up  against  his  adversary  at 
the  point  where  they  were  strongest  and  he  was  least  so. 
He  opposed  infantry  to  infantry ;  oblivious  of  the  fact  that 
the  British  infantry  were  of  the  most  perfectly  organized 
kind,  while  his  own  was  at  best  an  extemporized  force. 
The  natural  result  followed.  Whatever  the  mounted  force 
under  Harry  Lee  or  Allan  McLane  may  have  been,  it  is  ap- 
parent that  it  was  not  sufficient  to  cut  any  figure  during  the 
momentous  movement  culminating  at  Monmouth  Court 
House.  To  a  wagon  train,  eleven  miles  in  length,  the 
American  cavalry  offered  no  disturbing  obstacle.  To  have 
stopped  that  train's  forward  movement,  and,  in  so  doing,  to 
have  thrown  the  whole  column  into  confusion,  would  in  our 
day  have  been  a  simple  matter.  But  the  weapon  was  not  at 
command.  It  was  by  a  margin  of  only  five  days  that  Clin- 
ton's army  escaped  heavy  disaster,  if  not  total  destruction. 
Drawing  inferences  from  this  record,  would  it  be  unfair  to 
conclude  that  two  thousand  of  the  King's  Mountain  rangers 
led,  we  will  say,  by  Daniel  Morgan,  might,  during  those 
momentous  ten  days  of  transfer,  have  very  potently  contrib- 
uted towards  then  and  there  ending  the  War  of  Independ- 
ence ?  If  so,  there  would  seem  to  be  ground  for  concluding 
that  at  that  juncture  of  Revolutionary  experiences  also,  as 
well  as  at  Flatbush  and  on  the  Brandywine,  economy  in 
horse-keep  may  have  cost  somewhat  dearly. 

"No  more  pitched  battles  were  fought  in  the  North. 
Washington  never  met  Clinton  in  the  field.  The  two  com- 
manders, one  impregnably  intrenched  in  the  Highlands,  and 
the  other  impregnably  intrenched  in  the  town  of  New  York, 
simply  watched  each  other,  from  July,  1778,  until  September, 


100  MILITARY  STUDIES 

1781,  when  Washington  made  his  sudden  move  to  Yorktown, 
Virginia."  1 

The  period  of  active  operations  which  has  now  been  passed 
in  review  covered  almost  exactly  two  years,  from  July,  1776, 
to  July,  1778.  During  nearly  the  whole  of  that  period  the 
British  operations  were  directed  by  Sir  William  Howe. 
With  no  natural  aptitude  for  cavalry  leadership,  Howe 
had  no  cavalry  at  his  command ;  nor  does  it  seem  ever  to 
have  occurred  to  him  that  the  key  of  the  situation,  so  far 
as  active  field  operations  were  concerned,  lay  in  the  de- 
velopment and  use  of  that  weapon  in  warfare.  But  of 
Howe  and  his  characteristics  it  is  not  necessary  here  to  speak. 
They  are  elsewhere  discussed.2  Suffice  it  now  to  say  that 
both  as  a  man  and  a  commander  he  was  one  of  a  class  fre- 
quently met  with  in  all  military  annals,  but  in  British  mili- 
tary annals  perhaps  a  little  more  frequently  than  elsewhere. 
Lacking  in  initiative,  he  was  also  inert  in  the  hour  of  victory, 
belonging  to  the  "enough-for-one-day  "  order  of  merit.  Wel- 
lington's career  once  supplied  a  dramatic  illustration  of 
what  is  apt  to  occur  when  a  born  soldier  suddenly  finds 
himself  at  a  moment  of  crisis  subordinated  to  one  of  this 
type,  —  the  incident  eliciting  from  Wellington  at  the  time 
a  highly  characteristic  ejaculation.  It  was  in  Portugal,  at 
Vimeiro,  August  20,  1808,  where  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  as  he 
then  was,  in  temporary  command  of  the  British  expedition- 
ary force,  met  the  French  army  of  occupation  under  Junot. 
That  day  the  future  Duke  found  himself  pitted  for  the  first 
time  against  the  soldiers  of  the  Empire.  He  scored  a  decided 
success ;  and  then,  a  born  fighter  with  victory  in  his  grasp, 
he  was  replaced  in  command  by  Sir  Harry  Burrard,  his 
senior  in  commission,  who  had  put  in  his  appearance  while 

1  Fisher,  II,  207.  Morgan,  at  this  time,  wrote  to  Washington,  "You 
know  the  cavalry  are  the  eyes  of  the  infantry."  *  Infra,  168-170. 


WASHINGTON   AND  'OAYAL&Y  101 

the  battle  was  still  on.  Junot  was  in  exactly  the  position  of 
Washington  after  the  Brandywine.  By  a  vigorous  forward 
movement  Junot  could  be  cut  off  from  Lisbon,  as  Washing- 
ton from  Philadelphia.  Wellesley  saw  his  opportunity. 
The  French  were  in  full  retreat,  and  the  English  advance 
along  the  Torres  Vedras  road  had  begun;  when,  suddenly, 
Burrard,  assuming  command,  ordered  all  pursuit  to  stop.  In 
vain  Wellesley  expostulated,  saying:  "Sir  Harry,  now  is 
your  time  to  advance.  The  enemy  are  completely  beaten. 
We  shall  be  in  Lisbon  in  three  days."  Like  Howe  at  Flat- 
bush  and  again  at  the  Brandywine,  Burrard  held  that 
"enough  had  been  done  for  one  day";  and  it  only  re- 
mained for  the  disgusted  Wellesley  to  turn  away,  remarking 
characteristically  to  his  aid  as  he  did  so,  "Well,  then,  there  is 
nothing  for  us  soldiers  to  do  here  except  to  go  and  shoot  red- 
legged  partridges!"  Judging  by  his  own  masterly  dispo- 
sition and  energetic  pursuit  of  a  routed  enemy  three  years 
later  at  Camden  (August  16, 1780),  Cornwallis,  at  the  Brandy- 
wine (September  11,  1777),  must  have  been  in  much  the  same 
mood  towards  his  commander  as  was  Wellington,  long  after- 
wards, at  Vimeiro.  The  flank  movement  conducted  by  him 
had  been  wholly  successful ;  taken  unawares  and  beaten,  the 
American  army  was  in  full  retreat,  while  Philadelphia,  the 
British  objective  eighteen  miles  only  from  them,  was  three  and 
twenty  from  the  main  body  of  the  Americans,  driven  into 
a  cul-de-sac.  And,  under  such  circumstances,  Cornwallis 
heard  Howe  order  his  army  to  discontinue  pursuit.  As  on 
Long  Island  a  year  before,  "enough  had  been  done  for  that 
day."  In  narrating  the  course  of  British  operations  about 
New  York  under  Howe,  Lord  Mahon  exclaims  (VI,  194), 
"Thus  was  some  respite  obtained  for  the  harassed  and  dis- 
pirited remnant  of  the  American  army.  —  Oh !  for  one 
hour  of  Clive  !"     Lord  Clive  was  four  years  only  the  senior  of 


102  UtLITKKY  STUDIES 

Sir  William  Howe,  as  he  was  four  years  Gage's  junior.  It  is 
well  known  historically  that  when,  in  November,  1774,  Clive 
died  by  his  own  hand,  the  British  Ministry,  in  view  of  that 
appeal  to  the  sword  towards  which  the  disputes  with  the 
American  colonists  were  then  plainly  tending,  had  planned  to 
avail  themselves  of  his  services.  In  the  outcome  of  either 
Flatbush  or  the  Brandywine,  Cornwallis  in  command  would 
probably  have  sufficed  wholly  to  change  the  course  of  events ; 
but  it  confounds  the  imagination  to  try  even  to  conceive 
what  history  might  have  had  to  record  had  it  been  fated  for 
Washington,  in  place  of  Major-General  Thomas  Gage,  or 
Lieutenant-Generals  Sir  William  Howe  and  Sir  Henry 
Clinton,  to  confront  Robert  Clive  at  Boston  in  1775,  at  New 
York  in  1776,  on  the  Brandywine  in  1777,  or  at  Monmouth 
in  1778. 

After  Monmouth,  the  seat  of  active  Revolutionary  warfare 
was  transferred  from  the  vicinity  of  New  York  and  the  Jer- 
seys to  the  Carolinas,  and  General  Nathanael  Greene,  in  place 
of  Washington,  directed  operations.  Before,  however, 
Greene  superseded  Gates,  one  incident  connected  with  the 
latter's  southern  fiasco  is  suggestive  in  the  present  connec- 
tion. When  Gates  first  assumed  command,  some  of  the 
officers  with  experience  in  his  new  Department,  especially 
Colonel  White  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Washington,  both  of 
whom  had  commanded  mounted  men,  pressed  on  his  atten- 
tion the  importance  of  that  branch  of  the  service  in  the  coun- 
try in  which  he  now  had  to  operate.  Gates  paid  no  atten- 
tion to  their  suggestions.  His  indifference  probably  resulted 
from  his  experience  at  Saratoga  where,  as  already  pointed 
out,  cavalry  could,  from  the  nature  of  the  country  and  the 
conditions  under  which  operations  were  conducted,  perform 
no  obviously  important  service.  In  his  Memoirs,  "Light 
Horse  Harry"  Lee  attributes  to  his  neglect  of  the  advice 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  103 

now  tendered  the  crushing  disaster  which  at  Camden  soon 
after  befell  Gates.  "In  no  country  in  the  world/'  he  adds, 
"were  the  services  of  the  cavalry  more  to  be  desired  than 
was  that  which  was  committed  to  Major-General  Gates,  and 
how  it  was  possible  for  an  officer  of  his  experience  to  have 
been  regardless  of  this  powerful  auxiliary  remains  inexpli- 
cable." 

It  is  not  necessary  here  to  enter  in  detail  into  the  opera- 
tions conducted  in  the  Carolinas  between  the  occupation 
of  Charleston  by  the  British,  in  May,  1780,  and  their  final 
evacuation  of  South  Carolina  in  September,  1782.  It  is 
sufficient  to  say  that,  as  a  military  study  from  the  cavalry 
point  of  view,  those  operations  afford  a  striking  contrast 
to  what  had  previously  taken  place  during  an  almost  exactly 
similar  space  of  time  in  the  Northern  Department. 

There  was,  it  is  true,  a  large  royalist  faction  in  the  Caro- 
linas ;  but  the  same  element  was  found  in  almost  equal  pro- 
portion in  New  York,  New  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania.  The 
horse  was  equally  at  hand  in  each  region ;  while  forage  was 
more  plentiful  in  the  northern  than  in  the  southern  States : 
but  it  seemed  as  though  both  sides,  simultaneously  and  as  if 
from  instinct,  "caught  on"  in  the  Carolinas.1     For  instance, 

1  Describing  the  expedition  to  Savannah  under  Clinton,  Tarleton,  then  a 
lieutenant-colonel,  says  (Campaigns  of  1780  and  1781,  4-6)  it  included 
."a  powerful  detachment  of  artillery"  and  "two  hundred  and  fifty  cavalry." 
It  left  New  York  on  the  26th  of  December,  1779 ;  but,  encountering  a 
succession  of  storms,  the  fleet  was  dispersed,  and  "most  of  the  artillery 
and  all  the  cavalry  horses  perished."  On  landing  in  Tybee  harbor  Tarle- 
ton "found  the  condition  of  his  corps  mortifying  and  distressing ;  the  horses 
of  both  officers  and  men,  which  had  been  embarked  in  excellent  order, 
were  destroyed,  owing  to  the  badness  of  the  vessels  employed  to  transport 
them,  and,  unfortunately,  there  was  no  substitute  found  in  Georgia  to 
remedy  such  a  catastrophe."  Transporting  his  "men  and  furniture"  by 
boat  to  Port  Royal  Island,  Tarleton  proceeded  "to  collect  at  that  place, 
from  friends  and  enemies,  by  money  or  by  force,  all  the  horses  belonging 
to  the  islands  in  that  neighborhood."  This  was  towards  the  end  of  Feb- 
ruary; but  "about  the  middle  of  March"  Tarleton  received  orders  to 


104  MILITARY  STUDIES 

Savannah  surrendered  on  the  11th  of  May,  1780,  and,  on  the 
29th  of  the  same  month,  only  eighteen  days  later,  Tarleton 
had  behind  him  seven  hundred  mounted  men  when  he  sur- 
prised Colonel  Buford  at  the  Waxhaws,  and  destroyed 
nearly  his  entire  command.  The  British  officer  had  covered 
one  hundred  and  fifty-four  miles  in  fifty-four  hours.  This 
was  great  cavalry  work.  Nothing  like  it  was  attempted, 
much  less  accomplished,  by  any  of  Washington's  command 
in  the  Monmouth  campaign. 

The  tactics  employed  on  both  sides  in  the  Carolina  struggle 
were  strikingly  suggestive  of  those  employed  in  South  Africa 
a  century  and  a  quarter  later.  They  were  in  largest  part 
partisan.  Irregular  bodies,  the  men  mounted  on  their  own 
horses,  called  together  at  a  moment's  notice  and  separating 
at  the  will  of  those  composing  the  band,  harried  the  land, 
cut  off  detached  parties,  showed  small  mercy  to  prisoners, 
and,  withal,  did  little  in  the  way  of  effective  work  towards 
bringing  warfare  to  an  end.  It  was  a  process  of  exhaus- 
tion. Made  up  chiefly  of  eccentric  partisan  operations,  as 
studied  in  the  voluminous  detail  of  McCrady's  two  bulky 
volumes,  the  narrative  conveys  no  lesson.     The  one  cause 

join  the  main  command,  "if  he  had  assembled  a  sufficient  number  of 
horses  to  re-mount  the  dragoons ;  the  number  was  complete,  but  the 
quality  was  inferior  to  those  embarked  at  New  York."  Less  than  a  month 
later  (April  12)  Tarleton,  with  his  command  thus  re-mounted,  surprised 
General  Huger  at  the  Cooper  River  crossing;  and  "four  hundred  horses 
belonging  to  officers  and  dragoons,  with  their  arms  and  equipments  (a 
valuable  acquisition  for  the  British  cavalry  in  their  present  state),  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  victors.  .  .  .  This  signal  instance  of  military  advantage 
may  be  partly  attributed  ...  to  the  injudicious  conduct  of  the  American 
commander,  who  besides  making  a  false  disposition  of  his  corps,  by  placing 
his  cavalry  in  front  of  the  bridge  during  the  night,  and  his  infantry  in  the 
rear,  neglected  sending  patrols  in  front  of  his  videttes"  (lb.  16,  17).  Ex- 
actly one  month  later  Charleston  was  surrendered,  and  Tarleton  led  his 
command,  remounted  in  the  way  described,  on  the  raid  referred  to  in  the 
text.  No  similar  showing  of  energy  and  enterprise  in  the  cavalry  arm 
of  the  service  had  up  to  this  time  been  seen  on  either  side. 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  105 

for  wonder  is,  how  Greene,  without  arms,  munitions,  cloth- 
ing, commissariat  or  camp-chest,  contrived  to  keep  the 
field  at  all. 

As  to  Greene,  also,  it  is  impossible  now  to  say  whether  he 
possessed  in  any  marked  degree  the  elements  of  an  officer 
of  cavalry.  He,  however,  fully  realized,  as  a  result  of 
experience,  the  immense  importance  of  that  arm  of  the 
service,  causing  him  to  write  to  Lafayette,  when  the  latter 
was  conducting  operations  in  Virginia,  the  enemy  "are 
increasing  their  cavalry  by  every  means  in  their  power,  and 
have  a  greater  number  than  we  have,  though  not  of  equal 
goodness.  We  are  trying  to  increase  ours.  Enlarge  your 
cavalry  or  you  are  inevitably  ruined."  l    . 

It  is  a  curious  and  very  noticeable  fact,  also,  that  as 
respects  both  the  organization  of  cavalry  and  its  effective 
use,  the  British  not  only  seem  to  have  taken  the  initiative, 
but  they  held  their  advantage  up  to  the  close  of  the  struggle. 
In  other  words,  while  cavalry  in  the  campaigns  of  Corn- 
wallis  and  Lord  Rawdon  acted  as  an  adjunct  in  military 
operations,  and  was  used  effectively  in  this  way,  this  on 
the  patriot  side  was  the  case  to  a  very  limited  extent  only. 
All  the  cavalry  Greene  ever  could  depend  upon  as  an  effec- 
tive weapon  in  his  immediate  central  command,  were  the 
comparatively  insignificant  organizations  commanded  by 
Harry  Lee  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Washington.  On  the 
other  hand,  judging  by  McCrady's  statements,  Pickens, 
Marion,  Sumter  and  the  rest  gave  Greene  almost  as  much 

1  G.  W.  Greene,  Life  of  General  Greene,  III,  320.  Greene's  cry  for 
cavalry  seems  to  have  been  loud  and  incessant,  for,  as  he  wrote  to  Wash- 
ington, November  23,  1777,  during  the  operations  about  Philadelphia, 
before  the  army  went  into  its  winter-quarters  at  Valley  Forge:  "We  are 
greatly  distressed  for  want  of  a  party  of  light-horse  ;"  and  again,  the  fol- 
lowing day,  "I  would  wish  if  possible  some  horse  might  be  sent,  as  every 
army  is  an  unwieldy  body  without  them.''  —  lb.  I,  517,  519. 


106  MILITARY  STUDIES 

trouble  as  they  rendered  him  assistance.  He  was  continually 
making  futile  attempts  to  draw  them  under  his  personal 
control  for  some  concentrated  movement ;  while  they,  much 
older  men  and  natives  of  the  country,  plainly  more  or  less 
jealous  of  his,  the  Rhode  Islander's,  authority,  acted  on 
their  own  responsibility,  obeying  or  neglecting  to  obey  his 
orders  much  as  they  saw  fit. 

Two  conflicts,  however,  which  occurred  in  the  Carolinas, 
the  one  at  King's  Mountain  on  the  6th  of  October,  1780,  the 
other  at  the  Cowpens  on  January  17,  1781,  are  especially 
noticeable;  and  King's  Mountain  offered  what  has  since 
been  admiringly  referred  to  by  the  latest  British  investigator 
as  an  exploit  which  affords  "as  fine  an  example  as  can  be 
found  of  the  power  of  wood-craft,  marksmanship  and  sports- 
manship in  war."1  The  whole  patriot  force  engaged  was 
less  than  fourteen  hundred  strong,  " over-mountain  men," 
as  they  were  called.  Suddenly  concentrated,  and  covering 
a  considerable  distance  with  great  rapidity,  "as  soon  as 
they  arrived  near  the  base  of  the  spur  [on  which  the  conflict 
occurred]  the  riflemen  all  dismounted  and,  leaving  their 
coats  and  blankets  strapped  to  the  saddles,  tied  their  horses 
in  the  woods  and  with  scarcely  a  moment's  delay  started  on 
foot  up  the  three  easy  sides  of  the  spur."  Stedman's  ac- 
count of  this  episode  is  curiously  suggestive:  "These  men 
.  .  .  the  wild  and  fierce  inhabitants  of  Kentucky,  and  other 
settlements  west  of  the  Alleganey  Mountains  .  .  .  were  all 
well  mounted  on  horseback  and  armed  with  rifles:  each 
carried  his  own  provisions  in  a  wallet,  so  that  no  incum- 
brance of  waggons,  nor  delays  of  public  departments, 
impeded  their  movements.  .  .  .  When  the  different 
divisions  of  mountaineers  reached  Gilbert-town,  which  was 
nearly  about  the  same  time,  they  amounted  to  upwards 
1  Fortescue,  History  of  the  British  Army,  III,  323. 


WASHINGTON  AND   CAVALRY  107 

of  three  thousand  men.  From  these  fifteen  hundred  of 
the  best  were  selected,  who,  mounted  on  fleet  horses,  were 
sent  in  pursuit."  * 

So,  three  months  later,  at  Cowpens  (January  17,  1781), 
Daniel  Morgan  there  gave  evidence  of  the  possession  of  all 
the  attributes  of  a  born  military  commander  and  cavalry 
leader.  Making  his  dispositions  without  regard  for  accepted 
military  rules,  he  availed  himself  in  the  best  way  possible 
of  the  weapons  at  his  command.  He  had  a  small  force  of 
cavalry  only,  amounting  perhaps  to  one  hundred  and  fifty 
troopers.  They  were  under  the  command  of  Harry  Lee; 
and  these  he  flung  upon  Tarleton's  flank  at  the  crisis  of  the 
action,  in  a  manner  so  effective  that  defeat  became  at  once 
a  rout.  He  hurled  his  little  band  of  horsemen  on  his  oppo- 
nent, when,  to  use  Napoleon's  expression,  "the  battle  was 
ripe,"  much  as  a  stone  is  flung  by  a  slinger.  One  of  the  very 
few  patriot  victories  of  the  entire  war,  Cowpens  was  alto- 
gether the  most  neatly,  though  unscientifically,  fought 
battle  in  it.  The  distinctive  American  attributes  were 
there  manifest  both  in  the  commander  and  in  his 
command. 

1  Major  Patrick  Ferguson  of  the  2d  Battalion,  71st  Regiment  Light 
Infantry,  Highlanders,  an  excellent  and  enterprising  officer,  commanded 
the  loyalists  at  King's  Mountain,  and  there  lost  his  life.  It  is  a  curious 
and  most  interesting  historical  fact  in  connection  with  the  subject  of  the 
present  paper  that  Ferguson  was  the  inventor  of  the  first  serviceable  and 
practical  breech-loading  rifled  weapon  ever  adopted  into  any  service. 
Patented  in  England  in  1776,  by  it  "four  aimed  shots  a  minute  could  be 
fired,  as  against  an  average  of  one  shot  in  fifteen  minutes  with  a  European 
muzzle-loading  rifle  after  it  had  become  foul."  —  Sawyer,  Firearms  in 
American  History,  137-139. 

The  only  difficulty  with  the  Ferguson  breech-loader  seems  to  have  been 
that  it  was,  as  a  weapon  in  practical  European  warfare,  a  full  half  century 
before  its  time.  Even  as  late  as  our  own  War  of  Secession  the  West  Point 
martinets  and  ordnance  officers  were  wholly  opposed  to  the  adoption  of 
the  breech-loading  weapons  for  use  by  infantry.  Breech-loading  cavalry 
carbines  were  in  use. 


108  MILITARY  STUDIES 

So  far  as  Greene's  operations  were  concerned,  while  most 
skilfully  as  well  as  persistently  conducted,  they  indicated 
rather  the  possession  by  him  of  the  attributes  of  an  excellent 
commander  of  infantry  than  the  dashing  qualities  of  one 
either  accustomed  to  the  handling  of  cavalry  or  naturally 
inclined  to  it.  Both  Guilford  Court-House  and  Eutaw 
Springs  could  have  been  turned  from  defeats,  or  at  best 
indecisive  actions,  into  complete  victories,  had  he  then  had 
attached  to  his  command  an  effective  force  of  cavalry  and, 
like  Morgan,  known  exactly  when  and  how  to  make  use  of  it. 
Even  as  it  was,  his  small  body  of  mounted  men,  under  com- 
mand of  Lee  and  Washington,  rendered  on  more  than  one 
occasion  effective  service.  As  to  Tarleton,  he  proved  the 
right  arm,  such  as  it  was,  of  Cornwallis,  and  the  raids  led 
by  him,  both  in  the  Carolinas  and  in  Virginia,  seem  extraor- 
dinary in  dash  and  daring. 

But  when  it  is  borne  in  mind  that  the  active  military 
operations  of  the  Revolutionary  period  extended  from  the 
affairs  at  Lexington  and  Concord  in  April,  1775,  to  the  fall  of 
Yorktown,  in  October,  1781,  or  through  more  than  six  years 
of  incessant  field  work,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  war  in 
South  Africa  lasted  only  two  years,  and  our  own  War  of 
Secession  covered  not  more  than  four  years,  the  slowness 
with  which  the  patriot  side  realized  the  nature  of  the  situa- 
tion, and  learned  to  make  the  most  effective  use  of  the  wea- 
pons at  its  command,  is  indisputably,  to  say  the  least,  sug- 
gestive. It  even  gives  rise  to  a  doubt  whether,  after  all, 
there  was  not  some  ground  for  the  impatience  at  times  felt 
in  the  Congress,  and  whether  recourse  might  not  well  earlier 
have  been  had  to  a  different,  and  much  more  effective,  sys- 
tem of  tactics.  In  any  event,  this  phase,  as  yet  undeveloped, 
of  an  interesting  historical  situation  merits  careful  study  on 
the  part  of  some  future  investigator. 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  109 


This l  and  the  following  paper,  entitled  "  The  Campaign  of  1777," 
were  originally  prepared  for  submission  to  the  Massachusetts 
Historical  Society,  and  are  to  be  found  in  its  Proceedings.  (Vol. 
XLIII,  547-593 ;  Vol.  XLIV,  13-65.)  Certain  facts  relating  to 
the  reason  of  their  preparation,  and  the  process  through  which 
they  assumed  final  shape,  are  there  given.  While  appropriate 
enough  in  papers  submitted  to  an  historical  society  at  its  stated 
meetings,  such  matter,  largely  personal  and  to  a  certain  extent 
at  times  colloquial,  is  manifestly  out  of  place  in  a  more  formal 
publication.  The  two  papers  have,  therefore,  now  been  revised 
in  this  respect,  and,  in  a  manner,  recast.  The  general  reader  is, 
however,  always  more  or  less  careless,  while  the  judgment  of  the 
specialist  and  investigator  is  apt  to  be  affected  by  preconceptions 
or  prejudice.  In  the  case  of  these  papers,  misapprehensions 
would,  therefore,  almost  surely  rise  in  the  minds  of  most,  unless 
they  read  with  some  understanding  of  the  purpose  for  which  the 
studies  were  prepared,  and  the  successive  steps  through  which  they 
obtained  whatever  they  may  have  of  both  form  and  proportion. 

For  a  number  of  years  an  intermittent  correspondence  has  been 
carried  on  between  Sir  George  Otto  Trevelyan  and  myself.  More 
recently  we  had,  when  together,  discussed  certain  phases  of  the 
Revolutionary  struggle  in  connection  generally  with  the  work  on 
which  Sir  George  was  engaged,  and  more  especially  with  persons 
and  events  necessarily  to  be  dealt  with  in  the  forthcoming  por- 
tions of  his  unfinished  history.  Chancing  to  be  in  Europe  during 
the  autumn  of  1909,  I  had  proposed  a  visit  to  Wallington,  Sir 
George's  Northumberland  home,  for  the  purpose  more  especially 
of  discussing  with  him  the  use  of  cavalry  by  Washington  in  his 
military  operations,  or  rather  Washington's  failure  to  make  any 
use  of  that  arm  of  the  service ;  and  this  was  to  be  discussed  in 
the  light  of  what  had  recently  occurred  in  South  Africa.  It  so 
chanced,  however,  that  Sir  George  was,  at  just  the  time  suggested 
for  the  proposed  visit,  leaving  England  for  the  Continent.  As  a 
personal  meeting  could,  therefore,  not  be  arranged,  it  was  agreed 
that  on  my  return  to  America  I  should  put  my  suggestions  in  the 
form  of  a  memorandum  for  Sir  George's  consideration. 

1  Supra,  59  n. 


110  MILITARY  STUDIES 

This  accordingly  was  presently  attempted.  As  originally  pro- 
posed, the  memorandum  in  question  it  was  thought  might  cover 
at  most  some  eight  or  ten  pages  of  typewritten  letter-paper. 
When  entered  upon,  however,  the  undertaking  developed,  and 
presently  assumed  almost  the  proportions  of  a  treatise.  I  then 
concluded  that  the  best  way  for  it  to  reach  its  destination  was 
through  the  medium  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  Massachusetts 
Historical  Society.  The  preparation  of  the  paper  in  this  form 
then  brought  to  light  new  material,  otherwise  suggestive.  One 
step  thus  led  to  another,  until  the  original  brief  memorandum  of 
ten  typewritten  pages  developed  into  five  papers  covering  over 
one  hundred  and  fifty  of  the  somewhat  solid  printed  pages  of 
the  Society's  Proceedings.  The  papers  in  question  were  entitled 
(1)  " Washington  and  Cavalry,"  (2)  "The  Campaign  of  1777," 
(3)  "Contemporary  Opinion  of  the  Howes,"  (4)  "The  Weems 
Dispensation,"  and  (5)  "General  Craufurd's  March."  In  their 
original  form,  and  with  full  references  to  the  authorities  made  use 
of,  these  papers  can  be  found  in  Volumes  XLIII  and  XLIV  of  the 
Proceedings  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society.  Only  the 
more  essential  portions  are  here  reproduced,  together  with  a  few 
additions,  and  the  citation  of  some  authorities  brought  to  light 
since  the  original  papers  were  prepared. 

Obviously,  the  themes  and  events  discussed  are  lacking  in 
novelty.  The  story  has  been  many  times  told;  and,  even  now, 
is  being  retold  in  greater  or  less  detail  by  investigators  whose 
volumes  are  in  course  of  preparation,  or  not  yet  come  from  the 
press.  A  justification  of  this  reproduction  must,  therefore,  be 
found,  if,  indeed,  it  exists,  in  the  fact  that,  as  I  was  step  by  step 
drawn  on  in  my  investigations,  I  became  more  and  more  persuaded 
of  the  truth  of  the  following  observation  of  Sydney  G.  Fisher,  in 
his  recently  (1908)  published  work,  The  Real  Struggle  for  American 
Independence :  — 

"Although  our  Revolution  is  said  to  have  changed  the  thought 
of  the  world,  like  the  epochs  of  Socrates,  of  Christ,  of  the  Reforma- 
tion, and  of  the  French  Revolution,  yet  no  complete  history  of  it 
has  ever  been  written  upon  the  plan  of  dealing  frankly  with  all 
the  contemporary  evidence  and  withholding  nothing  of  importance 
that  is  found  in  the  original   records.     Our  histories  are  able 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  111 

rhetorical  efforts,  enlarged  Fourth  of  July  orations,  or  pleasing 
literary  essays  on  selected  phases  of  the  contest.  .  .  . 

"  Although  we  are  a  democratic  country,  our  history  of  the 
event  which  largely  created  our  democracy  has  been  written  in  the 
most  undemocratic  method  —  a  method  which  conceals  the  real 
condition ;  a  method  of  paternalism  which  seeks  to  let  the  people 
know  only  such  things  as  the  writer  supposes  will  be  good  for 
them ;  a  method  whose  foundation  principle  appears  to  be  that 
the  people  cannot  be  trusted  with  the  original  evidence.' '  (Preface, 
v,  vi,  ix.) 

In  plain  language  the  entire  already  much  written  history  of 
what  is  known  as  the  American  Revolution,  but  which,  as  Hamil- 
ton observed  over  a  century  ago,  was  no  revolution  at  all,1  but 
should  more  correctly  be  styled  the  War  of  American  Indepen- 
dence, —  this  entire  much  written  history  needs  to  be,  not  re- 
written exactly,  but  written  de  novo.  The  trouble  with  the  exist- 
ing narratives  is  not  that  those  who  prepared  them  were  either 
superficial  or  inaccurate,  or  that  stores  of  new  material  have  been 
brought  to  light  altering  the  aspect  of  events,  or  the  motives  which 
actuated  individuals;  on  both  of  these  heads  something  might 
be  said,  but  nothing  affecting  the  main  issue.  The  difficulty  — 
and,  so  far  as  the  American  school  of  historians  is  concerned,  it  is 
radical  —  is  that  pointed  out  by  Mr.  Fisher ;  and  it  is  pervasive 
as  well  as  radical.  Our  American  historians  have  approached 
their  task  in  neither  a  judicial  frame  of  mind  nor  a  detached  spirit. 
In  plain  vernacular,  they  write  under  an  overruling  patriotism 
or  hero-worshipping  preconception;  and  their  work  is  accord- 
ingly of  the  spread  eagle  and  Fourth  of  July  variety  —  this  some- 
times unconsciously  and  from  tradition,  but  not  infrequently 
through  an  intentional  suppression  of  facts,  a  perversion  of  evi- 
dence or  a  recourse  to  manifest  special  pleading. 

This,  undeniably,  is  a  sweeping  indictment;  yet,  after  years 
passed  in  the  reading  of  narratives  and  the  study  of  the  original 
material  on  which  they  are  supposed  to  be  based,  to  this  conclu- 
sion I  have,  in  common  with  Mr.  Fisher,  found  myself  compelled. 
And,  such  being  the  case,  the  fact,  if  stated  at  all,  had  best  be 

1  Alexander  Hamilton,  by  A.  McLean  Hamilton,  296.  Massachusetts 
Historical  Society  Proceedings,  XLIV,  233. 


!12  MILITARY  STUDIES 

stated  in  language  which  does  not  admit  of  misapprehension. 
Take  Washington,  for  instance ;  Washington  was  in  reality  an  ex- 
tremely human  man,  one  of  a  class;  a  high-minded,  partially 
educated,  Virginia  country  gentleman  and  planter  of  the  colonial 
period.  Of  eminently  lofty  character,  fair  ability,  and  great  com- 
mon-sense, he  was  throughout  genuine  —  a  gentleman  in  the 
highest  sense  of  the  term.  As  such,  he  impressed  himself  on  all 
with  whom  he  came  in  close  personal  contact.  He  stands,  and 
deservedly  stands,  second  to  none,  not  even  to  William  of  Orange, 
in  the  gallery  of  those  world-recognized  as  great  historical  figures. 
Yet  as  one  conducting  critical  military  operations,  his  limitations, 
except  in  the  pages  of  the  distinctive  American  historian,  were 
great  and  apparent.  The  brilliant  Hamilton,  his  favorite  aide- 
de-camp  and  confidential  civil  adviser,  even  went  so  far  as  to  say 
that  he  had  no  military  aptitude  whatever ; l  and  in  this  conclu- 
sion Pickering,  his  quarter-master-general,  and  Steuben,  his  in- 
spector-general, are  known  to  have  concurred.  In  the  eyes  of 
the  American  type  of  historian,  however,  the  expression  of  such 
an  opinion  savors  strongly  of  something  which  bears  a  close  re- 
semblance to  the  questioning  of  the  Godhead  in  the  mind  of  an 
Orthodox  minister  of  the  old  school,  or  to  lese-majesty  in  a  pres- 
ent-day German  correctional  court. 

Washington  in  reality  conducted  active  operations  in  five 
campaigns,  that  (1)  of  1775-1776  before  Boston;  that  (2)  of  1776, 
in  New  York  and  New  Jersey;  that  (3)  of  1777,  about  Philadel- 
phia; that  (4)  of  1778,  culminating  at  Monmouth  Court  House; 
and,  finally,  that  (5)  of  1781,  closing  at  Yorktown.  Of  these,  the 
first,  the  operations  in  and  about  Boston,  were  creditable,  though 
in  no  wise  brilliant ;  but  they  most  fortunately  established  Wash- 
ington's reputation,  winning  him  the  confidence  of  his  countrymen. 
The  operations  of  1776,  in  New  York,  ill-conceived  at  the  start,  in 
their  development  were,  in  reality,  little  more  than  a  succession  of 
blunders  which  by  rights  should  have  irretrievably  ruined  the 
American  cause:  the  campaign  was,  however,  saved,  if  not  re- 
deemed, by  a  brilliant  final  counterstroke  made  possible  by  the 
gross  incapacity  of  the  adversary.  The  1777  campaign  in  Penn- 
sylvania was,  like  the  1776  campaign  in  New  York,  in  judgment  a 
1  Pickering,  MSS.  46,  354. 


WASHINGTON  AND  CAVALRY  113 

mistake,  and  in  execution  disastrous  ;  in  military  parlance,  a 
mess  was  made  of  it.  The  Monmouth  campaign  (1778)  reflected 
no  considerable  credit  on  any  one,  American  or  British,  wholly  fail- 
ing of  decisive  results.  Finally,  the  Yorktown  campaign  of  1781 
was  the  one  real  success  to  be  set  down  to  Washington's  military 
account.  Boldly,  as  well  as  brilliantly,  conceived  and  in  detail 
planned,  it  was  carried  out  with  prescience,  judgment,  skill  and 
energy,  and  crowned  by  complete  success.  A  fine  design  strategi- 
cally, too  much  praise  cannot  be  awarded  to  its  execution. 

Yet  to-day,  in  the  accepted  rendering,  there  is  as  much  need  of 
a  re-writing  of  the  military  record  of  Washington  as  there  was  of 
that  of  Cromwell,  when  Carlyle  took  up  the  theme.  The  former 
has,  up  to  this  time,  been  as  much  written  up  as  the  latter  had 
to  as  late  a  period  as  1845  been  written  down.  Yet  to-day,  if  an 
effort  is  made  to  discuss  Washington,  the  Soldier,  dispassionately, 
intelligently  and  critically  —  applying  to  his  operations  recognized 
strategic  rules  and  precedents  —  the  answer  is  made  that  Freder- 
ick, Napoleon,  Lee,  all  made  mistakes  in  war,  so  why  call  atten- 
tion to  those  of  Washington ;  to  which  the  proper  reply  is  that  the 
mistakes  made  are  in  the  case  of  each  of  those  named  pointed  out, 
acknowledged  and  criticized.  In  the  case  of  Washington,  they  are 
on 'the  contrary  by  the  American  "  standard"  historian,  literary 
or  school  —  but  more  especially  by  those  writing  for  the  young  — 
ignored,  palliated,  or  flatly  denied,  and  that  on  principle  and  as  a 
habit. 

In  short,  when  dealing  with  the  Revolutionary  period,  to  make 
out  America's  case  on  every  occasion  has  been  the  manifest, 
almost  the  avowed,  purpose  of  the  American  historian.  As  to 
hero-worship,  Lord  Rosebery  has  recently x  found  occasion,  when 
referring  to  Thomas  Carlyle,  tersely  to  observe  that  it  "  makes 
bad  history."  Finally,  while  Dr.  Johnson  energetically  defined 
" patriotism"  as  "the  last  refuge  of  a  scoundrel,"  it  might  with 
equal  point,  and  far  more  truth,  be  otherwise  denominated  the 
Stumbling  Block  of  the  Historian. 

1  Lord  Chatham,  186. 


IV 
THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  * 

"  When  Sylla,  after  all  his  victories,  styled  himself  a  happy, 
rather  than  a  great,  general,  he  discovered  his  profound 
knowledge  of  the  military  art.  Experience  taught  him  that 
the  speed  of  one  legion,  the  inactivity  of  another,  the  ob- 
stinacy, the  ignorance,  or  the  treachery  of  a  subordinate 
officer,  was  sufficient  to  mar  the  best  concerted  plan,  — 
that  the  intervention  of  a  shower  of  rain,  an  unexpected 
ditch,  or  any  apparently  trivial  accident,  might  determine 
the  fate  of  a  whole  army.  It  taught  him  that  the  vicissi- 
tudes of  war  are  so  many,  disappointment  will  attend  the 
wisest  combinations;  that  a  ruinous  defeat,  the  work  of 
chance,  often  closes  the  career  of  the  boldest  and  most 
sagacious  of  generals;  and  that  to  judge  of  a  commander's 
conduct  by  the  event  alone  is  equally  unjust  and  unphilo- 
sophical,  a  refuge  for  vanity  and  ignorance."  2 

In  penning  these  reflections,  while  writing  of  the  tragic 
outcome  of  Sir  John  Moore's  Corunna  campaign,  Sir  William 
Napier  might  well  have  added  to  his  vicissitudes  of  warfare 
the  good  fortune  of  a  commander  who  finds  himself  con- 
fronted with  a  succession  of  dull  incompetents,  or  unenter- 
prising professional  strategists;  and  when  the  caliber  and 
temperaments  of  those  opposed  in  command  to  him,  and 

1  A  paper  submitted  to  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society  at  its 
October  meeting,  1910;  and  printed  in  its  Proceedings  (XLIV,  13-65.). 
See  supra,  109-113.  Citations  of  authorities  can  be  found  by  reference 
to  the  Proceedings  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society. 

2  Napier,  War  in  the  Peninsula,  Bk.  IV,  Chap.  VI. 

114 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF   1777  115 

with  whom  only  he  was  fated  to  measure  himself,  are  taken 
into  account,  there  may  possibly  be  grounds  for  concluding 
that  Washington,  even  more  than  Sylla,  might  have  had 
cause  to  style  " himself  a  happy,  rather  than  a  great,  general.' ' 

The  names  of  Major-General  Thomas  Gage,  Sir  William 
Howe  and  Sir  Henry  Clinton  do  not  readily  associate  them- 
selves with  any  considerable  military  achievements.  Indeed, 
those  who  bore  them  are  remembered  only  as  having  been 
opposed  to  Washington;  who,  again,  stands  out  in  world 
history  far  more  conspicuously  than  does  Sylla.  And  yet 
an  English  contemporary,  writing  in  1778  of  the  operations 
of  1777,  summed  the  matter  up  by  saying  "in  short,  I  am 
of  the  opinion  .  .  .  that  any  other  General  in  the  world 
than  General  Howe  would  have  beaten  General  Washington ; 
and  any  other  General  in  the  world  than  General  Washing- 
ton would  have  beaten  General  Howe." 

The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  analyze  the  Revolutionary 
campaign  of  1777  —  the  third  of  that  conflict  —  from  a 
purely  critical  point  of  view,  as  distinguished  from  the 
points  of  view  —  partisan,  patriotic  or  hero-cult  —  from 
which  it  has  been  seen  and  described  by  the  distinctively 
"standard"  American  historians. 

In  our  great  Civil  War  the  thing  known  as  "Strategy" 
was  first  and  last  much,  and  not  always  over-wisely,  dis- 
cussed ;  the  most  popular  definition  of  the  term,  and  the 
one  generally  accepted  among  the  more  practically  experi- 
enced, being  that  attributed  to  the  Confederate  leader, 
Nathan  B.  Forrest.  A  somewhat  uncouth  Tennessean, 
taught,  like  Cromwell,  in  the  school  of  practical  warfare 
and  actual  fighting,  General  Forrest  is  reported  to  have 
remarked  that,  so  far  as  his  observation  went,  the  essence  of 
all  successful  strategy  was  simply  "to  get  there  fust,  with 
most  men."     With   all   due   respect,   however,   to   General 


116  MILITARY  STUDIES 

Forrest,  —  unquestionably  a  born  soldier  of  high  grade,  — 
while  his  may  be  accepted  as  a  definition  so  far  as  it  goes, 
it  hardly  covers  the  whole  ground.  The  getting  " there" 
first  with  most  men  is  undeniably  of  the  essence  of  all 
sound  strategy;  but  the  word  " there"  in  this  connection 
implies  another  word,  —  "Where?"  Put  in  a  different 
way,  there  is  a  key  to  about  every  military  situation; 
but  that  key  has  to  be  both  found  and  properly  made  use 
of.  When  found  and  properly  utilized,  there  is  apt  to  result 
what  in  chess  is  known  as  a  check,  or,  possibly,  a  check- 
mate. Strategy,  therefore,  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than 
the  art  of  playing,  more  or  less  skilfully,  a  complicated 
game  of  chess  with  a  considerable,  not  seldom  with  a  vast, 
area  of  broken  country  as  its  board,  on  which  geographic 
points,  cities  and  armies,  are  the  Kings,  Queens  and  Castles, 
while  smaller  commands  and  individual  men  serve  as  Pawns. 
In  the  present  case,  therefore,  —  that  of  the  Revolutionary 
campaign  of  1777,  —  as  in  every  similar  case,  it  is  essential 
to  any  correct  understanding  of  the  game  and  its  progress  to 
describe  the  board,  and  to  arrange  the  pieces  in  antagonism. 
The  board  of  1777  was  extensive;  but,  for  present  pur- 
poses, both  simple  and  familiar.  It  calls  for  no  map  to 
render  it  visually  comprehensible.  With  the  Canada  boun- 
dary and  Lake  Champlain  for  a  limit  to  the  north,  it  extends 
to  Chesapeake  Bay  on  the  south,  —  a  distance  of  approxi- 
mately four  hundred  and  fifty  miles.  Bordering  on  the 
ocean,  this  region  was  almost  everywhere  vulnerable  by 
water,  while  its  interior  depth  at  no  point  exceeded  two 
hundred  and  fifty  miles,  and  for  all  practical  purposes  was 
limited  to  one  hundred  miles;  Oswego,  on  Lake  Ontario, 
being  the  farthest  point  from  New  York  (250  miles)  on  the 
northwest,  and  Reading  the  farthest  point  westward  (100 
miles)  from  the  Jersey  coast.     Practically  New  York  City 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF   1777  117 

was  at  the  strategic  centre,  —  that  is,  where  movement  was 
concerned,  it  was  about  equidistant  from  Albany  and  Fort 
Edward  at  one  extreme,  and  from  the  capes  of  the  Delaware 
and  the  head-waters  of  Chesapeake  Bay  on  the  other.  In 
either  sphere  and  in  both  directions  the  means  of  communi- 
cation and  of  subsistence  were  equally  good,  or  equally 
inadequate  or  insufficient.  Philadelphia,  the  obvious  but 
unessential  military  objective  at  the  south,  was  practically 
one  hundred  miles  from  New  York;  while  Albany,  the 
equally  obvious  but  far  more  important  military  objective 
at  the  north,  was  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  from  it.  The 
average  day's  march  of  an  army  is  fifteen  miles ;  by  a  forced 
march  thirty  miles  or  more  can  be  covered.  From  New  York 
as  a  strategic  starting-point,  Albany  was  therefore  a  ten 
days'  march  distant,  while  Philadelphia  was  three  less,  or  a 
march  of  seven  days. 

Such  being  the  board  on  which  the  game  of  war  was  to  be 
played,  it  remains  to  locate  the  pieces  as  they  stood  upon  it. 
The  June  of  1777  was  well  advanced  before  active  operations 
were  begun.  After  the  brilliant  and  redeeming  Trenton- 
Princeton  stroke  with  which  Washington,  in  the  Christmas 
week  of  that  year,  brought  the  1776  campaign  to  a  close, 
Sir  William  Howe  had  drawn  the  British  invading  forces 
together  within  the  Manhattan  lines,  and  there,  comfortably 
established  in  winter  quarters,  had  awaited  the  coming  of 
spring,  and  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  and  supplies  from 
England.  Washington  had  placed  himself  in  a  strong  de- 
fensive position  at  Morristown,  there  holding  together  as 
best  he  could  the  remnants  of  an  army.  Nearly  due  west  of 
the  town  of  New  York,  and  about  twenty-five  miles  from 
the  Jersey  shore  of  the  Hudson,  Morristown  was  a  good 
strategic  point  from  which  to  operate  in  any  direction, 
whether  towards  Peekskill,  —  the  gateway  to  the  Hudson 


118  MILITARY  STUDIES 

Highlands  on  the  road  to  Albany,  fifty  miles  away,  —  or 
towards  Trenton,  forty  miles  off  in  the  direction  of  Phila- 
delphia. When,  therefore,  Sir  William  Howe,  moving  with 
that  inexplicable  and  unsoldierly  deliberation  always  char- 
acteristic of  him,  began  at  last  to  bestir  himself,  the  situa- 
tion was  simple.  Washington's  army,  some  seven  thousand 
strong,  but  being  rapidly  increased  by  the  arrival  of  fresh 
levies,  was  at  Morristown,  waiting  for  Howe  to  disclose  a 
plan  of  operations;  General  Israel  Putnam,  quite  incompe- 
tent and  with  only  a  nominal  force  under  his  command,  made 
a  pretence  of  holding  the  Hudson  Highlands,  the  stronghold 
of  the  patriots,  in  which  they  had  stored  their  supplies, 
"  muskets,  cannon,  ammunition,  provisions  and  military 
tools  and  equipments  of  all  kinds."  x  Farther  north,  General 
St.  Clair,  with  some  thirty-five  hundred  men  all  told,  occu- 
pied the  defences  of  Ticonderoga  at  the  foot  of  Lake  George, 
a  strategic  outpost  erroneously  supposed  to  be  well-nigh 
impregnable,  and  hence  utilized  as  a  sort  of  arsenal  and 
supply-depot;  in  point  of  fact,  however,  it  was,  in  face  of 
any  skilfully  directed  attack,  wholly  untenable.  Here, 
accordingly,  had  been  collected  a  great  number  of  cannon  — 
some  one  hundred  and  twenty  pieces  —  and  a  large  amount 
of  ammunition,  together  with  a  quantity  of  beef  and  flour. 
Elsewhere  the  patriots  had  nothing  with  which  the  British 
commanders  would  be  compelled  to  reckon.  Opposed  to 
this  half-organized,  poorly  armed,  unclad  and  scattered 
musterfield  gathering,  numbering  perhaps  an  aggregate  of 
fifteen  thousand,  insufficiently  supplied  with  artillery  and 

1  Fisher,  Struggle  for  American  Independence,  II,  101.  In  the  present 
paper  this  work  is  used  as  the  standard  and  for  recurring  reference  because 
of  its  detailed  and  systematic  citations.  In  the  preface  to  his  narrative 
(p.  x)  Mr.  Fisher  takes  occasion  to  lament  the  "great  mistake"  made  by 
the  historians  of  our  Revolution  "in  abandoning  the  good,  old-fashioned 
plan  of  referring  to  the  original  evidence  by  foot-note  citations." 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF   1777  119 

with  no  mounted  auxiliary  force,  the  British  arrayed  two 
distinct  armies  counting,  together,  thirty-three  thousand 
effectives;  eight  thousand  under  General  Burgoyne  in 
Canada,  and  twenty-five  thousand  under  Sir  William  Howe 
in  and  about  New  York.  Perfectly  organized  and  equipped, 
well  disciplined  and  supplied,  they  had  a  sufficient  artillery 
contingent,  though  few  cavalry ;  and  what  of  mounted  force 
they  mustered  was  ill  adapted  to  American  conditions.  The 
British  control  of  the  sea  was  undisputed,  but  ineffective  as 
respects  blockade. 

Thus,  making  full  allowance  for  every  conceivable  draw- 
back on  the  part  of  the  British,  and  conceding  every  possible 
advantage  to  the  patriots,  the  outlook  for  the  latter  was,  in 
the  early  summer  of  1777,  ominous  in  the  extreme.  To 
leave  their  opponents  even  a  chance  of  winning,  it  was  plain 
that  the  British  commanders  would  have  to  play  their  game 
very  badly.  And  they  did  just  that !  Displaying,  whether 
on  land  or  water,  an  almost  inconceivable  incompetence, 
they  lost  the  game,  even  though  their  opponents,  beside 
failing  to  take  advantage  of  their  blunders,  both  fundamental 
and  frequent,  committed  almost  equal  blunders  of  their 
own. 

What  has  in  recent  years  come  to  be  known  as  the  General 
Staff  was  in  the  eighteenth  century  undreamed  of  as  part 
of  a  military  organization;  but,  viewed  from  a  modern 
General-Staff  standpoint,  the  contrast  of  what  actually  was 
done  on  either  side  in  that  campaign  with  what  it  is  obvious 
should  have  been  done,  affords  a  study  of  no  small  histor- 
ical interest.  Such  a  contrast  is  also  one  now  easy  to  make, 
for  not  only  is  hind-sight,  so  called,  proverbially  wiser  and 
more  penetrating  than  fore-sight,  but  a  century's  perspec- 
tive lends  to  events  and  situations  a  proper  relative  pro- 
portion.    That  becomes  clear  which  was  at  the  time  obscure. 


120  MILITARY  STUDIES 

For  instance;  the  merest  tyro  in  the  study  of  the  conditions 
on  which  great  military  movements  depend  can  now  point 
out  with  precision  and  confidence  the  errors  of  policy  and 
strategy  for  which  Napoleon  was  responsible  in  1812  and 
1813,  and  which  lured  him  to  destruction.  What  is  obvious 
in  the  case  of  Napoleon  less  than  forty  years  later  is,  of 
course,  even  more  obvious  in  the  case  of  Sir  William  Howe 
and  General  Washington  in  1777. 

Coming  then  to  the  point  now  at  issue,  the  military  policy 
and  line  of  strategic  action  Howe  would  have  pursued  had 
he,  in  May,  1777,  firmly  grasped  the  situation  and  risen  to 
an  equality  with  it,  are  now  so  manifest  as  to  be  hardly  open 
to  discussion;  they  need  but  to  be  set  forth.  Having  a 
complete  naval  and  a  great  military  superiority,  he  would 
have  sought  to  open  from  his  base  at  New  York,  and  se- 
curely hold,  a  connection  with  Montreal  and  Canada  by 
way  of  the  Hudson  and  Lake  Champlain,  thus  severing  his 
enemy's  territory  and,  in  great  degree,  paralyzing  his  mili- 
tary action.  The  means  at  disposal  with  which  to  accom- 
plish this  result  were  ample,  —  Howe's  own  army,  twenty- 
five  thousand  strong  at  New  York,  moving  north  on  the 
easy  line  of  the  Hudson,  could,  cooperating  with  the  fleet, 
easily  open  the  route,  while  a  naval  support  would  insure 
the  invading  column  constant  and  ample  supplies.  In 
close  contact  with  an  open  and  navigable  river,  there 
need  be  no  fear  of  a  repetition  of  the  tactics  of  Concord 
and  Lexington.  Beyond  any  question,  Sir  William,  lean- 
ing on  Lord  Howe's  arm  as  he  advanced  on  this  line, 
would  be  able  to  connect  with  the  army  of  Burgoyne, 
eight  thousand  strong,  moving  down  from  Montreal. 
His  single  other  military  objective  would  then  be  the 
patriot  army  under  Washington,  in  every  respect  inferior 
to  the  force  at  Howe's  own  disposal;   and  this  army  it 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777         121 

would  be  his  aim  to  bring  to  the  issue  of  pitched  battle  on 
almost  any  terms,  with  a  view  to  its  total  destruction  or 
dispersal.  If  he  succeeded  in  so  doing,  the  struggle  would 
be  ended,  he  holding  the  dividing  strategic  line  of  the 
Hudson ;  if,  however,  he  failed  to  get  at  and  destroy  Wash- 
ington's army,  he  would  still  hold  the  line  of  the  Hudson, 
and  the  navy  under  Lord  Howe  then  seizing  for  permanent 
occupation  Wilmington,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Delaware, 
and  Hampton  Roads  on  the  Chesapeake,  the  brothers 
Howe  could  securely  depend  on  the  blockade *  and  the 
gradual  securing  of  other  strategic  points  to  bring  to  their 
opponent  sure  death  through  inanition,  —  or,  in  the  language 
of  General  Charles  Lee  in  the  "Plan"  of  operations  prepared 
by  him  during  his  New  York  captivity,  and  then  submitted 
to  Howe,  would  "unhinge  and  dissolve  the  whole  system 
of  [patriot]  defence."  2    Such  a  strategy,  in  pursuance  of  a 

1  The  crushing  influence  of  an  effective  blockade  on  the  revolted  Prov- 
inces was  at  the  time  forcibly  set  forth  by  the  Philadelphia  renegade 
and  exiled  loyalist,  Joseph  Galloway,  in  his  pamphlet  entitled  "A  Letter 
to  the  Right  Honorable  Lord  Viscount  H — e,  on  His  Naval  Conduct  in 
the  American  War,"  London,  1779.  Galloway  shows  that  the  naval 
force  put  at  Lord  Howe's  disposal  was  more  than  ample  for  an  effective 
blockade;  that  to  establish  and  maintain  such  a  blockade  was  wholly 
practicable;  and,  finally,  that  had  one  been  thus  established  and  main- 
tained, "the  whole  commerce  of  the  revolted  Colonies  must  have  ceased. 
Their  army  and  navy  must  have  been  ruined,  from  the  utter  impractica- 
bility of  procuring  for  them  the  necessary  provisions,  clothing  and  sup- 
plies. Their  produce  must  have  perished  on  their  hands."  Salt,  for 
instance,  was  almost  wholly  imported.  In  Philadelphia  "  this  commod- 
ity, which  before  the  rebellion  was  commonly  bought  for  15  to  20  pence 
now  (1776-77)  sold  from  £15  to  £20  in  currency  of  the  same  value." 

2  N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc,  Lee  Papers,  IV,  408.  The  story  of  this  traitorous 
"plan"  of  Charles  Lee  is  told  by  George  H.  Moore,  and  can  be  found  in 
New  York  Historical  Society  Collections,  1874,  vol.  IV,  p.  406.  Fisher 
refers  to  it  as  "a  plan  of  no  military  merit"  (ii,  76)  ;  but  on  what  ground 
he  thus  condemned  it  is  not  apparent.  There  is,  on  the  contrary,  reason 
for  concluding  that  it  was  based  on  a  thorough  and  correct  understanding 
of  existing  conditions,  and  evinced  a  clear  strategic  insight.  Speaking 
of  the  course  of  events  at  that  time,  Hamilton,  in  a  conversation  with 


122  MILITARY  STUDIES 

policy  at  once  aggressive  and  passive,  was  not  only  safe, 
but  obvious.  Secure  in  control  of  the  sea,  Howe  had  but 
to  divide  his  opponent's  territory,  and  then  destroy  his 
army  or  starve  it  out. 

The  policy  and  strategy  to  be  adopted  and  pursued  by  the 
Patriots  were,  on  the  other  hand,  hardly  less  plain.  With 
no  foothold  at  all  on  the  sea,  except  through  a  sort  of  mari- 
time letter-of-marque  militia,  on  land  they  were  hopelessly 
outclassed,  —  outclassed  in  numbers,  in  organization,  in 
weapons,  in  discipline,  and  in  every  form  and  description  of 
equipment.  They  had  three  things  only  in  their  favor: 
(1)  space,  (2)  time,  and  (3)  interior  lines  of  communication, 
implying  mobility.  In  any  pitched  battle  they  would 
necessarily  take  the  chances  heavily  against  themselves. 
Their  manifest  policy  was,  therefore,  to  fight  only  in  posi- 
tions of  their  own  choosing  and  with  every  advantage  on 
their  side,  striking  as  opportunity  offered  with  their  whole 
concentrated  strength  on  an  enemy  necessarily  more  or  less 
detached,  and  his  detachments  beyond  supporting  distance 
of  each  other.  Put  in  simpler  form,  and  drawing  examples 
from  actual  experience,  Bunker  Hill,  Lexington  and  Concord 
pointed  the  way  so  far  as  policy  and  positions  were  con- 
cerned, and  Princeton  and  Trenton  perfectly  illustrated 
the  system  of  harassing  and  destroying  segregated  detach- 
ments. On  the  other  hand,  the  bitter  lessons  received  on 
Long  Island  and  in  and  about  Manhattan  in  1776  should  have 

Pontigibaud  about  the  year  1792,  remarked  —  "All  the  English  need 
have  done  was  to  blockade  our  ports  with  twenty-five  frigates  and  ten 
ships  of  the  line.  But,  thank  God,  they  did  nothing  of  the  sort."  (Allen 
McLane  Hamilton,  Hamilton,  295.)  This,  Charles  Lee  at  the  time  dis- 
tinctly saw,  and  counselled  Sir  William  Howe  accordingly.  The  utter 
failure  of  the  two  Howes  to  avail  themselves  of  the  sea  power  by  insti- 
tuting a  rigid  blockade  of  the  Chesapeake  and  Delaware  bays  can  be 
explained  only  on  grounds  of  professional  incapacity.  They  neither  of 
them  knew  how  to  make  effective  use  of  the  weapons  at  their  command. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  123 

taught  the  patriot  leaders  that,  face  to  face  in  ordered 
battle,  their  half-equipped,  undisciplined  levies,  when  op- 
posed to  the  European  mercenaries,  stood  just  about  the 
chance  of  a  rustic  plough-boy  if  pitted  in  a  twelve-foot 
ring  against  a  trained  prize  fighter.  It  was  challenging 
defeat. 

Such,  as  is  now  apparent,  being  the  manifest  and  indis- 
putable conditions  under  which  each  party  moved,  and 
must  win  or  lose  the  game  or  in  it  hold  its  own,  it  possibly 
is  not  passing  a  too  sweeping  criticism  to  say  that  every  one 
of  these  conditions  was  either  ignored  or  disregarded  equally, 
and  on  both  sides,  throughout  that  momentous  campaign. 
In  other  words,  British  or  Patriot,  it  was  a  campaign  of 
consecutive  and  sustained  blundering.  The  leisurely  fashion 
in  which  it  was  opened  has  already  been  referred  to.  Wash- 
ington, holding  together  with  difficulty  what  was  hardly 
more  than  a  skeleton  organization,  remained  prudently 
in  his  lines  at  Morristown.  There,  his  army  as  a  military 
objective  was  apparently  within  Howe's  grasp  all  through 
the  months  of  April  and  May,  —  practically  at  his  mercy. 
It  could  easily  have  been  manoeuvred  out  of  its  positions, 
and  dispersed  or  sent  on  its  wanderings;  it  continued  to 
hold  together  only  so  long  as  its  antagonist  failed  to  avail 
himself  of  his  superiority  and  the  situation.  Howe,  mean- 
while, in  his  usual  time-killing  way,  was  perfecting  his 
arrangements  in  New  York;  Burgoyne,  at  Montreal,  was 
similarly  engaged.  Not  until  May  was  well  advanced,  and 
what  is  for  that  region  some  of  the  best  campaigning  weather 
in  the  whole  year  was  over,  did  Washington  voluntarily 
emerge  from  his  winter-quarters,  and,  so  to  speak,  look  about 
to  see  what  his  opponent  might  be  up  to ;  for,  that  he  must 
be  up  to  something,  seemed  only  likely.  That  opponent 
had,  however,  apparently  not  yet  roused  himself  from  his 


124  MILITARY  STUDIES 

winter's  lethargy,  and  it  was  not  until  June  was  half  over 
that  he  at  last  gave  signs  of  active  life.  Burgoyne  at  the 
same  time  (June  17)  moved  on  his  path  towards  Ticonderoga, 
the  first  stage  in  his  march  to  Albany.  Now  was  Howe's 
opportunity.  It  dangled  before  his  eyes,  plain  and  unmis- 
takable. Washington's  army  should  have  been  his  objec- 
tive. Only  seven  thousand  strong,  Howe  could  oppose 
twenty  thousand  to  it  either  for  direct  attack  or  purposes  of 
manoeuvre.  Washington's  army  disposed  of  or  held  off, 
Howe,  following  the  dictates  of  simple  common  sense,  would 
then  have  turned  his  face  northwards,  and  marched,  prac- 
tically unopposed,  to  Albany,  by  way  of  Peekskill.  Co- 
operating with  the  British  fleet,  Clinton  four  months  later 
did  this  with  four  thousand  men  only;  capturing  on  his 
way  "vast  supplies  of  muskets,  cannon,  ammunition,  pro- 
visions and  military  tools  and  equipments  of  all  kinds  which 
the  patriots  had  stored  in  their  great  stronghold,"  the 
Hudson  Highlands.  Howe  thus  wholly  failed  to  avail 
himself  of  what  was  obviously  the  opportunity  of  a  good 
soldier's  lifetime.  Both  what  he  did  do  and  what  he  failed 
to  do  were  and  remain  enigmas  to  both  friends  and  foes.  As 
a  strategic  operation  it  resembled  nothing  so  much  as  the 
traditional  and  familiar  movement  of  the  unspecified  King 
of  France.  Howe  marched  his  twice  ten  thousand  men  over 
into  New  Jersey ;  and  then  marched  them  back  again. 
Well  might  Stedman  afterwards  plaintively  ask:  "Why  did 
he  not  march  round  either  on  the  North  or  South  to  the  rear 
of  that  enemy,  where  he  might  have  been  assaulted  without 
any  other  hazard  than  such  as  must,  in  the  common  course 
of  war,  be  unavoidably  incurred  ?"  1  The  query  to  this  day 
remains  unanswered ;  but,  certainly,  the  British  commander 
did  not  then  make  any  considerable  effort  to  bring  matters 
1  History  of  the  American  War,  I,  288. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  125 

"to  the  issue  of  pitched  battle  on  almost  any  terms." 
When,  shortly  after,  severely  criticised  for  his  conduct,  Howe 
simply  said:  "I  did  not  think  it  advisable  to  lose  so  much 
time  as  must  have  been  employed  upon  that  march  during 
the  intense  heat  of  the  season."  The  march  in  question 
could  not  very  well  have  been  made  to  cover  much  more 
than  fifty  miles;  though  it  might  have  implied  some  dis- 
comfort from  heat  and  dust.  Washington  was  wholly 
unable  to  account  for  his  opponent's  proceedings ;  those  who 
participated  in  the  subsequent  midsummer  marchings  and 
fightings  of  our  Civil  War  have  been  unable  to  account  for 
them  since.     Howe's  explanation  was  puerile. 

This  military  "fooling"  over,  Howe  next  evacuated  New 
Jersey  altogether,  leaving  the  astonished  Washington  and 
his  army  free  to  go  where  they  liked  and  to  do  what  they 
pleased,  quite  unmolested ;  but,  instead  of  turning  his  face 
north,  and  marching  up  to  meet  Burgoyne,  thus  making 
secure  the  Hudson  line  of  communication  with  Canada,  the 
British  commander  next  shipped  his  army  on  a  mighty  fleet 
of  transports,  gathered  in  New  York  Bay,  and,  after  idly 
lingering  there  some  precious  weeks,  sailed  away  with  it 
into  space.  The  contemporary  verdict  on  these  perform- 
ances was  thus  expressed  by  a  participant,  in  language 
none  too  strong :  — 

"  In  the  spring  and  summer  it  is  impossible  for  the  mind  of  man 
to  conceive  the  gloom  and  resentment  of  the  army,  on  the  retreat 
from  the  Jerseys,  and  the  shipping  them  to  the  southward  :  nothing 
but  being  present  and  seeing  the  countenances  of  the  soldiers,  could 
give  an  impression  adequate  to  the  scene ;  or  paint  the  astonish- 
ment and  despair  that  reigned  in  New  York,  when  it  was  found 
that  the  North  River  was  deserted,  and  Burgoyne's  army 
abandoned  to  its  fate.  All  the  former  opportunities  lost  through 
indolence  or  rejected  through  design,  appeared  innocent  when  com- 
pared with  this  fatal  movement.     The  ruinous  and  dreadful  con- 


126  MILITARY  STUDIES 

sequences  were  instantly  foreseen  and  foretold ;  and  despondence 
or  execration  filled  every  mouth. 

"  Had  there  been  no  Canada  army  to  desert  or  to  sacrifice,  the 
voyage  to  the  southward  could  only  originate  from  the  most  pro- 
found ignorance  or  imbecility."  * 

Disappearing  from  sight  on  the  24th  of  July,  on  the  30th 
the  British  armament  was  reported  as  being  off  the  entrance 
of  the  Delaware  River;  again  vanishing,  not  until  the  21st  of 
August  did  it  at  last  make  its  appearance  in  the  Chesapeake. 
Howe's  objective  then  was  apparent.  He  was  moving  on 
Philadelphia,  —  the  town  in  which  the  Congress  was  hold- 
ing its  sittings,  —  the  seat  of  Government,  —  the  Capital  of 
the  provinces  in  rebellion ! 

As  a  move  on  the  strategic  chess-board  this  further  pro- 
ceeding on  the  part  of  Sir  William  was  at  the  time  incompre- 
hensible; nor  has  it  since  been  accounted  for.  Had  he 
marched  to  Philadelphia  overland  (ninety  miles),  he  would 
at  least  have  relieved  Burgoyne  by  keeping  Washington's 
entire  available  force  occupied ;  possibly  he  might  have 
brought  on  a  pitched  battle  in  which  every  chance  would 
have  been  in  his  favor.  He  would  also  have  been  free  at  any 
moment  to  countermarch  north,  with  or  without  a  battle. 
Electing  to  go  by  sea,  when  he  got  into  Delaware  Bay  the 
Admiral  in  command  of  the  fleet  apparently  bethought 
himself  of  Sir  Peter  Parker's  dismal  experience  before 
Charleston  just  a  year  before,  and  did  not  like  to  face  on  a 
river  water-front  the  guns  of  the  several  forts  below  the 

1  View  of  the  Evidence  relative  to  the  Conduct  of  the  American  War  under 
Sir  William  Howe,  etc.,  152. 

"  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  in  his  manuscript  notes  to  Stedman's  American  War, 
says,  '  I  owe  it  to  truth  to  say  there  was  not,  I  believe,  a  man  in  the  army, 
except  Lord  Cornwallis  and  General  Grant,  who  did  not  reprobate  the 
move  to  the  Southward,  and  see  the  necessity  of  a  co-operation  with  Gen- 
eral Burgoyne.' "  —  Fisher,  II,  71. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF   1777  127 

town  covering  obstructions  in  the  channel ; l  so,  instead  of 
landing  his  army  at  Wilmington,  and  proceeding  thence  to 
Philadelphia,  Howe  had  recourse  to  another  of  those  flank- 
ing movements  to  which,  after  his  Bunker  Hill  frontal  experi- 
ment, he  always  showed  himself  addicted.  The  front  door 
to  Philadelphia  being  closed,  he  made  for  the  back  door, 
sailing  south  around  Cape  Charles  and  up  Chesapeake  Bay 
to  what  was  known  as  the  Head  of  Elk,  close  to  Havre  de 
Grace,  some  fifty  miles  southwest  of  Philadelphia;  Wil- 
mington being  at  that  time  not  only  wholly  unprotected 
and  perfectly  accessible,  but  lying  on  the  Delaware  almost 
exactly  half  the  distance  from  Philadelphia  to  the  Head  of 
Elk,  and,  as  every  one  making  a  trip  from  New  York  to 
Washington  now  knows,  on  the  direct  road  between  the 
two  first-mentioned  points.  By  this  move,  very  cunning  of 
its  kind,  Sir  William  Howe,  unquestionably,  though  in 
most  unaccountable  fashion,  flanked  the  defences  of  his 
objective  point,  which  now  lay  at  his  mercy;  but  the  move 
had  taken  him  as  far  away  from  the  line  of  the  Hudson  as  he 
could  conveniently  and  comfortably,  at  that  hot  season  of 
the  year,  arrange  to  get,  and  had  consumed  four  weeks  of 
precious  time.  But,  with  Sir  William  Howe,  time  was  never 
of  moment !  Such  a  thing  is  not  to  be  suggested,  and,  in 
the  case  of  Sir  William  Howe,  is  inconceivable,  but  had  he 
deliberately  and  in  cold  blood  designed  the  ruin  of  Burgoyne, 
—  as  was,  indeed,  charged  by  his  more  hostile  critics,  —  he 
would  not  have  done  other  than  he  did.  He  not  only  took 
himself  off  and  out  of  the  way,  but,  by  hovering  in  sight  of 
the  mouth  of  Delaware  Bay  and  then  sailing  southward,  he 
gave  Washington  the  broadest  of  hints  that  he  need  appre- 
hend no  interference  on  Howe's  part  with  any  northward 

1  On  this  point  see  the  passage  and  note  in  J.  W.  Fortescue's  History  of 
the  British  Army,  III,  212. 


128  MILITARY  STUDIES 

movement  the  patriots  might  see  fit  to  decide  upon.  Theirs 
was  the  chance  !  The  blunder  —  for  disloyalty  and  treach- 
ery, though  at  the  time  suspected,  are  not  gravely  alleged  — 
the  blunder  of  which  the  British  general  had  now  been  guilty 
was,  in  short,  gross  and  manifest;  so  gross  and  manifest, 
indeed,  that  it  could  only  be  retrieved  by  a  blunder  of  equal 
magnitude  on  the  part  of  his  adversary.  This  followed  in 
due  time;  meanwhile,  Howe,  wholly  losing  sight  of  his 
proper  immediate  objective,  —  Washington's  army, — had 
moved  away  from  the  sphere  of  vital  operations,  —  the 
severance  of  New  England  from  New  York  and  the  Middle 
Provinces,  —  and  made  himself  and  the  force  under  him 
practically  negligible  quantities  for  the  time  being.  Off 
the  board,  he  was  out  of  the  game. 

Even  now,  any  plausible  explanation  of  Howe's  course  at 
this  time  must  be  looked  for  in  the  mental  make-up  and 
physical  inclinations  of  the  man.  Of  him  and  them,  as 
revealed  in  the  record,  something  will  be  said  later  on  in  this 
paper.  It  is  sufficient  here  to  observe  that  if,  as  held  from 
the  beginning  of  time,  it  is  one  of  the  distinctive  traits  of  a 
great  soldier  to  read  the  mind  of  an  opponent  so  truly  as  to 
be  able  immediately  to  forecast  his  line  of  conduct,  Wash- 
ington now  certainly  did  not  evince  a  conspicuous  posses- 
sion of  that  particular  trait. 

The  explanation,  at  once  most  plausible  and  most  chari- 
table, of  Howe's  performance  is  that,  during  the  winter  of 
1776-77,  he  had  conceived  an  exaggerated  and  wholly  erro- 
neous idea  of  the  importance  of  the  possession  of  Philadelphia 
as  a  moral  as  well  as  strategic  factor  in  the  struggle  the  con- 
duct of  which  had  been  entrusted  to  him.  There  were,  in- 
deed, good  grounds  for  believing  that  a  large  and  influential 
element  in  the  population  of  the  middle  provinces  —  New 
Jersey,    Pennsylvania   and   Maryland  —  were   distinctly   of 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF   1777  129 

loyalist  proclivity,  and  that  they  only  needed  countenance 
and  protection  to  assert  themselves.  Doubtless  also  Howe 
counted  largely  on  his  own  personal  magnetism  and  kindli- 
ness of  temper,  as  elements  of  political  conciliation.  He 
then,  in  his  military  operations,  proceeded  to  discard  every 
sound  strategic  rule  and  consideration  in  favor  of  moral  effect 
and  social  influence.  He  also  seems  to  have  looked  on  Phila- 
delphia as  if  it  had  been  a  Paris  or  a  Berlin  or  a  Vienna ;  and 
he  recalled  the  vital  importance  of  those  capitals  in  the  wars 
of  Marlborough  and  Frederick,  —  the  legendary  past  of  the 
British  army.  He  was  accordingly  under  an  obsession ;  pos- 
sessed by  what  was  from  a  strictly  military  point  of  view  a 
pure  delusion.  Thirty-five  years  later  one  infinitely  greater 
than  Howe  suffered  in  the  same  way,  but  with  results  far 
more  serious.  In  his  work,  How  England  saved  Europe, 
W.  H.  Fitchett  says  (IV,  81)  of  Napoleon's  Russian  cam- 
paign, "Russia,  like  Spain,  to  quote  Professor  Sloane,  'had 
the  strength  of  low  organisms/  Its  vitality  was  not  centred 
in  a  single  organ.  It  could  lose  a  capital  and  survive."  If 
this  was  true  of  Russia,  as  Napoleon  in  1812  to  his  cost  found, 
it  was  yet  more  true  of  the  American  federated  States  in 
1777;  for,  practically,  in  Revolutionary  warfare  Philadelphia 
in  itself,  in  that  respect  wholly  unlike  Albany,  was  of  no 
more  strategic  importance  than  any  other  considerable  town. 
When,  therefore,  Howe  carried  off  the  bulk  and  flower  of 
the  army  of  British  invasion  and  set  it  down  in  Philadelphia, 
he  made  as  false  a  move  as  was  possible  in  the  game  assigned 
him  to  play. 

It  then  remained  for  his  opponent  to  avail  himself  of  the 
great  and  unlooked-for  opportunity  thus  offered  him,  —  to 
call  a  check  in  the  game,  possibly  even  a  checkmate.  This 
Washington  wholly  failed  to  do  ;  on  the  contrary,  he  actually 
played  his  opponent's  game  for  him,  redeeming  Howe's  blun- 


130  MILITARY  STUDIES 

ders  by  the  commitment  of  blunders  of  his  own,  fortunately 
less  fatal  in  their  effect,  though  scarcely  in  nature  less  gross. 
When  Howe,  after  disappearing  with  his  armament  below  the 
sea-line  on  the  24th  of  July,  reappeared  off  the  mouth  of  the 
Delaware  on  the  30th  of  the  month,  and  his  general  objective 
thus  became  obvious,  the  relation  to  each  other,  and  to  the 
game,  of  the  remaining  pieces  on  the  military  chess-board 
would  seem  to  have  been  plain.  No  matter  where  Howe  now 
went,  it  was  settled  that  he  was  not  going  up  the  Hudson. 
That  made  clear,  he  might  go  where  he  pleased.  Using  a 
shallow  artifice,  he  tried  to  induce  Washington  to  think  he 
was  going  to  Boston,  thence  to  make  a  juncture  with  Bur- 
goyne.  "  Silly  "  is  the  only  term  to  apply  to  such  a  weak 
invention  of  the  enemy.1  Why  go  to  Boston  to  march  over- 
land to  Albany,  when  the  shorter  way  by  the  Hudson  lay 
open  before  him?  Had  he  really  proposed  so  to  do,  Wash- 
ington might  pleasantly  have  bade  him  God-speed,  and 
pointed  out  that  his  best  route  lay  through  Lexington  and 
Concord,  or,  possibly,  up  Bennington  way.  Under  condi- 
tions similar  to  those  then  confronting  Washington,  it  is 
not  difficult  to  imagine  the  nervous  energy  or  "  stern  con- 
tentment" with  which  Frederick  or  Wellington,  or  still  more 
Napoleon,  with  his  "tiger  spring,"  would  have  contemplated 
the  arrangement  of  the  strategic  board.  The  game  would 
have  been  thrown  into  their  hands.  His  opponent  had 
hopelessly  divided  his  forces  beyond  the  possibility  of 
effective  mutual  support,  and  Washington  held  the  interior 
line.  On  which  of  the  three  should  he  pounce?  And  this 
question  seemed  to  answer  itself.  Howe  was  not  only  too 
strong  for  successful  attack,  but,  for  every  immediate 
strategic  purpose,  he  had  made  of  himself  a  negligible  quan- 
tity. Placed  where  he  had  put  himself,  or  plainly  proposed 
1  Irving,  Washington  (Geoffrey  Crayon  ed.),  Ill,  164. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF   1777  131 

to  put  himself,  he  could  not  greatly  affect  results.  Clinton, 
at  New  York,  was  equally  negligible;    for,  while  the  force 

—  some  six  thousand  men  —  left  there  with  him  by  Howe 
was  not  sufficient  properly  to  man  the  defences,  much  less 
to  assume  a  dangerous  aggressive,  the  place  was  secure  under 
the  protection  of  the  British  fleet.  There  was  no  victim 
in  that  quarter  ripe  just  yet  for  sacrifice.  There  re- 
mained Burgoyne.  He  could  incontinently  be  wiped  from 
off  the  face  of  the  earth,  or,  to  speak  more  correctly,  re- 
moved from  the  chess-board.  That  done,  and  done  quickly ; 
then  —  the  next ! 

Extrication  by  retreat  was  now  no  longer  possible;  Bur- 
goyne was  hopelessly  entangled.  His  bridges  were  burned ; 
he  had  to  get  through  to  Albany,  and  thence  to  New  York, 
with  destruction  as  his  sole  alternative.  Six  weeks  before 
(June  17)  he  had  set  out  on  his  southward  movement,  four 
days  after  Howe  had  crossed  from  New  York  into  New 
Jersey  for  his  "two  weeks'  fooling. "  On  the  5th  of  July 
Burgoyne  occupied  Ticonderoga;  on  that  day  Howe,  his 
"two  weeks'  fooling"  over,  was  loading  his  army  on  the 
transports  anchored  in  New  York  Bay,  and  Washington  was 
observing  him  in  a  state  of  complete  and  altogether  excus- 
able mental  bepuzzlement.  What  move  on  the  board  had 
the  man  in  mind?  Clearly,  his  true  move  would  be  up  the 
Hudson ;   but  why  load  an  army  —  foot,  horse  and  artillery 

—  on  ocean  transports  to  sail  up  the  Hudson  ?  The  idea 
was  absurd.  But,  if  Albany  was  not  Howe's  destination, 
what  other  destination  had  he  in  mind  ?  At  length,  July  24, 
he  put  to  sea,  —  disappeared  in  space.  In  the  interval  Bur- 
goyne had  made  his  irretrievable  mistake.  Hitherto  his 
movement  had  been  in  every  respect  most  successful.  Win- 
ning victories,  capturing  strongholds  and  supplies,  he  had 
swept  on,  forcing  the  great  northern  barrier.     He  had  now 


132  MILITARY  STUDIES 

the  choice  of  two  routes  to  Albany.  He  could  go  by  water 
to  the  head  of  Lake  George  on  his  way  to  Fort  Edward, 
capture  it  and  in  ten  days  be  in  Albany ;  or  he  could  try  to 
get  there  by  constructing  a  military  road  through  the  woods. 
He  elected  the  latter,  plunging  into  "a  half- wilderness, 
rough  country  of  creeks,  marshes  and  woodland  trails." 
Beside  removing  obstructions  and  repairing  old  bridges,  he 
had  to  build  forty  new;  and  one  of  these  "was  a  causeway 
two  miles  long  across  a  swamp."  *  To  withdraw  was  now 
impossible ;  the  victim  was  nearing  the  sacrificial  spot.  He 
occupied  the  hastily  evacuated  Fort  Edward  on  the  30th  of 
July.  On  that  same  day  "the  people  living  at  Cape  Hen- 
lopen,  at  the  entrance  of  Delaware  Bay,  saw  the  ocean 
covered  with  a  vast  fleet  of  nearly  three  hundred  transports 
and  men-of  war."  It  was  Howe's  armament.  He  was  not 
bound  for  Albany !  From  that  moment,  strategically  and 
for  immediate  purposes,  he  was  for  Washington  as  if  he  did 
not  exist.  He  might  go  where  he  willed  to  go ;  he  was  out- 
side of  the  present  field  of  vital  operation,  —  clean  off  the 
chess-board. 

Did  Washington  see  his  opportunity,  and  quickly  avail 
himself  of  it,  Burgoyne  was  now  lost  —  hopelessly  lost.  He 
might  indeed  get  to  Albany ;  but  Washington  could  get  there 
"fust  with  most  men."  Washington  had  now  twelve  thou- 
sand men.  A  large  portion  of  them  were  militia,  and  the 
militia  were  notoriously  unreliable  whether  on  the  march  or 
in  battle ;  as  Washington  expressed  it,  under  fire  they  were 
"afraid  of  their  own  shadows";  and  so,  teaching  them  how 
to  cover  the  ground  rapidly  and  well  was  mere  waste  of  time. 
They  would,  of  course,  have  had  to  be  left  behind  to  occupy 
the  attention  of  the  enemy.  There  would  remain  probably 
some  eight  thousand  marching  and  fighting  effectives, 
i  Fisher,  II,  65;  Trevelyan,  Pt.  Ill,  123. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  133 

Schuyler  had  forty-four  hundred  men  with  him  when  (July 
30)  he  abandoned  Fort  Edward ;  and  the  militia  were  pour- 
ing in.  A  month  later  Gates,  who  relieved  Schuyler  in  com- 
mand, had  seven  thousand.  Here  was  a  force  fifteen  thou- 
sand strong,  if  once  united,  and  Burgoyne,  when  he  emerged 
from  the  wilderness,  could  muster  less  than  five  thousand. 
It  was  the  opportunity  of  a  lifetime ;  unfortunately,  Wash- 
ington did  not  so  see  it,  failed  to  take  full  advantage  of  it. 
Instead,  he  again  had  recourse  to  those  halfway  measures 
always  in  warfare  so  dangerous.1 

The  possibility  of  such  a  move  on  the  part  of  his  adver- 
sary had  indeed  occurred  to  Howe,  and,  apparently,  to  him 
only;  so,  just  before  sailing  from  New  York,  he  wrote  to 
Burgoyne,  congratulating  him  on  his  occupation  of  Ticon- 
deroga  (July  5),  and  added:  " Washington  is  awaiting  our 
motions  here,  and  has  detached  Sullivan  with  about  twenty- 
five  hundred  men,  as  I  learn,  to  Albany.  My  intention  is 
for  Pennsylvania,  where  I  expect  to  meet  Washington ;  but 
if  he  goes  to  the  northward,  contrary  to  my  expectations, 
and  you  can  keep  him  at  bay,  be  assured  I  shall  soon  be  after 
him  to  relieve  you."  2  The  letter  containing  this  extraor- 
dinary assurance  of  support  did  not  reach  Burgoyne  until 
the  middle  of  September.  It  lends  a  touch  of  the  grotesque 
to  the  situation.  Three  weeks  before  Howe's  missive 
reached  Burgoyne,  Washington  might  with  perfect  ease  have 
effected  a  junction  of  his  own  army  with  that  under  Schuy- 
ler, and  crushed  Burgoyne. 

That,  as  Commander-in-Chief,  Washington  had  ample 
authority  to  undertake  such  a  diversion  without  previously 
consulting  Congress  or  obtaining  its  consent  thereto,  did  not 
admit  of  doubt.     The  question  had  already  been  raised,  and 

1  Supra,  51. 

2  Fiske,  The  American  Revolution,  I,  308. 


134  MILITARY  STUDIES 

it  had  once  for  all  been  settled;  "all  the  American  forces 
were  under  his  command,  whether  regular  troops  or  volun- 
teers, and  he  was  invested  with  full  powers  to  act  for  the 
good  of  the  service  in  every  part  of  the  country. "  The 
conditions  were  now  exactly  those  prefigured  by  Charles 
Lee  the  year  before  at  Boston,  when  he  said  to  Washington : 
"Your  situation  is  such  that  the  salvation  of  the  whole 
depends  on  your  striking,  at  certain  crises,  vigorous  strokes, 
without  previously  communicating  your  intention."  l 

When  Howe  was  descried  at  the  mouth  of  the  Delaware 
(July  30),  Washington  was  still  in  central  New  Jersey,  in  the 
neighborhood  of  the  Raritan.  Clinton,  in  New  York,  was 
looking  for  reinforcements,  which  did  not  reach  him  until 
October.  Powerless  for  aggression,  he  could  be  safely  dis- 
regarded. Albany  was  only  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
away;  if  taken  leisurely,  a  pleasant  ten  days'  summer 
march.  It  was  a  mere  question  of  shoe  leather;  and,  in  all 
successful  warfare,  shoes  are  indeed  a  prime  factor.  So 
much  is  this  the  case  that  when,  some  thirty-five  years  later, 
Wellington,  attending  to  every  detail  which  contributed  to 
the  effectiveness  of  his  army,  was  preparing  for  that  final 
campaign  in  the  Peninsula  which  culminated  one  month 
later  in  the  complete  overthrow  of  the  French  under  King 
Joseph,  directed  and  dry-nursed  by  Marshal  Jourdan,  at 
Vittoria,  it  was  prescribed  that  every  British  infantry  soldier 
should  carry  in  his  knapsack  three  pairs  of  shoes,  with  an 
extra  pair  of  spare  soles  and  heels.  Such  an  ample  provision 
of  foot-wear  would  in  the  summer  of  1777  have  probably 
been  beyond  the  reach  of  Washington's  Quartermaster- 
General  ;  but,  shortly  before,  shoes  sufficient,  it  is  said,  for 
twenty-five  thousand  troops  had  arrived  safely  at  Ports- 
mouth, sent  out  with  other  munitions  of  war  by  French 
»N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc,  Lee  Papers,  IV,  262. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  135 

sympathizers.  New  England,  moreover,  was  then  a  com- 
munity of  cordwainers,  and  the  coarse  cowhide  foot-wear  of 
the  period  could,  if  called  for,  have  hardly  failed  somehow 
to  be  forthcoming.  In  any  event,  the  march  of  one  hundred 
and  twenty-five  miles  towards  Chesapeake  Bay  actually 
made  at  that  time  was  in  degree  only  less  destructive  of  sole 
leather  than  one  twenty-five  miles  longer  to  Albany.  As  to 
the  operation  from  any  other  point  of  view,  it  was  exactly 
the  experience  and  discipline  the  patriot  army  stood  most 
in  need  of.  As  every  one  who  has  had  any  experience  in 
actual  warfare  knows,  there  is  nothing  which  so  contributes 
to  the  health,  morale  and  discipline  of  an  army  as  steady 
and  unopposed  marching  over  long  distances.  In  our  own 
more  recent  experience  Sherman's  famous  movements 
through  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas  afforded  convincing  illus- 
tration of  this  military  truism.  Nothing,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  so  bad  for  the  morale  and  physical  health  of  a  military 
force,  especially  one  hastily  levied,  as  long  hot-weather  tarry- 
ing in  any  one  locality.  For  instance,  at  the  very  time  now 
under  consideration,  while  Washington  was  waiting  near  the 
Falls  of  the  Schuylkill  for  Howe's  movement  to  reveal  itself, 
we  are  told  that  the  sanitary  arrangements  of  the  patriots 
were  "particularly  unfortunate,"  and  in  the  "hot  August 
weather  a  most  horrible  stench  rose  all  round  their  camp." 
Had  Washington,  straining  on  the  leash,  broken  camp  and 
set  his  columns  in  motion  for  Peekskill  on  the  Hudson  during 
the  first  week  in  August,  by  the  20th  of  a  month  of  easy 
marches  he  would  have  joined  Schuyler,  and  the  united 
armies,  fifteen  thousand  strong,  would  have  been  on  top  of 
Burgoyne.  At  that  time  Gates  had  not  yet  assumed  com- 
mand of  the  Northern  Department.  Lincoln  and  Stark  were 
wrangling;  and  Schuyler  was  issuing  orders  which  both  re- 
fused or  neglected  to  obey.     The  battle  at  Bennington  was 


136  MILITARY  STUDIES 

fought  on  August  14.  Out-flanked,  surrounded,  crushed  by 
an  overwhelming  superiority  of  force,  his  enemy  flushed  with 
victory,  Burgoyne's  camp  everywhere  searched  day  and 
night  by  rifle-bullets,  while  cannon-balls  hurtled  through  the 
air,  a  week  at  most  would  have  sufficed;  the  British  com- 
mander would  have  had  to  choose  between  surrender  and 
destruction.  The  combination  and  catastrophe  of  Ulm 
thirty-eight  years  later,  might,  on  a  smaller  scale  and  in  a 
different  field,  have  been  anticipated;  but  with  results  not 
less  decisive.  Events  would  thus  have  been  precipitated 
seven  weeks,  and  the  early  days  of  September  might  have 
seen  Washington  moving  south  on  his  interior  lines  at  the 
head  of  a  united  army,  flushed  with  success  and  full  of  con- 
fidence in  itself  and  its  leader.  Rich  in  the  spoils  of  Bur- 
goyne,  it  would  also  have  been  a  force  well  armed  and 
equipped,  especially  strong  in  artillery ;  for,  indeed,  even  at 
this  interval  of  more  than  a  century  and  a  quarter  of  time, 
it  leads  to  something  closely  resembling  a  watering  of  the 
American  eyes  and  mouth  to  read  at  once  the  account  of 
the  parade  of  Washington's  so-called  army  through  Phila- 
delphia on  its  way  to  the  Brandywine  during  the  latter  days 
of  August,  1777,  and  the  schedule  of  the  impedimenta 
turned  over  by  the  vanquished  to  the  victors  at  Saratoga 
fifty  days  later.  Of  the  first  Fisher  says  (II,  19) :  "  The 
greatest  pains  were  taken  with  this  parade.  Earnest  appeals 
were  made  to  the  troops  to  keep  in  step  and  avoid  strag- 
gling. ...  To  give  some  uniformity  to  the  motley  hunting- 
shirts,  bare  feet,  and  rags,  every  man  wore  a  green  sprig  in 
his  hat.  .  .  .  But  they  all  looked  like  fighting  men  as 
they  marched  by  to  destroy  Howe's  prospects  of  a  winter  in 
Philadelphia."  This  authority  then  unconsciously  touches 
the  heart  of  the  strategic  blunder  in  that  march  being  per- 
petrated by  adding :  "With  the  policy  Howe  was  persistently 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  137 

pursuing,  it  might  have  been  just  as  well  to  offer  no  obstacle 
to  his  taking  Philadelphia.  He  merely  intended  to  pass  the 
winter  there  as  he  had  done  in  Boston  and  New  York." 
Mr.  Fisher  does  not  add  that  this  half-organized,  half- 
armed,  half-clad,  undisciplined  body  twelve  thousand  strong 
was  on  its  way  to  measure  itself  in  pitched  battle  against 
eighteen  thousand  veterans,  British  and  German,  perfectly 
organized,  equipped  and  disciplined,  in  an  effort  doomed  in 
advance  to  failure,  —  an  effort  to  protect  from  hostile  occu- 
pation a  town  of  not  the  slightest  strategic  importance !  It 
was  in  truth  a  very  sad  spectacle,  that  empty  Philadelphia 
parade  of  victims  on  the  way  through  a  dark  valley  of 
death  and  defeat  to  Valley  Forge  as  a  destination.  The 
cold,  hard  military  truth  is  that  the  flower  of  that  force  — 
eight  thousand  of  the  best  of  the  twelve  thousand  should 
then  have  been  at  Saratoga,  dividing  among  themselves  the 
contents  of  Burgoyne's  army  train  —  "a  rich  prize,"  con- 
sisting, as  Trevelyan  enumerates,  almost  exclusively  of 
articles  which  the  captors  specially  needed.  " There  were 
five  thousand  muskets,  seventy  thousand  rounds  of  ball- 
cartridges,  many  ammunition  wagons,  four  hundred  sets  of 
harness,  and  a  fine  train  of  brass  artillery,  —  battering  guns, 
field  guns,  howitzers,  and  mortars ;  —  forty-two  pieces  of 
ordnance  in  all."  This  surrender  actually  occurred  on 
October  18 ;  it  might  equally  well  have  been  forced  in  early 
September,  and  the  united,  victorious  and  seasoned  army 
which  compelled  it  might  on  the  8th  of  that  month  —  the 
day  Howe  landed  at  the  Head  of  Elk  on  Chesapeake  Bay 
—  have  been  hurrying  forward,  well  advanced  on  its  way 
back  to  confront  him. 

That  Washington  had  at  this  juncture  no  realizing  sense, 
or  indeed  any  conception  of  that  fundamental  strategic 
proposition   of   Frederick   and   Napoleon  —  the   value   and 


138  MILITARY  STUDIES 

effectiveness  in  warfare  of  concentration  and  mobility 
through  utilizing  interior  lines  against  a  segregated  enemy 
—  was  now  made  very  manifest.  For  a  time  it  was  sup- 
posed that  the  far-wandering  and  elusive  British  armament 
might  have  Charleston  for  its  destination.  The  Congress 
now  (August  1)  conferred  on  Washington  plenary  powers 
as  to  the  Northern  Department.  Instead  of  acting  on  this 
empowerment  instantly  and  decisively,  in  the  way  the  situa- 
tion called  for,  Washington  excused  himself  on  the  singular 
ground  that  the  situation  in  the  Northern  Department  was 
"delicate"  and  might  involve  "interesting  consequences." 
He  then  called  a  council  of  war  to  advise  on  the  general 
strategic  situation  and  the  line  of  action  best  calculated  to 
meet  it.  Assuming  that  Howe's  objective  was  Charleston, 
the  council  decided  in  favor  of  a  movement  toward  the 
Hudson.  As  such  a  "movement  might  involve  the  most 
important  consequences,"  Washington,  instead  of  acting, 
sent  a  letter  to  the  President  of  Congress,  requesting  the 
"opinion  of  that  body."  Congress  gave  the  seal  of  its  ap- 
proval to  the  conclusion  of  the  council.  When  every  one 
had  thus  been  consulted  and  all  possible  advice  solicited  and 
received,  the  northward  movement  was  initiated.  But  at 
just  that  juncture  Howe  appeared  in  the  Chesapeake.  That 
Philadelphia  was  his  objective  now  became  certain;  and 
immediately  the  northern  movement  was  countermanded. 
The  grounds  on  which  it  was  countermanded  were  thus  set 
forth  by  Washington  himself:  "The  state  of  affairs  in  this 
quarter  will  not  admit  of  it.  It  would  be  the  height  of  im- 
policy to  weaken  ourselves  too  much  here,  in  order  to  in- 
crease our  strength  [in  the  Northern  Department];  and  it 
must  certainly  be  considered  more  difficult,  as  well  as  of 
greater  moment,  to  control  the  main  army  of  the  enemy, 
than  an  inferior,  and,  I  may  say,  a  dependent  one ;  for  it  is 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  139 

pretty  obvious  that  if  General  Howe  can  be  kept  at  bay, 
and  prevented  from  effecting  his  purpose,  the  successes  of 
General  Burgoyne,  whatever  they  may  be,  must  be  partial 
and  temporary. "  In  other  words,  the  advantages  of  con- 
centration were  to  be  ignored,  and  no  use  made  of  time  and 
interior  lines  in  the  striking  of  blows,  —  now  here,  now 
there.  It  is  quite  safe  to  say  that  neither  Frederick,  twenty 
years  before,  nor  Napoleon,  twenty  years  later,  would  have 
viewed  that  particular  situation  in  that  way.  They,  with 
all  their  strength  concentrated  in  one  solid  mass,  would  have 
struck  Burgoyne  first,  and  then  Howe.  They  would  hardly 
have  weakened  themselves  by  sending  Morgan  to  help  "hold 
Burgoyne  at  bay  " ;  and  then  insured  the  loss  of  Philadelphia,  a 
thing  in  itself  of  no  consequence,  by  confronting  Howe  with  half 
of  an  army,  which,  as  a  whole,  was  insufficient  for  the  work. 

As  Irving  shows  with  a  delightful  naivete,  the  significance 
of  which  Fiske  wholly  failed  to  appreciate,  "Washington 
was  thus  in  a  manner  carrying  on  two  games  at  once,  with 
Howe  on  the  seaboard  and  with  Burgoyne  on  the  upper 
waters  of  the  Hudson,  and  endeavoring  by  a  skilful  move- 
ment to  give  check  to  both.  It  was  an  arduous  and  compli- 
cated task,  especially  with  his  scanty  and  fluctuating  means, 
and  the  wide  extent  of  country  and  great  distances  over 
which  he  had  to  move  his  men."  1  To  attempt  to  carry  on 
"two  games  at  once"  on  the  chess-board  of  war,  especially 
with  "scanty  and  fluctuating  means/'  is  a  somewhat  peril- 
ous experiment,  and  one  rarely  attempted  by  the  great 
masters  of  the  art.  But,  with  Sir  William  Howe  for  an 
opponent,  almost  any  degree  of  skill  would  suffice ;  opposite 
him  at  the  board  blundering  did  not  count. 

In  the  next  place,  the  extreme  slowness  of  movement 
which  characterized  all  the  operations  of  this  campaign, 
1  Washington  (Geoffrey  Crayon  ed.),  Ill,  180-181,  Chap.  XIII. 


140  MILITARY  STUDIES 

whether  British  or  patriot,  is  by  no  means  their  least  notice- 
able feature.  Neither  side  seems  to  have  known  how  to 
march  in  the  Napoleonic  or  Wellingtonian  sense  of  the  term, 
or  as  the  grenadiers  of  Frederick  covered  space.  Phila- 
delphia, for  instance,  was  only  ninety  measured  miles  from 
New  York;  it  was  Howe's  objective,  by  way  of  the  Head  of 
Elk.  Taking  twenty-eight  days  (July  24-August  21)  to  get 
to  the  Head  of  Elk,  Howe  then  spent  nine  more  days  in 
landing  his  army  and  setting  it  in  motion;  finally,  having 
won  a  complete  victory  on  the  Brandy  wine  on  the  11th  of 
September,  it  was  not  until  September  26  that  he  occupied 
Philadelphia,  only  some  twenty  miles  away  from  his  suc- 
cessful battle-field.  In  all  sixty-five  days  had  been  con- 
sumed in  the  process  of  getting  into  Philadelphia  from  New 
York.  On  the  other  hand,  the  patriot  movements  were  no 
more  expeditious.  In  sending  reinforcements  to  Gates, 
Morgan,  then  at  Trenton,  received  from  Washington  orders 
to  move  north,  August  16;  the  distance  to  be  covered  was 
approximately  two  hundred  miles,  and  the  riflemen  did  it  at 
the  rate  of  ten  miles  a  day.  Reporting  to  Gates,  September 
7,  Morgan  was  actively  conspicuous  in  the  subsequent  opera- 
tions, which  dragged  on  through  forty  days.  Burgoyne 
capitulated  October  17,  and  Washington  was  then  in  sore 
straits  after  Germantown  (October  4) ;  but  not  until  No- 
vember 1  did  Morgan  even  receive  his  orders  to  return,  and 
it  was  eighteen  days  more  before  he  at  last  reported  back  at 
Whitemarsh;  having,  quite  unopposed  and  under  pressing 
orders  for  haste,  covered  some  two  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
in  eighteen  days  —  an  average  of  fourteen  miles  a  day. 
Under  the  circumstances,  he  should  certainly  have  covered 
twenty.  He  had  then  been  gone  ninety-four  days  in  all; 
under  Wellington,  Frederick  or  Napoleon,  thirty  at  most 
would  have  been  deemed  quite  enough  in  which  to  finish 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF   1777  141 

up  the  job,  with  a  court-martial  and  dismissal  from  the  ser- 
vice the  penalty  for  dilatoriness.  Not  until  eighteen  days 
after  the  capitulation  at  Saratoga  was  official  notice  thereof 
communicated  to  Congress ;  and  it  was  the  20th  of  Novem- 
ber —  five  full  weeks  —  after  Burgoyne's  surrender  before 
the  longed-for  reinforcements  from  the  Army  of  the  North 
put  in  an  appearance.  "Had  they  arrived  but  ten  days 
sooner/'  wrote  Washington,  "it  would,  I  think,  have  put  it 
in  my  power  to  save  Fort  Mifflin  and  consequently  have 
rendered  Philadelphia  a  very  ineligible  situation  for  the 
enemy  this  winter."  *  They  ought  to  have  been  back  in 
Howe's  front  ten  weeks  earlier;  and,  even  as  it  was,  allow- 
ing for  both  Gates's  inexcusable  procrastination  and  Put- 
nam's wrong-headed  incompetence,2  they  had  moved  to 
Washington's  relief  in  a  time  of  well-understood  crisis  at  the 
snail-like  pace  of  twelve  miles  a  day.  Marching  in  the  Pen- 
insula towards  Talavera  (July  28,  1809)  to  the  assistance  of 
his  less  hardly  pressed  chief,  General  Crauford's  famous 
Light  Brigade,  moving  over  execrable  roads  under  an  almost 
intolerable  midsummer  sun,  covered  thirty-six  miles  in  eigh- 
teen hours;  only  seventeen  men  having  fallen  out  of  the 
ranks.3     Four  years  later  (1813)  Wellington,  in  a  campaign 

1  Irving,  Washington,  III,  371.  2  lb.  363-367. 

3  Napier's  statement  is  that  on  this  occasion  the  Light  Brigade  covered 
sixty-two  miles  in  twenty-six  hours  (B.  VIII,  Chap.  II)  and  subsequent 
authorities  have  followed  Napier.  The  statement  is  erroneous.  See 
Mass.  Hist.  Soc,  Proceedings,  XLIV,  296.  The  correct  time  and  distance 
are  as  stated  in  the  text. 

Incomparably  the  best  and  most  dramatic  infantry  march  I  personally 
ever  witnessed  was  that  of  the  Sixth  (Sedgwick's)  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  on  the  2d  of  July,  1863,  hurrying  to  the  support  of  Meade,  very 
hardly  pressed  by  Lee  on  the  second  day  of  Gettysburg.  Breaking  camp 
at  9  p.m.  of  the  1st,  and  marching  all  the  next  day,  under  a  Pennsylvania 
July  sun,  the  corps,  moving  in  solid  column,  covered  some  thirty-four  miles. 
The  leading  brigade  was  then  double-quicked  into  position  to  help  hold  the 
Little  Round  Top  against  Longstreet. 

In  each  of  those  cases,  that  in  Spain  in  1809  and  that  in  Pennsylvania 


142  MILITARY  STUDIES 

of  six  weeks  conducted  in  a  Spanish  midsummer  and  over 
Spanish  roads,  marched  his  army  six  hundred  miles,  passed 
six  great  rivers,  gained  one  decisive  battle,  invested  two 
fortresses,  and  drove  from  Spain  a  homogeneous  army  of 
French  veterans  a  fifth  more  numerous  than  his  own  con- 
glomerate command.1  As  Napier  in  recording  these  events 
tersely  observes,  "the  difference  between  a  common  general 
and  a  great  captain  is  immense,  the  one  is  victorious  when 
the  other  is  defeated." 

This,  however,  was  thirty  years  subsequent  to  the  Howe- 
Washington  campaign  in  Pennsylvania;  but,  just  twenty 
years  before,  Frederick  had  set  a  yet  higher  standard  of 
concentration  and  mobility  with  which  all  military  men  were 
familiar  in  1777.  Berlin,  the  capital  of  Prussia,  was  raided 
and  occupied  by  the  imperialists  on  the  17th  of  October, 
1757,  and  a  contribution  levied  upon  it.  Frederick  was  then 
at  Leipsic,  eighty  miles  away.  His  confederated  enemies 
were  pressing  in  upon  him  from  every  side.  Twenty  days 
later  (November  5)  he  routed  the  French  at  Rossbach  on 
the  western  limits  of  his  kingdom ;  and  then,  turning  fiercely 
to  the  east,  fighting  battle  on  battle  and  announcing  his 
determination  to  assault  Prince  Charles  and  his  Austrians 

in  1863,  both  officers  and  men  knew  how  to  march.  I  may  claim  to  have 
participated  in  the  march  last  mentioned;  as  the  First  Massachusetts 
Cavalry  was  then  temporarily  detached  from  the  brigade,  under  orders 
to  report  to  Sixth  Corps  headquarters.  Its  marching  directions  for  July 
2  were  to  follow  immediately  in  rear  of  the  corps,  and  permit  no  strag- 
gling whatever.  That  day  the  regiment  had  practically  nothing  to  do ; 
there  was  no  straggling.  My  recollection  is  that,  in  the  saddle  at  sunrise 
(4  o'clock),  we  reached  the  field  of  battle  at  about  4  p.m.  As  respects 
speed,  solidity  and  spirit,  the  infantry  march  could  not  have  been  im- 
proved upon ;  and  the  deployment  of  the  column  as  it  reached  the  rear 
of  the  line  of  battle  at  the  crisis  of  the  day's  fight  was  the  most  striking  and 
impressive  incident  I  remember  to  have  witnessed  during  my  period  of 
service. 

1  Napier,  History  of  the  Peninsular  War,  B.  XX,  Chap.  VIII. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  143 

" wheresoever  and  whensoever  I  may  meet  with  them/'  on 
the  5th  of  December  he  won  his  great  victory  of  Leuthen  in 
Silesia  two  hundred  miles  from  Rossbach,  the  odds  in  num- 
bers engaged  being  some  three  to  one  against  him.  In  that 
campaign  (1757);  concentrating  his  strength,  throwing  his 
whole  force  from  side  to  side  of  his  kingdom  regardless  equally 
of  distance  or  of  odds,  he  executed  a  multiplicity  of  compli- 
cated movements,  fought  seven  pitched  battles,  and  occu- 
pied one  hundred  and  seven  different  positions.  After 
Leuthen,  without  a  moment's  hesitation  investing  Breslau, 
with  its  garrison  twenty  thousand  strong,  he  compelled  its 
surrender  December  19,  and  then,  and  not  until  then,  was 
what  was  left  of  his  war-worn  and  foot-sore  battalions  per- 
mitted to  go  into  winter  quarters.  Two  years  later  (Sep- 
tember, 1759),  during  the  darkest  hours  of  Frederick's  seem- 
ingly hopeless  struggle  for  existence,  his  brother,  Prince 
Henry,  ua  highly  ingenious  dexterous  little  man  in  affairs  of 
War,  sharp  as  needles,"  1  evaded  Marshal  Daun,  who  had 
everything  fixed  to  destroy  him  on  the  Landskron,  near  Gor- 
litz,  at  break  of  day,  and  marching  in  fifty-six  hours  through 
fifty  miles  of  country  " wholly  in  the  Enemy's  possession," 
fell  upon  the  Austrian  general,  Wehla,  and  killed  or  cap- 
tured his  entire  command,  utterly  wrecking  the  imperialist 
plan  of  campaign  for  that  year.     This  was  conducting  mili- 

1  Carlyle,  Frederick  the  Great,  B.  XIX,  Chap.  VI.  From  a  literary- 
point  of  view  most  remarkable,  and  indisputably  a  work  of  genius,  Carlyle's 
Frederick  as  a  military  narrative  is  undeniably  irritating.  In  almost  every 
page  of  his  very  striking  account  of  the  Second  Silesian  War,  it  is  apparent 
that  the  narrator  was  wholly  devoid  of  familiarity  with  the  details  of 
matter-of-fact  warfare.  Had  it  been  Carlyle's  fortune  to  have  himself 
lugged  a  knapsack  and  musket  a  few  hundred  miles,  to  have  passed  a 
winter  or  two  in  camp,  and  to  have  participated  in  half  a  dozen  battles, 
his  narrative  would  have  been  altogether  other  than  it  is,  and  vastly  more 
instructive  as  well  as  realistic.  Carlyle's  Frederick  smells  of  the  lamp ; 
Napier's  Peninsular  War,  of  the  camp-fire. 


144  MILITARY  STUDIES 

tary  operations  on  great  strategic  lines  and  in  strict  con- 
formity with  the  fundamental  rules  governing  the  game; 
but  it  contrasts  strangely  with  the  performances  in  America 
exactly  twenty  years  later. 

Bearing  in  recollection  such  military  operations  and 
possibilities,  conducted  on  interior  lines  to  well-considered 
and  attainable  objectives  under  correct  strategic  rules,  it  is 
interesting  to  consider  what  Washington  actually  did  in 
1777.  As  will  be  seen,  it  is  not  unsafe  to  say  that  during 
the  four  months  —  August  to  November  —  every  sound  prin- 
ciple whether  of  policy  or  strategy  was  on  the  patriot  side 
either  disregarded  or  violated. 

Eecurring  to  the  24th  of  July,  when  Howe,  putting  out 
to  sea  from  Sandy  Hook,  disappeared  below  the  horizon,  the 
pieces  on  the  strategic  chess-board,  as  already  seen,  stood 
as  follows:  Washington  with  some  twelve  thousand  men, 
probably  eight  thousand  of  whom  were  marching  effectives, 
was  at  Middlebrook  on  the  Raritan.  He  held  a  controlling 
position  on  the  interior  line,  practically  midway  between 
Peekskill,  on  the  Hudson,  and  Philadelphia,  on  the  Dela- 
ware, —  one  hundred  and  seventy  miles  from  Albany  to  the 
north,  and  one  hundred  and  forty  from  Elkton,  at  the  head 
of  Chesapeake  Bay,  to  the  south.  From  the  military,  operat- 
ing point  of  view  the  two  places  were  practically  equidistant, 
Albany  being  two  days'  march  further  off  than  Elkton. 
Clinton,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  been  left  by  Howe  to 
hold  the  British  base  at  the  mouth  of  the  Hudson,  with 
hardly  force  enough  (six  thousand  men)  for  the  purpose. 
For  the  time  he  was  a  mere  pawn  in  the  game.  Burgoyne, 
with  some  seven  thousand  effectives,  was  slowly  approach- 
ing Fort  Edward,  which  the  patriots  abandoned,  and  he 
occupied,  July  30.  In  his  front,  forty  miles  only  from 
Albany,   was  Schuyler   with   some   forty-five  hundred   de- 


THE   REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF   1777  145 

moralized  men.  Howe,  with  the  bulk  of  the  British  army, 
some  eighteen  thousand,  had  disappeared,  —  his  where- 
abouts and  destination  were  matters  of  pure  conjecture. 
To  the  strategic  eye  of  Washington  two  things  only  were 
clear;  while  the  advance  of  Burgoyne  must  at  any  cost  be 
checked,  Howe  must  be  watched,  and,  if  possible,  circum- 
vented. As  respects  the  first,  he  was  right;  as  respects  the 
second,  he  was  in  error :  and,  because  of  that  error,  Wash- 
ington now  made  two  egregious,  and,  as  the  result  showed, 
well-nigh  fatal  mistakes.  Instead  of  going  himself  at  the 
head  of  the  whole  effective  part  of  his  army,  he,  in  the  face 
of  an  enemy  already  superior  in  every  respect,  divided  that 
army,  sending  a  large  detachment,  some  three  thousand 
strong  including  Morgan's  riflemen,  —  the  very  kernel  and 
pick  of  his  command,  —  to  reenforce  Gates,  now  (August  16) 
in  charge  of  the  Northern  Department;  he  himself,  in  his 
pest-hole  of  a  summer  camp  near  Philadelphia,  continuing 
his  anxious  watch  for  Howe.  It  may  have  been  generous, 
but  it  was  not  war ;  and,  within  less  than  a  week  (August  21), 
after  he  had  thus  depleted  his  previously  insufficient  strength, 
Howe  put  in  his  appearance  at  the  Head  of  Elk.  With  his 
divided  force  to  risk  a  pitched  battle  under  such  circum- 
stances was  to  disregard  the  first  strategic  rule  for  his  con- 
duct, and,  in  so  doing,  to  invite  disaster  and  defeat;  yet 
that  was  just  what  Washington  did.  When,  in  1812,  after 
Borodino,  Kutuzof,  the  Russian  Commander-in-Chief,  was 
urged  to  risk  another  battle  before  abandoning  "the  holy 
Ancient  Capital  of  Russia"  to  the  hated  invader,  Tolstoi  says 
that  he  put  the  case  thus  to  the  Council  of  War:  "The 
question  for  which  I  have  convened  these  gentlemen  is  a 
military  one.  That  question  is  as  follows:  The  salvation 
of  Russia  is  her  army.  Would  it  be  more  to  our  advantage 
to  risk  the  loss  of  the  army  and  of  Moscow  too  by  accepting 


146  MILITARY  STUDIES 

battle,  or  to  abandon  Moscow  without  a  battle?"  Tolstoi 
tells  us  that  a  long  discussion  ensued.  At  last,  during  one  of 
the  lulls  which  occurred,  when  all  felt  that  nothing  remained 
to  be  said,  "Kutuzof  drew  a  long  sigh,  as  if  he  were  prepared 
to  speak.  All  looked  at  him;  'Eh  bien,  Messieurs,  je  vois 
que  c'est  moi  qui  payerai  les  pots  casses,'  said  he.  And, 
slowly  getting  to  his  feet,  he  approached  the  table :  '  Gentle- 
men, I  have  listened  to  your  views.  Some  of  you  will  be  dis- 
satisfied with  me.  But'  —  he  hesitated  —  'I,  in  virtue  of 
the  power  confided  to  me  by  the  sovereign  and  the  country, 
I  command  that  we  retreat/"  *  Half  a  loaf  is  proverbially 
better  than  no  bread;  and  this  homely  domestic  aphorism 
holds  true  also  of  military  operations.  The  Russian  General- 
in-Chief  merely  recognized  the  fact.  Kutuzof  lost  Moscow, 
but,  as  the  invader  presently  found  out  to  his  great  cost, 
he  saved  the  Russian  army.  Washington  not  only  lost 
Philadelphia,  but  the  wreck  and  remnant  of  the  patriot 
army  survived  two  unnecessary  defeats  only  to  face  the 
privations  and  disease  of  Valley  Forge. 

That,  strategically,  and  from  the  American  point  of  view, 
the  battle  of  the  Brandywine  ought  never  to  have  been 
fought  is  a  point  upon  which  there  is  no  disagreement.  It 
is,  however,  argued  that  it  was  a  political  and  moral  neces- 
sity, —  that  a  meddling  and  impracticable  Congress  com- 
pelled it  out  of  regard  to  an  unreasoning  public  sentiment. 
As  Marshall,  a  contemporary  authority,  and  himself  then 
serving  in  a  Virginia  regiment  under  Washington,  assures  us : 
"  Their  inferiority  in  numbers,  in  discipline,  and  in  arms, 
was  too  great  to  leave  the  Americans  a  probable  prospect  of 
victory.  A  battle,  however,  was  not  to  be  avoided.  Public 
opinion,  and  the  opinion  of  Congress,  required  it.  To  have 
given  up  Philadelphia  without  an  attempt  to  preserve  it 
1  War  and  Peace,  Pt.  XI,  Chap.  IV. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  147 

would  have  excited  discontents."  l  If  such  was  indeed  the 
case,2  the  decision  announced  by  Kutuzof  to  his  Council  of 
War  in  1812  would  have  been  very  apposite  in  the  mouth  of 
Washington  in  1777.  As  the  result  of  the  battle,  he  should 
have  lost  his  army ;  for,  in  addition  to  the  fact  that  it  ought 
never  to  have  been  fought  at  all,  the  battle  of  the  Brandy- 
wine,  while  well  and  skilfully  fought  by  the  British,  was  very 
badly  and  blunderingly  fought  on  the  side  of  the  Americans. 
They  were  out-manoeuvred,  surprised,  out-fought  and 
routed.  That  the  chief  patriot  army  —  the  mainstay  of 
the  cause  of  Independence  —  was  not  on  that  occasion 
utterly  destroyed  was,  indeed,  due  wholly  to  the  indolent 
forbearance  of  Howe.  It  was  one  of  the  pithy  aphorisms 
of  Napoleon  that  the  art  of  war  is  to  march  twelve  leagues 
in  a  single  day,  overthrow  your  enemy  in  a  great  battle,  and 
then  march  twelve  leagues  more  in  pursuit.  Sir  William 
Howe  met  neither  requirement ;  but  it  was  in  the  last  that 
he  failed  most  conspicuously.  As  Galloway,  the  Philadelphia 
loyalist,  with  the  best  conceivable  opportunities  for  forming 
an  opinion,  wrote  of  him,  "Howe  always  succeeded  in  every 
attack  he  thought  proper  to  make,  as  far  as  he  chose  to  suc- 
ceed." In  this  respect  Brandy  wine  was  a  mere  repetition 
of  Bunker  Hill  and  Flatbush.  Of  two  French  officers  who 
took  part  in  the  operations  on  the  Brandywine,  one  (La- 
fayette) observes,  "Had  the  enemy  marched  directly  to 
Derby,  the  American  army  would  have  been  cut  up  and 
destroyed;  they  lost  a  precious  night";  the  other  (Du  Por- 
tail)  wrote,  "If  the  English  had  followed  their  advantage 
that  day,  Washington's  army  would  have  been  spoken  of  no 
more."     But  Howe  would  not  do  it.     If  he  had  pursued 

1  Washington,  III,  144,  152,  164. 

2  To  the  same  effect  Irving,  Washington,  III,  241.     This  subject  will 
again  be  referred  to  in  this  paper,  infra,  163. 


148  MILITARY  STUDIES 

Washington,  it  was  said,  and  inflicted  a  crushing  defeat,  he 
might  have  left  part  of  his  force  to  occupy  Philadelphia,  and 
marched  the  rest  to  the  assistance  of  Burgoyne.  This  was 
what  the  ministry  had  expected.  As  matter  of  cold  historic 
truth  Washington  had,  in  the  great  game  of  war,  played  into 
his  opponent's  hands,  —  done  exactly  what  that  opponent 
wanted  him  to  do,  and  what  he  ought  never  to  have  done.1 
He  had  permitted  Howe  to  draw  him  away  from  his  true 
objective,  —  the  army  of  Burgoyne,  —  then  to  divide  his 
force,  and,  finally,  in  the  sequence  of  so  doing,  to  venture  a 
pitched  battle  which  he  had  not  one  chance  in  ten  of  win- 
ning. Great  in  ministerial  circles  were  the  gratulations  when 
news  arrived  in  London  that  Howe's  false  move  had  been 
thus  retrieved  by  a  move  equally  false  on  the  patriot  side. 
"I  confess,"  wrote  Lord  George  Germain,  —  and  one  can 
even  now  almost  hear  a  deep-drawn  breath  of  relief  in  the 
words,  —  "I  confess  I  feared  that  Washington  would  have 

1  In  his  defence  of  his  proceedings,  after  resigning  his  command  and 
returning  to  England,  Howe  claimed  that  so  far  as  Burgoyne  was  con- 
cerned, his  Chesapeake  Bay  expedition  was  a  well-designed  and  altogether 
successful  movement,  fully  accomplishing  its  intended  purpose.  "Had 
I  adopted  the  plan  of  going  up  Hudson' s-river,  it  would  have  been  alleged, 
that  I  had  wasted  the  campaign  with  a  considerable  army  under  my  com- 
mand, merely  to  ensure  the  progress  of  the  northern  army,  which  could 
have  taken  care  of  itself,  provided  I  had  made  a  diversion  in  its  favour,  by 
drawing  off  to  the  southward  the  main  army  under  General  Washington." 
Therefore,  acting  upon  the  advice  of  the  admiral,  Lord  Cornwallis  and 
other  general  officers,  believing  that  Washington  would  follow  him,  he 
"determined  on  pursuing  that  plan  which  would  make  the  most  effectual 
diversion  in  favour  of  the  northern  army,  which  promised  in  its  conse- 
quences the  most  important  success,  and  which  the  Secretary  of  State  at 
home,  and  my  own  judgment  upon  the  spot,  had  deliberately  approved." 
—  Parliamentary  History,  XX,  693,  694.  And  in  his  Observations  upon  a 
Pamphlet  entitled  "  Letters  to  a  Nobleman,,J  61,  Howe  repeated  the  assertion. 
"I  shall  ever  insist,  and  I  am  supported  by  evidence  in  insisting,  that  the 
southern  expedition,  by  drawing  off  General  Washington  and  his  whole 
force,  was  the  strongest  diversion  [in  favor  of  the  northern  army]  that 
could  have  been  made.'! 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF   1777  149 

marched  all  his  force  towards  Albany,  and  attempted  to 
demolish  the  army  from  Canada,  but  the  last  accounts  say 
that  he  has  taken  up  his  quarters  at  Morristown  after  de- 
taching three  thousand  men  to  Albany.  If  this  is  all  he 
does,  he  will  not  distress  Burgoyne."  1  Thus,  while  himself 
wandering  off  with  an  utterly  false  objective  —  Philadelphia 
—  in  view,  by  supreme  good  fortune  Howe  had  not  only 
induced  Washington  to  follow  him,  but  also  in  so  doing  to 
give  the  British  leader  a  chance  at  his  true  objective,  Wash- 
ington's own  army.  In  the  final  outcome,  it  is  difficult  to 
see  how  blundering  could  have  gone  further.  Out-ma- 
noeuvred and  out-fought,  twice  beaten  in  pitched  battles, 
neither  of  which  under  the  circumstances  he  ought  to  have 
risked,  Washington  presently  crawled  into  his  winter-quar- 
ters at  Valley  Forge,  while  Howe  ensconced  himself  com- 
fortably in  Philadelphia.  Yet  months  before,  Charles  Lee, 
then  a  prisoner  of  war  in  New  York,  had  traitorously  but 
truly  advised  Howe,  "In  my  opinion  the  taking  possession 
of  Philadelphia  will  not  have  any  decisive  consequences. " 

The  undeniable  fact  is  that  from  a  cold  military  point  of 
view,  Howe's  movement  ought  to  have  been  encouraged  by 
Washington,  and  the  British  occupation  of  Philadelphia 
rather  facilitated  than  opposed.  A  mere  show  of  obstruction 
to  it  should  have  sufficed ;  for,  as  Franklin,  the  shrewdest 
observer  of  the  day,  whether  of  nature  or  of  events,  is  said 
to  have  remarked  when  the  news  reached  him  that  Howe 
had  captured  Philadelphia:  "No,  Philadelphia  has  captured 
Howe!" 

In  a  recent  Congressional  Report 2  on  the  proposal  to  erect 
a  statue  of  General  Nathanael  Greene  on  the  battleground  at 

1  Lord  George  Germain  to  General  Irwin,  August  23,  1777.      Hist.  MSS. 
Com.,  Report  on  MSS.  of  Mrs.  Stopford-Sackville,  I,  138. 
8  House  Report,  No.  1698,  61st  Congress,  2d  Session. 


150  MILITARY  STUDIES 

Guilford  Courthouse,  North  Carolina,  it  is  stated  with  ap- 
parent correctness  that  when,  in  March,  1781,  nearly  four  years 
after  Howe's  occupation  of  Philadelphia,  Greene  made  his 
indecisive  North  Carolina  fight,  Washington  had  formed  a 
plan  to  attack  Clinton,  who  had  12,000  troops,  in  New  York ; 
and,  the  French  fleet  cooperating,  to  capture  him  and  his 
army,  thereby  putting  an  end  to  the  war.  His  preparations 
to  that  end  were  in  full  progress,  when,  suddenly,  tidings  of 
Greene's  battle  reached  him,  and  of  the  subsequent  falling 
back  of  Cornwallis  on  Wilmington.  Though  victorious,  un- 
able, because  of  his  losses,  longer  to  hold  the  field  in  the 
South,  the  British  commander  must  obviously  return  north- 
ward through  the  lower  part  of  Virginia.  Grasping  the  essen- 
tial fact  that  the  capture  of  either  Cornwallis  or  Clinton 
would  bring  the  war  to  an  end,  Washington,,  this  time,  saw  his 
opportunity.  Cornwallis,  as  Burgoyne  in  1777,  was  the  surer 
victim,  he  having  only  7000  men,  while  Clinton  had  12,000. 
Washington  changed  his  plans  accordingly.  Deceiving 
Clinton,  he  moved  rapidly  upon  the  weaker  force,  and 
by  a  masterly  movement  brought  hostilities  to  a  practical 
close  at  Yorktown.  But  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  a  move- 
ment and  combination  of  precisely  similar  character  might 
not  have  brought  the  war  to  a  close  four  years  earlier.  The 
march  to  Lake  Champlain  would,  in  1777,  have  been  both 
shorter  and  easier  than  the  subsequent  march  of  1781  from 
the  banks  of  the  Hudson  to  the  shores  of  the  Chesapeake ;  and 
Howe  at  Philadelphia  in  1777  would  have  been  even  more 
powerless  to  stay  it  than  in  1781  was  Clinton  in  New  York. 
The  actual  strategy  of  the  campaign  of  1777  has  now  been 
passed  in  view,  and  its  merits  or  demerits  on  either  side 
tested  by  the  application  to  them  of  the  acknowledged  prin- 
ciples of  a  sound  policy  or  rules  of  correct  strategy,  laid  down 
in  the  full  light  of  subsequent  events  and  with  our  knowledge 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  151 

of  conditions  then  existing.  The  result  has  been  stated.  On 
neither  side  was  the  great  game  played  with  an  intelligent 
regard  to  its  rules ;  but;  taken  as  a  whole,  the  mistakes  com- 
mitted and  the  blunders  perpetrated  on  the  British  side  clearly 
and  considerably  more  than  counterbalanced  those  on  the 
patriot  side.  On  each  side  they  were  bad;  but  in  Bur- 
goyne's  capitulation  the  British  lost  so  to  speak  a  queen, 
while  in  Howe's  failure  to  destroy  Washington's  army  after 
his  victory  on  the  Brandywine  the  British  threw  away  the 
chance  of  mating  their  adversary's  king,  by  no  means  im- 
possibly of  calling  a  checkmate. 

Charles  Lee  was  second  to  Washington  in  command  of  all 
the  American  armies.  Captured,  or  rather  ignominiously 
bagged,  by  the  British  at  Basking  Ridge,  December  13, 
1776,  Lee  passed  the  entire  year  1777  a  prisoner  of  war 
in  New  York,  not  being  released  in  exchange  until  May, 
1778.  While  in  New  York,  Lee  experienced  a  change  of 
heart  as  respects  the  conflict  in  which  he  was  a  partici- 
pant ;  and  the  plan  of  operations  he  then  drew  up  for  the 
consideration  of  Sir  William  Howe  has  already  been  re- 
ferred to.1  Charles  Lee  was  not  a  man  who  inspired  either 
confidence  or  respect.  So  lightly  did  his  former  British 
army  associates  regard  him  that  when  his  capture  was  an- 
nounced and  the  disposition  to  be  made  of  him  as  a  pris- 
oner of  war  was  mooted,  it  was  contemptuously  observed 
by  "one  of  the  wisest  servants  of  the  Crown"  that  he  was 
so  constituted  that  "he  must  puzzle  everything  he  med- 
dles in,  and  he  was  the  worst  present  the  Americans  could 
receive."  2  Lee,  nevertheless,  did  have  a  certain  military 
instinct  as  well  as  training,  and  the  scheme  of  operations  out- 
lined by  him  for  Howe's  consideration  was  in  close  general 
conformity  with  the  principles  set  forth  in  the  earlier  portion 
1  Supra,  121.  2  N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc.  Lee  Papers,  IV,  402. 


152  MILITARY  STUDIES 

of  this  paper.  Holding  New  York  as  a  base,  the  British  navy- 
was  also  to  secure  the  control  of  Chesapeake  Bay ;  and  then, 
cutting  New  England  off  from  the  Middle  Provinces,  was  to 
rely  on  a  gradual  process  of  inanition  to  dissolve  the  patriot 
levies.  So  self-evident  did  this  strategic  proposition  seem  to 
Lee  that  up  to  the  15th  of  June,  1778,  three  days  only  before 
Howe's  successor,  Clinton,  abandoning  Philadelphia  in  the 
summer  following  Brandywine,  began  his  march  to  New 
York,  Lee  at  Valley  Forge  insisted,  in  a  long  letter  addressed 
to  Washington,  that  the  plainly  impending  move  of  the 
British  commander  would  be  in  the  direction  of  Lancaster, 
Pa.,  with  a  view  to  manoeuvring  the  patriot  army  out  of 
its  strong  position  at  Valley  Forge  and  forcing  it  to  a  trial  of 
strength  under  conditions  less  advantageous  to  it ;  and  then, 
whatever  the  result,  Clinton  purposed  to  take  possession  of 
some  convenient  tract  of  country  effectually  protected  by 
the  British  command  of  the  sea,  and,  by  so  doing,  to  para- 
lyze further  resistance.1 

The  French  alliance,  jeopardizing  as  it  did  for  the  time 
being  —  and  until  Rodney's  victory  (February  19,  1782)  — 
the  British  control  of  the  sea,  had  in  June,  1778,  introduced 
a  new  and  controlling  factor  into  the  strategic  situation,  in 
obedience  to  which  Clinton  made  his  move  from  Philadelphia 
to  New  York.  But  until  the  news  of  Burgoyne's  capitula- 
tion reached  Europe  (December,  1777),  resulting  in  the 
Franco-American  alliance  (January,  1778),  it  is  difficult  to 
detect  any  point  of  weakness  in  "Mr.  Lee's  Plan."  If  put 
in  operation  at  any  time  during  1777  and  systematically 
pursued,  it  could  hardly  have  failed  to  work.  The  British 
commander  had  at  his  disposal  an  ample  force  with  which 
to  do  anything,  except  generally  occupy  the  country.  Had 
he  seen  fit  in  June,  1777,  to  move  up  the  Hudson  by  land  and 
1  Lee  Papers,  II,  401. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  153 

river  to  effect  a  junction  with  Burgoyne,  the  Americans,  as 
their  leaders  perfectly  well  knew,  could  have  offered  to  him 
no  sort  of  effective  opposition.  "Nothing  under  Heaven 
can  save  us,"  wrote  Trumbull,  "but  the  enemy's  going  to 
the  southward."  *  Chesapeake  Bay,  with  Hampton  Roads 
as  a  depot  and  arsenal,  next  lay  at  the  mercy  of  the  British 
fleet.  Wilmington,  carrying  with  it  a  complete  control  of 
the  Delaware  and  the  whole  eastern  shore  of  Maryland,  did 
not  admit  of  defence;  neither,  as  events  subsequently 
showed,  did  Charleston  or  the  coast  of  the  Carolinas :  and 
the  interior  was  subsidiary  to  the  seaboard  controlling 
points.  The  patriot  army,  if  left  to  itself,  behind  an  effec- 
tively blockaded  coast,  could  not  be  held  together  because 
of  a  mere  lack  of  absolute  necessities  in  the  way  of  food, 
raiment  and  munitions.  All  the  British  had  to  do  was, 
apparently,  to  hold  the  principal  points  of  seaboard  supply 
and  distribution,  and  a  single  line  of  interior  communica- 
tion —  New  York  Bay  to  Lake  Champlain  —  and  then  — 
wait !  How  utterly  and  completely  they  failed  to  adopt 
this  policy,  or  to  act  on  these  strategic  lines,  is  matter  of 
record.  They  not  only  threw  away  their  game,  but  they 
lingered  out  eight  years  in  doing  it. 

Turning  now  to  the  other  side,  the  conclusion  to  be 
reached  is  not  greatly  better.  The  sequence  of  events 
hardly  needs  to  be  recalled  :  at  the  South,  Brandywine  (Sep- 
tember 11),  Paoli  (September  20),  Germantown  (October  4), 
Fort  Mifflin  (November  15),  and  Valley  Forge  (December  9) 
—  all  in  1777.  An  undeniably  bad  and  ill-considered 
record,  with  a  most  wretched  termination.  At  the  North  it 
was  better,  though  somewhat  checkered;  Ticonderoga  lost 
(July  5),  Fort  Edward  abandoned  (July  30),  Bennington 
won  (August  14),  Fort  Montgomery  and  the  Hudson  High- 

1  Fisher,  II,  71. 


154  MILITARY  STUDIES 

lands  lost  (October  6),  winding  up  with  the  Saratoga  capitu- 
lation (October  17).  Assuming  now  that  the  game  had 
been  played  quite  otherwise  than  it  was  played,  and  more 
in  accord  with  the  rules  of  "good  generalship/'  it  is  possible, 
knowing  as  we  do  the  characters  and  temperamental  methods 
of  those  responsible  for  the  movements  made,  approximately 
to  predicate  results.  As  already  set  forth,  and  for  ulterior 
reasons  once  more  briefly  summarized,  they  would  have  been 
somewhat  as  follows :  — 

On  July  30  Howe's  armament  appeared  at  the  entrance  of 
Delaware  Bay,  and  again  vanished.  Had  Washington  been 
endowed  with  the  keen  military  instinct  of  Frederick  or  of 
Napoleon,  that  one  glimpse  would  have  been  enough. 
Holding  the  interior  line,  Washington  would  have  realized 
that  Howe  had  made  himself  for  an  indefinite  but  most  vital 
period  of  time  a  purely  negligible  military  quantity.  Bur- 
goyne,  on  the  other  hand,  had  compromised  himself.  There 
would  have  been  one  tiger  spring;  and,  before  the  last- 
named  British  commander  realized  his  danger,  he  would 
have  been  in  the  toils.  The  next  move  would  have  been  a 
logical  sequence.  Working  on  interior  lines  and  applying 
either  Frederick's  or  Napoleon's  pitiless  mobility  to  the 
situation,  eighteen  days  would  have  seen  the  patriot  army 
either  striking  savagely  at  Clinton  in  the  absence  of  a  pro- 
tecting fleet,  or  back  on  the  Delaware. 

What  Frederick  or  Napoleon  would  next  have  done,  if 
placed  in  the  position  of  Washington,  it  would  be  foolish 
to  undertake  to  say ;  for  Frederick  and  Napoleon  were  men 
of  genius,  and,  when  the  critic  or  theorist  undertakes  to  indi- 
cate the  path  either  of  the  two  would  have  followed  under  any 
given  conditions,  one  thing  only  can  safely  be  predicated : 
The  conclusion  reached  would  be  far  from  the  mark !  Not 
impossibly,  however,  if  a  guess  may  be  ventured  by  a  tyro, 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  155 

—  and  in  the  case  of  Frederick  such  a  move  would  have 
been  characteristic — the  morning  after  Burgoyne's  capitu- 
lation, the  head  of  the  patriot  column  would  have  been 
in  motion  towards  Albany.  Surveying  the  chess-board,  and 
the  character  and  location  of  the  pieces  upon  it,  Frederick 
might  have  argued  somewhat  as  follows :  Howe  is  in  Phila- 
delphia; if  I  now  strike  swiftly  and  heavily  at  Clinton  in 
New  York,  Howe,  —  and  I  think  I  understand  the  man,  — 
suddenly  awakened  to  the  fatal  mistake  he  has  made,  and 
his  imperilled  base,  will  be  sure  to  hurry  by  the  shortest 
route  to  Clinton's  rescue ;  and  I,  abandoning  New  York,  will 
then  meet  him,  with  every  man  and  gun  I  can  muster,  at  a 
point  I  will  myself  select  in  New  Jersey;  but  "I  propose  to 
fight  him  wheresoever  and  whensoever  I  can  find  him." 
Clinton's  turn  would  have  come  next. 

Wellington,  on  the  other  hand,  if  similarly  circumstanced, 
would  not  improbably  have  from  the  outset  observed  Howe's 
performances  with  the  same  "stern  contentment"  with  which 
he  observed  the  mistaken  move  of  Marmont  at  Salamanca.1 
He  would  have  been  not  ill  pleased  to  have  his  opponent 
establish  himself  in  Philadelphia,  thus  dividing  his  com- 
mand, and  placing  himself  in  an  isolated  spot  far  from  his 
base  and  of  no  strategic  importance.  Looking  into  the 
necessary  subsequent  moves  in  the  game,  Wellington  would 
have  seen  that  Howe,  once  in  Philadelphia,  must  as  a  mili- 
tary necessity  possess  himself  of  the  forts  on  the  Delaware ; 
he  had  to  communicate  with  the  British  fleet.  Those  forts 
were  held  by  patriot  garrisons,  and,  after  the  bagging  of 
Burgoyne,  their  capture  must  be  effected  under  the  eyes  of 
a  united  and  well-equipped  covering  force  awaiting  its  op- 
portunity, in  no  degree  depleted  by  defeat.  To  a  hawk- 
eyed  commander,  and  that  Wellington  unquestionably  was, 

1  Infra,  178. 


156  MILITARY  STUDIES 

such  an  opportunity  could  hardly  fail  to  offer  itself;  and 
the  equivalent  of  Germantown  would  then  have  been  fought 
under  wholly  different  auspices.  It  would  have  been  fought 
to  cover  the  defences  on  the  Delaware.  It  is  useless  to  ven- 
ture a  surmise  as  to  the  probable  outcome  of  such  a  trial  of 
strength.  One  thing  only  can  safely  be  predicated  of  it,  a 
victory  won  under  those  conditions  would  have  cost  Howe 
heavily — Bunker  Hill  over  again,  in  it  not  impossibly  half 
his  army  would  have  melted  away. 

Unfortunately  Washington  did  not,  until  too  late,  see  this 
latter  situation  in  any  such  light.  On  the  contrary,  during 
the  aimless  marching  and  countermarching  which  followed 
the  disaster  on  the  Brandywine,  when  no  doubt  longer 
existed  of  Howe's  ultimate  occupation  of  Philadelphia,  Mar- 
shall says:  "To  the  requisitions  for  completing  the  works 
on  the  Delaware,  the  general  answered  that  the  service 
would  be  essentially  injured  by  employing  upon  them  at 
this  critical  juncture,  while  another  battle  was  contemplated, 
any  part  of  the  continental  troops;  that,  if  he  should  be 
enabled  to  oppose  the  enemy  successfully  in  the  field,  the 
works  would  be  unnecessary ;  if  not,  it  would  be  impossible 
to  maintain  them."  As  the  actual  result  showed,  this  con- 
clusion was  wrong  at  each  point;  the  enemy  was  not  suc- 
cessfully opposed  in  the  field,  and  the  forts  should  have  at 
once  been  completed,  to  be  firmly  held  under  the  watchful 
eyes  of  a  covering  and  as  yet  unbeaten  army. 

It  is  related  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington  that,  on  the  day 
following  one  of  his  Peninsular  battles,  he  gruffly  observed 
to  an  old  Scotch  regimental  commander,  "  How's  this,  Colo- 
nel, I  hear  that  some  French  cavalry  got  inside  your  square 
yesterday?"  To  which  he  received  the  no  less  gruff  reply, 
"Is  that  so,  your  Grace;  but  ye  did'na  happen  to  hear  they 
got  out  again,  did  ye?"     It  was  easy  enough  for  Howe,  after 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  157 

Brandy  wine,  to  get  into  Philadelphia;  it  was  for  Washing- 
ton to  see  that,  once  in,  it  was  not  equally  easy  for  Howe's 
army  to  open  communications  with  the  British  fleet. 

Speaking  generally,  however,  and  making  no  attempt  to 
peer  too  curiously  into  the  infinite  might-have-beens,  the 
situation  of  the  pieces  on  the  strategic  chess-board  in  Sep- 
tember, 1777,  and  after  Brandy  wine,  was  comparatively 
simple.  Certain  moves,  become  military  necessities,  may 
safely  be  predicated  as  having  then  been  inevitable;  for, 
unless  they  had  complete  control  of  the  Delaware  to  the 
sea,  "  Philadelphia  was  nothing  but  a  death-trap  for  the 
British. "  x  Had  the  game  therefore  been  played  by  the 
Americans  skilfully  and  in  accordance  with  the  rules,  Howe 
would  have  been  permitted  to  march  into  the  trap  there, 
then  to  find  the  door  between  him  and  his  fleet  very  firmly 
barred.  In  other  words,  avoiding  a  pitched  battle  like 
Germantown,  but  manoeuvring  for  delay,  the  patriots  should 
have  perfected  and  provisioned  the  defences,  throwing  into 
them  strong  garrisons  of  the  more  reliable  troops,  under 
their  most  resolute  commanders.  The  covering  army  should 
then  menacingly  have  watched ;  for  Howe  would  have  been 
compelled  at  any  cost  to  possess  himself  of  the  works. 
Nothing  of  the  sort  was  done.  When  at  last  a  force  of  some 
two  hundred  men  was  thrown  into  Fort  Mifflin,  it  was  found 
to  be  " garrisoned  by  thirty  militia  only."  The  whole  mili- 
tary situation  had  been  misconceived ; 2  but  Howe,  after 
Germantown,  most  characteristically  gave  his  opponent  two 
weeks'  time  in  which  to  do  the  long-neglected  obvious,  and 
in  some  slight  degree  save  the  gravely  jeopardized  patriot 

1  Fisher,  II,  44. 

2  "It  had  been  impracticable  for  the  commander-in-chief  to  attend  per- 
sonally to  these  works,  and  they  were  entirely  incomplete.  The  pres- 
ent relative  position  of  the  armies  gave  them  a  decisive  importance."  — 
Marshall,  Washington,  III,  175. 


158  MILITARY  STUDIES 

situation.  With  Germantown  fought  on  October  4,  not 
until  the  19th  did  the  British  commander  address  himself 
to  the  imperative  problem  of  securing  the  defences  on  the 
Delaware.  Two  weeks  of  time  very  precious  to  his  side  had 
been  wantonly  wasted.  Fortunately  for  him,  his  adversary 
had  also  failed  to  improve  them.  Delays  were  equally 
divided:  for,  far  to  the  north,  Burgoyne,  who  should  have 
been  wiped  off  the  board  six  weeks  at  least  before,  had  ca- 
pitulated on  October  17;  but  not  for  over  two  weeks  yet 
(November  1)  did  Morgan  and  his  riflemen  receive  orders  to 
rejoin  Washington,  and  they  found  him  at  Whitemarsh, 
November  18.  The  campaign  was  then  over.  Such  dila- 
toriness  does  not  admit  of  satisfactory  explanation.  War- 
fare was  not  then,  nor  can  it  ever  be,  successfully  conducted 
in  that  way. 

Apparently  Washington's  still  divided  army  had  as  a 
fighting  unit  been  used  up  in  two  ill-considered  and  hopeless 
battles,  that  on  the  Brandy  wine  (September  11)  and  that  at 
Germantown  (October  4),  and  was  equal  to  no  aggressive 
action  during  the  month  of  Howe's  operations  against  the 
forts  (October  22-November  15).  A  golden  opportunity 
was  thus  lost. 

It  is  hardly  worth  while  further  to  consider  what  might 
have  been  the  outcome  of  that  campaign,  with  Howe  still 
in  command  of  the  British,  had  the  patriots  pursued  a  more 
active  and  intelligent  course.  But,  had  the  fundamental 
rules  which  should  have  governed  the  game  been  grasped 
and  observed,  it  is  by  no  means  beyond  the  range  of  reason- 
able possibilities  that  the  conflict  might,  even  as  it  was, 
have  then  been  brought  to  a  triumphant  close.  Burgoyne 
disposed  of  even  by  the  middle  of  October,  a  united  and 
seasoned  patriot  army,  equipped  with  Burgoyne's  stores  and 
strengthened  by  his  excellent  field  batteries,  might  have  con- 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF   1777  159 

fronted  Howe  in  his  Philadelphia  death-trap;  and  they 
would  then  have  been  in  position  to  assail  him  fiercely  when 
he  tried  to  open  the  securely  fastened  door  which  stood  in 
the  way  of  all  communication  with  his  fleet.  Even  as  it  was, 
those  defences  —  neglected,  half-finished  only,  ill-garrisoned, 
unsupplied  and  unsupported  —  held  out  six  weeks,  checking 
the  more  important  operations  against  Washington's  de- 
pleted and  twice  beaten  army.  During  that  time  Howe  was 
in  great  danger  of  being  starved  out  of  Philadelphia,  as  his 
army  had  to  be  supplied  by  flatboats  running  the  gauntlet 
of  the  forts  at  night,  and  never  had  more  than  a  week's 
rations  on  hand.1  Under  these  circumstances  it  was  small 
cause  for  surprise  that  as  the  days  crept  on  the  extreme 
gravity  of  the  situation  "was  apparent  in  the  countenance  of 
the  best  officers,  who  began  to  fear  that  the  fort  would  not 
be  reduced";2  in  which  case  was  it  at  all  impossible  that 
Howe  might  in  one  season  have  shared  the  fate  of  Burgoyne, 
the  tactics  and  mobility  of  Princeton  and  Trenton  having 
been  enlarged  and  developed  to  cover  the  broader  strategic 
field  between  Philadelphia  and  Saratoga?  In  such  case 
Yorktown  would  have  been  anticipated  by  exactly  four 
years. 

Again,  and  finally,  reviewing  the  campaign  of  1777,  it  is 
almost  undeniable  as  an  historical  and  strategic  proposition, 
that,  either  in  its  early  stages  or  in  the  course  of  it,  decisive 
results  as  respects  the  entire  conflict  were  within  the  safe 
and  easy  reach  of  either  party  to  it,  who  both  saw  and  took 

1  View  of  the  Evidence  relative  to  the  Conduct  of  the  American  War  under 
Sir  William  Howe,  etc.,  114. 

2  Letters  to  a  Nobleman  [Howe]  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  in  the  Middle 
Colonies,  81.  Greene,  writing  November  4,  said  :  "The  enemy  are  greatly- 
discouraged  by  the  forts  holding  out  so  long ;  and  it  is  the  general  opinion 
of  the  best  of  citizens  that  the  enemy  will  evacuate  the  city  if  the  fort 
holds  out  until  the  middle  of  next  week."  —  Life,  I,  504. 


160  MILITARY  STUDIES 

advantage  of  the  conditions  in  his  favor  and  the  opportunities 
offered  him.  Had  Howe  gone  up  the  Hudson  in  June  and 
effected  a  junction  with  Burgoyne  on  the  land  side,  while 
with  the  navy  the  British  seized  Hampton  Roads  and 
blockaded  the  Delaware  from  Wilmington,  further  resist- 
ance would  have  been  almost  completely  paralyzed,  and  the 
patriot  army  must  apparently  have  dissolved  from  inani- 
tion. There  would  have  been  no  visible  alternative.  On 
the  other  hand,  when  Howe,  at  the  crisis  of  the  campaign, 
disappeared  in  space,  leaving  the  field  free  for  his  opponent, 
Saratoga,  the  Philadelphia  death-trap  and  the  defences  of 
the  Delaware  offered  almost  infinite  strategic  and  tactical 
possibilities. 

It  remains  to  forestall,  and,  if  possible,  in  advance  meet  the 
criticisms  which  may  not  improbably  be  made  upon  the  views 
herein  taken  and  the  conclusions  reached.  In  the  first  place, 
it  will  almost  inevitably  be  urged  that  due  allowance  has  not 
been  made  for  the  earlier  and  less  matured  conditions  existing 
in  1777,  as  compared  with  those  of  the  present  time  or  of 
1861-1865.  In  the  Revolutionary  period  the  country  was  in 
no  way  self-sustaining ;  the  present  means  of  information  did 
not  exist ;  the  roads  and  channels  of  communication,  when  as 
yet  not  still  unmade,  were  at  best  crude  and  inadequate; 
and,  consequently,  such  military  mobility  as  that  suggested, 
while  practicable  for  Frederick,  was  impossible  for  Washing- 
ton. 

The  reply  to  this  criticism  is  obvious  and  conclusive.  In  an- 
swer to  a  call  of  great  exigency  from  Albany  after  the  evacu- 
ation of  Ticonderoga  (July  4)  Washington,  in  presence  of  the 
enemy,  —  dividing  thereby  a  force  at  best  insufficient,  — 
sent  Glover's  brigade  and  Morgan's  riflemen,  in  all  some  3000 
of  his  most  effective  troops,  to  confront  Burgoyne.  They 
covered  the  ground  with  a  fair  degree  of  rapidity,  and  ren- 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  161 

dered  valuable  service.  There  is  no  apparent  reason  why  what 
was  accomplished  by  this  large  detachment  with  no  serious 
difficulty  should  have  been  impracticable  for  the  commander- 
in-chief  with  the  bulk  of  his  army.  Four  years  later,  when  the 
operation  suggested  itself  to  him,  Washington  moved  a  larger 
force  through  a  more  difficult  country  a  yet  greater  distance 
in  less  time;  and  he  did  it  with  no  particular  trouble.  A 
French  contingent,  some  fifteen  hundred  strong,  then  pro- 
ceeded from  Newport,  R.I.,  through  Connecticut,  crossed 
the  Hudson  above  New  York,  and  marched  down  to  the 
Head  of  Elk  on  Chesapeake  Bay ;  this  in  midsummer  and 
early  autumn.  Apparently  those  composing  this  array  had 
a  highly  enjoyable  outing.1  Accompanying  the  movement 
of  the  allied  forces  from  the  Hudson  to  Yorktown,  Washing- 
ton, with  his  companions,  is  said  to  have  at  times  got  over 
sixty  miles  a  day.  During  the  intervening  four  years  he  had 
obviously   improved   both   in   strategy   and    mobility.      In 

1  The  entire  distance,  land  and  water,  traversed  by  Rochambeau's 
command  in  this  movement  was  756  miles.  Setting  out  from  Providence 
June  18,  Yorktown  was  reached  October  28.  The  actual  road-marching 
distance  was  548  miles,  which  were  covered  in  thirty-seven  days,  or  at  an 
average  rate  of  fifteen  miles  a  day.  The  American  army  set  out  from 
Dobbs  Ferry  August  20,  and  reached  Williamsburg,  492  miles,  September 
14,  having  covered  on  an  average  twenty  miles  a  day.  The  itinerary  of 
the  allied  army  in  the  Yorktown  movement  is  described  in  graphic  detail 
in  Chapter  XX  of  the  posthumously  published  France  in  the  American 
Revolution  of  the  late  James  Breck  Perkins.  Elsewhere  in  his  narrative 
(p.  319)  Mr.  Perkins  observes,  in  connection  with  a  somewht  similar 
operation  at  one  time  considered  in  New  York,  "  to  attack  the  French  [in 
Rhode  Island]  successfully  and  then  return  to  meet  the  American  army 
[under  Washington]  required  decision,  celerity,  and  boldness.  Clinton 
possessed  none  of  these  qualities.  .  .  .  The  daring  that  takes  great  risks 
and  accomplishes  great  results  had  been  common  in  the  officers  who  were 
inspired  by  Chatham,  but  it  was  not  found  in  the  generals  and  admirals 
whom  George  III  sent  out  to  fight  with  his  rebellious  subjects."  The 
same  author  speaks  (p.  385)  of  "  the  dull  inefficiency  that  seemed  charac- 
teristic of  the  operations  of  the  English  in  America,"  whether  naval  or 
military. 


162  MILITARY  STUDIES 

effecting  on  interior  lines  this  really  fine  concentrated  move- 
ment against  a  divided  enemy,  the  American  commander 
had,  also,  knowingly  left  Philadelphia  quite  uncovered  from 
the  direction  of  New  York,  where  Sir  Henry  Clinton  lay  with 
18,000  idle  effectives  at  his  disposal.  It  has  been  urged  in 
justification  of  Washington's  course  in  following  Howe's 
movement  south  in  1777  and  futilely  striving  to  protect 
Philadelphia,  that,  had  he  done  otherwise,  some  great 
disaster  might  have  befallen  the  cause;  his  "interior  lines" 
would  have  been  jeopardized.  He  could  not  —  it  is  argued 
—  know  exactly  how  long  Howe's  salt-water  excursion  would 
last,  or  where  it  might  end.  It  is  not  easy  to  assign  its 
proper  weight  to  such  shadowy  considerations.  In  warfare 
there  is  always  an  element  of  doubt  as  to  what  may  be 
occurring,  as  Wellington  put  it,  "on  the  other  side  of  the 
hill,"  or  as  to  the  counterstroke  an  opponent  may  meditate; 
but  the  risk  in  this  way  incurred  in  the  Yorktown  move- 
ment of  1781  was  quite  as  great  as  would  have  been  any  risk 
incurred  by  a  similar  movement  to  the  north  in  1777.  For- 
tunately, however,  the  fear  lest  Clinton,  were  he  not  at 
hand  to  prevent,  break  loose  and  do  something  terrible  in 
the  direction  of  Albany  or  Philadelphia  did  not  hold  Wash- 
ington back  from  aggressive  action  in  1781.  Four  years 
before  a  similar  fear  as  respects  Howe  had  both  held  him 
back  and  led  him  astray.  The  real  explanation  of  the  York- 
town  movement,  and  of  Clinton's  inertness  while  it  was  in 
process  must  be  looked  for  elsewhere ;  nor  is  it  far  to  seek. 
The  simple  fact  is  that  both  sides  had  at  last  got  to  a  realiz- 
ing sense  that,  strategically,  Philadelphia  was  eccentric.  A 
mere  pawn  in  the  game,  its  loss  or  taking,  signified  nothing. 
The  sudden  concentrated  move  on  Cornwallis  at  Yorktown 
called,  on  the  contrary,  checkmate  to  King  George. 
In  their  deeply  suggestive  and  intensely  interesting  story, 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  163 

Le  Conscript  de  1813,  which,  now  become  a  classic,  excited 
some  fifty  years  ago  such  world-wide  attention,  Erckmann- 
Chatrian  describe  the  veteran  sergeant  Pinto  observing 
through  the  vanishing  mist  the  allied  armies  about  to  attack 
Napoleon  in  flank  and  cut  his  column  in  two,  on  the  morning 
of  Liitzen  (May  2,  1813) ;  as  he  does  so,  "le  nez  en  Fair  et  la 
main  en  visiere  sur  les  yeux,"  he  remarks  to  the  conscript  at 
his  side,  "C'est  bien  vu  de  leur  part;  ils  apprennent  tous 
les  jours  les  malices  de  la  guerre."  A  similar  observation 
might  have  been  applied  by  Sir  Henry  Clinton  to  Washing- 
ton and  his  movement  in  September,  1781.  Meanwhile  the 
conditions  under  which  operations  were  carried  on  had  not 
greatly  changed  since  July,  1777;  it  was  Washington  who 
had  developed. 

Another  objection  urged  will  not  improbably  be  to  the 
effect  that  Washington's  military  action  was,  in  July,  1777, 
hampered.  From  considerations  of  prestige  and  on  political 
grounds  he  could  not  afford  to  leave  Philadelphia  and  the 
Middle  Provinces  even  temporarily  uncovered,  no  matter 
what  great  and  speedy  results  might  by  so  doing  be  secured 
in  the  North.  In  the  first  place  be  it  observed,  Washington 
never  suggested  any  such  move  as  that  against  Burgoyne, 
leaving  Philadelphia  uncovered  to  await  its  outcome ;  nor, 
accordingly,  did  Congress  in  any  way  hamper  him  as  respects 
making  it.  On  the  contrary,  he  seems  to  have  acted  wholly 
on  his  own  volition  and  in  accordance  with  his  own  best  judg- 
ment, and  is  himself  on  record  to  this  effect.  But,  even 
assuming  the  contrary,  the  extreme  unwisdom,  not  to  say 
weakness,  of  allowing  clergymen,  politicians,  editors  and 
citizens  generally  to  influence  campaign  operations  has  been 
generally  admitted  ever  since  September  3,  1650,  and  that 
day's  experience  of  Leslie's  Scotch  army  at  the  hands  of 
Cromwell,  near  Dunbar.     Really  masterful  captains  do  not 


164  MILITARY  STUDIES 

give  ear,  much  less  yield,  to  such  influences.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  matter  of  record  that  Washington  was  noticeably 
given  to  holding  councils  of  war,  ever  seeking  advice  and 
showing  a  somewhat  excessive  deference  to  public  opinion. 
He  did  so  on  Long  and  Manhattan  Islands  in  1776;  and 
again  before  Philadelphia,  in  1777;  in  both  cases  thereby 
gravely  jeopardizing  the  cause  entrusted  to  him.  He  did 
so  knowingly  and  avowedly;  for,  difficult  as  it  is  of  belief, 
he  seems  actually  for  a  time  to  have  held  himself  bound 
to  follow  the  opinions  of  the  councils  he  had  called  in 
all  cases  where  they  diverged  from  his  own.1  As  to  Phila- 
delphia, Washington  in  the  summer  of  1777  seems  him- 
self to  have  been  laboring  under  as  great  a  delusion  as  that 
which  possessed  Howe.  It  apparently  never  occurred  to  him 
that  Philadelphia  could  most  certainly  be  either  saved  or 
rescued  by  a  sudden,  concentrated  blow  struck  just  north  of 
Albany.  Greene,  far  and  away  the  ablest  of  his  lieutenants, 
also  shared  in  the  costly  delusion ;  but  with  a  saving  hesita- 
tion due  to  his  keener  military  instinct.  -  "I  think  it,"  he 
wrote,  on  August  14,  1777,  "an  object  of  the  first  importance 
to  give  a  check  to  Burgoyne,  .  .  .  [but]  Philadelphia  is  the 
American  Diana,  she  must  be  preserved  at  all  events.     There 

1  In  March,  1777,  Washington  sent  Greene  to  Philadelphia  to  reach  a 
distinct  understanding  with  the  Congress  on  this  subject,  among  others. 
The  question  was  then  formally  raised,  and  the  following  recorded :  "Re- 
solved, that  General  Washington  be  informed  that  it  never  was  the  in- 
tention of  Congress  that  he  should  be  bound  by  the  majority  of  voices 
in  a  council  of  war,  contrary  to  his  own  judgment."  —  Greene,  I,  348 ; 
Journals  of  the  Congress,  March  24,  1777.  In  this  connection  it  is  inter- 
esting to  note  the  important  part  played  by  councils  of  war  in  the  Parlia- 
mentary armies  of  the  English  Civil  War  period.  Frequently  held  and 
largely  attended,  they  seem  to  have  been  regarded  almost  as  a  matter 
of  right,  and  the  neglect  of  a  commander  to  call  them  was  denounced  as 
"unconstitutional."  Fairfax  undertook  no  important  operation  with- 
out consulting  a  council.  (Firth,  Cromwell's  Army,  57-59.)  A  study  of 
the  American  Revolutionary  army,  similar  to  that  made  by  Firth  of  the 
Parliamentary  army,  is  much  needed. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  165 

is  great  attention  paid  to  this  city ;  it  is  true  it  is  one  of  the 
finest  upon  this  continent,  but  in  my  opinion  is  an  object  of 
far  less  importance  than  the  North  River. 'n  So,  less  wise 
than  Kutuzof  in  the  next  generation,  Washington  sacrificed 
an  army  in  hopeless  conflict  to  save  "the  American  Diana"; 
and,  when  the  "Diana"  in  question  fell  a  prey  to  the  ravisher, 
it  was  in  due  time  discovered  that  she  was  not  worth  saving, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  only  a  Delilah,  and  rather  in  the  nature 
of  a  "death-trap"  to  the  foreign  possessor.  Having,  so  far 
as  the  record  shows,  been  in  no  respect  hampered  in  his  action, 
but  following  the  dictates  of  his  judgment,  "his  own  valiant 
spirit"  and  "the  native  ardor  of  his  character,"  2  but,  unfor- 
tunately, in  pursuance  of  a  thoroughly  unmilitary  plan, 
Washington  lost  Philadelphia  and  reduced  his  army  to  im- 
potence from  repeated  defeat.  He  then  presently  did  what 
he  should  have  done  four  months  before,  abandoned  Phila- 
delphia to  the  enemy  and  elsewhere  sought  salvation  for 
the  cause.  Even  this,  however,  was  decided  upon  only 
after  the  holding  of  yet  other  useless  councils  of  war. 

These  grounds  of  criticism  anticipated,  and  perhaps  in 
degree  overcome,  the  final  and  fundamental  objection  to  the 
views  here  advanced  remains;  and  that  objection,  already 
alluded  to,  is  in  reality  at  the  basis  of  all  others,  and  conse- 
quently the  one  most  difficult  to  overcome. 

At  the  threshold  of  his  Life  of  Columbus,  Washington  Ir- 
ving, in  a  tone  so  earnest  as  to  amount  almost  to  indignation 
of  utterance,  lays  down  this  canon  for  the  guidance  of  his- 

1  Greene,  I,  435.  "  Philadelphia  was  then  the  largest  city  in  America, 
and  even  those  accustomed  to  European  capitals  found  in  it  much  to 
admire.  The  population  was  about  forty  thousand,  the  buildings  were 
good,  the  streets  broad  and  straight,  and  they  were  even  provided  with 
sidewalks.  The  shops  were  numerous  and  richly  supplied.  Some  of  the 
brick  buildings  on  Market  St.  were  of  such  proportions  that  the  [officers 
of  Rochambeau's  army]  called  them  immense."  Perkins,  France  in  the 
Revolution,  370.  2  Irving,  Washington,  III,  241-242. 


166  MILITARY  STUDIES 

torical  investigation:  "  There  is  a  certain  meddlesome  spirit, 
which,  in  the  name  of  learned  research,  goes  prying  about 
the  traces  of  history,  casting  down  its  monuments,  and 
marring  and  mutilating  its  fairest  trophies.  Care  should 
be  taken  to  vindicate  great  names  from  such  pernicious 
erudition.  It  defeats  one  of  the  most  salutary  purposes 
of  history,  that  of  furnishing  examples  of  what  human 
genius  and  laudable  enterprise  may  accomplish."  *  This 
in  the  case  of  Columbus;  but  the  same,  or  a  very  simi- 
lar, canon  of  criticism  is  levelled  at  all  those  who  since 
have  ventured,  or  even  now  venture,  in  any  way  or  degree  to 
dissent  from  that  sweeping  and  altogether  indiscriminate 
estimate  of  Washington,  whether  as  a  man,  a  patriot  or  a 
captain,  emanating  first  from  Mason  L.  Weems,  as  early  as 
1800,  and  since  greatly  elaborated  by  a  large  and  devoted 
school  of  investigators  and  biographers,  of  which  Weems 
must  ever  remain  the  unacknowledged  head.  Of  this  school 
Irving  is  himself,  perhaps,  the  chief  and  most  respected  ex- 
ponent. Such  have  established  a  cult  —  almost  a  creed.  To 
dissent  from  it  in  any  respect  may  not  indeed  be  proof  of 
moral  turpitude,  but  is  with  them  suspiciously  suggestive  of 
intellectual  weakness.  In  our  historical  literature  this  cult 
has  been  carried  to  such  a  point  as  to  have  become  a  proverb 
in  Europe.  Bagehot,  for  instance,  in  alluding  to  some  exag- 
geration of  statement,  says  it  would  be  as  absurd  as  "to 
describe  a  post-boy  as  a  sonneteer  describes  his  mistress, 
or  as  the  Americans  stick  metaphors  upon  General  Washing- 
ton." 2  This  almost  theological  desire  to  preserve  the  Wash- 
ington legend  in  undiminished  lustre,  above  all  doubt  and 
beyond  limitation,  has  gone  to  the  extent  even  of  a  systematic 
suppression  of  evidence  and  consequent  falsification  of  his- 

1  Columbus  (Geoffrey  Crayon  ed.),  I,  71. 
1  Literary  Studies,  I,  126. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF   1777  167 

tory.  In  some  well-established  cases  this  has  been  advanced 
as  a  patriotic  duty.  A  striking  instance  is  afforded  in  the  Life 
of  Greene  by  his  grandson.  Among  the  papers  consulted  by 
G.  W.  Greene  in  the  preparation  of  his  work  were  the  Pick- 
ering MSS.,  in  the  possession  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical 
Society.  He  there  found  this  anecdote,  recorded  by  Timothy 
Pickering/  Adjutant-General  of  Washington's  army  during 
those  operations  about  Philadelphia  in  the  autumn  of  1777 
which  have  just  been  passed  in  review:  "On  one  of  these 
dreary  nights,"  wrote  Pickering,  "as  the  army  marched  up- 
wards on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Schuylkill,  in  its  rear  I  fell  in 
with  General  Greene.  We  descended  the  bank  of  Perkiomen 
Creek  together,  and  while  our  horses  were  drinking,  I  said  to 
him:  ' General  Greene,  before  I  came  to  the  army,  I  enter- 
tained an  exalted  opinion  of  General  Washington's  military 
talents,  but  I  have  since  seen  nothing  to  enhance  it.'  I  did 
not  venture  to  say  it  was  sensibly  lowered,  though  that  was 
the  fact;  and  so  Greene  understood  me,  for  he  instantly 
answered  in  these  words  precisely :  i  Why,  the  General  does 
want  decision;  for  my  part,  I  decide  in  a  moment.'  " 

The  biographer  of  Greene  then  adds  this  delightful  com- 
ment and  naive  confession,  breathing  in  its  every  word  the 
whole  spirit  of  the  Weems  school  and  Washington  cult: 
"That  Greene  did  decide,  after  a  careful  examination  of 
facts,  with  marvellous  promptitude,  is  asserted  by  all  who 
knew  him,  and  proved  by  all  his  independent  acts.  Still,  I 
could  wish  that  he  had  never  permitted  himself  to  call  Wash- 
ington's decision  in  question ;  for  the  hereditary  reverence  I 
have  been  trained  up  in  for  that  wonderful  man,  and  which 
Greene's  precept  and  example  have  made  traditional  in  his 
family,  renders  it  difficult  for  me  to  enter  into  the  feelings  of 
those  who,  acting  with  him,  and  loving  and  revering  him,  and 
1  See  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  Proceedings,  XLIV,  233. 


168  MILITARY  STUDIES 

putting  full  faith  in  his  civic  talents,  still  permitted  them- 
selves —  as  Hamilton  and  Pickering  and  Steuben  are  known 
to  have  done  —  to  doubt  his  military  talents." 

Then  follows,  in  a  foot-note:  "I  have  been  counselled  not 
to  repeat  this  anecdote;  but,  as  I  interpret  the  historian's 
duty,  the  suppression  of  a  characteristic  fact  is  a  practical 
falsehood.  Greene  saw  faults  in  Washington,  but  saw  too 
that  they  were  outbalanced  by  his  virtues.  Lafayette  tells  us 
that  Washington's  'reluctance  to  change  opinion'  led  him 
to  expose  himself  and  his  suite  to  a  serious  danger.  Did 
Lafayette  look  up  to  him  with  any  the  less  reverence?" 

Further  comment  is  unnecessary.  Volumes  could  not 
express  more;  but,  followed  in  that  spirit, 

"Science  is  a  blind  man's  guess 
And  History  a  nurse's  tale." 

Finally,  as  to  the  two  opponents  confronting  each  other  at 
the  chess-board  of  the  Kriegspiel  which  has  now  been  passed 
in  review,  —  Howe  and  Washington.  Of  Howe  it  is  not 
easy  to  find  much  that  is  pleasant  or  anything  commendatory 
to  say.  Trevelyan,  after  his  kindly  fashion,  tries  to  part  from 
him  with  a  few  pleasantish  words,  but  does  so  with  at  best 
indifferent  success.  He  says  of  him  that  he  was  "an  indul- 
gent commander;  who  lived  and  let  live;  and  who,  when 
off  duty,  was  as  genial  to  his  followers,  high  and  low,  as  on 
the  actual  day  of  battle  he  was  formidable  to  the  enemy." 
But,  when  it  came  to  presenting  an  estimate  of  Sir  William 
Howe,  Charles  Stedman  enjoyed  far  better  opportunities  for 
so  doing  than  Sir  George  Trevelyan ;  and,  if  the  cold  historical 
truth  is  the  thing  sought,  Stedman's  measured  but  stern  in- 
dictment of  the  British  commander  should  be  read  in  close  con- 
junction with  Trevelyan's  words  of  friendly  farewell.  A  man 
of  unquestioned  physical  courage,  as  a  soldier  Howe  was  a 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  169 

very  passable  tactician.  Face  to  face,  on  the  way  to  a  field 
of  battle  or  on  that  field  itself,  he  never  failed  both  to  out- 
manoeuvre and  to  out-fight  Washington ;  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  he  had  no  conception  of  a  large  strategy,  or  of  the  value 
of  time  and  energy  as  factors  in  warfare.  Most  companion- 
able, he  was  lax  in  morals,  physically  self-indulgent  and  in- 
dolent in  the  extreme.  In  no  way  either  thoughtful  or  studi- 
ous, he  was  without  any  proper  sense  of  obligation,  personal 
or  professional;  and,  moreover,  there  is  reason  to  suspect 
that  he  was  somewhat  disposed  to  jealousy  of  those  who 
might  be  considered  in  the  line  of  succession  to  him,1  espe- 
cially of  Sir  Guy  Carleton  and  General  Burgoyne,  who  chanced 
both  to  be  his  seniors,  the  last  by  no  less  than  seven  years. 
Receiving  at  Bunker  Hill  a  severe  lesson  in  his  over-confident 
attempt  at  a  frontal  attack,  he  afterwards  showed  a  fair 
degree  of  skill  in  a  recourse  to  flanking  tactics;  but,  judged 
by  the  higher  standards  of  this  sort  of  work  both  before  and 
since,  what  he  accomplished  was  in  no  degree  memorable. 
As  a  man  of  thirty  he  led  Wolfe's  famous  scaling  party  at 
Quebec  on  the  morning  of  September  13,  1759;  but  in  1777 
he  was  forty-eight  years  old,  and,  becoming  heavy  in  person, 
had  apparently  lost  any  mental  or  physical  alertness  he  might 
once  have  possessed.  Certainly,  it  cannot  be  claimed  that 
during  the  campaigns  of  either  1776  or  1777  he  evinced  the 
possession  of  either  personal  character  or  professional  skill. 
In  1777  his  failure  to  grasp  the  controlling  factors  of  the  situa- 
tion was  so  gross  as  to  excite  surprise  at  the  time,  and  after- 
wards to  defy  all  efforts  at  explanation  either  by  himself  or 
the  historian.  It  remains  to  this  day  a  puzzle,  or  worse; 
for,  in  plain  language,  his  course,  as  already  intimated,  was 
suggestive  at  least  of  jealousy  and  disloyalty,  if  not  of  actual 
treachery.  If  he  did  not  intentionally  betray  him,  he  wan- 
1  Fisher,  Chap.  LIX,  with  authorities  cited. 


170  MILITARY  STUDIES 

tonly  abandoned  Burgoyne  to  his  fate.  A  man,  in  short,  of 
the  Charles  II  type,  he  set  the  worst  possible  example  to  his 
subordinates,  and  did  much  to  debauch  and  demoralize  the 
army  entrusted  to  him.  A1  together,  it  can  hardly  be  denied 
that,  in  1777,  he  was,  in  mess-room  parlance,  a  rather  poor 
shote.1 

Washington,  on  the  other  hand,  impresses  one  throughout 
as  being  a  clear-headed,  self-centred  Virginia  planter  and 
gentleman  of  the  colonial  period,  noble-minded,  serene  and 
courageous,  upon  whom,  at  the  mature  age  of  forty-three,  had 

1  Charles  Lee  was  two  years  Howe's  junior,  Howe  in  1775  being  forty- 
eight  and  Lee  forty-six.  They  had  probably  known  each  other  before 
our  Revolutionary  troubles.  Both  had  served  in  America  during  King 
George's  Wai,  Lee  having  been  with  Braddock  at  Fort  Duquesne 
(1755),  and  Howe  with  Wolfe  at  Quebec  (1759).  Lee  was  a  prisoner 
of  war  in  New  York,  where  Howe  was  in  command,  from  December, 
1776,  to  April,  1778,  and  the  two  doubtless  then  saw  more  or  less  of 
each  other.  Subsequently  Lee,  writing  to  Benjamin  Rush  from  the  camp 
at  Valley  Forge,  June  4,  1778,  gave  to  his  correspondent  the  following 
pen-and-ink  sketch  of  Howe,  who  had  then  shortly  before  laid  down  his 
command  and  gone  to  England:  "From  my  first  acquaintance  with  Mr. 
Howe  I  liked  him.  I  thought  him  friendly,  candid,  good  natur'd,  brave 
and  rather  sensible  than  the  reverse.  I  believe  still  that  he  is  naturally 
so,  but  a  corrupt  or  more  properly  speaking  no  education,  the  fashion 
of  the  times  .  .  .  have  so  totally  perverted  his  understanding  and  heart, 
that  private  friendship  has  not  force  sufficient  to  keep  a  door  open  for 
the  admittance  of  mercy  towards  political  Hereticks.  ...  He  is  besides 
the  most  indolent  of  mortals.  ...  I  believe  he  scarcely  ever  read  the 
letters  he  signed.  .  .  .  You  will  say  that  I  am  drawing  my  Friend  Howe 
in  more  ridiculous  colors  than  He  has  yet  been  represented  in  —  but  this 
is  his  real  character  —  He  is  naturally  good  humour'd  and  complacent,  but 
illiterate  and  ignorant  to  the  last  degree  unless  as  executive  Soldier,  in 
which  capacity  He  is  all  fire  and  activity,  brave  and  cool  as  Julius  Caesar 
—  his  understanding  is,  as  I  observ'd  before  rather  good  than  otherwise, 
but  was  totally  confounded  and  stupify'd  by  the  immensity  of  the  task 
impos'd  upon  him  —  He  shut  his  eyes,  fought  his  battles,  drank  his  bottle, 
had  his  little  whore,  advis'd  with  his  Counsellors,  receiv'd  his  orders  from 
North  and  Germain,  one  more  absurd  than  the  other,  took  Galloways 
opinion,  shut  his  eyes,  fought  again,  and  is  now  I  suppose  to  be  called  to 
Account  for  acting  according  to  instructions ;  but  I  believe  his  eyes  are  now 
open'd.':  —  Lee  Papers,  II,  397-398. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  171 

been  imposed  the  conduct  of  a  cause  through  the  command  of 
the  simulacrum  of  an  army.  A  man  of  dignified  presence  and 
the  purest  morals,  his  courage,  both  moral  and  physical,  was 
unquestioned;  but,  frequently  puzzled  and  hesitating,  he 
showed  a  proneness  to  councils  ol  war  in  no  way  characteristic 
of  the  born  commander  of  men.  As  a  strategist,  he  was 
scarcely  superior  to  Howe ;  while,  as  a  tactician,  Howe,  me- 
diocre as  in  this  respect  he  indisputably  was,  distinctly  and 
invariably  outclassed  him.  Washington  fought  two  pitched 
battles  in  the  1777  campaign,  neither  of  which  can  be  justi- 
fied under  the  circumstances;  and  both  of  which  he  lost. 
His  strategy  was  at  the  time  and  has  since  been  characterized 
as  Fabian,  yet  in  every  one  of  his  campaigns  he  evinced  a 
most  un-Fabian  reluctance  to  abandoning  any  position,  even 
though  of  no  strategic  importance,  or  perhaps  mcapable  of 
successful  defence.  It  was  so  at  Brooklyn  and  on  Manhattan 
Island  in  1776;  and,  again,  on  the  Delaware  in  1777.  In 
both  cases  he  was,  in  fact,  altogether  too  ready  to  fight.  To 
characterize  such  a  strategy  and  tactics  as  Fabian  is  in- 
dicative of  complete  misconception  both  of  terms  and  op- 
erations ;  they  are  the  reverse  of  Fabian.  That  the  tools  with 
which  he  had  to  work  were  poor,  unwieldy  and  altogether  too 
often  unreliable  does  not  admit  of  question ;  but  it  is  the  part 
of  great  commanders  to  make  good  such  deficiencies  in  un- 
expected ways.  This  Washington  failed  to  do.  What  he 
lacked  is  obvious,  though  then  it  could  not  have  been  forth- 
coming, —  a  trained  and  experienced  chief  of  staff,  a  man 
who  would  have  been  to  him  what  Gneisenau  was  to  Bliicher 
in  1815,  and  what  A.  A.  Humphreys  was  to  General  Meade 
during  sixteen  months  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Among 
the  revolutionary  officers  Greene  unquestionably  would 
most  nearly  have  met  the  requirements  of  the  place;  but 
Greene,  though  naturally  a  soldier,  was  self-taught  and  lacked 


172  MILITARY  STUDIES 

experience.  It  is  doubtful  if  he  had  any  correct  idea  of  the 
functions  of  a  staff;  and  he  certainly  was  not  familiar  with 
the  details  of  a  complete  military  organization,  even  to  the 
degree  that  organization  had  attained  prior  to  the  wars  of 
Napoleon.  But,  probably,  it  is  fortunate  no  such  position 
then  existed ;  for,  had  it  existed,  some  foreigner  would  al- 
most certainly  have  been  selected  to  fill  it ;  and  it  would  be 
difficult  to  name  any  foreigner,  adventurer  or  otherwise,  who 
in  the  American  service  has  ever  yet  really  understood  either 
American  conditions  or  the  American  as  a  soldier.  Almost 
invariably  such  bring  to  their  task  European  notions  and 
formulas ;  and  such  do  not  apply.  Essentially  a  volunteer, 
a  ranger  and  a  rifleman,  the  American  soldier  has  an  instinc- 
tive dislike  for  the  European  martinet;  and,  curiously 
enough,  Washington  himself  neither  understood  nor  used  the 
American  soldier  as  did  Greene  and  Morgan  in  the  Revo- 
lution, Jackson  in  the  War  of  1812,  or  Grant,  Sherman  and 
Sheridan,  on  the  one  side,  and  Lee,  Jackson  and  Forrest  on 
the  other  in  the  War  of  Secession. 

In  one  respect,  however,  and  a  most  important  respect, 
Washington  was  supremely  and  uniformly  fortunate,  —  his 
luck  as  respects  those  opposed  to  him  in  the  game  of  war  was 
notable  and  uniform.  Gage,  Howe,  Clinton,  fairly  vied  with 
each  other  in  their  low  level  of  the  British  commonplace,  — 
what  Stedman  most  happily  terms  " monotonous  mediocrity." 
Finally,  as  has  elsewhere  been  said,  Washington,  courageous 
and  enduring,  confident  himself  and  inspiring  confidence  in 
others,  great  in  saving  Common  Sense,  was  unequalled  in  the 
possession  of  those  qualities  which  go  to  make  up  what  men 
know,  and  bend  before,  as  Character. 

Not  only  in  this  respect  but  in  his  other  limitations  as  well 
as  attributes,  a  study  of  Washington  is  suggestive  of  William 
of  Orange.     Each  evinced  throughout  life  and  under  most 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CAMPAIGN  OF  1777  173 

trying  conditions  the  same  overruling  sense  of  duty  and  obli- 
gation, —  the  same  steadfastness  and  serenity  in  presence  of 
adversity,  an  equal  saneness  of  judgment  and  patient  con- 
fidence in  the  cause  to  which  fate  had  devoted  him.  As  a 
soldier,  William  did  not  excel.  Confronted  in  Alva  with  a 
really  capable  military  opponent,  he  never  won  a  battle,  and 
his  campaigns  were  utter  failures.  The  Spaniard  in  fact  did 
with  him  almost  as  he  pleased ;  yet  the  Dutchman  was  in- 
domitable. Though  between  the  Duke  of  Alva  and  Lieuten- 
ant-General  Sir  William  Howe  no  comparison  can,  of  course, 
be  instituted,  it  was  much  the  same  in  this  respect  with 
Washington.  Neither  William  nor  Washington  evinced  in 
his  career  the  possession  of  any  highly  developed  military  or 
strategic  instinct.  In  both  also  there  was  a  noticeable  ab- 
sence of  aggressive  will  power;  and,  moreover,  be  it  added 
of  that  dangerous  and  ill-boding  arbitrariness  of  disposition 
almost  invariably  the  concomitant  of  an  excess  of  will  power. 
In  Washington,  as  in  William,  there  was  likewise  noticeable 
a  certain  lack  of  intellectual  alertness,  amounting  at  times 
almost  to  a  slowness  of  apprehension. 

By  universal  admission  there  is  no  more  considerable,  as 
well  as  admirable,  figure  in  all  modern  history  than  William 
the  Silent ;  and,  while  he  stands  forth  as  the  great  historical 
prototype  of  Washington,  it  may  not  unfairly  be  asserted  the 
latter  suffers  nothing  in  a  comparison  with  him. 


V 

THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS1 

Writing  in  India,  in  his  sixty-eighth  year,  Sir  Charles 
Napier,  in  reminiscent  mood,  thus  referred  to  certain  inci- 
dents in  his  earlier  life,  when,  a  young  man  of  twenty-eight, 
he  was  serving  under  Wellington,  in  his  famous  Peninsular 
campaigns :  — 

"September  27th  [1849].  —  Anniversary  of  Busaco,  where 
Wellington  first  essayed  the  courage  of  the  Portuguese 
troops.  .  .  .  Well,  Busaco  was  the  great  test,  and  a  very 
beautiful  fight  it  was.  The  French  were  in  the  valley, 
shrouded  in  mist  when  the  morning  broke  and  the  running 
fire  of  the  outposts  began ;  soon  an  irregular  but  very  sharp 
musquetry  rung  through  the  gradually  dispersing  mist, 
which,  mingled  with  smoke,  came  up  the  mountain,  and  from 
it  many  wounded  men  broke  out.  The  picquets  then 
appeared,  being  driven  back,  but  firing  so  hard  that  our  line 
loudly  cheered  them  from  the  crest  above:  following  fast 
came  the  enemy's  columns,  and  eighty  pieces  of  cannon 
opened  with  a  roar  from  the  summit  of  the  mountain,  send- 
ing shrapnels,  shells  and  round  shot  down  on  them.  The 
battle  was  thus  begun,  and  soon  they  reached  us.  The 
firing  rolled  loud  and  heavy,  the  shouts  of  our  men  were 
grand,  and  their  charges  in  different  parts  of  the  line  went 
fiercely  home.  I  was  hit,  woe  the  while  for  me !  Now, 
thirty-nine  years  after,  the  horrid  suffocation  of  that  wound 

1  From  the  Proceedings  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  Second 
Series,  Vol.  XIII,  412-433.     Recast,  revised  and  enlarged. 

174 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS  175 

is  scarcely  endurable.  Oh !  it  shakes  my  very  soul,  the 
horror  of  this  feeling  does ! i  I  was  carried  into  a  small 
chapel  of  the  convent  of  Busaco.  .  .  .  [Presently]  I  got 
up  from  the  pallet  on  which  I  had  been  laid,  walked  clean 
out,  and  got  to  the  convent  door,  looking  for  my  horse.  I 
was  however  seized  instantly  by  Edward  Pakenham,  and 
led  back  with  this  expression,  'Damn  it,  Napier,  are  you 
mad  to  think  you  can  go  back  in  this  state  to  the  action  ? 
Be  quiet  for  God's  sake!'  I  could  not  speak  plain,  as  my 
jaw  was  broke,  and  blood  flowed  freely  from  my  mouth,  so 
my  looks  were  worse  than  the  reality.  .  .  .  Poor  Edward 
Pakenham  was  wounded  at  Busaco,  which  was  what  brought 
him  to  the  convent,  and  having  been  dressed  he  was  return- 
ing to  the  battle  when  he  caught  me  trying  to  do  the  same. 
Poor  fellow !  He  was  a  heroic  man,  that  Edward  Paken- 
ham, and  it  was  a  thousand  pities  he  died  in  defeat :  it  was 
not  his  fault,  that  defeat." 

It  was  at  New  Orleans,  a  little  more  than  four  years  after 
the  Busaco  fight  here  referred  to  by  Napier,  that  this  Edward 
Pakenham  thus  "died  in  defeat."  The  battle  in  which  he 
died,  fought  in  the  early  morning  hours  of  January  8,  1815, 
was  the  sequel  of  what  had  occurred  at  Bladensburg  five 
months  before.  The  general  in  command  of  the  British 
force  had,  it  is  true,  been  changed,  for  Major-General  Robert 
Boss  was  killed  before  Baltimore,  and  Sir  Edward  Paken- 
ham, fresh  from  the  battle  fields  of  the  Peninsula,  had  suc- 
ceeded him.     But  the  British  regiments,  which  had,  simply 

1  Sir  Charles  Napier,  then  suffering  from  an  attack  of  a  chronic  trouble 
with  which  he  was  afflicted,  thus  wrote  at  Orleans,  France,  May  8,  1848  : 
"Perhaps  there  is  no  better  way  of  dying,  except  apoplexy:  that  is 
prince  of  deaths  !  No  pain,  no  preparation,  no  trouble  to  friends.  You 
go  'like  shot  out  of  a  shovel.'  I  know  it!  God  defend  me  from  the 
suffocating  feel  in  my  nose,  produced  by  my  horrid  wound  at  Busaco : 
rather  would  I  be  broke  upon  the  wheel.'' 


176  MILITARY  STUDIES 

with  a  volley,  a  shout  and  a  rush,  walked  over  the  American 
line  at  Bladensburg,  all  took  part  in  the  attempt  to  do  the 
same  at  New  Orleans.  The  tactics,  if  such  they  deserve  to 
be  called,  were  in  each  case  identical,  —  they  were  those  of 
the  football  field.  In  other  words,  at  Bladensburg  the 
British  officers,  proceeding  in  conformity  with  their  simple 
traditional  rules,  endeavored  to  do,  and  succeeded  in  doing, 
exactly  what  they  intended  to  do,  and  failed  in  doing,  at 
Bunker  Hill ;  that  is,  they  marched  up  directly  in  face  of 
the  defending  force,  carried  the  position  with  little  loss, 
routed  their  opponents,  and  then,  as  matter  of  course,  cap- 
tured the  objective  those  opponents  were  there  to  defend. 
The  proceeding  was  perfectly  simple,  —  a  body  of  superior 
troops  carrying  by  frontal  assault  weakly  defended  defen- 
sive positions.  Examined  in  this  connection,  however,  Bun- 
ker Hill  and  New  Orleans  afford  the  basis  of  a  study,  not 
only  interesting  in  itself,  but  extremely  suggestive  as  illus- 
trating racial  characteristics  as  developed  in  actual  warfare. 
For,  in  any  carefully  considered  account  of  the  operations 
of  December,  1814,  and  January,  1815,  before  New  Orleans 
the  suddenly  levied,  and  hence  undisciplined  force  of  Amer- 
ican riflemen  and  rangers,  under  command  of  Andrew 
Jackson,  must  necessarily  be  brought  in  striking  contrast 
with  the  highly  organized  battalions  of  British  veterans 
directed  and  led  by  an  officer  trained  in  the  school  of  Wel- 
lington. 

And,  first,  something  needs  to  be  said  of  Sir  Edward 
Pakenham,  and  his  record  in  the  Spanish  peninsula.  In 
Great  Britain,  even  more  than  in  America,  Pakenham  is  an 
almost  forgotten  military  character.  The  reason  for  this 
oblivion,  so  far  as  his  own  country  is  concerned,  will  pres- 
ently appear;  but,  in  America,  so  far  as  he  is  mentioned 
at  all,  he  has  been  misunderstood  when  not  misrepresented. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS  177 

A  brother  of  the  wife  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  it  is  as- 
sumed that,  because  of  family  influence,  he  was  entrusted 
with  a  command.  Brave  to  rashness,  it  is  next  assumed 
that  otherwise  he  was  quite  incompetent.  A  more  careful 
examination  of  his  record  in  the  light  of  recently  published 
memoirs  of  those  closely  associated  with  Sir  Edward  lead 
to  the  conclusion  that  he  was  in  many  respects  a  very  dif- 
ferent and  much  more  interesting  character,  not  undeserving 
even  at  this  late  day  of  kindly  and  appreciative  mention. 

James  Parton  was  by  birth  English,  and  in  his  Life  of 
Jackson  —  one  of  the  most  picturesque  and  vivid  biogra- 
phies, be  it  said,  in  the  language  —  Parton  speaks  thus  of 
the  class  to  which  Pakenham  belonged ;  and  his  words  were 
no  less  true  of  those  prominent  in  the  recent  war  in  South 
Africa  than  of  those  who  fought  in  the  Peninsula,  at  Water- 
loo and  at  New  Orleans  nearly  a  century  before.  The 
characteristics  are  racial. 

"The  British  service  seems  to  develop  every  high  and  noble 
quality  of  man  and  soldier,  except  generalship.  Up  to  the  hour 
when  the  British  soldier  holds  an  independent  command,  he  is 
the  most  assured  and  competent  of  men.  Give  him  a  plain, 
unconditional  order  —  Go  and  do  that  —  and  he  will  go  and  do  it 
with  a  cool,  self-forgetting  pertinacity  of  daring  that  can  scarcely 
be  too  much  admired.  All  of  the  man  below  the  eyebrows  is 
perfect.  The  stout  heart,  the  high  purpose,  the  dexterous  hand, 
the  enduring  frame  are  his.  But  the  work  of  a  general  in  com- 
mand demands  head  —  a  cool,  calculating  head,  fertile  in  expedi- 
ents; a  head  that  is  the  controlling  power  of  the  man.  And  this 
article  of  head,  which  is  the  rarest  production  of  nature  every- 
where, is  one  which  the  brave  British  soldier  is  apt  to  be  signally 
wanting  in;  and  never  so  much  so  as  when  responsibility  rests 
upon  him." 

Turning  back  now  to  Sir  William  Napier's  famous  narra- 
tive of  the  Peninsular  War,  in  it  there  is  a  spirited  account  of 

N 


178  MILITARY  STUDIES 

the  battle  of  Salamanca,  fought  by  Wellington  on  the  22d 
of  July,  1812,  a  year  after  Busaco  and  about  thirty  months 
before  New  Orleans,  a  battle  in  which  Pakenham  won  great 
distinction.  Then  thirty-five  years  of  age,  he  commanded, 
temporarily,  what  was  known  as  the  Third,  or  Picton's 
Division  of  Wellington's  army,  familiarly  spoken  of  as  the 
"Fighting  Third." 

Napier,  himself  a  combatant  that  day,  says  that  at  about 
three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  a  report  reached  Wellington  — 
"that  the  French  left  was  rapidly  fronting  towards  the 
Ciudad  Rodrigo  Road.  Starting  up  he  repaired  to  the  high 
ground  and  observed  their  movements  for  some  time  with  a 
stern  contentment,  for  their  left  wing  was  then  entirely 
separated  from  the  center;  the  fault  was  flagrant,  and  he 
fixed  it  with  the  stroke  of  a  thunderbolt.  A  few  orders 
issued  from  his  lips  like  the  incantations  of  a  wizard,  and 
suddenly  the  dark  mass  of  troops  which  covered  the  English 
Hermanito  seemed  agitated  by  some  mighty  spirit;  rush- 
ing violently  down  the  interior  slope  of  the  mountain  they 
entered  the  great  basin  amidst  a  storm  of  bullets  which 
appeared  to  shear  away  the  whole  surface  of  the  earth  over 
which  they  were  moving.  .  .  .  The  Third  Division  was, 
however,  still  hidden  from  (Marmont l)  by  the  western 
heights,  and  he  hoped  the  tempest  of  bullets  under  which  the 
British  line  was  moving  in  the  basin  beneath  would  check  it 
until  he  could  bring  up  his  reserve  divisions.  ...  In  this 
crisis,  despatching  officer  after  officer  to  hasten  up  his  troops 
from  the  forest,  others  to  stop  the  progress  of  his  left  wing, 
he  with  fierce  and  sanguine  expectation  still  looked  for 
victory,  until  he  saw  Pakenham  with  the  Third  Division 

1  Due  de  Ragusa.  Youngest  of  Napoleon's  marshals,  Marmont  was 
born  in  1774,  made  marshal  in  1809,  and  died  at  Vienna  in  1852. 
He  had  in  1811  succeeded  Massena  in  command  of  the  forces  opposed  to 
Wellington. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS  179 

shoot  like  a  meteor  across  [his  subordinate,  General]  Mau- 
cune's  path;  then  pride  and  hope  alike  died  with  him,  and 
desperately  he  was  hurrying  in  person  to  that  fatal  point 
when  an  exploding  shell  stretched  him  on  the  earth." 

Salamanca  has  been  pronounced  "the  most  soldierly  and 
skilful"  of  all  Wellington's  battles,  and  he  himself  con- 
sidered it  the  occasion  which  best  proved  his  military  genius. 
The  use  then  made  of  the  Third  Division  was  the  master 
stroke  of  the  day.  The  details  of  what  occurred,  as  given  in 
the  several  narratives,  are  curious,  and,  in  several  ways, 
suggestive.  They  in  the  first  place  are  in  all  the  renderings 
individually  as  well  as  racially  characteristic;  in  the  next, 
they  illustrate  well  the  school  of  British  soldiership  in  which 
Pakenham  had  that  education  which  resulted  in  the  assault 
on  Jackson's  lines  below  New  Orleans;  and,  finally,  not 
least  suggestive  of  all,  a  good  example  is  furnished  of  the 
extreme  difficulty  attendant  on  an  effort  at  anything  ap- 
proaching accuracy  on  a  point  of  historical  detail.  One 
account  says  that  when  Wellington  saw  the  gap  in  his 
opponent's  formation,  he  at  once  turned  it  to  account. 
"'Now's  your  time,  Ned/  he  said  to  Pakenham,  who  stood 
near  him.  The  hint  was  enough.  Pakenham  kissed  his 
brother-in-law,  and,  giving  the  word  to  his  division,  moved 
on,  and  won  the  battle."  *  The  next  account,  obviously 
taken  almost  verbatim  from  the  foregoing,  reads  as  fol- 
lows: Watching  the  gap  in  his  opponent's  line  widen, 
"'Now's  your  time,  Ned,'  (Wellington)  said  to  Pakenham, 
who  was  standing  near  him;  and  the  words  were  scarcely 
spoken  before  Pakenham  gave  the  word  to  his  division,  and 
commenced  the  movement  which  won  the  battle." 2     The 


1  G.  R.  Gleig,  in.  Apple  ton's  Cyclopedia  of  American  Biography,  vol. 
IV,  "Pakenham." 

2  Dictionary  of  National  Biography,  "Pakenham." 


180  MILITARY  STUDIES 

next  rendering  of  this  family  incident  is  equally  graphic, 
but  quite  different:  "Pakenham  was  in  command  of  'the 
Fighting  Third/  and  Wellington's  orders  were  given  to  him 
in  person,  and  with  unconventional  bluntness.  'Do  you 
see  those  fellows  on  the  hill,  Pakenham,'  he  said,  pointing 
to  where  the  French  columns  were  now  visible ;  '  throw 
your  division  into  columns  of  battalions  at  them  directly, 
and  drive  them  to  the  devil!'  Pakenham,  an  alert  and 
fiery  soldier,  formed  his  battalions  into  column  with  a  word, 
and  took  them  swiftly  forward  in  an  attack  described  by 
admiring  onlookers  as  'the  most  spirited  and  most  perfect 
thing  of  the  kind  ever  seen.'"  * 

The  last,  and  what  must  be  considered  the  most  official 
account  of  what  the  English  commander-in-chief  really  did 
and  actually  said  on  this  dramatic  and  memorable  occasion 
is  that  in  Sir  Herbert  Maxwell's  Life  of  Wellington  (I,  281). 
And,  in  the  first  place,  it  may  not  be  improper  to  observe 
that,  when  Salamanca  was  fought,  "Our  Special  Head- 
Quarters  Correspondent"  had  not  yet  been  evolved;  and 
Wellington  most  distinctly  discouraged  the  presence  of 
civilians  within  the  sphere  of  his  operations.  Looking  upon 
them  as  interlopers,  he  was  strongly  inclined  to  treat  them 
as  spies.  There  is  consequently  no  authentic  contempo- 
raneous report  of  his  exact  words  and  acts  on  the  occasion 
in  question.  It  is  not  unsafe,  however,  to  surmise  that 
Wellington  then  gave  no  "hints"  to  his  brother-in-law,  nor 
did  the  brother-in-law  indulge  in  any  osculation  in  return 
for  the  same.  Wellington,  a  somewhat  grim  personality,  was 
not  given  to  "hints"  on  the  field  of  battle,  nor  was  kissing 
conspicuously  in  order  in  the  English  Peninsular  service.  It 
is  tolerably  safe,  therefore,  to  dismiss  these  two  details  as,  so 
to  speak,  unhistorical.  Others  will  follow  presently. 
1  Fitchet,  How  England  saved  Europe,  III,  325-326. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS        181 

This  is  the  Maxwell  account:  Wellington  had  during 
the  morning  hours  been  observing  Marmont's  movements 
from  the  Oripile.  Shortly  after  mid-day  he  had  withdrawn 
and  was  snatching  a  hasty  meal  in  the  rear  of  a  farm  build- 
ing exposed  to  the  enemy's  fire,  when,  as  he  was  " stumping 
about  and  munching/ '  word  was  brought  him  of  the  open- 
ing offered  by  Marmont's  false  move.  Mounting  at  once, 
he  galloped  back  to  his  former  point  of  observation.  Ob- 
serving the  movement  for  a  time,  with  Napier's  "  stern  con- 
tentment," he  presently  ordered  the  formation  of  the  Fifth 
Division;  he  then  .dashed  off  to  where  the  Third  was  resting. 
Riding  up  to  Pakenham,  he  said,  "Ned,  d'ye  see  those 
fellows  on  the  hill?  Throw  your  division  into  column; 
at  them!  and  drive  them  to  the  devil !"  He  then  at  once 
returned  at  speed  to  the  Oripile,  whence  he  came.  This  was 
at  one  o'clock.  Movements  on  the  field  of  battle  take  time ; 
orders  are  not  executed  as  soon  as  uttered ;  and  it  was  five 
o'clock,  or  four  whole  hours  later,  before  the  head  of  Paken- 
ham's  division  struck  the  advancing  French  formation. 

Unlike  the  others,  this  rendering  has  a  natural  sound. 
There  is  in  it  no  suggestion  of  "hints,"  no  kissing,  no  in- 
stantaneous movement;  but  a  doubt  does  suggest  itself  as 
to  the  exact  words  used.  They  are  not  quite  Welling- 
tonian.  The  destination  of  the  driving  is  not  altogether  in 
accordance  with  the  somewhat  picturesque  as  well  as  forci- 
ble Peninsular  usage  as  it  has  come  to  us,  and  it  is  more 
probable  that  Wellington  indicated  "hell"  as  the  terminal 
point  of  the  "drive"  than  that  he  named  "the  devil." 

However  this  may  be,  and  it  is  not  important,  it  is  now 
in  order  to  return  to  Napier's  trumpet-toned  narrative  of 
what  next  occurred:  "It  was  about  five  o'clock  when 
Pakenham  fell  on  Maucune's  first  division  under  Thomieres, 
who  had  then  just  reached  an  isolated  open  hill  at  the  ex- 


182  MILITARY  STUDIES 

tremity  of  the  southern  range  of  heights.  .  .  .  The  counter 
stroke  was  terrible !  Two  batteries  of  artillery  placed  on 
the  summit  of  the  western  heights  suddenly  took  his  troops 
in  flank;  Pakenham's  mass  of  infantry  supported  by  cavalry 
and  guns  was  bearing  full  on  his  front,  and  two  thirds  of 
his  own  division,  lengthened  out  and  unconnected,  were 
still  behind  in  a  wood  where  they  could  hear  but  could  not 
see  the  storm  which  was  bursting:  from  the  chief  to  the 
lowest  soldier,  all  felt  they  were  lost,  and  in  an  instant 
Pakenham,  the  most  frank  and  gallant  of  men,  commenced 
the  battle.  .  .  .  Bearing  onwards  with  the  might  of  a 
giant,  Pakenham  broke  the  half-formed  lines  into  fragments 
and  sent  the  whole  in  confusion  upon  the  supporting  col- 
umns. .  .  .  Some  French  squadrons  now  fell  on  the  flank 
of  the  third  division;  .  .  .  but  Pakenham,  continuing  his 
tempestuous  course,  found  the  remainder  of  Thomieres' 
division  very  imperfectly  arrayed  on  the  wooded  heights 
behind  the  first  hill,  offering  two  fronts.  ...  In  this 
oppressed  state,  while  Pakenham  was  pressing  their  left 
with  a  conquering  violence,  while  the  fifth  division  was 
wasting  their  ranks  with  fire,  the  interval  between  those 
divisions  was  suddenly  filled  with  a  whirling  cloud  of  dust 
which  moved  swiftly  forward,  carrying  with  it  the  tram- 
pling sound  of  a  charging  multitude.  .  .  .  Anson's  cavalry 
had  suffered  little  in  the  charge,  and  now  passing  quite  over 
the  ridge  were  joined  by  D'Urban's  horsemen  and  took  the 
place  of  Le  Marchant's  exhausted  men.  United  with  the 
third  and  fifth  divisions  and  the  guns,  they  formed  one  for- 
midable line  more  than  a  mile  in  advance  of  where  Paken- 
ham had  commenced  the  battle,  and  that  impetuous  officer, 
with  unmitigable  fury,  was  still  pressing  forward,  spreading 
terror  and  confusion." 

Such  was  the  estimate  of  Edward  Pakenham  held  by  the 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS  183 

famous  English  field  marshal,  and  by  England's  most 
distinguished  military  historian.  To  a  like  effect,  Welling- 
ton, shortly  after  Salamanca,  wrote  to  the  Horse  Guards  in 
London,  strongly  commending  the  " celerity  and  accuracy" 
which  marked  Pakenham's  conduct  of  the  operations  of 
that  day,  adding,  "Pakenham  may  not  be  the  brightest 
genius,  but  my  partiality  for  him  does  not  lead  me  astray 
when  I  tell  you  that  he  is  one  of  the  best  we  have."  These 
three  estimates,  from  such  different  quarters  and  so  sepa- 
rated in  time,  certainly  give  a  favorable  impression  of  the 
chief  victim  of  the  8th  of  January,  —  the  defeated  of  New 
Orleans.  Looking  at  that  battle  from  his  point  of  view, 
it  now  remains  to  explain,  if  possible,  why  and  how  it  was 
that  this  "heroic  soul"  —  "the  most  frank  and  gallant  of 
men"  —  went,  as  he  did,  to  his  own  death,  while  thrusting 
his  storming  columns  against  breastworks  bristling  with  ar- 
tillery and  swarming  with  riflemen;  thus  seeking,  in  bull- 
headed  fashion,  to  accomplish  a  result  which  could  have 
been  secured  in  another  and  more  scientific  way  absolutely 
without  loss.  For,  strange  as  it  sounds  to  American  ears, 
New  Orleans  was  on  the  8th  of  January,  1815,  within  the 
easy  grasp  of  the  British  army. 

After  the  death  of  Ross  before  Baltimore,  September  12, 
1814,  the  British  War  Office  looked  about  for  some  one  to 
take  charge  of  active  operations  in  America.  The  field  of 
these  it  was  proposed  to  transfer  from  Chesapeake  Bay  to 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  making  New  Orleans  the  military  ob- 
jective. The  conflict  with  Napoleon  had  then  been  brought 
to  a  triumphant,  and,  apparently,  final  close ;  Napoleon, 
having  abdicated  six  months  before,  was  in  exile  at  Elba. 
Though  the  campaign  of  Waterloo  was  to  open  less  than  six 
months  later,  Wellington's  veteran  army  of  the  Peninsula 
had  already  been  withdrawn  from  the  south   of  France, 


184  MILITARY  STUDIES 

and  largely  disbanded.  Wellington  himself  was  in  London. 
Under  these  circumstances,  it  was  proposed  to  send  him  to 
America,  not  only  to  take  charge  of  operations  in  the  field, 
but  with  full  powers  to  negotiate,  and  bring  hostilities  to  a 
close ;  for  that  struggle  was  after  all  but  a  side  show  to  the 
great  European  conflict.  That  ended,  why  prolong  the  side 
show?  For  very  sufficient  reasons  connected  with  the  still 
disturbed  aspect  of  continental  affairs,  it  was  not  deemed  ex- 
pedient to  have  Wellington  out  of  immediate  reach,  and  the 
choice  of  a  successor  to  Ross  was  left  to  him.  He  desig- 
nated his  brother-in-law,  Pakenham.  Sailing  from  Ports- 
mouth in  November,  Sir  Edward  was  accompanied  among 
others  by  Brigade-Major  Smith,  afterward  Lieutenant-Gen- 
eral  Sir  Harry  Smith,  whose  autobiography,  published  in 
1909,  affords  some  lifelike  glimpses  of  his  commander. 
Smith,  having  often  come  in  contact  with  him  in  the  Penin- 
sula, thought  highly  of  Pakenham.  Referring  to  him  as 
"dear  Sir  Edward,"  he  describes  him  as  "a  most  light- 
hearted  fellow"  and  "one  of  the  most  amusing  persons 
imaginable  —  high-minded  and  chivalrous  in  every  idea, 
and  to  our  astonishment  very  devoutly  inclined";  he  adds, 
"I  never  served  under  a  man  whose  good  opinion  I  was  so 
desirous  of  having,"  and  "to  fall  in  his  estimation  would 
have  been  worse  than  death  by  far." 

A  brave  officer,  trained  in  the  European  school  of  actual 
warfare  during  a  period  in  which  the  bayonet  was  still 
looked  upon  as  the  effective  weapon,  and  rifle  marksman- 
ship was  not  yet  highly  regarded,  Pakenham's  bravery  was 
"of  that  animated  intrepid  cast  that  he  applied  his  mind 
vigorously  at  the  moment  to  the  position  of  his  own  troops 
as  well  as  that  of  the  enemy  .  .  .  but  he  never  avoided  a 
fight  of  any  sort."  In  other  words,  an  excellent  subordi- 
nate in  Spain,  —  a  most  effective  weapon  in  the  hands  of 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS  185 

Wellington,  —  he  was,  as  an  officer  in  independent  command 
under  American  conditions,  to  him  altogether  strange,  no 
match  for  Andrew  Jackson. 

Strategically  speaking,  the  object  of  his  campaign  was 
obvious.  It  was  the  capture  of  New  Orleans.  The  destruc- 
tion of  Jackson's  army  was  desirable  as  an  incident,  but  by 
no  means  necessary  to  the  end  in  view.  The  British  base 
of  supplies  was  close  to  the  objective  point,  and  communica- 
tion could  easily  be  kept  up  either  by  the  right  bank  of  the 
river,  or  by  the  river  itself;  or,  indeed,  by  the  left  bank, 
provided  only  Jackson  could  be  forced  from  his  lines.  The 
essential  thing  was  to  compel  him  to  leave  his  lines.  If  he 
did  so,  he  must  abandon  New  Orleans  to  the  British.  From 
a  tactical  point  of  view  the  situation  was  different.  Through 
a  reconnoissance  in  force,  and  as  the  result  of  an  artillery 
action,  it  had  been  ascertained  that  Jackson's  lines  were 
strong,  and  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  carry  by  assault. 
The  assaulting  party,  whether  it  approached  from  the  cen- 
tre or  on  either  wing,  would  be  subjected  to  a  converging 
fire  of  artillery  and  riflemen.  Under  these  circumstances 
it  would  obviously  have  been  the  part  of  a  skilful  tactician 
to  endeavor  to  turn  Jackson  out  of  his  works  by  render- 
ing them  untenable.  This  the  English  commander  could 
perfectly  well  have  done.  Being  in  close  proximity  to  New 
Orleans,  —  only  four  miles  from  that,  his  objective,  point, 
—  all  General  Pakenham  had  to  do  was  to  pass  a  strong 
division  of  his  army  across  the  Mississippi  to  its  western 
bank,  and  by  it  threaten,  if  he  did  not  capture,  New  Orleans 
from  the  west  side  of  the  river,  operating  from  that  side  on 
Jackson's  flank  and  rear.  The  Mississippi  was  less  than 
half  a  mile  in  width;  its  current,  varying  with  the  tide,  did 
not  at  that  season  of r  the  year  exceed  four  miles  an  hour, 
and  presented  no  obstacle  to  crossing  by  boat  or  barge, 


186  MILITARY  STUDIES 

which  could  likewise  be  propelled  upstream  by  hugging  the 
convex  or  western  bank.  Pakenham  had  from  the  fleet  an 
abundance  of  boats  at  his  disposal,  well  manned  by  sailors; 
and,  by  establishing  his  artillery  upon  the  western  bank,  he 
could  enfilade  Jackson's  line,  searching  his  works  within  easy 
range,  and  rendering  them,  in  case  of  assault,  practically 
untenable.  Under  such  circumstances,  Jackson  would  have 
had  no  choice  but  to  vacate  his  position,  and  allow  New 
Orleans  to  fall. 

It  has  always  been  assumed  that  Pakenham,  after  the  wont 
of  the  English  officer,  preferred  a  direct  assault,  —  that, 
greatly  underrating  his  antagonist,  the  recent  Bladensburg 
exnerience  lured  him  on.  So  far  as  that  portion  of  the  force 
composing  his  army  which  arrived  with  him  was  concerned, 
this  is  unquestionably  true;  and,  in  the  literature  of  the 
campaign,  it  is  curious  to  come  across  footprints  of  the  fact. 
Pakenham  joined  the  army  before  New  Orleans  on  the  morn- 
ing of  Christmas  Day,  1814,  —  only  two  weeks  before  the 
battle.  The  English  had  then  already  met  with  much  stiffer 
resistance  than  they  had  anticipated,  and  those  whom 
Pakenham  relieved  of  command  recognized  the  difficulty  of 
the  confronting  problem.  Nevertheless,  as  the  reinforce- 
ments the  new  commander-in-chief  brought  with  him  stepped 
on  shore,  not  a  few  of  them  expressed  their  fears  lest  they 
should  be  too  late  to  take  part  in  the  advance,  as  they 
thought  New  Orleans  would  be  captured  before  they  could 
get  into  line.  On  the  7th  of  January,  the  day  before  the 
battle,  as  one  of  the  newly  arrived  regiments  moved  towards 
the  front,  passing  another  regiment  which  had  been  at  Blad- 
ensburg, some  of  the  officers  of  the  former  remarked  to  those 
of  the  latter  that  "it  would  be  now  our  turn  to  get  into  New 
Orleans,  as  they  had  done  at  Washington." 

On  the  other  hand,  Jackson  at  this  juncture  evinced  one 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS  187 

of  the  highest  and  rarest  attributes  of  a  great  general:  he 
read  correctly  the  mind  of  his  opponent,  —  divined  his  course 
of  action.  And  yet  it  was  a  narrow  chance;  for,  it  now 
appears  that  the  British  commander  was  not  so  completely 
impervious  to  reason  and  changed  conditions  as  has  been 
supposed.  According  to  Smith,  who  was  then  serving  as 
the  senior  officer  of  his  staff,  Pakenham,  immediately  after 
getting  on  the  ground,  reconnoitred  Jackson's  position.  As 
the  result  of  so  doing  he  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  could 
not  be  successfully  assailed  in  front  or  on  either  flank.  Smith 
asserts  that  being  asked  for  his  opinion,  he  then  said  in 
reply,  "As  yet  the  enemy  has  not  occupied  the  opposite 
[right]  bank  of  the  river.  We  must  possess  the  right  bank, 
enfilade  the  enemy's  position  with  our  fire,  and,  so  soon  as 
we  open  a  fire  from  the  right  bank,  we  should  storm  the 
work  in  two,  three  or  more  columns.'7  This  opinion,  Smith 
says,  commended  itself  to  Pakenham,  and  he  proceeded 
accordingly,  giving  orders  for  the  erection  of  batteries.  As 
the  proposed  movement  assumed  shape,  it  naturally  caused 
Jackson  anxiety.  All  depended  on  its  magnitude.  If  it 
was  the  operation  in  chief  of  the  British  army,  New 
Orleans  could  hardly  be  saved.  Enfiladed,  and  threatened 
in  his  rear  from  the  west  bank,  Jackson  must  fall  back. 
If,  however,  the  west  bank  movement  was  only  a  diver- 
sion in  favor  of  a  main  assault  planned  on  his  front,  the 
demonstration  across  the  river  might  be  checked,  or  prove 
immaterial.  As  the  thing  developed  during  the  night  pre- 
ceding the  battle,  Commodore  Patterson,  who  commanded 
the  American  naval  contingent  on  the  river,  became 
alarmed,  and  hurried  a  despatch  to  Jackson,  advising  him 
of  what  was  taking  place,  and  begging  immediate  reinforce- 
ment. At  one  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  messenger  roused 
Jackson  from  sleep,   stating  his  errand.     Jackson  listened 


188  MILITARY  STUDIES 

to  the  despatch,  and  at  once*  said :  "  Hurry  back  and  tell 
Commodore  Patterson  that  he  is  mistaken.  The  main 
attack  will  be  on  this  side,  and  I  have  no  men  to  spare. 
General  Morgan  must  maintain  his  position  at  all  hazards." 
To  use  a  vernacular,  but  expressive,  term,  Jackson  had 
" sized"  Pakenham  correctly,  —  when  the  moment  came, 
he  could  be  depended  on  not  to  do  what  the  occasion  re- 
quired. He  would  not  throw  a  sufficient  force  across  the 
river,  and  move  on  his  objective  by  a  practically  undefended 
road,  merely  holding  his  enemy  in  check  on  the  east  bank. 
Had  he  done  so,  he  would  have  acted  in  disregard  of  that 
first  principle  both  of  tactics  and  strategy  which  forbade 
the  division  of  a  force  in  presence  of  an  enemy  in  such  a  way 
that  the  two  parts  are  not  in  position  to  support  each  other ; 
—  but  he  would  have  taken  New  Orleans !  An  attack  in 
front  was,  on  the  contrary,  in  accordance  with  British  mili- 
tary traditions  and  the  recent  experience  of  Bladensburg. 
Pakenham  acted  accordingly.  In  his  main  assault  he  sac- 
rificed his  army  and  lost  his  own  life,  sustaining  an  almost 
unexampled  defeat;  while  his  partial  movement  across  the 
river  was  completely  successful  so  far  as  it  was  pressed, 
opening  a  straight  and  practicable  road  to  New  Orleans, 
and  gravely  jeopardizing  Jackson's  position.  A  mere 
diversion  or  auxiliary  operation,  the  principal  attack  having 
failed  it  was  not  persisted  in. 

Possibly  it  might  by  some  now  be  argued  that  had  Paken- 
ham thus  weakened  his  force  on  the  east  side  of  the  river 
by  operating  on  New  Orleans  and  on  Jackson's  flank  and 
rear  from  the  west  side,  in  the  way  suggested,  a  vigorous 
fighting  opponent,  such  as  Jackson  unquestionably  was, 
might  have  turned  the  tables  on  him,  for  thus  violating  an 
elementary  rule  of  warfare.  Leaving  his  lines,  and  boldly 
taking  the  aggressive,  Jackson,  it  will  then  be  urged,  might 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS        189 

have  overwhelmed  the  British  force  in  his  front,  thus  cutting 
the  column  operating  west  of  the  river  from  the  fleet  and  its 
base  of  supplies,  —  in  fact,  destroying  the  expedition.  Not 
improbably  Pakenham  argued  in  this  way;  if  he  did,  how- 
ever, he  simply  demonstrated  his  incompetence  for  high 
command.  He  failed  to  grasp  the  situation,  or  put  a  correct 
estimate  on  its  conditions;  for  it  is  the  part  of  a  skilful 
commander  to  know  when  to  secure  results  by  making  ex- 
ceptions to  even  the  most  general  and  the  soundest  rules. 
Pakenham,  it  is  true,  grossly  exaggerated  the  number  of 
the  force  confronting  him.  He,  and  those  with  him,  put 
them  at  from  26,000  to  30,000;  but  all  militia.  In  point  of 
fact,  however,  his  command  outnumbered  that  of  Jackson 
by  about  two  to  one;  while,  moreover,  the  British  were 
veterans,  those  composing  Jackson's  levy  were  hardly  more 
than  raw  recruits,  —  like  the  South  African  Boers,  good 
material,  well  accustomed  to  handling  rifles.  As  one  of 
the  best  of  his  own  brigadiers,  General  Adair,  afterwards 
expressed  it,  "our  men  were  militia  without  discipline, 
and  if  once  beaten,  they  could  not  be  relied  on  again." 
They  were,  in  fact,  men  of  exactly  the  same  temper  and 
stuff  as  those  who  were  stampeded  by  a  volley  and  a  shout 
at  Bladensburg;  and  the  unpleasant  principle  of  military 
morale  thus  stated  by  General  Adair  was  only  that  learned 
by  Washington  at  Kips  Bay  forty  years  previous.  The 
force  Pakenham  had  under  his  command  before  New  Orleans 
was,  on  the  other  hand,  composed  of  seasoned  soldiers  of 
the  best  class.  In  the  open  field  and  on  anything  approach- 
ing equality  of  position,  he  had  absolutely  nothing  to  fear. 
He  might  safely  provoke  attack;  indeed,  the  very  most  he 
could  ask  was  to  get  Jackson  out  from  behind  his  breast- 
works on  almost  any  terms.  So  fully,  moreover,  did  he  real- 
ize this,  that  it  inspired  him  to  his  assault.     It  is  useless, 


190  MILITARY  STUDIES 

therefore,  to  suggest  that  he  hesitated  to  separate  his  force, 
overestimating  Jackson's  numbers  and  aggressive  capacity. 
Had  he  done  so,  he  would  hardly  have  ventured  to  assail 
Jackson  in  front.  On  the  contrary,  Pakenham's  trouble 
lay,  not  in  overestimating,  but  in  underestimating,  his 
adversary.  He  failed  to  divide  his  force  and  operate  on 
correct  principles,  not  because  he  was  afraid  to  do  so,  but 
because  he  did  not  know  enough  to  do  so. 

In  case,  then,  dividing  his  command,  Pakenham  had 
thrown  one  half  of  it  across  the  river  to  assail  New  Orleans 
in  force  and  turn  Jackson's  rear,  and  then  with  the  other 
half  held  his  position  on  the  east  bank,  thus  keeping  open  his 
communications  with  the  fleet,  the  only  possible  way  in 
which  Jackson  could  have  taken  advantage  of  the  situation 
would  have  been  by  leaving  his  lines  and  attacking. 

Now,  it  so  happens  that  resisting  attack  under  just  such 
circumstances  is  the  position  in  which  the  British  soldier 
has  always  developed  his  best  staying  qualities.  Quebec 
was  a  case  directly  in  point.  Again,  the  men  under  Paken- 
ham before  New  Orleans  were  even  more  reliable  than  those 
who,  only  five  months  later  at  Waterloo,  after  the  auxiliary 
troops  had  been  swept  from  the  field  by  the  fury  of  the 
French  attack,  held  their  position  from  noon  to  a  June  sun- 
set against  an  assaulting  force  of  nearly  twice  their  number 
commanded  by  the  Emperor  himself.  The  somewhat  un- 
reasoning bulldog  tenacity  of  the  English  infantry  under 
such  circumstances  is  well  known ;  nor  needs  to  be  dilated  on. 
But  concerning  it,  there  is  a  statement  of  the  French  marshal, 
Bugeaud,  curious,  and  bearing  on  its  face  evidence  that  it 
was  written  by  a  military  man  of  practical  experience, 
—  one  who  knew  from  his  own  recollections  that  whereof 
he  spoke.  Marshal  Bugeaud,  in  making  this  statement, 
referred  not  to  Waterloo,  but  to  the  operations  in  the  Penin- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS  191 

sular  War,  —  that  school  in  which  the  soldiers  under  Paken- 
ham  had  learned  their  business.  What  he  says  reveals, 
moreover,  a  curious  insight  into  the  characteristics  of  the 
French  and  English  infantry :  — 

"The  English  generally  occupied  well  chosen  defensive  positions, 
having  a  certain  command,  and  they  showed  only  a  portion  of  their 
force.  The  usual  artillery  action  first  took  place.  Soon,  in  great 
haste,  without  studying  the  position,  without  taking  time  to  ex- 
amine if  there  were  means  to  make  a  flank  attack,  we  marched 
straight  on,  taking  the  bull  by  the  horns.  About  1000  yards  from 
the  English  line  the  men  became  excited,  spoke  to  one  another, 
and  hurried  their  march ;  the  column  began  to  be  a  little  confused. 

"The  English  remained  quite  silent,  with  ordered  arms,  and 
from  their  steadiness  appeared  to  be  a  long  red  wall.  This  steadi- 
ness invariably  produced  an  effect  on  the  young  soldiers. 

"Very  soon  we  got  nearer,  shouting  'Vive  TEmpereur,  en  avant ! 
a  la  bayonette  ! '  Shakos  were  raised  on  the  muzzles  of  the  mus- 
kets ;  the  columns  began  to  double,  the  ranks  got  into  confusion, 
the  agitation  produced  a  tumult ;  shots  were  fired  as  we  advanced. 

"The  English  line  remained  still,  silent  and  immovable,  with 
ordered  arms,  even  when  we  were  only  300  paces  distant,  and 
appeared  to  ignore  the  storm  about  to  break. 

"The  contrast  was  striking;  in  our  inmost  thoughts,  each  felt 
that  the  enemy  was  a  long  time  in  firing,  and  that  this  fire,  reserved 
for  so  long,  would  be  very  unpleasant  when  it  did  come.  Our 
ardour  cooled.  The  moral  power  of  steadiness,  which  nothing 
shakes  (even  if  it  be  only  in  appearance),  over  disorder  which 
stupefies  itself  with  noise,  overcame  our  minds.  At  this  moment 
of  intense  excitement,  the  English  wall  shouldered  arms,  an  in- 
describable feeling  rooted  many  of  our  men  to  the  ground,  —  they 
began  to  fire.  The  enemy's  steady  concentrated  volleys  swept 
our  ranks ;  decimated  we  turned  round,  seeking  to  recover  our 
equilibrium :  then  three  deafening  cheers  broke  the  silence  of  our 
opponents ;  at  the  third  they  were  on  us,  pushing  our  disorganized 
flight.  But  to  our  great  surprise,  they  did  not  push  their  ad- 
vantage beyond  a  hundred  yards,  retiring  calmly  to  their  lines  to 
await  a  second  attack." 


192  MILITARY  STUDIES 

Those  thus  vividly  described  by  an  hereditary  race  oppo- 
nent, who  had  himself  confronted  them,  were  the  identical 
men  Jackson  would  have  had  to  attack,  had  he,  as  the  only 
possible  alternative  to  a  precipitate  retreat  and  the  aban- 
donment of  New  Orleans,  found  himself  compelled  on  the 
8th  of  January  to  leave  his  lines  and  assume  the  aggressive. 
Unfortunately  for  himself  and  for  his  command,  Pakenham 
underestimated  his  opponent;  and  it  is  hardly  necessary 
to  say  that,  as  an  opponent,  in  a  rough-and-tumble  fight, 
whether  street,  political  or  military,  Andrew  Jackson  was  a 
factor  not  safe  to  regard  lightly.  Certainly  on  the  8th  of 
January,  1815,  Jackson  was  under  about  as  great  an  obliga- 
tion to  Pakenham  as  one  man  can  be  to  another.  Paken- 
ham offered  Jackson  his  opportunity;  and  Jackson  was 
equal  to  the  occasion. 

From  neither  the  strategic  nor  the  tactical  point  of  view 
is  there,  or,  at  the  time,  was  there,  anything  new  to  be 
learned  from  the  New  Orleans  episode.  It  was,  as  already 
more  than  once  pointed  out,  in  every  essential  respect 
merely  Bunker  Hill  over  again,  —  forty  years  after,  —  a 
body  of  highly  disciplined  veterans  led  by  experienced 
officers  confronted  from  behind  improvised  breastworks  by 
intensely  individual  but  scarcely  organized  rangers  and 
riflemen.  The  assaulting  party  enjoyed  in  both  cases  the 
advantage  of  flanking  water  surroundings,  and,  having  a 
complete  maritime  control,  by  an  obvious  movement  could 
have  made  the  position  they  undertook  to  storm  wholly 
untenable  by  their  opponents.  Underestimating  those 
opponents,  though  of  the  same  blood  as  themselves,  the 
British  commander  in  each  case  elected  to  throw  away  the 
lives  of  those  subject  to  his  orders.  The  American  rifleman 
under  cover  was  simply  beyond  their  powers  of  compre- 
hension. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS        193 

Thus  the  one  really  interesting  and  suggestive  feature  at 
New  Orleans  was  the  instinctive  recourse  of  the  American 
general  to  what  may  not  unfairly  be  termed  the  racial  char- 
acteristics of  those  composing  the  force  under  him  —  their 
individuality,  their  adaptability  to  conditions,  their  natural 
inclination  to  ranger  tactics.  If  it  had  come  to  a  line  of 
battle  formation  or  battalion  evolutions  under  fire,  the 
seasoned  veterans  from  the  Peninsula  would,  as  at  Bladens- 
burg,  have  made  very  short  work  of  the  American  levies; 
but,  apparently,  it  never  occurred  to  Jackson,  a  born 
fighter,  to  measure  himself  and  his  command  against  his 
opponent  in  that  way;  and  those  composing  his  command 
instinctively  recognized  in  Jackson  one  of  themselves.  He 
knew  how  to  fight  them  for  all  they  were  worth ;  and  they 
knew  that  he  knew  it.  The  one  chance,  therefore,  Paken- 
ham  had  was  so  to  manoeuvre  as  to  compel  Jackson  either  to 
withdraw  from  in  front  of  the  British  objective,  or  to  come 
out  and  fight  on  Pakenham's  own  terms  —  uman  fashion," 
as  the  expression  went.  Throwing  away  his  opportunity 
to  compel  this,  he  took  the  consequences. 

And  yet,  studied  in  the  light  of  Sir  Harry  Smith's  auto- 
biographic statements,  it  is  marvellous  to  see  how  close,  for 
both  Jackson  and  Pakenham,  the  call  was.  The  British 
assault  was  to  be  made  at  dawn  of  the  8th.  The  storming 
columns  were  all  moved  into  position  during  the  earlier 
hours  of  the  night.  The  firing  of  two  rockets  was  to  be  the 
signal  for  assault.  A  detachment  was  meanwhile  to  be 
thrown  across  the  river,  to  move  up  the  right  bank, 
capture  the  batteries,  and  turn  the  guns  on  Jackson's  flank, 
enfilading  his  works  at  the  moment  they  were  assailed  in 
front.  To  get  the  boats  from  the  fleet,  anchored  in  the 
bayou,  across  the  intervening  plantations  to  the  river  it 
was  necessary  to  widen  slightly  a  canal  which  connected  the 


194  MILITARY  STUDIES 

two.  The  river  stood  at  higher  level  than  the  bayou ;  con- 
sequently a  certain  amount  of  water  had  to  be  let  into  the 
canal,  using  it  as  a  lock,  so  as  to  raise  it  to  the  necessary 
level.  When  it  came  to  opening  the  river  end,  the  bayou 
end  was  dammed;  but  when  the  banks  of  the  river  were 
cut,  the  pressure  of  the  inflowing  water  drove  the  dam  out, 
and  the  delay  necessary  to  repair  the  damage  thus  done 
prevented  the  boats  being  worked  into  the  river  at  the  hour 
assigned.  Smith  at  that  time  was  with  the  column  of  General 
Lambert,  one  of  the  three  formed  for  the  assault  planned  on 
the  left,  or  eastern,  bank.     What  ensued  he  thus  describes : — 

"About  half  an  hour  before  daylight,  while  I  was  with  General 
Lambert's  column,  standing  ready,  Sir  Edward  Pakenham  sent 
for  me.  I  was  soon  with  him.  He  was  greatly  agitated.  '  Smith, 
most  Commanders-in-Chief  have  many  difficulties  to  contend  with, 
but  surely  none  like  mine.  The  dam,  as  you  heard  me  say  it 
would,  gave  way,  and  Thornton's  people  will  be  of  no  use  whatever 
to  the  general  attack.'  I  said,  'So  impressed  have  you  ever  been, 
so  obvious  is  it  in  every  military  point  of  view,  we  should  possess 
the  right  bank  of  the  river,  and  thus  enfilade  and  divert  the  atten- 
tion of  the  enemy ;  there  is  still  time  before  daylight  to  retire  the 
columns  now.  We  are  under  the  enemy's  fire  so  soon  as  discovered.' 
He  says,  '  This  may  be,  but  I  have  twice  deferred  the  attack.  We 
are  strong  in  numbers  now  comparatively.  It  will  cost  more 
men,  and  the  assault  must  be  made.'  I  again  urged  delay.  While 
we  were  talking,  the  streaks  of  daylight  began  to  appear,  although 
the  morning  was  dull,  close,  and  heavy,  the  clouds  almost  touching 
the  ground.  He  said,  'Smith,  order  the  rocket  to  be  fired.'  I 
again  ventured  to  plead  the  cause  of  delay.  He  said,  and  very 
justly,  '  It  is  now  too  late :  the  columns  would  be  visible  to  the 
enemy  before  they  could  move  out  of  fire,  and  would  lose  more 
men  than  it  is  to  be  hoped  they  will  in  the  attack.  Fire  the 
rocket,  I  say,  and  go  to  Lambert.'  This  was  done.  .  .  .  The 
rocket  was  hardly  in  the  air  before  a  rush  of  our  troops  was  met 
by  the  most  murderous  and  destructive  fire  of  all-arms  ever  poured 
upon  column." 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS  195 

In  the  diary  entry  with  which  this  paper  began,  Sir 
Charles  Napier,  a  man  presumably  well  informed  on  the 
facts  of  the  particular  case  and  one  generally  well  qualified 
to  express  an  opinion  professionally,  spoke  of  Pakenham  as 
having  died  in  defeat  —  a  defeat  "  not  his  fault. "  And  to 
the  same  effect,  Captain  Edward  Codrington,  as  he  then 
was,,  writing  home  to  his  wife  from  the  British  fleet  shortly 
after  the  battle,  said  that  Pakenham  "fell  a  sacrifice  to  the 
errors  of  others."  Codrington,  on  the  spot  and  a  partici- 
pant in  the  operations,  was  personally  cognizant  of  the  facts ; 
Napier,  writing  long  after  the  event,  expressed  a  common 
understanding  among  contemporaries.  To  the  same  effect, 
Sir  Harry  Smith,  with  Pakenham  up  almost  to  the  very 
moment  of  his  death,  writing  long  afterward,  exclaimed : 
"Poor  dear  Sir  Edward  Pakenham,  a  hero,  a  soldier,  a  man 
of  ability  in  every  sense  of  the  word,  had  to  contend  with 
every  imaginable  difficulty,  starting  with  the  most  unwise 
and  difficult  position  in  which  he  found  the  Army.  By 
perseverance,  determination,  and  that  gallant  bearing  which 
so  insures  confidence,  he  overcame  all  but  one,  which  he 
never  anticipated,  a  check  to  the  advance  of  British  soldiers. 
.  .  .  The  fire,  I  admit,  was  the  most  murderous  I  ever 
beheld  before  or  since."  What  then  had  all  these  in  mind 
when  each  made  the  same  or  a  similar  reservation?  What 
was  the  British  army  belief  at  the  time,  and  tradition  after- 
wards, in  regard  to  the  outcome  of  the  New  Orleans  expedi- 
tion and  the  fate  of  Wellington's  brother-in-law  ? 

Neither  the  Ross  expedition,  which  resulted  in  the  cap- 
ture and  burning  of  Washington,  nor  the  Pakenham  expe- 
dition, which  ended  as  in  this  paper  described,  loom  large  in 
any  except  American  military  annals.  As.  already  said, 
they  were  at  best  a  mere  side  show  to  the  larger  and  more 
concentrated  drama  then  drawing  to  its  close  in  Europe. 


196  MILITARY  STUDIES 

America  was  in  1815  a  remote  region,  very  unfamiliar  to 
Europeans;  and,  strange  as  such  slowness  in  transmission 
now  seems,  the  news  of  disaster  to  their  arms  at  New  Or- 
leans, and  Pakenham's  death,  did  not  reach  England  until 
early  in  March.  This  was  fifty  days  subsequent  to  the 
event,  and  ten  whole  weeks  after  formal  announcement  of 
the  treaty,  signed  at  Ghent  (December  24)  which  should 
have  brought  the  trans- Atlantic  hostilities  to  a  close.  Those 
tidings  thus  would,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  events,  have 
been  suggestive  only  of  a  dying  echo  of  the  remote  last  gun 
of  a  long  war ;  but  the  course  of  events  at  that  time  was  in 
no  way  " ordinary."  Not  only  England  and  English  army 
circles,  but  all  Europe,  were,  in  the  early  days  of  March, 
1815,  listening,  not  to  the  echoes  of  the  last  guns  of  a  war 
which  was  ended,  but  for  the  deep  reverberation  of  those 
which  were  to  announce  that  a  fresh  life-and-death  struggle 
had  begun.  And  so,  "amid  the  excitement  caused  by  the 
return  from  Elba,  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  and  the  subsequent 
exile  of  the  emperor,  little  was  heard,  and  less  was  thought, 
of  the  events  that  had  transpired  in  the  delta  of  the  Missis- 
sippi. A  vague,  brief  and  incorrect  bulletin  was  published 
in  the  official  Gazette,  and  then  the  expedition  against  New 
Orleans  was  allowed  to  be  forgotten."  x 

What  then  was  the  true  inwardness  of  the  fatal  event  of 
the  morning  of  January  8?  A  formidable  British  fleet 
of  sixty  sail,  carrying  about  a  thousand  guns  and  manned 
proportionately,  made  part  of  the  New  Orleans  expedition- 
ary force.  Of  this  naval  contingent,  Vice-Admiral  Sir 
Alexander  Cochrane  was  flag  officer,  as  he  had  also  been  of 
the  similar  naval  contingent  during  the  joint  operations  in 
Chesapeake  Bay,  four  months  before.  His  recollection  of 
what  had  taken  place  at  Bladensburg  was  fresh  as  well  as 
1  Parton,  Jackson,  II,  326. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS  197 

personal ;  and  he  would  have  been  less  than  English  had  he 
not  felt  the  deepest  contempt  for  the  resisting  qualities  of 
hastily  organized  and  undisciplined  American  levies,  and 
given  most  outspoken  expression  thereof.  He  had  come  in 
contact  with  them,  and  seen  them  routed  from  behind 
breastworks  like  a  pack  of  sheep.  Pakenham,  on  the  other 
hand,  found  himself  in  command  of  an  army  amid  sur- 
roundings and  under  conditions  wholly  strange  to  him. 
His  previous  military  experience  was  in  fact  worse  than 
useless;  it  was  misleading.  Though  at  his  death  not  yet 
thirty-seven,  he  had  already  served  over  twenty  years. 
Writing  immediately  after  the  battle  in  which  he  fell, 
Codrington  spoke  of  him  as  "the  flower  of  the  flock,"  and 
wrote  "  there  was  something  about  him  which  made  me 
look  forward  to  a  future  intercourse  with  him  as  a  source 
of  great  satisfaction."  He  had  been  placed  in  command 
with  an  eye  to  a  particular  service.  It  was  proposed  to 
capture  New  Orleans,  and  occupy  Louisiana  with  a  view 
to  effect  on  the  negotiations  already  (July  24)  entered  on, 
which  resulted,  five  months  later,  in  the  Treaty  of  Ghent 
(December  24).  The  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  and  the 
region  adjacent  thereto  was  to  be  seized  and  held  with  a 
view  "to  obtaining  better  terms  in  the  pending  negotiation 
or  of  exacting  cession  thereof  as  the  price  of  peace." l 
Pakenham,  it  has  been  seen,  did  not  join  the  New  Orleans 
expeditionary  force  until  late  in  December,  and  it  was  the 
25th  of  that  month  before  he  assumed  actual  command. 
During  the  fourteen  days  which  now  intervened  before 
the  battle  and  his  own  death,  the  British  commander  was 
not  only  much  occupied,  but  was  mentally  perplexed  in 
the  extreme.  He  found  himself  in  independent  control  for 
the  first  time,  and  that  in  a  most  difficult  position.  At  the 
1  Henry  Adams,  United  States,  vol.  VIII,  313. 


198  MILITARY  STUDIES 

outset  he  seems  to  have  shown  a  somewhat  unexpected 
degree  of  caution.  Though  accustomed  under  Wellington 
to  furious  direct  assaults,  when,  three  days  after  assuming 
command,  he  came  suddenly  in  his  advance  on  Jackson's 
unfinished  but  still  ugly-looking  breastworks,  they  gave  him 
pause.  Things  were  not  according  to  rule.  Improvised 
earthworks  were  to  him  a  novelty.  Belonging  to  the  class 
" Fortifications/'  they  must  be  treated  as  such ;  and,  accord- 
ing to  all  Peninsular  precedents  a  practical  breach  in  them 
must  be  effected,  and  the  position  then  stormed.  To  pro- 
ceed in  this  way  required  time  and  breaching  artillery.  So, 
instead  of  being  told  to  advance  at  once  and  clear  the  way, 
as  at  Bladensburg,  the  army  was,  to  the  surprise  of  all, 
ordered  to  retire  out  of  cannon  range,  and  to  go  into  camp. 
The  order  was,  of  course,  obeyed ;  but,  as  one  of  those  who 
obeyed  it  afterwards  wrote,  "  there  was  not  a  man  among 
us  who  failed  to  experience  both  shame  and  indignation." 
This  was  on  the  28th  of  December. 

Fresh  from  the  Chesapeake,  and  with  Bladensburg  and 
Washington  in  memory,  Vice-Admiral  Cochrane,  a  man 
twenty  years  Pakenham's  senior,  seems  to  have  viewed  this 
proceeding  with  marked  disfavor.  Siege  equipage  had  now 
to  be  brought  up  from  the  ships,  and  the  work  of  bringing  it 
up  fell  upon  the  sailors.  The  guns,  loaded  on  boats,  had 
first  "with  incredible  labor"  to  be  rowed  from  the  fleet  to 
the  bayou,  and  then  dragged  through  three  miles  of  bog  to 
the  British  lines.  At  last,  by  the  evening  of  the  31st,  they 
were  in  position.  But,  meanwhile,  Jackson  had  not  been 
idle;  his  breastworks  had  been  perfected,  and  he  also  had 
mounted  some  heavy  guns.  At  8  o'clock  on  the  morning 
of  January  1  the  British  batteries  opened  fire;  and  those 
behind  them,  Pakenham  least  of  all,  "made  not  the  slightest 
doubt  of  its   effect."     The   opposing  batteries   replied,    at 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS  199 

first  faintly  and  with  seeming  difficulty ;  but,  by  and  by,  as 
a  British  officer  wrote,  their  "  salutation  became  more 
spirited,  till  it  gradually  surpassed  our  own,  both  in  rapidity 
and  precision."  About  noon  the  British  fire  slackened; 
and,  at  one  o'clock,  it  had  been  completely  overpowered. 
"Never,"  wrote  the  British  officer,  "was  any  failure  more 
remarkable  or  unlooked  for  than  this."  Its  effect  on 
Pakenham  can  be  imagined.  He  was  at  his  wit's  ends; 
something  must  be  done,  and  that  quickly ;  but  —  what  ? 
Having  his  personality  and  position  in  mind,  the  situa- 
tion now  becomes  distinctly  tragic;  to  a  degree,  pathetic. 
In  his  perplexity  he  next  had  recourse  to  something  to 
which  his  brother-in-law  and  master  in  practical  warfare 
never  once  had  recourse  in  his  whole  long  military  life  — 
if  he  did  not  actually  hold  a  formal  council  of  war,  he  sought 
advice;  and,  most  naturally,  of  Sir  Alexander  Cochrane 
among  others.  There  is  no  authentic  report  of  what  advice 
was  given  him,  but  it  is  said1  that  the  strategic  purpose  of 
the  expedition  —  the  capture  of  New  Orleans  —  was  by  some 
of  his  advisers  kept  in  mind,  and  it  was  proposed  to  accom- 
plish this  result  by  throwing  a  heavy  detachment  across  the 
river  in  the  way  already  referred  to,  which  should  march  by 
its  west  bank  up  to  a  point  opposite  the  town,  and  command- 
ing it.  The  only  difficulty  in  the  way  of  so  doing  lay  in 
finding  a  practical  method  of  crossing  troops  and  artillery. 
The  Americans  had  destroyed  or  removed  all  the  boats. 
Admiral  Cochrane,  it  is  said,  suggested  that  the  Villere 
canal  from  the  Bayou  connecting  with  Lake  Borgue  could 
easily  be  deepened  and  widened,  and  opened  into  the  river, 
thus  admitting  of  the  passage  of  boats  and  barges  from  the 
fleet.     This  was  obviously  feasible,  and  was  determined  on. 

1  Z.  F.  Smith.     The  Battle  of  New  Orleans  (Filson  Club  Publications, 
No.  19) ,  91  ;  Bourchier,  Codrington,  vol.  I,  336. 


200  MILITARY  STUDIES 

So  f ar,  all  was  well ;  things  were  going  swimmingly.  But  it 
is  now  further  related  that  Pakenham  wished  the  main 
movement  to  be  made  by  the  west  side,  and  the  capture  of 
New  Orleans  so  assured ;  while  Jackson  was  to  be  held  in  a 
position  now  made  useless  as  well  as  untenable  by  a  demon- 
stration in  force  on  his  front,  supported  by  a  renewed 
artillery  fire.  Thoroughly  sensible  in  itself,  this  plan  of 
operations  could  hardly  have  failed  of  success;  indeed,  as 
the  event  showed,  it  would  have  succeeded.  Most  fortu- 
nately for  Jackson,  most  unhappily  for  Pakenham  and 
numerous  good  officers  and  brave  men  under  his  command, 
Cochrane  at  this  point  again,  as  it  is  alleged,  intervened, 
this  time  making  some  observation  to  the  effect  that  a 
movement  in  force  by  the  west  side  might  be  all  very  well, 
but,  for  his  part,  "if  the  army  could  not  take  those  mud- 
banks,  defended  by  ragged  militia,  he  would  undertake  to 
do  it  with  two  thousand  sailors  armed  only  with  cutlasses 
and  pistols."  *  Gross  injustice  may  have  been  done  Vice- 
Admiral  Sir  Alexander  Forester  Inglis  Cochrane,  and  pos- 
sibly he  never  was  guilty  of  so  cruel  a  slur  on  a  brother 
officer,  one  much  his  junior  in  years  and  in  a  trying  posi- 
tion. But  at  that  time  Pakenham  had  within  ten  days 
of  his  assumption  of  command  been  twice  balked  in  his 
operations;  and,  having  in  fresh  recollection  what  Ross 
had  so  recently  accomplished  at  Bladensburg  and  Wash- 
ington, most  naturally  an  unfavorable  comparison  between 
the  two  leaders  was  in  the  minds  and  mouths  of  all.  Coch- 
rane also  had  been  on  peculiarly  friendly  terms  with  Ross, 
writing  that  in  him  were  "  blended  those  qualities  so  essen- 
tial to  promote  success  where  cooperation  between  the  two 
services  becomes  necessary. "  He  and  Ross  were  also  of 
nearly  the  same  age,  while  Ross's  successor  was  in  the  eyes 
1  Parton,  Jackson,  vol.  II,  189. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS        201 

of  the  rough  old  admiral  hardly  more  than  a  boy.  In  any 
event,  the  story  has  a  natural  sound  to  lend  probability  to 
it,  and  it  appears  in  all  the  narratives.1  Curiously  enough, 
also,  a  force  of  sailors,  armed  in  the  way  described,  did,  at 
the  exact  time  of  Pakenham 's  failure  and  death  on  the  east 
bank,  accomplish  on  the  west  bank  the  very  feat  Cochrane 
had  claimed  they  could  accomplish.  Armed  only  with  cut- 
lasses and  pistols  they,  in  the  course  of  Colonel  Thornton's 
successful  flank  movement,  carried  the  American  earthworks 
and  captured  their  batteries.  Their  loss  was  also  incon- 
siderable, about  one  in  eight  of  those  engaged. 

Speaking  historically,  it  will  not  do  to  yield  a  too  im- 
plicit credence  to  those  legends  of  the  quarter-deck  and 
the  mess-room.  But,  conceding  a  basis  of  fact  for  the 
Cochrane  cutlass-and-pistol  taunt,  both  Napier's  and  Cod- 
rington's  implications  are  accounted  for.  Nationality  even 
becomes  a  factor :  for  Cochrane  was  a  Scotchman ;  Paken- 
ham  an  Irishman.  Bladensburg  was  only  four  months  gone, 
and  Pakenham  had  succeeded  the  gallant  and  dashing  Ross. 
The  implication  was  obvious ;  what  Ross  had  done,  Paken- 
ham could  do  —  if  he  dared  !  And  so,  as  Codrington  at  the 
time  wrote,  Pakenham,  though  acting  against  his  better 
judgment,  "did  not  like  to  countermand  an  order  for  attack 
a  second  time." 

It  is  needless  to  follow  further  the  chain  of  inference.  It 
is,  however,  curious  to  consider  what  Pakenham 's  brother- 
in-law  would  have  done  if  similarly  circumstanced.  In  the 
first  place,  Wellington  would  have  called  no  council  of  war, 
nor  would  he  have  invited  suggestions.  With  his  extraor- 
dinary eye  for  a  military  situation  and  keen  tactical  sense, 
he  would  unquestionably  have  moved  on  his  objective  by 

1  Latour,  Historical  Memoir  of  the  War  in  West  Florida  and  Louisiana^ 
162  ;  Parton,  Jackson,  II,  189. 


202  MILITARY  STUDIES 

the  west  bank  of  the  river,  holding  Jackson  firmly  by  one 
arm  while  he  seized  New  Orleans  with  the  other;  finally, 
if  a  commander  in  another  branch  of  the  service,  either  in 
his  presence  or  to  his  knowledge,  had  criticised  his  conduct 
or  impugned  his  courage,  it  is  not  difficult  to  imagine  the 
cutting  curtness  of  look  and  speech  with  which  his  imperti- 
nence would  at  once  have  been  met  and  disregarded.  Pak- 
enham  was  differently  constituted. 


VI 

THE  ETHICS  OF  SECESSION1 

'ANAXKH 

"Laws  derive  their  authority  from  possession  and  use:  'tis 
dangerous  to  trace  them  back  to  their  beginning;  they  grow 
great  and  ennoble  themselves,  like  our  rivers,  by  running ;  follow 
them  upward  to  their  source,  'tis  but  a  little  spring,  scarce  dis- 
cernible, that  swells  thus  and  thus  fortifies  itself  by  growing  old. 
Do  but  consult  the  ancient  considerations  that  gave  the  first 
motion  to  this  famous  torrent,  so  full  of  dignity,  awe,  and  rever- 
ence ;  you  will  find  them  so  light  and  weak  that  it  is  no  wonder  if 
these  people,  who  weigh  and  reduce  everything  to  reason,  and 
who  admit  nothing  by  authority  or  upon  trust,  have  their  judg- 
ments very  remote  and  differing  from  those  of  the  public."  —  Mon- 
taigne, Essays,  Book  II,  Chap.  XII. 

Two  hundred  and  sixty-four  years  ago  a  schism,  since  be- 
come historic,  occurred  in  the  infant  colony  of  Massachusetts 
Bay.  It  was  rent  in  twain ;  and  so,  as  the  Father  of  Massa- 
chusetts has  recorded,  "  finding,  upon  consultation,  that  two 
so  opposite  parties  could  not  continue  in  the  same  body  with- 
out apparent  hazard  of  ruin  to  the  whole,  [those  in  the  major- 
ity] agreed  to  send  away  some  of  the  principal."  2  And 
again,  "by  the  example  of  Lot  in  Abraham's  family,  and 
after  Hagar  and  Ishmael,  he  [Governor  John  Winthrop]  saw 
they  must  be  sent  away."  3    Those  thus  proscribed  went  ac- 

1  An  address  delivered  at  Charleston,  S.  C,  December  24,  1902,  at  the 
annual  celebration  of  the  New  England  Society  of  that  city.  See  infra, 
p.  227 ;  also,  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  Proceedings,  Second  Series, 
Vol.  XVII,  pp.  90-116. 

2  Winthrop  History  (Savage's  ed.),  Vol.  1,  p.  *245. 
» Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  p.  *250. 

203 


204  MILITARY  STUDIES 

cordingly  into  banishment ;  and  so,  the  year  following,  Rhode 
Island  came  into  existence.  This  was  in  1638 ;  and,  in  1640, 
the  chief  of  those  thus  thrust  into  exile  having  occasion  to 
write  to  the  magistrate  who  had  enforced  the  order  of  ban- 
ishment, said,  with  a  pathos  reached  only  by  words  of  sim- 
plicity, "what  myself  and  wife  and  family  did  endure  in  that 
removal,  I  wish  neither  you  nor  yours  may  ever  be  put 
unto";1  but  again,  and  at  almost  the  same  time,  writing 
from  his  new  home  in  Newport,  Governor  William  Codding- 
ton  expressed  to  Governor  John  Winthrop  the  approval  he 
felt  "of  a  speech  of  one  of  note  amongst  you,  that  we  were 
in  a  heate  and  chafed,  and  were  all  of  us  to  blame;  in  our 
strife  we  had  forgotten  that  we  were  brethren."  2 

The  expression  is  apt ;  the  admission  appropriate.  More, 
much  more  than  two  years  ago,  —  longer  ago  than  the  life- 
time of  a  generation,  —  Massachusetts  and  South  Carolina 
got  in  "a  heate  and  chafed"  one  with  the  other,  and  fell  into 
bitter  strife.  Forgetting  that  we  were  brethren,  were  we 
also  "all  of  us  to  blame"? 

Not  long  since,  circumstances  led  me  into  a  dispassionate 
reexamination  of  the  great  issues  over  which  the  country  di- 
vided in  the  mid-years  of  the  last  century.  As  a  result  thereof, 
I  said  in  a  certain  Phi  Beta  Kappa  Society  address3  delivered 
in  June  [1902],  at  Chicago,  —  "legally  and  technically,  —  not 
morally,  again  let  me  say,  and  wholly  irrespective  of  hu- 
manitarian considerations,  —  to  which  side  did  the  weight 
of  argument  incline  during  the  great  debate  which  culmi- 
nated in  our  Civil  War  ?  ...  If  we  accept  the  judgment  of 
some  of  the  more  modern  students  and  investigators  of  his- 

1  The  Winthrop  Papers,  4  Mass.  Hist.  Coll.,  Vol.  VI,  p.  314. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  317. 

3  "Shall  Cromwell  have  a  Statue?"  See  Lee  at  Appomattox  and  Other 
Papers  (2d  ed.),  pp.  366,  367. 


THE  ETHICS  OF  SECESSION  205 

tory, — either  wholly  unprejudiced  or  with  a  distinct  Union 
bias,  —  it  would  seem  as  if  the  weight  of  argument  falls  into 
what  I  will  term  the  Confederate  scale."  For  instance, 
Goldwin  Smith,  —  an  Englishman,  a  life-long  student  of  his- 
tory, a  friend  and  advocate  of  the  Union  during  the  Civil 
War,  the  author  of  one  of  the  most  compact  and  readable 
narratives  of  our  national  life,  —  Dr.  Smith  has  recently 
said  :  "Few  who  have  looked  into  the  history  can  doubt  that 
the  Union  originally  was,  and  was  generally  taken  by  the 
parties  to  it  to  be,  a  compact,  dissoluble,  perhaps,  most  of 
them  would  have  said,  at  pleasure,  dissoluble  certainly  on 
breach  of  the  articles  of  Union.771  To  a  like  effect,  but  in 
terms  even  stronger,  Mr.  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  now  a  senator 
from  Massachusetts,  has  said,  not  in  a  political  utterance, 
but  in  a  work  of  historical  character:  "When  the  Constitu- 
tion was  adopted  by  the  votes  of  States  at  Philadelphia,  and 
accepted  by  the  votes  of  States  in  popular  conventions,  it  is 
safe  to  say  that  there  was  not  a  man  in  the  country,  from 
Washington  and  Hamilton,  on  the  one  side,  to  George  Clin- 
ton and  George  Mason,  on  the  other,  who  regarded  the  new 
system  as  anything  but  an  experiment  entered  upon  by  the 
States,  and  from  which  each  and  every  State  had  the  right 
peaceably  to  withdraw,  a  right  which  was  very  likely  to  be 
exercised."  2  Incited  by  those  utterances  to  yet  further  in- 
quiry of  my  own,  the  result  thereof  was,  to  me  at  least,  curi- 
ous ;  —  and  moreover  suggestive  of  moralizing. 
The  question  is  now  one  purely  historic ;  but  on  that  ques- 

1  "  England  and  the  War  of  Secession,"  Atlantic  Monthly  Magazine, 
March,  1902,  p.  305. 

2  Webster,  American  Statesmen  Series,  p.  172.  But  see  Mass.  Hist.  Soc. 
Proceedings,  Second  Series,  XVI,  151-173,  paper  entitled  "Historical  Con- 
ception of  the  Constitution,"  in  which  the  views  expressed  by  Dr.  Smith 
and  Mr.  Lodge  are  controverted  by  D.  H.  Chamberlain.  Also,  lb.  XVIII, 
397-398. 


206  MILITARY  STUDIES 

tion  of  the  weight  of  authority  and  argument  as  respects  the 
right  of  secession,  I  found  a  divergence  of  opinion  existing  to- 
day so  great  as  hardly  to  admit  of  reconciliation.  On  the 
one  side  it  was  —  I  am  told  still  is *  —  taught  as  an  article  of 
political  faith,  that  not  only  was  the  constitutional  right  of 
peaceable  secession  at  will  plain,  manifest  and  expressly 
reserved,  but  that,  until  a  comparatively  recent  period,  it 
had  never  been  even  disputed.  In  the  words  of  one  writer  of 
authority,  "  Through  a  period  of  many  years,  the  right  of 
secession  was  not  seriously  questioned  in  any  quarter  except 
under  the  exigencies  of  party  politics."  2  On  the  other 
hand,  in  the  section  of  the  country  where  my  lot  has  been 
cast,  this  alleged  heresy  is  sternly  denounced,  and  those  pro- 
pounding it  are  challenged  to  their  proofs.     With  equal  posi- 

1  During  the  summer  of  1903  a  significant  discussion  was  carried  on 
in  the  columns  of  the  press,  more  especially  in  the  New  York  Evening 
Post  and  the  Boston  Transcript.  It  originated  in  a  communication  which 
appeared  in  the  New  York  Nation  of  August  7,  1902,  from  a  professor  of 
Randolph-Macon  College,  Virginia.  The  writer  said  :  "This  public  opinion 
[now  prevalent  in  the  South]  positively  demands  that  teachers  of  history, 
both  in  the  colleges  and  high  schools,  shall  subscribe  unreservedly  to  two 
trite  oaths:  (1)  That  the  South  was  altogether  right  in  seceding  from 
the  Union  in  1861 ;  and  (2)  that  the  war  was  not  waged  about  the  negro." 
During  the  early  months  of  1911  a  somewhat  similar  controversy  developed 
in  Roanoke  College,  Virginia,  the  demand  being  that  Elson's  History  of 
the  United  States  should  be  put  on  the  Southern  Index  Expurgatorius  be- 
cause of  references  considered  objectionable  to  the  "institution"  and  to 
the  "slave-holders'  rebellion."  Referring  to  the  communication  in  the 
Nation  of  August  7,  1902,  a  Southern  writer  commenting  thereon,  and,  to 
a  degree,  controverting  its  statements,  proceeds  on  the  assumption  that 
"Historical  scholarship  has  settled  the  fact  that  according  to  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  American  Constitution  up  to  the  time  of  the  Civil  War 
the  Southern  States  did  have  the  right  to  secede  from  the  Union."  The 
whole  opposite  contention,  from  the  days  of  Andrew  Jackson  and  Daniel 
Webster  to  1860  is  thus  summarily  dismissed. 

2  J.  William  Jones,  Chaplain-General  of  the  United  Confederate  Vet- 
erans, on  the  Study  of  American  History  in  Southern  Schools  and  Colleges. 
The  South  in  History,  Baltimore  Sun,  August  10, 1902.  See  also  oration  by 
Hon.  John  W.  Daniel  on  the  Life,  Services  and  Character  of  Jefferson 
Davis,  January  25,  1890,  pp.  33-35. 


THE  ETHICS  OF  SECESSION  207 

tiveness  it  is  claimed  that,  from  the  time  of  the  adoption  of 
the  Constitution  down  to  a  comparatively  recent  day,  "  there 
was  not  a  man  in  the  country  who  thought  or  claimed  that 
the  new  system  was  anything  but  a  perpetual  Union."  l 

Which  contention,  I  asked,  is  right?  And  separating  my- 
self from  my  present  environment,  I  tried  to  go  back  to  the 
past,  and  to  see  things,  not  as  they  now  are,  but  as  they  were ; 
as  they  appeared  to  those  of  three  generations  gone,  —  to  the 
fathers,  in  short,  of  our  grandfathers.  It  was  a  groping  after 
forgotten  facts  and  conditions  in  places  dark  and  unfamiliar. 
The  results  reached  also,  were,  I  confess,  very  open  to  ques- 
tion. But,  while  more  or  less  curious  as  well  as  unexpected, 
they  were  such  as  a  Massachusetts  man,  forty  years  ago  at 
this  time  in  arms  for  the  Union,  need  not  hesitate  to  set  forth 
in  South  Carolina,  where  the  right  of  secession,  no  longer  pro- 
claimed as  a  theory,  was  first  resorted  to  as  a  fact. 

It  was  Alexander  Pope,  hard  on  two  centuries  ago  (1733), 
who  wrote :  — 

"  Manners  with  fortunes,  humors  turn  with  climes, 
Tenets  with  books,  and  principles  with  times. " 

And,  again,  Tennyson  in  our  day  has  said :  — 

"The  drift  of  the  Maker  is  dark,  an  Isis  hid  by  the  veil. 
Who  knows  the  ways  of  the  world,  how  God  will  bring  them  about? 
Our  planet  is  one,  the  suns  are  many,  the  world  is  wide. 

"  We  are  puppets,  Man  in  his  pride,  and  Beauty  fair  in  her  flower ; 
Do  we  move  ourselves,  or  are  moved  by  an  unseen  hand  at  a  game 
That  pushes  us  off  from  the  board,  and  others  ever  succeed  ?  " 

As  I  delved  into  the  record,  I  concluded  that  humors 
turned  quite  as  much  with  climes  in  the  nineteenth  century  as 
they  did  in  the  eighteenth ;   and  that,  in  the  later  as  in  the 

1 D.  H.  Chamberlain,  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proceedings,  Second  Series, 
XVI,  173. 


208  MILITARY  STUDIES 

earlier  period;  "  principles/ '  so  called,  bore  a  very  close  rela- 
tion to  " times."  We,  too,  had  been  " puppets"  moved  by 
"an  unseen  hand  at  a  game."  As,  in  short,  I  pursued  my  in- 
quiries, the  individual  became  more  and  more  minimized; 
chance  and  predestination  cut  larger  figures ;  and,  at  last,  it 
all  assumed  the  form  of  a  great  fatalistic  process,  from  which 
the  unexpected  alone  was  sure  to  result. 

But  to  come  to  the  record :  For  more  than  a  century, 
lawyers,  jurists  and  publicists  —  journalists,  politicians  and 
statesmen  —  have  been  arguing  over  the  Federal  Constitu- 
tion. Sovereignty  carries  with  it  allegiance.  Wherein 
rested  sovereignty  ?  Was  it  in  the  State  or  in  the  Nation  ? 
Was  the  United  States  a  unit,  —  an  indissoluble  Union  of 
indestructible  States,1  —  or  was  it  a  mere  confederacy  of  na- 
tions, held  together  solely  by  a  compact,  upon  possible  in- 
fringements of  which  each  one,  so  far  as  it  was  concerned, 
was  a  final  judge?  Each  postulate  has  been  maintained 
from  the  beginning;  for  that  matter,  is  maintained  still. 
Each  has  been  argued  out  with  great  legal  acumen  and  much 
metaphysical  skill  to  results  wholly  satisfactory  to  those  that 
way  inclined ;  and  yet  absolutely  illogical  and  absurd  to  the 
faithful  of  the  other  side.  It  was  the  old  case  of  the  shield 
of  the  silver  and  golden  sides.  That  the  two  sides  were  ir- 
reconcilable made  no  difference.  Be  it  silver  or  gold,  the 
thing  to  him  who  had  eyes  to  see  was  in  his  sight  silver  or 
gold,  as  the  case  might  be.  And  yet,  as  I  pursued  my  in- 
quiries, I  gradually  felt  assured,  not  that  the  thing  was  in  this 
case  either  silver  or  gold,  but  that  it  was  both  silver  and  gold. 
Everybody,  in  short,  was  right;  no  one,  wrong.  Merely 
conditions  changed ;  and,  with  them,  not  only  appearances 

*"An  indestructible  Union  composed  of  indestructible  States,"  Chief 
Justice  Chase,  Texas  v.  White,  7  Wallace,  725.  "An  indissoluble  Union 
of  imperishable  States,"  Bancroft,  History  of  the  Formation  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, Vol.  II,  p.  334. 


THE  ETHICS  OF  SECESSION  209 

but  principles,  and  even  facts.     Simply,  the  inevitable,  and 
yet  the  unexpected,  had  occurred. 
This  I  propose  for  my  thesis. 

at. 

In  dealing  with  these  questions  the  lawyers,  I  find,  start 
always  with  the  assumption  that,  at  a  given  time  in  the  past, 
to  wit,  at  or  about  1788,  there  was  in  the  thirteen  States,  then 
soon  to  become  the  present  United  States,  a  definite  consen- 
sus of  public  opinion,  which  found  expression  in  a  written 
compact,  since  known  as  the  Federal  Constitution.  But  was 
this  really  the  case?  Public  opinion,  so  called,  is  a  very 
elusive  and  uncertain  something,  signifying  things  different 
at  different  times  and  in  different  places.  Especially  was 
this  the  case  in  the  States  of  the  old  Federation.  So  far  as 
I  can  ascertain,  every  State  of  the  Federation  became  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Union  with  mental  reservations,  often  unexpressed, 
growing  out  of  local  traditions  and  interests,  in  the  full  and 
correct  understanding  of  which  the  action  of  each  must  be 
studied.1  Dissatisfied  with  the  past  and  doubtful  of  the 
future,  jealous  of  liberties,  to  the  last  degree  provincial  and 
suspicious  of  all  external  rule,  intensely  common-sensed  but 
illogical  and  alive  with  local  prejudice,  the  one  thing  our  an- 
cestry united  in  most  apprehending  was  a  centralized  gov- 
ernment. From  New  Hampshire  to  Georgia  such  a  govern- 
ment was  associated  with  the  idea  of  a  foreign  regime.  The 
people  clung  to  the  local  autonomy,  —  the  Sovereignty  of 
the  State.  With  this  fundamental  fact  the  framers  of  the 
Constitution  had  to  deal.  And  they  did  so,  in  my  opinion, 
with  consummate  skill.  Accepting  things  as  they  were,  they 
went  as  far  as  they  could,  leaving  the  outcome  to  time  and 

1  "Every  State  has  some  objection  to  the  present  form  [the  Constitution 
of  1788,  then  under  discussion],  and  these  objections  are  directed  to 
different  points.  That  which  is  most  pleasing  to  one  is  obnoxious  to 
another,  and  so  vice  versa."  George  Washington  to  Bushrod  Washington, 
November  10,  1787.  Writings,  Ford's  ed.,  XI,  184. 
P 


210  MILITARY  STUDIES 

the  process  of  natural  growth.  The  immediate  result  was  a 
nation  founded  on  a  metaphysical  abstraction,  —  a  con- 
dition of  unstable  equilibrium.  In  the  nature  of  things,  such 
a  condition  could  not  be  permanent.  But  the  great  mass  of 
people  composing  a  community  —  Lincoln's  " plain  people" 
—  are  not  metaphysicians,  and  do  not  philosophize.  Lov- 
ing to  argue,  in  argument  they  are  not  logical.  Even  in  Vir- 
ginia they  were  not  then  all  abstractionists ;  and  while,  in  a 
vague  way,  the  Virginians  wanted  to  become  part  of  one 
people,  they  never  proposed  to  cease  to  be  Virginians,  or  to 
permit  Virginia  to  become  other  than  a  Sovereign  State. 
It  was  so  with  the  others. 

Confronted  with  this  fact,  what  did  the  framers  of  the  Con- 
stitution propose  ?  Taking  refuge  in  metaphysics,  they  pro- 
posed a  contradiction  in  terms  —  a  divided  sovereignty ! 
Sovereignty,  it  was  argued,  was  in  the  People.  But  who  are 
the  People  ?  The  People  of  the  United  States,  it  was  replied, 
are  the  aggregate  of  those  inhabiting  the  particular  States. 
Then  they  began  to  apportion  sovereignty,  oblivious  of  the 
fact  that  sovereignty  does  not  admit  of  apportionment. 
A  modus  vivendi  may,  of  course,  be  agreed  on,  and  even  work 
effectively  as  well  as  harmoniously,  by  any  number  of  people 
and  for  an  indefinite  period  of  time,  but  the  agreed  modus 
vivendi  is  a  proposed  substitute  for  sovereignty,  not  the  thing 
itself.  The  Constitution  as  framed  and  originally  put  in 
operation  was,  so  far  as  sovereignty  was  concerned,  an 
avowed  modus  vivendi.  Agreeing  on  this  abstraction,  the 
framers,  next  pursuing  some  vague  analogy  of  the  solar  sys- 
tem, and  conceiving  of  States  as  planets  in  their  orbits, 
caused  the  people  of  the  particular  States  to  assign  to  the 
Nation  a  modicum  of  sovereignty,  to  confer  another  modicum 
on  the  State  governments,  and  reserve  whatever  remained  to 
the  People  themselves.     Now  it  is  written,  "No  man  can 


THE  ETHICS  OF  SECESSION  211 

serve  two  masters:  for  either  he  will  hate  the  one  and  love 
the  other;  or  else  he  will  hold  to  the  one  and  despise  the  other." 
The  everlasting  truth  of  this  precept  in  the  fulness  of  time 
held  good  in  our  case.  From  the  moment  the  fathers  sought 
to  divide  the  indivisible,  the  result  was  written  on  the  wall. 
It  was  a  mere  question  of  years  and  of  might.  Sovereignty, 
in  case  of  dissent  insisting  peremptorily  on  final  arbitrament, 
had  to  be  somewhere,  and  accepted  as  being  there. 

Thus,  intentionally  by  some  of  the  most  far-seeing,  uninten- 
tionally by  others  anxious  to  effect  only  a  more  perfect  union, 
a  pious  fraud  was  in  1788  perpetrated  on  the  average  Ameri- 
can, and  his  feet  were  directed  into  a  path  which  inevitably 
led  him  to  the  goal  he  least  designed  for  his  journey's  end.1 

"  Through  the  Valley  of  Love  I  went, 
In  the  lovingest  spot  to  abide, 
And  just  on  the  verge  where  I  pitched  my  tent, 
I  found  Hate  dwelling  beside.' ' 2 

The  bond  was  deceptive ;  for,  on  this  vital  point  of  ultimate 
sovereignty,  —  To  whom  was  allegiance  due  in  cases  of  direct 

l4<The  convention  framed  a  constitution  by  the  adoption  of  which 
thirteen  peoples  imagining  themselves  still  independent  and  sovereign, 
really  acknowledged  themselves  to  be  but  parts  of  a  single  political  whole. 
But  they  made  this  acknowledgment  unconsciously.  They  continued 
to  think  of  themselves  as  sovereigns,  who  indeed  permitted  an  agent  to 
exercise  some  of  their  functions  for  them,  but  who  had  not  abdicated  their 
thrones.  If  the  constitution  had  contained  a  definite  statement  of  the  actual 
fact ;  if  it  had  said  that  to  adopt  it  was  to  acknowledge  the  sovereignty  of 
the  one  American  people,  no  part  of  which  could  sever  its  connections  from 
the  rest  without  the  consent  of  the  whole,  it  would  probably  have  been 
rejected  by  every  State  in  the  Union." — J.  P.  Gordy,  Political  Parties  in 
the  United  States  (ed.  1900),  Vol.  I,  p.  79.  "To  the  familiar  state  govern- 
ments which  had  so  long  possessed  their  love  and  allegiance,  [the  plan 
devised  and  recommended  by  the  Federal  Convention  of  1787]  was  super- 
adding a  new  and  untried  government,  which  it  was  feared  would  swallow 
up  the  states  and  everywhere  extinguish  local  independence."  —  Fiske, 
The  Critical  Period  of  American  History,  p.  237. 

2  Browning,  Pip-pa  Passes,  II,  Noon. 


212  MILITARY  STUDIES 

issue  and  last  resort  ?  —  on  this  crucial  point  of  points  the 
Constitution  was  not  self-explanatory,  —  explicit.  Nor  was 
it  meant  to  be.  The  framers  —  that  is,  the  more  astute, 
practical  and  farseeing  —  went  as  far  as  they  dared.  The 
difficulty  —  the  contradiction  involved  —  was  explicitly, 
and  again  and  again,  pointed  out.  It  is  impossible  to  believe 
that  a  man  so  intellectually  acute  as  Hamilton  failed  to  see 
the  inherent  weakness  of  the  plan  proposed.  He  did  see  it; 
but,  under  existing  conditions,  the  plan  was,  from  his  point 
of  view,  the  best  attainable.  Madison,  though  a  man  of  dis- 
tinctly constructive  mind,  was  also  an  abstractionist.  He 
seems  really  to  have  had  faith  in  the  principle  of  an  unstable 
political  equilibrium.  At  a  later  day  that  faith  was  put  to  a 
rude  test ;  and,  in  1814,  while  the  Hartford  Convention  was 
in  session,  the  scales  fell  from  his  eyes.  He  had  all  he  wanted 
of  a  divided  sovereignty  in  practical  operation !  Lawyers, 
meanwhile,  have  since  argued  on  this  point ;  philosophers  and 
publicists  have  refined  over  it;  historians  have  analyzed 
the  so-called  original  materials  of  history;  and  men  with 
arms  in  their  hands  have  fought  the  thing  to  a  final  result. 
Nevertheless,  the  real  facts  in  the  case  seem  quite  clear; 
though  altogether  otherwise  than  they  are  usually  assumed 
to  have  been. 

When  the  Federal  Constitution  was  framed  and  adopted, — 
an  indissoluble  Union  of  indestructible  States,  —  what  was 
the  law  of  treason,  —  to  what  or  to  whom,  in  case  of  final 
issue,  did  the  average  citizen  owe  allegiance?  Was  it  to  the 
Union  or  to  his  State  ?  As  a  practical  question,  seeing  things 
as  they  then  were,  —  sweeping  aside  all  incontrovertible 
legal  arguments  and  metaphysical  disquisitions,  —  I  do  not 
think  the  answer  admits  of  doubt.  If  put  in  1788,  or  indeed 
at  any  time  anterior  to  1825,  the  immediate  reply  of  nine 
men  out  of  ten  in  the  northern  States,  and  of  ninety-nine 


THE  ETHICS  OF  SECESSION  213 

out  of  a  hundred  in  the  southern  States;  would  have  been 
that,  as  between  the  Union  and  the  State,  ultimate  allegiance 
was  due  to  the  State. 

A  recurrence  to  the  elementary  principles  of  human  nature 
tells  us  that  this  would  have  been  so,  and  could  have  been  no 
otherwise.  We  have  all  heard  of  a  famous,  much-quoted 
remark  of  Mr.  Gladstone  to  the  effect  that  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  was  "the  most  wonderful  work  ever 
struck  off  at  a  given  time  by  the  brain  and  purpose  of  man." 
This  may  or  may  not  be  so.  I  propose  neither  to  affirm  nor 
to  controvert  it,  here  and  now;  but,  however  wonderful  it 
may  actually  have  been,  it  would  have  been  more  than  won- 
derful, it  would  have  been  distinctly  miraculous,  had  it  on 
the  instant  so  wrought  with  men  as  at  once  to  transfer  the  al- 
legiance and  affection  of  those  composing  thirteen  distinct 
communities  from  their  old  traditional  governments  to  one 
newly  improvised.  The  thing  hardly  admits  of  discussion. 
The  change  was  political  and  far-reaching ;  but  it  produced  no 
immediate  effect  on  the  feelings  of  the  people.1  As  well  say 
that  the  union  of  the  crowns  of  Scotland  and  England  immedi- 
ately broke  up  Scotch  clanship.  It  did  break  it  up ;  but  the 
process  was  continuous  through  one  hundred  and  fifty  years. 
The  British  union  became  an  organic  and  legalized  fact  in 
1707 ;  but,  as  the  events  of  forty  years  later  showed,  the  con- 
sequences of  the  union  no  Campbell  nor  Cameron  foresaw. 
So  with  us  in  1788,  allegiance  to  State  had  only  a  few  years 
before  proved  stronger  than  allegiance  to  the  Crown  or  to  the 
Confederation,  and  no  one  then  was  "  foolish  enough  to  sup- 
pose that"  the  executive  of  the  Union  " would  dare  enforce 
a  law  against  the  wishes  of  a  sovereign  and  independent 
State";  the  very  idea  was  deemed  "preposterous."  "That 
this  new  government,  this  upstart  of  yesterday,  had  the 

1  Toequeville,  Democracy  in  America,  Reeve's  ed.  (1889),   I,  389,  n., 
394.     Infra,  349. 


214  MILITARY  STUDIES 

power  to  impose  its  edicts  on  unwilling  States  was  a  political 
solecism  to  which  they  could  in  no  wise  assent."  * 

I  am  sure  that  all  this  was  so  in  1788.  I  am  very  confident 
it  remained  so  until  1815.  I  fully  believe  it  was  so,  though  in 
less  degree,  until  at  least  1830.  A  generation  of  men  born  in 
the  Union  had  then  grown  up,  supplanting  the  generations 
born  and  brought  up  in  the  States.  Steam  and  electricity 
had  not  yet  begun  to  exert  their  cementing  influence;  but 
time,  sentiment,  tradition,  —  more,  and  most  of  all,  the  in- 
tense feeling  excited  North  and  South  by  our  naval  successes 
under  the  national  flag  in  the  War  of  1812,  —  had  in  1815 
in  large  part  done  their  work.  The  sense  of  ultimate  alle- 
giance was  surely,  though  slowly  as  insensibly,  shifting  from 
the  particular  and  gravitating  to  the  general,  —  from  the 
State  to  the  Union.  It  was  not  a  question  of  law,  or  of  the  in- 
tent of  the  fathers,  or  the  true  construction  of  a  written  in- 
strument; for,  on  that  vital  point,  the  Constitution  was 
silent,  —  wisely,  and,  as  I  hold  it,  intentionally  silent.  But, 
though  through  and  because  of  that  silence  there  may  have 
been  ground  for  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  right  of  seces- 
sion, there  is  no  possible  room  for  doubt,  whether  doubt  legal 
or  doubt  historical,  on  the  question  of  a  divided  sovereignty.2 
That  is  part  of  the  record.  Only  strictly  limited  and  care- 
fully enumerated  powers  were  conceded  by  the  States  to  the 
Nation ;  the  rest  were  reserved.    Even,  therefore,  though  Mr. 

1  Gordy,  Political  Parties  in  the  United  States,  I,  203,  341. 

2  "Every  State  in  the  Union,  in  every  instance  where  its  sovereignty 
has  not  been  delegated  to  the  United  States,  is  considered  to  be  as  com- 
pletely sovereign  as  the  United  States  are  in  respect  to  the  powers  sur- 
rendered. The  United  States  are  sovereign  as  to  all  the  powers  of  govern- 
ment actually  surrendered ;  each  State  in  the  Union  is  sovereign  as  to  all 
the  powers  reserved."  —  Mr.  Justice  Ire4ell  of  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court,  in  1793  (2  Dallas,  435).  Judge  Iredell  was  a  member  of  the  Con- 
vention of  1787,  which  framed  the  Constitution,  and  advocated  its  adoption 
in  the  North  Carolina  Convention. 


THE  ETHICS  OF  SECESSION  215 

Lodge  and  Gold  win  Smith,  and  the  other  authorities  I  have 

referred  to,  may  be  totally  wrong  on  the  question  of  the  right 

of  withdrawal  from  the  Union,  and  the  views  held  in  regard 

to  a  withdrawal  at  the  time  the  Constitution  was  adopted,1 

— and  I  wish  here  distinctly  to  say  that,  in  my  opinion,  they 

were  wrong,   and  a  somewhat  careful  examination  of  the 

record  has  disclosed  to  me  no  evidence  on  which  to  base  their 

somewhat  sweeping  assertions,  —  though,  I  say,  Mr.  Lodge 

and  Dr.  Smith  may  be  wrong,  yet  whether  they  were  wrong 

or  right  does  not  affect  the  proposition  that,  from  1788  to 

1861,  in  case  of  direct  and  insoluble  issue  between  sovereign 

State  and  sovereign  Nation,  every  man  was  not  only  free  to 

decide,  but  had  to  decide  the  question  of  ultimate  allegiance 

for  himself;   and,  whichever  way  he  decided,  almost  equally 

good  grounds  in  justification  thereof  could  be  alleged.     The 

Constitution  gave  him  two   masters.     Both  he   could  not 

serve;   and  the  average  man  decided  which  to  serve  in  the 

light  of  sentiment,  tradition  and  environment.     Of  this  I  feel 

as  historically  confident  as  I  can  feel  of  any  fact  not  matter  of 

absolute  record  or  susceptible  of  demonstration. 

I  have  already  referred  to  the  academic  address  I  some 

months  ago  had  occasion  to  deliver.     In  response  to  it  I  re- 

1  As  respects  contemporaneous  opinion,  there  can  be  no  authority 
higher  than  that  of  Madison,  cited  by  Mr.  Chamberlain,  Mass.  Hist.  Soc. 
Proceedings,  Second  Series,  XVI,  167.  On  the  point  raised  Fiske  says  : 
."The  decisive  struggle  was  over  the  question  whether  New  York  could 
ratify  the  Constitution  conditionally,  reserving  to  herself  the  right  to  with- 
draw from  the  Union  in  case  the  amendments  upon  which  she  had  set  her 
heart  should  not  be  adopted.  Upon  this  point  Hamilton  reinforced  him- 
self with  the  advice  of  Madison,  who  had  just  returned  to  New  York. 
Could  a  State  once  adopt  the  Constitution,  and  then  withdraw  from  the 
Union  if  not  satisfied  ?  Madison's  reply  was  prompt  and  decisive.  No, 
such  a  thing  could  never  be  done.  A  State  which  had  once  ratified  was  in 
the  federal  bond  forever.  The  Constitution  could  not  provide  for  nor  con- 
template its  own  overthrow.  There  could  be  no  such  thing  as  a  constitu- 
tional right  of  secession."  —  The  Critical  Period  of  American  History,  1783- 
1789,  pp.  343,  344. 


216  MILITARY  STUDIES 

ceived  quite  a  number  of  letters,  one  of  which,  bearing  on 
this  point,  seemed  very  notable.  It  was  from  the  president 
of  an  historic  Virginia  college,  who  himself  bears  an  historic 
Virginia  name.  In  the  address  alluded  to  I  had  said  that, 
"however  it  may  have  been  in  1788,  in  1860  a  nation  had 
grown  into  existence."  This  I  take  to  be  indisputable.  In  no 
way' denying  the  fact,  my  correspondent,  quoting  the  words 
I  have  given,  thus  wrote:  "But  is  it  not  true  that  this 
nationality  was  after  all  a  Northern  nationality?  Did  the 
South  share  in  it  to  any  extent  ?  On  the  contrary,  the  Con- 
federate character  of  the  Union  was  more  strongly  impressed 
upon  the  South  in  1861  than  in  1788.  So  that  it  may  be 
more  truly  said  that  the  Secessionists'  recourse  in  1861 
was  to  peaceable  separation,  and  not  to  the  sword.  If 
the  North  was  really  the  only  national  part  of  the  Union, 
and  its  national  character  reached  out  after  the  South,  must 
not  the  responsibility  for  the  use  of  the  sword  be  visited  upon 
the  North,  and  not  on  the  South?  Both  North  and  South 
started  out  from  the  same  constitutional  standpoint  of  seces- 
sion ;  but,  while  the  South  adhered  to  the  same  idea,  the 
North  fused  into  a  nation,  which,  in  1861,  determined  to  con- 
quer the  other  and  conservative  part.  That  the  South  had 
ever  suffered  nationalization  in  spirit  or  in  fact,  previous  to 
1861,  I  think  your  address  clearly  disproves." 

In  some  of  the  conclusions  assumed  in  this  extract  from  the 
letter  of  my  Virginia  correspondent,  it  is  needless  to  say  I  do 
not  concur.  I  do  not,  as  I  have  said,  believe  in  the  right  of 
secession  as  an  original  "constitutional  standpoint"  from 
which,  in  1788,  North  and  South  started  out.  Neither  do  I 
believe  that  a  "peaceable  separation"  was  ever  contemplated 
as  a  possibility  by  any  one ;  least  of  all  by  those  who  took  the 
lead  in  the  Confederate  movement  of  1861.  I  do,  however, 
believe,  and  the  record  moreover  shows,  that  the  essential 


THE  ETHICS  OF  SECESSION  217 

basic  principle  of  the  Constitution  was  a  divided  sovereignty, 
and,  in  the  contingency  of  a  direct  insoluble  issue,  a  conse- 
quently divided  personal  allegiance.1 

But,  this  premised,  on  the  main  issue  —  the  essential  point 
involved  in  the  extract  from  his  letter  —  the  writer  was,  I 
think,  right.     Previous  to  1861,  the  South  did  not  undergo 
nationalization,  to   the  same  extent,    in  any  event,  as  the 
North.     And  why  did  it  not?     Again,  Tennyson's  "unseen 
hand  at  a  game"  !  —  a  game  in  which  we  are  "puppets." 
But,  after  all,  what  is  that  "unseen  hand"?    And  how  did 
it  manifest  itself  in  our  national  life  during  the  three-fourths 
of  a  century  between  1788  and  1861  ?     That  "unseen  hand," 
theologically  known  as  an  "inscrutable  providence,"  I  take 
to  be  nothing  more  or  less  than  those  material,  social,  in- 
dustrial and  political  conditions,  domestic  and  public,  which, 
making  up  our  environment,  mould  our  destiny  with  no  very 
great  regard  for  our  plans,  our  hopes,  our  traditions  or  our 
aspirations.     All  of  which  is  merely  our  nineteenth-century 
agnostical  way  of  putting  the  fifteenth- century  aphorism  that 
"Man  proposes,  but  God  disposes."     With  a  political  instinct 
which  now  seems  marvellous,  Madison,  in  the  course  of  debate 
in  the  Constitutional  Convention  of  1787,  casting  a  prophetic 
glance  into  futurity,  said  :  "The  great  danger  to  our  general 
government  is,  that  the  Southern  and  Northern  interests  of 
the  continent  are  opposed  to  each  other,  not  from  their  dif- 
ference of  size,  but  from  climate,  and  principally  from  the 
effects  of  their  having  or  not  having  slaves.     Defensive  power 
ought  to  be  given,  not  between  the  large  and  small  States, 
but  between  the  Northern  and  Southern."     And  again,  "The 
greatest  danger  is  disunion  of  the  States";   and  "It  seems 
now  well  understood  that  the  real  difference  of  interests  lies, 
not  between  the  large  and  small,  but  between  the  Northern 

1  Infra,  p.  300. 


218  MILITARY  STUDIES 

and  Southern  States."  Based  on  this  line  of  broad  difference, 
the  contest  was  "between  the  fear  of  the  centripetal  and  the 
fear  of  the  centrifugal  force  in  the  system."  On  the  other 
side  of  the  Atlantic,  a  shrewd  observer  and  pioneer  economist, 
profoundly  opposed  to  the  British  policy  during  our  War  of 
Independence,  had  thus,  shortly  before,  cast  a  horoscope  of 
the  American  people :  "The  mutual  antipathies  and  clashing 
interests  of  the  Americans,  their  difference  of  governments, 
habitudes  and  manners  indicate  that  they  will  have  no  centre 
of  union  and  no  common  interest.  They  never  can  be  united 
into  one  compact  empire  under  any  species  of  government 
whatever ;  a  disunited  people  till  the  end  of  time,  suspicious 
and  distrustful  of  each  other,  they  will  be  divided  and  sub- 
divided into  little  commonwealths  or  principalities  according 
to  natural  boundaries,  by  great  bays  of  the  sea  and  by  vast 
rivers,  lakes,  and  ridges  of  mountains. "  1 

Into  the  details  of  the  conflict  over  sovereignty  which 
dragged  along  for  seventy  years,  it  is  needless  for  me  here  to 
enter.  A  twice-told  tale,  I  certainly  have  no  new  light  to  cast 
upon  it ;  but  in  freshly  reviewing  it,  that  aspect  of  it  which 
has  most  impressed  me  is  its  resemblance  to  the  classic. 
Throughout  Fate,  the  inevitable,  "the  unseen  hand,"  are 
everywhere  now  apparent,  —  destiny  had  to  be  fulfilled.  In 
connection  with  the  history  of  those  momentous  years,  we 
read  much  of  men ;  and,  indeed,  it  is  a  galaxy  of  great  names, 
—  Washington,  Hamilton,  Jefferson,  Marshall,  Madison, 
Webster,  Calhoun ;  but,  as  I  went  back  to  the  deeper  under- 
lying influences,  —  the  profound  currents  of  thought  and 
action  which  in  the  end  worked  results,  —  one  and  all  those 
bearing  even  these  names  became  Tennyson's  "puppets" 
moved  by  the  "unseen  hand  at  the  game."     In  this  respect 

1  Josiah  Tucker,  Dean  of  Gloucester,  quoted  by  Bancroft,  History  of  the 
Formation  of  the  Constitution,  I,  65. 


THE  ETHICS  OF  SECESSION  219 

our  story  is  suggestive  of  some  cosmic  theory,  —  the  process 
by  which  suns  and  planets  and  satellites  are  evolved;  and 
gradually  it  seems  as  if  the  individual  man  were  able  to  affect 
the  course  of  events  and  final  results  as  respects  the  outcome 
of  the  one  as  much  as  he  does  of  the  other.1  The  elaborate 
legal  arguments,  the  metaphysical  theories  and  historical 
disquisitions,  —  even  the  rights  and  wrongs  of  the  case,  — 

1  This  assertion,  I  am  aware,  is  very  open  to  dispute,  and  impossible  of 
proof.  The  theory  that  men,  who,  in  history,  appear  to  have  given  shape 
to  their  own  times,  and,  by  so  doing,  to  subsequent  times,  did,  after  all,  but 
represent,  embody  and  bring  to  ahead  the  tendencies  of  their  age ;  which  em- 
bodiment would  have  inevitably  taken  place  through  some  other,  if  they  had 
not  been,  —  this  theory  of  historic  fatalism  was  first  developed  by  Buckle  in 
his  History  of  Civilization  in  England,  half  a  century  ago.  There  is  certainly 
an  element  of  truth  in  it,  inasmuch  as  no  man  can  be  really  great  except  in 
so  far  as  he  reads  his  time  aright,  "translating  its  dumb  inarticulate  cry  into 
some  articulate  language,  divining  its  wants  and  satisfying  them,  seeing  and 
laying  hold  of  the  helps  which  the  time  affords  to  carry  out  the  work 
which  the  time  requires."  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  impossible  to  ignore  the 
influence  of  exceptional  individuality  on  the  course  of  events,  as  evidenced 
by  innumerable  instances  from  Moses  to  Bismarck.  In  the  case  of  the 
development  of  American  nationality  because  of  the  adoption,  and  under 
the  operation,  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  the  two  possible  individual 
exceptions  to  the  general  rule  would  seem  to  be  Washington  and  Marshall. 
But  for  the  respect  in  which  Washington  was  held,  and  the  general  recog- 
nition of  his  great  attributes  of  character,  it  is  very  questionable  whether 
the  Constitution  of  1788  would  have  been  adopted,  or  could  have  been  set 
in  successful  operation.  But  for  the  solid  judicial  renderings  of  Marshall, 
stretching  through  a  long  period  of  years,  our  system  of  constitutional  law 
would  hardly  have  assumed  consistency  and  shape.  Yet,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  American  community  made  both  Washington  and  Marshall 
possible.  They  were  the  natural  outcome  of  their  environment.  The 
producing  power  and  the  thing  produced  had  to  be  in  harmony,  and  act 
and  react  on  each  other.  While  the  United  States  that  now  is  would  almost 
certainly  have  been  something  quite  other  but  for  the  presence  and  in- 
fluence of  Washington  and  Marshall  as  factors  in  the  solution  of  the  problem, 
Washington  and  Marshall  would  have  failed  to  produce  their  results  had 
they  not  been  in  complete  and  happy  accord  with  the  community  and 
conditions  in  which  they  lived  and  worked.  As  to  the  others  named,  there 
is  no  sufficient  reason  to  doubt  that  the  work  done  and  the  influence  exerted 
by  them  would  have  been  done  and  exerted  by  others  had  they  not  come 
forward. 


220  MILITARY  STUDIES 

became  quite  immaterial,  and  altogether  insignificant.  In 
obedience  to  underlying  influences,  and  in  conformity  with 
natural  laws,  a  system  is  crystallizing.  Discordant  elements 
blend;    assimilation,  willing  or  reluctant,  goes  on. 

See  how  the  sides  change  —  how  rapidly  "humors  turn 
with  climes" ;  while,  as  to  the  principles  involved,  the  muta- 
tion is  only  less  complete  than  sincere.  Nationality,  as  we 
see  it  to-day,  had  its  birth  in  Virginia ;  and  the  sovereignty 
of  the  Union  assumed  shape  through  the  agency  of  Washing- 
ton and  was  slowly  perfected  by  Marshall,  both  more  or  less 
consciously  responding  to  a  natural  movement,  and  working 
in  harmony  with  it.  Next,  Virginia  and  her  offspring, 
Kentucky,  are  passing  the  resolves  of  1798,  and  arraying 
themselves  under  the  standard  of  decentralization.  The 
government  then  passes  into  the  hands  of  the  protestants ; 
and,  almost  at  once,  again  in  response  to  an  underlying,  un- 
seen influence  too  strong  to  resist,  the  process  of  a  more 
complete  crystallization  enters  on  a  new  phase ;  and,  as  it  does 
so,  catholic  suddenly  becomes  protestant,  and  while  Federalist 
New  England  formally  pronounces  the  Union  at  an  end, 
Jeffersonian  Virginia  supplies  fresh  aliment  to  nationality. 

Meanwhile,  the  " unseen  hand"  is  again  at  work,  and  the 
" puppets"  duly  respond.  They  thought,  and  we  once 
thought,  they  were  free  agents.  Not  at  all !  In  the  light 
of  development  it  is  clear  to  us  now  that  they  merely  went 
through  their  motions  in  obedience  to  influences  of  the  very 
existence  of  which  they  were  at  most  but  vaguely  conscious. 
The  drama  was  drawing  insensibly  to  a  crisis;  the  forces 
were  arraying  themselves  in  opposing  ranks  on  the  lines  fore- 
cast by  Madison  in  1787.  With  much  confidence,  I  assert,  in 
its  fundamentals  there  was  no  right  or  wrong  about  it ;  it  was 
an  inevitable,  irrepressible  conflict,  —  the  question  of  sov- 
ereignty was  to  be  decided,  and  either  side  could  offer  good 


THE  ETHICS  OF  SECESSION  221 

ground,  historical  and  legal,  for  any  attitude  taken  in  regard 
to  it.  That  shield  did  actually  have  a  silver  as  well  as  a 
golden  side. 

Historically  speaking,  from  the  close  of  our  second  War  of 
Independence,  —  commonly  known  as  that  of  1812,  —  the 
ebb  and  flow  of  the  great  currents  of  influence  had  set  in  new 
and  definite  channels.  Gradually  they  assumed  irresistible 
force  therein.  Side  by  side  two  civilizations  —  a  Chang  and 
Eng  —  were  developing.  North  of  the  Potomac  and  the 
Ohio  a  community  was  taking  shape,  the  whole  tendency  of 
which  was  national.  Very  fluid  in  its  elements,  commercial 
and  manufacturing  in  its  diversified  industries,  it  was  largely 
composed  of  Europeans  or  their  descendants,  who,  knowing, 
little  of  States,  cared  nothing  for  State  Sovereignty,  which, 
indeed,  like  the  Unknown  God  to  the  Greeks,  was  to  them 
foolishness.  This  vast  discordant  migration  the  railroad, 
the  common  school  and  the  newspaper  were  rapidly  merging, 
coalescing  and  fusing  into  a  harmonious  whole.  Naturally 
it  found  a  mouthpiece ;  and  that  mouthpiece  preached  Union. 
It  was  not  exactly  a  consistent  utterance;  for,  less  than  a 
score  of  years  before,  the  same  voice  had  been  loud  and  em- 
phatic in  behalf  of  State  Sovereignty.1 

1  See  speech  on  the  Conscription  Bill,  made  by  Mr.  Webster  in  the  House 
of  Representatives  at  Washington,  December  9,  1814.    Infra,  p.  339. 

In  language  slightly  varied  the  speech  referred  to  was  a  repetition  of  the 
words  of  Governor  Jonathan  Trumbull,  addressed  to  the  legislature  of 
Connecticut,  at  the  opening  of  its  special  session,  February  23,  1809 : 
"Whenever  our  national  legislature  is  led  to  overleap  the  prescribed 
bounds  of  their  constitutional  powers,  on  the  State  legislatures,  in  great 
emergencies,  devolves  the  arduous  task  —  it  is  their  right  —  it  becomes 
their  duty,  to  interpose  their  protecting  shield  between  the  right  and 
liberty  of  the  people  and  the  assumed  power  of  the  General  Government." 
Again,  Mr.  Webster  did  but  voice,  in  the  extract  quoted,  the  full  spirit  of 
the  famous  Hartford  Convention,  which  began  its  sessions  six  days  after 
delivery  of  the  speech.  The  following  was  among  the  resolutions  there 
passed,  following  closely,  in  time  of  active  foreign  war,  Madison's  own  lan- 
guage in  drafting  the  Virginia  Resolutions  of  1798:    "The  mode  and  the 


222  MILITARY  STUDIES 

So  much  for  Chang,  north  of  the  Potomac  and  the  Ohio ; 
but  with  Eng,  south  of  those  streams,  it  was  altogether  other- 
wise. Under  the  influence  of  climate,  soil  and  a  system  of 
forced  African  labor  the  southern  States  irresistibly  reverted 
to  the  patriarchal  conditions,  becoming  more  and  more  agri- 
cultural; and,  as  is  always  the  case  with  agricultural  races 
and  patriarchal  communities,  they  clung  ever  more  closely 
to  their  traditions  and  local  institutions.  Then  it  was  that 
Calhoun,  the  most  rigid  of  logicians,  in  obedience  to  an 
irresistible  influence  of  the  presence  and  power  of  which 
he  was  unconscious,  —  Calhoun,  the  unionist  of  the  War  of 
1812  and  protectionist  of  1816,  turned  to  the  Constitution; 
he  began  that  "more  diligent  and  careful  scrutiny  into  its 
provisions,  in  order  to  ascertain  fully  the  nature  and  charac- 
ter of  our  political  system. "  Needless  to  say,  he  there  found 
what  he  was  in  search  of.1     But  a  similar  scrutiny  was  at  the 

energy  of  the  opposition  should  always  conform  to  the  nature  of  the 
violation,  the  intention  of  its  authors,  the  extent  of  the  injury  inflicted,  the 
determination  manifested  to  persist  in  it,  and  the  danger  of  delay.  But 
in  cases  of  deliberate  dangerous  and  palpable  infractions  of  the  Consti- 
tution, affecting  the  sovereignty  of  a  State  and  liberties  of  the  people,  it 
is  not  only  the  right  but  the  duty  of  such  a  State  to  interpose  its  authority 
for  their  protection  in  the  manner  best  calculated  to  secure  that  end. 
When  emergencies  occur  which  are  either  beyond  the  reach  of  the  judicial 
tribunals,  or  too  pressing  to  admit  of  the  delay  incident  to  their  forms, 
States  which  have  no  common  umpire  must  be  their  own  judges,  and  exe- 
cute their  own  decisions." 

Mr.  Webster,  in  his  reply  to  Hayne,  said  :  "I  do  not  hold  that  the  Hart- 
ford Convention  was  pardonable,  even  to  the  extent  of  the  gentleman's 
admission,  if  its  objects  were  really  such  as  have  been  imputed  to  it." 
It  is  somewhat  curious  to  consider  what  would  have  been  the  attitude  of 
the  Massachusetts  senator,  if,  after  uttering  these  words,  the  senator  from 
South  Carolina  had  been  able  to  confront  him  with  his  speech  of  fifteen 
years  previous  in  the  other  hall  of  the  Capitol.     But 

"Manners  with  fortunes,  humors  turn  with  climes, 
Tenets  with  books,  and  principles  with  times." 

1  "Just  at  what  time  Calhoun  changed  from  a  protectionist  to  a  free 
trader,  from  a  liberal  to  a  conservative,  from  a  liberal  constructionist  to  a 


THE  ETHICS  OF  SECESSION  223 

same  time  going  on  in  New  England.  As  a  result  of  the  two 
scrutinies,  Chang  and  Eng  both  changed  sides.  Before, 
Chang's  side  of  the  shield  was  gold,  while  that  of  Eng  was 
silver;  now,  Chang  saw  quite  clearly  that  it  was  silver  after 
all,  while  Eng  recognized  it  as  burnished  gold  of  the  purest 
stamp.  Both  were  honest,  and  both  fuJly  convinced.  Both 
also  were  right ;  the  simple  truth  —  the  truth  of  Holy  Writ 
—  being  that  no  man  can  serve  two  masters ;  and  two  mas- 
ters the  fundamental  law  prescribed.  The  inevitable  en- 
sued. 

But  what  was  the  inevitable?  That  again,  as  I  read  the 
story  of  our  development,  was  purely  a  matter  of  circumstance 
and  time.  Fate — the  Greek  'AvdyKT) —  intervened  in  those 
lists  and  decided  the  issue  of  battle.  To  my  mind,  the  record 
is  from  its  commencement  absolutely  clear  on  one  point,  — 
and  that  the  vital  point.  After  the  25th  of  July,  1788,  when 
the  last  of  the  nine  States  necessary  to  the  adoption  of  the 

strict  constructionist,  from  a  progressionist  to  an  obstructionist,  has  been 
difficult  to  determine.  One  thing  is  clear ;  his  change  followed  that  of  the 
majority  of  the  people  of  the  State ;  and  whatever  pressure  there  was,  was 
exerted  by  the  State  on  him,  and  not  by  him  on  the  State."  —  David 
Franklin  Houston,  A  Critical  Study  of  Nullification  in  South  Carolina, 
Harvard  Historical  Studies,  pp.  60,  82. 

When  time  was  ripe,  however,  and  he  had  directed  that  "more  diligent 
and  careful  scrutiny"  into  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  necessary  "in 
order  to  ascertain  fully  the  nature  and  character  of  our  political  system," 
he  found  himself  compelled  to  a  dispensation,  —  a  dispensation  new  to  him, 
to  the  country  very  old.  He  thus  formulated  it :  "The  great  and  leading 
principle  is  that  the  general  government  emanated  from  the  people  of  the 
several  States,  forming  distinct  political  communities,  and  acting  in  their 
separate  and  sovereign  capacity,  and  not  from  all  of  the  people  forming  one 
aggregate  political  community ;  that  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
is,  in  fact,  a  compact,  to  which  each  State  is  a  party,  in  the  character 
already  described ;  and  that  the  several  States,  or  parties,  have  a  right  to 
judge  of  its  infractions ;  and  in  case  of  a  deliberate,  palpable  and  dangerous 
exercise  of  power  not  delegated,  they  have  the  right,  in  the  last  resort  (to 
use  the  language  of  the  Virginia  Resolutions)  'to  interpose  for  arresting 
the  progress  of  the  evil,  and  for  maintaining,  within  their  respective  limits, 
the  authorities,  rights,  and  liberties  appertaining  to  them.'"  —  Ibid. 


224  MILITARY  STUDIES 

Federal  Constitution  acted  favorably  thereon,  the  withdrawal 
of  a  State,  or  States,  from  the  Union,  all  theories  to  the  con- 
trary notwithstanding,  became  practically  an  issue  of  might. 
Into  the  abstract  question  of  right  I  will  not  enter,  —  least  of 
all,  here  and  now.  But,  conceding  everything  that  may  be 
asked  on  the  point  of  abstract  right,  —  looking  only  on  im- 
perfect and  illogical  man  as  he  is,  and  as  he  acts  in  this  world's 
occasions  and  exigencies,  —  I  on  this  point  adhere  to  my 
own  belief.  In  1790  Rhode  Island  was  spared  from  being 
"  coerced  "  into  the  Union  only  by  a  voluntary,  though  very 
reluctant,  acceptance  of  it ;  and  from  that  day  to  1861  any 
attempted  withdrawal  from  the  Union  would,  after  long  ar- 
gument over  the  question  of  right,  have  ultimately  resolved 
itself  into  an  issue  of  might. 

Here  again  the  elements  of  the  Greek  drama  once  more 
confront  us — the  Fates,  necessity.  What  at  different  epochs 
would  have  been  the  probable  outcome  of  any  attempt  at 
withdrawal?  That  ever,  at  any  period  of  our  history  since 
1790,  a  single  State  —  no  matter  how  sovereign,  even  Vir- 
ginia —  could  alone  have  made  good,  peaceably  or  otherwise, 
a  withdrawal  in  face  of  her  unitedly  disapproving  sister 
States,  I  do  not  believe.  Naturally  or  as  a  result  of  force 
applied,  the  attempt  would  have  resulted  in  ignominious 
failure.  But  how  would  it  have  been  at  any  given  time  with 
a  combination  of  States,  acting  in  sympathy,  —  a  combina- 
tion proportionately  as  considerable  when  measured  with  the 
whole  as  was  the  Confederacy  in  1861  ?  I  hold  that,  here 
again,  it  was  merely  a  question  of  time,  and  that  such  a  with- 
drawal as  then  took  place  would  never  have  failed  of  success 
at  any  anterior  period  in  our  national  history.  Steam  and 
electricity  settled  the  issue  of  sovereignty ;  not  argument,  not 
military  skill,  not  wealth,  courage  or  endurance;  not  even 
men  in  arms.     Before  1861  steam  and  electricity,  neither  on 


THE  ETHICS  OF  SECESSION  225 

land  nor  water,  had  been  rendered  so  subservient  to  man  as 
to  make  him  equal  to  the  prodigious,  the  unprecedented,  task 
then  undertaken,  and  finally  accomplished.  In  that  case, 
might  in  the  end  made  right ;  but  the  end  was  in  no  degree 
a  foregone  conclusion. 

In  my  own  family  records  I  find  a  curious  bit  of  contem- 
porary evidence  of  this,  and  of  the  line  of  thought  and  reason- 
ing then  resulting  therefrom.  Following  the  foresight  of 
Madison,  J.  Q.  Adams,  noting  the  set  of  the  currents  in  1820, 
became  instinctively  persuaded  that  the  North  and  the 
South  would  be  swept  into  collision  by  the  forces  of  inherent 
development.  Again  and  again  did  he  put  this  belief  of  his 
on  record.1  Contemplating  such  an  eventuality,  he,  in  1839, 
thus  expressed  himself  in  a  public  utterance,  in  words  which 
I  have  of  late  more  than  once  seen  quoted  in  support  of  the 
abstract  constitutional  right  of  secession.  Speaking  in  New 
York  on  what  was  called  the  Jubilee  of  the  Constitution,  or 
the  fiftieth  anniversary  of  its  adoption,  he  said :  "If  the  day 
should  ever  come  (may  Heaven  avert  it !)  when  the  affections 
of  the  people  of  these  States  shall  be  alienated  from  each 
other,  when  the  fraternal  spirit  shall  give  way  to  cold  in- 
difference, or  collisions  of  interest  shall  fester  into  hatred, 
the  bands  of  political  association  will  not  long  hold  together 
parties  no  longer  attracted  by  the  magnetism  of  conciliated 
interests  and  kindly  sympathies ;  and  far  better  will  it  be  for 
the  people  of  the  disunited  States  to  part  in  friendship  from 
each  other  than  to  be  held  together  by  constraint.  Then  will 
be  the  time  for  reverting  to  the  precedents  which  occurred  at 
the  formation  and  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  to  form 

1  See  the  paper  entitled  "John  Quincy  Adams  and  Martial  Law," 
Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proceedings,  Second  Series,  XV,  436-478.  Separately 
printed  as  "John  Quincy  Adams,  His  Connection  with  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine (1823)  and  with  Emancipation  under  Martial  Law  (1819-1842)," 
by  Worthington  Chauncey  Ford  and  Charles  Francis  Adams. 
Q 


226  MILITARY  STUDIES 

again  a  more  perfect  union  by  dissolving  that  which  could  no 
longer  bind,  and  to  leave  the  separated  parts  to  be  reunited 
by  the  law  of  political  gravitation  to  the  centre. "  l 

In  other  words,  forecasting  strife,  and  measuring  the  coer- 
cive force  available  at  a  time  when  steam  on  land  and  water 
was  in  its  stages  of  earlier  development,  J.  Q.  Adams  regarded 
the  attempt  at  an  assertion  of  national  sovereignty  as  so  futile 
that,  though  he  most  potently  and  powerfully  believed  in  that 
sovereignty,  he  looked  upon  its  exercise  as  quixotic,  and, 
consequently,  not  to  be  justified.  A  dissolution  of  the  Union, 
at  least  temporarily,  he  believed  to  be  inevitable.  So 
strongly  was  he  convinced  of  the  power  of  the  disintegrating 
influence  as  contrasted  with  the  cohesive  force,  that  the  late 
Robert  C.  Winthrop,  then  a  young  man  of  twenty-seven,  writ- 
ing in  1836,  described  him  as  saying,  in  the  course  of  dinner- 
table  talk,  that  "he  despaired  of  the  Union,  believing  we 
are  destined  soon  to  overrun  not  merely  Texas,  but  Mexico, 
and  that  the  inevitable  result  will  be  a  break-up  into  two, 
three,  four  or  more  confederacies."  "Inevitable !"  the  un- 
expected alone  is  inevitable.  These  two  utterances  were,  the 
one  in  1836,  the  other  in  1839.  In  1839  there  were  not  five 
hundred  miles  of  constructed  railroad  in  the  United  States; 
steam  had  not  been  applied  to  naval  construction ;  electricity 
was  a  toy.  So  far  as  he  could  look  into  the  future,  Mr. 
Adams  was  right ;  only  —  the  unexpected  was  to  occur  !  It 
did  occur;  and  it  settled  the  question.  In  1788  the  pre- 
ponderance of  popular  feeling  and  affection  was  wholly  in  the 
scale  of  State  Sovereignty  as  opposed  to  Nationality ;  in  1801 
the  Union  was,  in  all  probability,  saved  by  being  taken  from 
the  hands  of  its  friends,  and,  so  to  speak,  put  out  to  nurse 
with  its  enemies,  who  from  that  time  were  converts  to  cen- 
tralization; in  1815  the  final  war  of  independence  gave  a 
1  J.  Q.  Adams,  Jubilee  of  the  Constitution  (April  30,  1839),  p.  69. 


THE  ETHICS  OF  SECESSION  227 

great  impetus  to  Nationality,  and  the  scales  hung  even;  in 
1831  the  irrepressible  conflict  began  to  assert  itself,  and  now 
they  inclined  slightly  but  distinctly  to  Nationality,  the 
younger  of  the  two  sovereigns  asserting  a  supremacy;  be- 
tween 1831  and  1861  science  threw  steam  and  electricity  into 
his  scale,  and,  in  1865,  they  made  the  opposite  scale  kick  the 
beam.  But,  when  all  is  said,  merely  a  fresh  illustration  had 
been  furnished  of  the  truth  of  that  scriptural  adage  in  regard 
to  a  divided  service. 

Such  are  the  conclusions  reached  from  a  renewed  and  some- 
what careful  review  of  a  record  frequently  scanned  by  others. 
They  found  it  in  the  outcome  of  great  orations,  labored  argu- 
ments and  the  teaching  of  individuals.  I  cannot  so  see  it. 
It  is,  as  I  read  it,  one  long,  majestic  Greek  tragedy. 

"Like  to  the  Pontic  sea, 
Whose  icy  current  and  compulsive  course 
Ne'er  feels  retiring  ebb,  but  keeps  due  on 
To  the  Propontic  and  the  Hellespont/ '  — 

so  that  great  drama  swept  on  to  its  inevitable  catastrophe,  — 
Fate  and  Necessity  ever  the  refrain  of  its  chorus,  —  until,  at 
the  end,  the  resounding  clash  of  arms. 


The  circumstances  connected  with  the  preparation  of  the  fore- 
going paper,  and  its  delivery  as  an  address,  were  peculiar.  Not  of 
a  merely  personal  and  passing  interest,  they  were  in  a  way  even 
of  historic  significance.  A  somewhat  particular  reference  to  them 
may,  therefore,  be  justified,  even  if  not  actually  called  for. 

During  the  earlier  months  of  1902  I  chanced  to  be  engaged  in  a 
somewhat  careful  study  of  the  view  generally  taken  at  the  time 
of  the  adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  of  the  right  of  secession. 
Led  into  a  more  elaborate  examination  than  I  anticipated  when  I 
began  my  inquiry,  early  in  October  of  that  year  an  invitation 
reached  me  from  the  New  England  Society  of  Charleston,  S.  C, 
to  go  there  on  Forefather's  Day,  December  22,  and,  as  its  guest,  to 


228  MILITARY  STUDIES 

address  that  society  on  any  subject  I  might  select.  I  had  never 
been  in  Charleston ;  and  yet  I  had  passed  well-nigh  an  entire  year, 
—  that  is,  the  eight  months  from  January  to  August  inclusive,  — 
almost  in  sight  of  the  famous  town.  The  only  actual  glimpse  I 
had  ever  got  of  it  was  a  distant  one  from  James  Island,  looking 
across  the  harbor  towards  Charleston,  with  Fort  Sumter  looming 
up  midway,  flying  the  Confederate  flag.  This  was  in  June,  1862, 
immediately  after  the  engagement  known  by  us  as  that  of  James 
Island,  and  by  the  Confederates  as  Secessionville.  Remaining  in 
South  Carolina  with  my  regiment,  the  First  Massachusetts  Cav- 
alry, until  August,  we,  together  with  all  other  available  forces,  were 
then  ordered  north.  Charleston  was  for  the  time  being  relieved 
of  our  presence,  and  from  apprehension.  It  was  a  respite  for  a  city 
doomed.  Since  the  stern  solution  less  than  three  years  later  of  the 
grave  question  which  we  had  been  sent  to  South  Carolina,  not  to 
discuss  but  to  dispose  of,  a  period  equal  to  that  passed  by  the 
children  of  Israel  in  the  wilderness  had  elapsed.  Such  being  the 
case,  it  was  in  no  way  unnatural  that  I  should  have  felt  a  strong 
desire  actually  to  see  the  city,  the  possession  of  which  we  had  in 
1862  so  greatly  coveted.  When  the  invitation  I  have  referred  to 
reached  me,  I  accordingly  felt  disposed  to  accept  it. 

Moreover  the  suggestion  that  a  Massachusetts  man  of  my  par- 
ticular antecedents  should  go  to  Charleston,  of  all  conceivable 
places,  deliberately  proposing  there  to  canvass  the  constitutional 
ethics  of  secession,  was  undeniably  startling.  It  was  like  penetrat- 
ing the  crater  of  a  recently  extinct  volcano,  and  philosophizing 
over  the  causes,  character,  and,  if  the  expression  may  be  used  in 
such  a  connection,  the  justification,  of  a  furious  eruption,  the  cin- 
ders of  which  were  still  warm.  The  very  delicacy  of  treatment 
called  for  in  so  doing  enhanced  the  desire  to  do  it.  To  speak  the 
truth  on  that  subject  there,  treating  it  as  an  academic  question,  in 
a  purely  philosophic,  dispassionate  tone,  was  not  easy.  The 
temptation  was  great.     I  concluded  to  accept  the  invitation. 

Since  I,  on  that  day  in  June,  1862,  had  viewed  the  place  from  an 
island  across  its  bay,  it  seemed  as  if  there  was  no  sorrow,  no  hu- 
miliation, no  loss  of  property,  Charleston  had  not  undergone. 
Conflagration,  blockade,  siege,  bombardment,  hostile  occupation, 
confiscation,  servile  supremacy  and  finally  earthquake   had  fol- 


THE  ETHICS  OF  SECESSION  '  229 

lowed  each  other  in  irregular  but  ordered  sequence.  Under  these 
circumstances  I  freely  confess  that  not  only  was  my  sympathy  now 
excited,  but  my  admiration  was  stirred  by  the  indications  of  re- 
siliency I  everywhere  saw,  and  still  more  by  the  cheerfulness,  and 
quiet,  uncomplaining  dignity  with  which  all  those  I  met  discussed 
the  past,  and  accepted  the  conditions  of  the  present.  If  any  bitter- 
ness of  feeling  existed  towards  those  who  had  so  largely  contributed 
to  their  calamities,  it  was  not  to  me  as  one  of  them  apparent  in 
word  or  sign.  Everywhere  I  was  received  with  the  same  simple 
courtesy,  and  listened  to  the  same  frank  reference  to  historic  and 
other  events,  as  my  attention  was  called  to  what  remained  of  the 
household  gods  peculiar  to  the  place,  and  pertaining  to  a  civiliza- 
tion long  since  passed  away,  —  the  civilization  of  plantation  and 
slave-owning  days. 

One  thing  was  apparent :  —  the  community  having,  when 
further  repining  was  obviously  in  vain,  adapted  itself  as  best  it 
could  to  the  conditions  imposed  upon  it  by  force  or  nature,  the 
people  composing  it  were  facing  the  future  with  confidence  as  well 
as  courage.  And  yet  that  future  did  not  strike  me  as  altogether 
encouraging.  On  the  contrary,  the  one  thing  which  most  deeply 
impressed  me  throughout  South  Carolina,  but  in  Charleston  more 
especially,  was  the  terrible  handicap  under  which  the  community 
was  laboring  in  the  race  of  competition.  As  an  average  observer, 
and  something  of  a  sociologist,  I  by  no  means  share  in  that  optimis- 
tic confidence,  so  much  in  vogue  in  the  present  day,  which  sees 
only  progress  everywhere.  On  the  contrary  there  is  to  my  mind 
much  truth  in  this  observation  of  the  late  Sir  Leslie  Stephen,  one 
of  the  keenest  observers  and  most  subtle  thinkers  of  the  last  half  of 
the  nineteenth  century : 

"Progress  is  the  rare  exception :  races  may  remain  in  the  lowest 
barbarism,  or  their  development  be  arrested  at  some  more  ad- 
vanced stage  during  periods  far  surpassing  that  of  recorded 
history ;  actual  decay  may  alternate  with  progress,  and  even  true 
progress  implies  some  admixture  of  decay.  The  intellectual  ac- 
tivity of  the  acuter  intellects,  however  feeble  may  be  its  immediate 
influence,  is  the  great  force  which  stimulates  and  guarantees  every 
advance  of  the  race.  It  is  of  course  opposed  by  a  vast  force  of  in- 
ertia. The  ordinary  mind  is  indifferent  to  the  thoughts  which 
occupy  the  philosopher,  unless  they  promise  an  immediate  ma- 


230  MILITARY  STUDIES 

terial  result.  Mankind  resent  nothing  so  much  as  the  intrusion 
upon  them  of  a  new  and  disturbing  truth.  The  huge  dead  weight 
of  stupidity  and  indolence  is  always  ready  to  smother  audacious 
inquiries."  1 

Thus  the  preponderance  of  the  factors  tending  towards  an  up- 
lifting is,  even  with  the  most  progressive  nations,  but  a  slight  per- 
centage of  the  whole.  That  slight  percentage,  varying  either 
way,  makes  the  difference  between  up  and  down,  —  it  causes  the 
scales  to  tip. 

Hence,  to-day,  of  an  hundred  distinct  nationalities,  speaking 
different  languages,  —  civilized,  semi-civilized  and  barbarian,  — 
white,  yellow  and  black,  —  it  is  fairly  questionable  whether  as 
many  as  ten  are  really,  in  themselves  and  of  themselves,  progres- 
sive. The  United  States,  Great  Britain,  Germany  and  Japan  are 
distinctly  uplifting ;  but  can  the  same,  save  exceptionally,  be  said 
of  the  Latin  races  on  either  continent,  or  of  any  of  the  peoples  of 
Southern  Asia  or  of  Africa  ?  The  vast  majority  of  mankind  are,  of 
themselves,  at  best  merely  stationary.  What  impetus  they  have 
is  from  without. 

Now,  as  compared  with  ourselves,  the  Southern  people  have  a 
dead-weight  of  Africanism  tied  to  them,  which  is  tending  perpetu- 
ally to  hold  back  or  pull  down.  It  may  seem  heterodox,  perhaps  it 
will  be  stigmatized  as  pessimistic,  to  say  so,  but  I  have  myself  little 
doubt  that,  if  left  to  themselves,  apart  from  the  example  and  sus- 
taining energy  of  the  white  man,  even  the  most  advanced  types  of 
the  African  race  on  this  continent,  taken  as  a  mass,  would  tend 
steadily  to  deteriorate,  —  they  would  sensibly  gravitate  towards 
the  normal  African  conditions.  In  other  words,  it  is  not  a  self-sus- 
taining, much  less  an  inherently  advancing  human  species.  It  is 
held  up  to  any  standard  to  which  it  is  brought  by  the  presence 
and  influence  of  the  white  man.  Meanwhile,  on  the  other  hand, 
it  acts  as  a  dead-weight  on  the  uplifting  race,  tending  steadily  to 
diminish  its  forward  impetus,  even  if  it  does  not  produce  direct 
deterioration.  Instinctively  comparing  what  I  saw  in  South  Car- 
olina with  the  more  fortunate  conditions  prevailing  in  Massachu- 
setts, the  impression  left  was  that  the  white  race  in  the  South, 
especially  in  South  Carolina,  were  at  a  distinct  disadvantage.  In 
1  English  Thought  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  Vol.  I,  p.  17. 


THE  ETHICS  OF  SECESSION  231 

Charleston,  for  instance,  there  are  about  three  inhabitants  of 
black  blood  to  two  of  white.  The  problem  before  that  commun- 
ity is,  therefore,  momentous.  They  are  now  making  an  effort, 
both  honest  and  strenuous,  to  educate  the  African.  What  the  re- 
sult will  be  at  some  remote  future  period,  I  do  not  undertake  to 
predict.  But,  so  far  as  can  be  judged  from  present  indications, 
the  outlook,  in  spite  of  expensive  schooling,  is  not  propitious. 
The  races  are  segregating,  and  becoming  more  and  more  antagon- 
istic. The  African  does  not  originate,  he  is  imitative.  It  is  so  in 
dress,  in  manners,  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  in  morals.  In  all  these 
respects  an  increasing  separation  of  the  two  species,  living  perforce 
not  side  by  side  but  together,  is  bad  for  both.  From  what  I  saw 
and  heard  I  should  apprehend  that  the  great  future  handicap  of 
the  South  would  be  the  presence  in  its  civilization  of  a  vast,  im- 
perfectly assimilated  mass  of  barbarism  veneered. 

The  foregoing  paper  is,  therefore,  a  thesis  submitted  in  Charles- 
ton in  1902,  by  a  Massachusetts  man,  there  born  and  still  there 
resident,  who  had  stood  in  arms  before  Charleston  in  1862.  Pre- 
sented in  the  full  light  of  existing  conditions,  it  related  to  the 
constitutional  theories  and  social,  political  and  economical  influ- 
ences of  the  earlier  period  which  had  been  preparatory  to  those 
existing  conditions.  The  why-and- wherefore  problem  was  ap- 
proached in  a  purely  historic  spirit;  for,  as  I  now  see  it,  the 
question  involved  can  never  be  disposed  of  if  technically  dealt 
with.  Not  a  mere  matter  of  the  verbal  construction  of  a  written 
instrument,  it  far  transcends  legal  argument,  however  close  or 
logically  convincing.  It  is  a  case  of  evolution,  —  the  growth  and 
development  of  a  living  organism.  What  was  true  of  the  Ameri- 
can people  in  1787  had  become  false  in  1860;  conditions  and 
modes  of  thought  which  prevailed  generally  in  the  earlier  period 
had  passed  out  of  existence  in  the  latter.  Not  only  were  they  de- 
funct, they  were  actually  and  literally  forgotten.  The  world  had 
moved ;  and,  with  the  passage  of  years,  the  Constitution  had  be- 
come transformed,  if  not  transfigured.  It  was  this  process  of  his- 
torical evolution  and  development  which  interested,  and  not  the 
proper  construction  of  words  and  phrases.  To  that,  and  to  that 
alone,  attention  was  directed. 


VII 

SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  * 

Based  on  the  careful  study  of  a  vast  mass  of  material, 
patiently  gathered  and  judicially  considered,  Mr.  Rhodes's 
fifth  volume  is  literary  in  tone  and  calm  in  spirit,  —  a 
thoroughly  good  piece  of  up-to-date  historical  work.  The 
significance  of  the  period  dealt  with  will,  moreover,  only 
increase  with  the  lapse  of  time,  and  to  its  history  this  vol- 
ume is  a  contribution  of  lasting  value.  If  for  no  other 
reason,  it  will  so  prove  from  the  fact  that  it  is  not  so  removed 
from  the  time  of  which  it  treats  as  to  cease  to  be  contem- 
poraneous. He  who  writes  has  in  this  case  shared  in  the 
intensity  of  that  of  which  he  writes;  with  his  own  eyes  he 
has  seen  many  of  the  actors  in  the  events  of  which  he  tells, 
and  his  ears  have  drunk  in  their  own  descriptive  words. 
How  great  an  advantage  this  may  prove  to  one  competent 
to  avail  himself  of  it  has  been  shown  more  recently  by 
Clarendon  and  Thiers,  as  in  the  classic  times  by  Tacitus  and 
Thucydides.  What  is  more,  the  judgments  both  of  men  and 
of  events  now  rendered  by  Mr.  Rhodes,  while  based  on  an 
exhaustive  study  of  material,  are  not  only  cautiously 
reached,  but  expressed  in  measured  terms,  quite  devoid  of 
either    zeal    or    preconception.     Neither    a   partisan   nor    a 

1  James  Ford  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States  from  the  Compromise 
of  1850.  Vol.  V  (October,  1864  — August,  1866).  This  paper  was  prepared 
for  submission  to  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society  and  appears  in  its 
Proceedings.  (Second  Series,  XIX,  311-356).  It  has  been  revised,  and 
to  a  certain  extent  remodelled  for  the  present  publication.    Supra,  109. 

232 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  233 

theorist,  Mr.  Rhodes  is  nothing  unless  critical.  It  is,  there- 
fore, not  unsafe  even  now  to  predict  that  in  essentials  the 
conclusions  here  reached  by  him  will  prove  in  harmony  with 
the  ultimate  verdict.  Nor  is  this  something  to  be  lightly 
said ;  for  the  events  and  men  of  the  period  of  Gettysburg 
and  Emancipation  will  be  studied  and  weighed  not  less 
closely  by  the  historians  and  historical  investigators  of  the 
twenty-third  century  than  were  those  of  the  Naseby  and 
Commonwealth  period  by  Masson,  by  Carlyle,  by  Macaulay 
and  by  Gardiner  in  the  century  recently  closed. 

But,  in  writing  history,  especially  the  narrative  of  events 
still  to  a  large  extent  contemporaneous,  much  necessarily 
depends  on  the  point  of  view.  The  direction  of  approach 
involves,  indeed,  nothing  less  than  the  question  of  perspec- 
tive, —  the  relative  proportion  of  parts.  On  these,  in  turn, 
depend  to  some  extent  the  conclusions  reached. 

Mr.  Rhodes  approaches  his  subject  in  a  general  way. 
Neither  a  politician  nor  a  soldier,  he  is  as  unskilled  in  prac- 
tical diplomacy  as  he  is  innocent  of  any  study  of  international 
law;  nor  can  he  be  classed  as  a  publicist.  Once,  indeed,  a 
man  of  affairs,  he  is  now  a  judicially-minded  general  investi- 
gator, bringing  much  hard  common-sense  to  bear,  always 
modestly,  on  the  complex  problems  of  a  troubled  and  event- 
ful period.  Now  it  so  chances  that  having  myself  been  a 
participant  in  both  the  political  movements  and  the  military 
operations  of  the  earlier  time,  I  have  more  recently,  through 
the  study  of  historical  material  as  yet  unpublished,  had 
occasion  to  look  upon  the  problems  discussed  by  Mr.  Rhodes 
from  points  of  view  other  than  his.  I  therefore  propose  in 
this  paper  to  discuss,  in  a  spirit  of  criticism  wholly  friendly,1 

1  Both  Mr.  Rhodes  and  the  writer  were  at  this  time  members  of  the 
Massachusetts  Historical  Society.  Mr.  Rhodes  was  present  at  the  meet- 
ing (October  12,  1905)  at  which  the  present  paper  was  submitted. 


234  MILITARY  STUDIES 

what  from  those  points  of  view  seem  deficiencies  and  short- 
comings in  Mr.  Rhodes's  treatment.  They  will  prove  not 
inconsiderable.  Indeed,  they  in  some  repects  go  to  the 
heart  of  the  subject. 

At  the  close  of  his  summary  of  the  war,  in  that  chapter 
devoted  to  a  consideration  of  the  internal  affairs  of  the  Con- 
federacy during  the  struggle,  Mr.  Rhodes  suggests  a  query 
which  many  others  have  often  put  to  themselves,  and  over 
which,  first  and  last,  they  have  pondered  much.  Tersely 
stated,  it  is  this:  How  was  it  that  we  succeeded  in  over- 
coming the  seceded  States  ?  A  task  truly  Titanic !  — 
and,  looking  back  now  through  a  vista  of  fifty  years, 
one  still  instinctively  asks,  How  did  we  ever  accom- 
plish it? 

Seeking  an  answer  to  this  far  from  self-explanatory  query, 
Mr.  Rhodes  says:  "A  certain  class  of  facts,  if  considered 
alone,  can  make  us  wonder  how  it  was  possible  to  subjugate 
the  Confederates.  It  could  not  have  been  accomplished 
without  great  political  capacity  at  the  head  of  the  Northern 
government,  and  a  sturdy  support  of  Lincoln  by  the  Northern 
people."  1  This,  assuredly,  is  an  inadequate  answer  to  a  per- 
plexing question,  —  a  question  which  goes  to  the  heart  of 
any  correct  historical  treatment  of  our  Great  Rebellion,  to 
adopt  Clarendon's  title.  It  goes  without  saying  that  to 
overcome  a  combination  of  numbers,  resources  and  territory 
such  as  that  composing  the  Southern  Confederacy  implied 
great  political  capacity  in  the  overcoming  power,  and  the 
sturdy  popular  support  of  him  upon  whom  the  task  de- 
volved. As  Shakespeare  causes  Horatio  to  observe  in  an- 
other connection,  "  There  needs  no  ghost  come  from  the 
grave  to  tell  us  this."  But  the  question  suggested  by  Mr. 
Rhodes,  being  one  of  a  very  perplexing  character,  cannot 

i  Vol.  V,  p.  481. 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  235 

satisfactorily  be  disposed  of  by  generalities.  To  formulate 
an  answer  at  once  definite  and  satisfactory,  we  must,  de- 
scending to  particulars,  be  more  specific. 

The  usual  and  altogether  conventional  explanation  given 
is  the  immense  preponderance  of  strength  and  resources  — 
men  and  material  —  enjoyed  by  one  of  the  contending  parties. 
The  census  and  the  statistics  of  the  War  Department  are 
then  appealed  to,  and  figures  are  arrayed  setting  forth  the 
relative  population  and  wealth,  —  the  resources,  manu- 
factures and  fighting  strength  of  the  two  sides.  As  the 
result  of  such  a  showing,  a  certain  amount  of  astonishment 
is  finally  expressed  that  the  Confederacy  ever  challenged 
a  conflict;  and  the  conclusion  reached  is  that,  under  all  the 
circumstances,  the  only  real  cause  for  wonder  is  that  such 
an  unequal  contest  was  so  long  sustained. 

But  this  answer  to  the  question  will  hardly  bear  examina- 
tion. After  the  event  it  looks  well,  —  has  a  plausible 
aspect ;  but  in  1861  a  census  had  just  been  taken,  and  every 
fact  and  figure  now  open  to  study  was  then  patent.  The 
South  knew  them,  Europe  knew  them;  and  yet  in  the  spring 
of  1861,  and  from  Bull  Run  in  July  of  that  year  to  Gettys- 
burg and  Vicksburg  in  1863,  no  unprejudiced  observer  any- 
where believed  that  the  subjugation  of  the  Confederacy  and 
the  restoration  of  the  old  Union  were  reasonably  probable, 
or,  indeed,  humanly  speaking,  a  possibility.  Mr.  Gladstone, 
a  man  wise  in  his  generation,  and  as  a  contemporaneous 
observer  not  unfriendly  to  the  Union  side,  only  expressed 
the  commonly  received  and  apparently  justified  opinion  of 
all  unprejudiced  onlookers,  when  at  Newcastle,  in  October, 
1862,  he  made  his  famous  declaration  in  public  speech  that 
"Jefferson  Davis  and  other  leaders  of  the  South  .  .  .  have 
made  a  nation.  .  .  .  We  may  anticipate  with  certainty  the 
success  of  the  Southern  States  so  far  as  regards  their  separa- 


236  MILITARY  STUDIES 

tion  from  the  North.  I  cannot  but  believe  that  that  event 
is  as  certain  as  any  event  yet  future  and  contingent  can  be." 
No  community,  it  was  argued,  numbering  eight  millions,  as 
homogeneous,  organized  and  combative  as  the  South,  in- 
habiting a  region  of  the  character  of  the  Confederacy,  ever 
yet  had  been  overcome  in  a  civil  war;  and  there  was  no 
sufficient  reason  for  supposing  that  the  present  case  would 
prove  an  exception  to  a  hitherto  universal  rule.  All  this, 
moreover,  was  so.  Wherefore,  then,  the  exception?  How 
was  it  that,  in  the  result  of  our  civil  war,  human  experience 
went  for  nothing? 

Was,  then,  the  unexpected  really  due  to  preponderance  in 
force?  Confederate  authorities  have,  of  late,  evinced  a 
strong  disposition  to  insist  upon  this  as  the  correct  and 
sufficient  explanation.  In  order,  however,  to  make  out  even 
a  prima  facie  showing,  the  Confederate  authorities  have 
assumed,  or  endeavored  to  show,  that  the  South  never,  from 
Sumter  to  Appomattox,  had  over  600,000  men  in  the  aggre- 
gate in  arms ;  and  these,  first  and  last,  were  opposed  by,  as 
they  assert,  some  2,800,000  on  the  part  of  the  Union.  Ad- 
mitting these  figures  to  be  correct  of  both  sides,  —  a  large 
admission,  and  one  which  any  careful  analysis  would  clearly 
disprove,  —  it  is  none  the  less  obvious  that  a  force  six 
hundred  thousand  strong,  made  up  of  fighting  material  of 
the  most  approved  character,  wholly  homogeneous,  mustered 
for  the  protection  of  the  hearthstone,  is  something  not  easily 
overcome.  It  constitutes  in  itself  a  defensive  army  of  almost 
unprecedented  size;  and  one  more  especially  formidable 
when  the  minds  of  those  composing  it  are  to  the  last  degree 
embittered  against  an  opponent  whose  courage,  as  well  as 
capacity,  they  held  in  almost  unmeasured  contempt.  Such 
a  force  would,  under  the  conditions  existing  in  1861  and 
1862,  unquestionably  have  considered  itself,  and  been  pro- 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  237 

nounced  by  others,  quite  adequate  for  every  purpose  of 
Southern  defence. 

But  this  estimate  of  Confederate  field  force  obviously  in- 
vites criticism  of  another  character.  It  calls  for  explanation. 
The  Confederate  historians  and  investigators  responsible  for 
it  do  not  seem  to  realize  that;  in  the  very  act  of  advancing  it, 
they  cast  opprobrium  on  the  community  they  belong  to  and 
profess  to  honor.  If  this  estimate  is  sustained,  the  verdict 
of  the  historian  of  the  future  cannot  be  escaped.  He  will  say 
that  if  600,000  men  were  all  the  Confederacy,  first  and  last, 
could  get  into  the  field,  it  is  clear  that  the  South  went  into 
the  struggle  in  a  half-hearted  way,  and,  being  in  it,  showed 
but  a  craven  soul.  No  effort  of  the  government,  no  induce- 
ment of  pride  or  patriotism,  sufficed  to  get  even  a  moiety  of 
its  arms-bearing  effectives  into  the  fighting  line. 

Such  a  showing  on  the  part  of  the  Confederacy,  if  estab- 
lished, will  certainly  not  compare  favorably  with  the  forty 
years  later  record  of  the  Boers  in  the  very  similar  South 
African  struggle.  Accepting  the  Confederate  figures  as 
correct,  how  do  the  two  cases  stand  ?  Territorially  the  Con- 
federacy covered  some  712,000  square  miles,  —  a  region 
considerably  (30,000  square  miles)  larger  than  the  combined 
European  areas  of  Austro-Hungary,  Germany,  France  and 
Italy,  with  Belgium,  Holland  and  Denmark  thrown  in. 
This  vast  space  was  inhabited  by  five  million  people  of 
European  descent,  with  three  millions  of  Africans  who  could 
be  depended  upon  to  produce  food  for  those  of  European 
blood  in  active  service.  In  the  course  of  the  conflict,  and 
before  admitting  themselves  beaten,  every  white  male  in  the 
Confederacy  between  the  ages  of  seventeen  and  fifty  capable 
of  bearing  arms  was  called  out.  Wherever  necessary  to 
preclude  evasion  of  military  duty,  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus 
was  suspended,  and  the  labor,  property  and  lives  of  all  in 


238  MILITARY  STUDIES 

the  Confederacy  were  by  legislation  of  the  most  drastic 
character  put  at  the  disposal  of  an  energetic  executive.  The 
struggle  lasted  four  full  years;  and  during  that  period  the 
eighth  part  of  a  generation  grew  up,  yielding  its  quota  of 
arms-bearing  men.  Consequently,  under  any  recognized 
method  of  computation,  the  Confederacy,  first  and  last, 
contained  within  itself  some  1,350,000  men  capable  of  doing 
military  duty.  This  result,  also,  is  in  accordance  with  the 
figures  of  the  census  of  I860.1  During  the  war  the  Con- 
federate army  was  reenforced  by  over  125,000  sympathizers2 
from  the  sister  slave  States  not  included  in  the  Confederacy. 
The  upshot  of  the  contention  thus  is,  out  of  a  population  of 
5,600,000  whites,  only  475,000  put  in  an  appearance  in  re- 
sponse to  a  many-tongued  and  often  reiterated  call  to  arms, 

1  The  exact  number,  arithmetically  computed  on  the  census  returns 
of  1860,  but  of  course  to  a  certain  extent  inaccurate  and  deceptive,  was 
1,356,500. 

2  An  exact  statistical  statement  of  the  number  of  sympathizers  from 
Delaware,  Maryland,  West  Virginia,  Kentucky  and  Missouri,  who,  first 
and  last,  found  their  way  into  the  ranks  of  the  Confederate  army,  is 
of  course  impossible.  It  has  been  asserted  that  there  were  316,424 
."Southern  men  in  the  Northern  army."  This  large  contingent,  so  far 
as  not  imaginary,  would  naturally  have  come  in  greatest  part  from  the 
''Border  States,"  so  called.  It  would  be  not  unnatural  to  assume  that 
these  States  furnished  an  equal  number  of  recruits  to  the  Confederacy; 
but  such  an  assumption  would,  on  the  basis  above  given,  be  manifestly 
absurd,  leaving  a  comparatively  pitiful  contingent  of  less  than  300,000  to 
be  accredited  to  the  States  which  formed  the  Confederacy.  The  War 
Records  contain  lists  of  all  military  organizations  of  the  Confederate  army 
referred  to  in  that  publication.  Including  regiments,  battalions  and  com- 
panies belonging  to  all  branches  of  the  service,  regular  and  provisional,  these 
numbered  279  from  the  four  States,  West  Virginia,  Maryland,  Kentucky 
and  Missouri.  Included  in  these  were  238  full  regiments.  If  these  aver- 
aged, from  first  to  last,  only  600  each,  they  represented  an  aggregate  of 
143,000  men.  No  less  than  132  lesser  organizations,  battalions,  and  com- 
panies, and  all  individual  enlistments,  remain  to  be  allowed  for.  In  view 
of  these  facts,  Colonel  T.  L.  Livermore,  who  has  made  a  specialty  of  this 
subject,  writes  under  date  of  October  24,  1905,  "I  think  a  larger  estimate 
than  135,000  in  the  Confederate  army  from  these  States  might  safely 
be  made." 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  239 

—  a  trifle  in  excess  of  one  man  to  each  twelve  inhabitants. 
There  were,  moreover,  more  than  500,000  able-bodied  negroes 
well  adapted  in  every  respeet  for  all  the  numerous  semi- 
military  services,  —  such  as  teamsters,  servants,  hospital 
attendants  and  laborers  on  fortifications,  the  call  for  which 
always  depletes  the  number  present  for  duty  of  every  army.1 
Yet  it  is  now  maintained  by  Confederate  authorities  that  all 
the  efforts  of  the  Richmond  government,  backed  by  every 
feeling  of  pride,  patriotism,  protection  of  the  domestic  roof- 
tree  and  hate  of  the  enemy,  could  only  induce  or  compel  a 
comparatively  Spartan  band  to  turn  out  and  strike  for  in- 
dependence.2 

How  was  it,  under  very  similar  circumstances,  with  the 
South  Africans  ?  On  Confederate  showing  they  are  a  braver, 
a  more  patriotic  and  self-sacrificing  race.  Two  communities, 
the  Transvaal  and  the  Orange  Free  State,  were  engaged  in  a 
defensive  struggle  against  Great  Britain.  They  included 
within  their  bounds  an  area  of  160,000  square  miles,  — less 
than  a  fourth  of  that  included  in  the  Confederacy.  Their 
entire  white  population  was  but  about  325,000,  and,  when  the 
war  commenced,  it  was  estimated  they  could  muster  a  force 
not  in  excess  of  48,000.  Yet  in  their  two  years  of  resistance, 
the  Boers,  it  is  computed,  had  90,000  men,  first  and  last,  in 
actual  service,  or  more  than  one  in  four  of  their  population, 
as  against  the  one  out  of  twelve  in  the  case  of  the  Con- 

l"I  propose  to  substitute  slaves  for  all  soldiers  employed  out  of  the 
ranks  —  on  detached  service,  extra  duty,  as  cooks,  engineers,  laborers, 
pioneers,  or  any  kind  of  work.  Such  details  for  this  little  army  amount 
to  more  than  10,000  men.  Negroes  would  serve  for  such  purposes  better 
than  soldiers.  .  .  .  The  plan  is  simple  and  quick.  It  puts  soldiers  and 
negroes  each  in  his  appropriate  place ;  the  one  to  fight,  the  other  to  work. 
I  need  not  go  into  particulars."  —  Gen.  J.  E.  Johnston,  to  Confederate 
Senator  L.  T.  Wigfall,  January  4,  1864 ;  Mrs.  D.  G.  Wright,  A  Southern 
Girl  in  '61,  pp.  168,  169. 

2  See  note,  infra,  282. 


240  MILITARY  STUDIES 

federacy.1  The  preponderance  of  force  opposed  to  the  Boers 
was  as  five  to  one ;  the  preponderance  of  force  in  the  case  of 
the  Confederates,  according  to  this  latest  estimate  of  their 
historians,  was  at  most  but  four  and  a  half  to  one.2 

Such  an  estimate  is,  however,  as  far  from  the  mark  as,  were 
it  based  on  actual  facts,  it  would  be  discreditable  to  Confed- 
erate manhood.  It  is  simply  unbelievable  that,  measured 
by  the  proportion  of  fighting  men  to  the  total  populations, 
the  Boer  spirit  was  to  the  spirit  of  the  Confederacy  as  three 
is  to  one.  The  statement  carries  its  own  refutation;  and 
the  Southerners  of  that  period  were  no  such  race  of  miching, 
mean-spirited,  stay-at-home  skulkers  as  their  self-constituted 
and  most  ill-advised  annalists  would  apparently  make  them 
out.     On  the  contrary,  as  matter  of  historical  fact,  they  did 

1  To  be  exact,  one  out  of  each  eleven  and  eight-tenths. 

2  We  have  census  (1860)  figures  of  the  population  of  the  States  of  the 
Confederacy  at  the  breaking  out  of  the  Civil  War;  but  the  Confederate 
muster-rolls,  showing  actual  enlistments,  are  confessedly  defective.  It 
is  not  easy  to  reach  any  accurate  figures  as  to  either  the  population 
of  the  two  South  African  republics,  or  the  number  of  men  actually  put 
into  the  field  by  them  during  the  war.  The  "total  number  of  officers 
and  men  of  all  Regular  and  Auxiliary  [British]  Forces  in  the  South  African 
War  from  the  beginning  to  the  end"  is  officially  stated  as  448,435.  At 
the  beginning  of  the  war  the  Intelligence  Division  of  the  British  War  Office 
estimated  the  total  available  forces  of  the  Transvaal  at  29,917,  and  those 
of  the  Orange  Free  State  at  13,104,  or  an  aggregate  of  43,021  combatants. 
At  the  close  of  the  war,  however,  the  total  number  accounted  for  was 
72,974  Transvaal  and  Free  State  combatants,  with  16,400  "Rebels," 
"Renegades  and  Foreigners,"  or  a  grand  total  of  89,374.  The  British 
officials  content  themselves  with  saying,  "It  is  difficult  to  explain  the  ex- 
cess over  the  Boer  official  returns  [preceding  the  conflict],  unless,  indeed, 
these  purposely  understated  the  actual  strength  of  the  burghers."  —  Re- 
port (1903)  of  "His  Majesty's  Commissioners  appointed  to  Inquire  into 
the  Military  Preparations  and  Other  Matters  Connected  with  the  War  in 
South  Africa,"  pp.  35,  158,  168.  Excluding  in  each  case  foreign  sym- 
pathizers, the  two  South  African  republics  apparently  put  into  the  field 
as  combatants  one  man  to  each  four  and  two-tenths  (4.2)  of  their  entire 
population ;  on  the  claim  of  the  Southern  historians  the  nine  States  of  the 
Confederacy  put  into  the  field  one  combatant  to  each  eleven  and  eight- 
tenths   (11.8)   of  their  total  white  population. 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  241 

both  turn  out  in  force/  and  they  fought  to  a  finish.  Un- 
doubtedly there  was,  towards  the  close  of  the  contest,  a 
large  desertion  from  the  Confederate  ranks.  The  army 
melted  imperceptibly  away.  The  men  would  not  stay  by 
the  colors.  When,  in  April,  1865,  Jefferson  Davis,  after 
his  flight  from  Richmond,  met  at  Greensboro ;,  N.  C, 
Joseph  E.  Johnston,  then  in  command  of  the  army  confront- 
ing Sherman,  a  species  of  council  was  held,  at  which  the  course 
to  be  pursued,  in  the  then  obviously  desperate  condition  of 
affairs,  was  discussed.  Johnston,  knowing  well  the  condition 
of  things,  and  the  consequent  feeling  among  his  men,  when 
appealed  to  for  his  opinion  bluntly  said  that  the  South  felt  it 
was  whipped,  and  was  tired  of  the  war.  Davis,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  eager  to  continue  the  struggle.  He  insisted  that 
in  spite  of  the  "terrible"  disasters  recently  sustained,  he 
would  in  three  or  four  weeks  have  a  large  army  in  the  field ; 
and,  further,  expressed  his  confident  belief  that  the  Con- 
federates could  still  win,  and  achieve  their  independence, 
if,  as  he  expressed  it,  "our  people  will  turn  out."  2 

That  Davis  even  then  honestly  so  thought  is  very  probable ; 
and,  looking  only  to  the  number  of  fighting  men  on  each  side 
available  for  service  under  proper  conditions,  he  was  right. 
And  yet  under  existing  conditions  he  was  altogether  wrong. 
As  respects  mere  numbers,  it  is  capable  of  demonstration 
that,  at  the  close  of  the  struggle,  the  preponderance  was  on 
the  side  of  the  Confederacy,  and  distinctly  so.  The  Union 
at  that  time  had,  it  is  said,  a  million  men  on  its  muster  rolls. 
Possibly  that  number  were  consuming  rations  and  drawing 

1  See  note,  infra,  282. 

2  Alfriend,  Life  of  Jefferson  Davis,  pp.  622-626 ;  B.  T.  Johnson,  Life  of 
Joseph  E.  Johnston,  p.  219  ;  Roman,  Military  Operations  of  General  Beaure- 
gard, Vol.  II,  p.  665.  Roman  here  prints  a  letter,  dated  March  30,  1868, 
from  J.  E.  Johnston  to  Beauregard,  giving  his  recollections  of  what  was 
said  and  took  place  at  the  Greensboro'  meeting  of  April  12-13,  1861.  See 
infra,  241,  325. 


242  MILITARY  STUDIES 

pay.  If  such  was  the  case,  acting  on  the  offensive,  and  deep 
in  a  vast  hostile  country,  the  Union  might  possibly  have  been 
able  to  put  500,000  men  in  the  fighting  line.  On  the  other 
side,  notwithstanding  the  heavy  drain  of  four  years  of  war, 
the  fighting  strength  of  the  Confederacy  at  the  close  cannot 
have  been  less  than  two-thirds  of  its  normal  strength.  The 
South  should  have  been  able  to  muster,  on  paper,  900,000 
men.  Such  a  force,  or  even  the  half  of  it,  acting  on  the 
defensive  in  a  region  inadequately  supplied  with  railroad 
facilities,  —  and  these,  such  as  they  were,  very  open  to 
attack,  —  should  have  been  ample  for  every  purpose. 
Texas  alone  had  in  1860  a  white  population  larger  by 
nearly  100,000  than  the  white  population  of  the  Transvaal 
and  Orange  Free  State  combined  in  1899. *  Texas  covered 
an  area  of  265,780  square  miles,  as  against  the  161,296  of  the 
combined  African  republics;  and  this  vast  region  was  ren- 
dered accessible  in  1861  by  some  300  miles  of  railroad,  or 
about  one  mile  of  railroad  of  most  inferior  construction  to 
each  900  square  miles  of  territory.2  The  character  of  the 
soil  made  heavy  movement,  slow  and  difficult  always,  at 
times  impossible.  In  such  a  region  and  under  such  con- 
ditions, how  could  an  invading  force  have  been  fed  or  trans- 
ported, or  kept  open  its  lines  of  communication?  Thus,  on 
the  face  of  the  facts,  Davis  was  right,  and  the  South,  if  it 
chose  to  defend  itself,  was  invincible. 

And  here  we  find  ourselves  face  to  face  with  one  of  the 
greatest  of  the  many  delusions  in  the  popular  conception  of 

1  According  to  the  best  authorities,  the  combined  white  population  of 
the  two  South  African  States  at  the  beginning  of  hostilities  was  approxi- 
mately 323,113  ;  the  white  population  of  Texas  was  returned  in  the  census 
of  1860  at  421,294. 

2  The  census  of  1860  returned  307  miles  of  railroad  in  operation  in 
Texas;  in  1903  it  was  stated  that  11,256  miles  were  in  operation.  The 
proportion  of  railroad  mileage  to  area  was,  in  1860,  one  mile  to  each  865 
square  miles  of  territory ;  in  1903  it  was  one  mile  to  each  24  square  miles. 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  243 

practical  warfare.  In  his  remark  at  the  Greensboro '  con- 
ference about  the  South  " turning  out/'  Jefferson  Davis 
seems  to  have  fallen  into  it.  The  South,  at  that  stage  of  the 
conflict,  simply  could  not  "turn  out."  So  doing  was  a 
physical  impossibility.  It  was  Napoleon  who  said  that  an 
army  was  like  a  serpent,  it  moves  on  its  belly.  In  dealing 
with  practical  conditions  in  warfare,  it  has  always  to  be 
borne  in  mind  that  an  army  is  a  most  complex  organization ; 
and  its  strength  is  measured  and  limited  not  by  the  census 
number  of  men  available,  but  the  means  at  hand  of  arming, 
equipping,  clothing,  feeding  and  transporting  those  men. 
This  topic  is  elsewhere  discussed  in  the  present  publication ; * 
here,  and  in  this  connection,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that,  so 
far  as  its  military  organizations  were  concerned,  for  those 
of  all  grades,  from  the  general  in  command  to  the  camp- 
follower,  after  January,  1865,  the  possibility  of  organized 
resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Confederacy  no  longer  existed. 
The  choice  lay  between  surrender  and  disbandment;  or, 
as  General  Johnston  subsequently  wrote:  "We,  without 
the  means  of  purchasing  supplies  of  any  kind,  or  procuring 
or  repairing  arms,  could  continue  this  war  only  as  robbers 
or  guerillas."  2 

The  next  question  is :  How  had  this  result  been  brought 
about?  How  did  it  happen  that  five  millions  of  people  in 
a  country  of  practically  unlimited  extent,  and  one  almost 
invulnerable  to  attack,  were  physically  incapable  of  further 
organized  resistance  ?  How  did  they  come  to  be  so  devoid  of 
arms,  food,  clothing  and  means  of  transport?  In  other 
words,  what  is  the  correct  answer  to  the  query  suggested  by 
Mr.  Rhodes  ?     He  certainly  does  not  give  it ;  but,  perplexing 

1  Infra,  325. 

2  Johnston  to  Beauregard,  March  30,  1868 ;  Roman,  Beauregard,  Vol. 
II,  p.  665. 


244  MILITARY  STUDIES 

as  the  question  is,  a  plausible  answer  can  surely  at  this  late 
day  be  at  least  approximated. 

When  it  comes  to  rendering  a  judgment  on  passing  events 
or  on  contemporaries,  Lord  Bacon  long  ago  classed  foreign 
nations  and  posterity  together,  to  them  making  his  individual 
appeal  for  "name  and  memory."  To  like  effect  another  and 
more  modern  writer  has  pronounced  aa  foreign  nation  a  kind 
of  contemporaneous  posterity."  This,  in  both  cases,  ob- 
viously because  in  the  opinion  and  estimate  of  a  "  foreign 
nation"  it  may  be  possible  to  find,  in  degree  at  least,  that 
detachment  and  sense  of  proportion  always  incompatible 
with  nearness  and  familiarity.  A  recourse  to  this  tribunal, 
for  what  it  is  worth,  is  in  the  present  case  possible.  Black- 
wood's Edinburgh  Magazine  for  July,  1866,  contains  a  some- 
what elaborate  contemporaneous  paper  entitled  The  Prin- 
ciples and  Issues  of  the  American  Struggle.1  Philosophizing 
over  the  outcome  of  the  struggle  rather  more  than  a  year 
after  it  had  been  brought  to  a  close,  the  writer  of  the  article 
thus  answered  Mr.  Rhodes's  query  some  thirty-eight  years 
in  advance  of  the  time  when  Mr.  Rhodes  put  it :  — 

"By  dint  of  obstinate  endurance  —  by  dint  of  illimitable  paper 
money  and  credit  —  by  dint  of  foreign  soldiers  from  Ireland  and 
Germany  who  swarmed  into  the  country,  allured  by  bounties  on 
enlistment  varying  from  £100  to  £200  sterling  per  head  —  by  dint 
of  sacrificing  general  after  general,  however  brave  and  able,  who 
could  not  gain  a  victory  —  by  dint  of  a  blockade  of  the  sea-board, 
producing  in  due  time  a  famine,  or  something  very  like  it,  through 
the  most  fertile  portions  of  the  South ;  and  last,  but  by  no  means 
least,  by  dint  of  the  cowardice  or  incapacity  of  the  British  govern- 
ment, that  refused  to  unite  with  that  of  France  in  acknowledging 
the  independence  of  the  South  —  the  Northern  people  conquered 
their  Southern  brethren." 

1  Blackwood's  Edinburgh  Magazine,  July,  1866,  C,   31. 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  245 

Here,  then,  is  a  foreign  contemporaneous  explanation,  and 
one,  in  some  respects,  close  to  the  mark.  Yet  it  is  not  wholly 
satisfactory.  It  again  is  too  general ;  for,  though  the  writer 
is  specific  enough,  he  generalizes  in  his  specification,  omitting 
nothing  that  suggests  itself,  and  emphasizing  everything 
about  equally.  Further  elimination  and  a  more  severe 
analysis  are  necessary. 

Six  contributing  causes  are  specified.  Let  us,  through  the 
perspective  of  forty  years,  see  which  still  stand  as  material. 
The  initial  two,  " obstinate  endurance"  and  " illimitable 
paper  dollars  and  credit,"  we  may  pass  over.  The  first  goes 
without  saying ;  and  the  last  would  not  in  itself  have  sufficed 
to  accomplish  the  end  sought  in  1865,  any  more  than  it  had 
sufficed  to  accomplish  the  end  then  sought,  when,  in  the 
struggle  with  its  revolted  American  provinces  which  ended 
in  1783,  Great  Britain,  in  like  manner,  had  at  its  command 
"  illimitable  paper  "  notes  and  "  credit,"  as  against  a  worth- 
less Continental  currency.  The  allegation  was  simply 
fatuous.  The  third  count  also  cuts  no  considerable  figure 
in  a  revised  summary.  The  backbone  of  the  Union  army 
at  the  close  of  the  struggle,  as  at  its  beginning,  was  made 
up  of  Americans.  The  number  of  foreigners,  Irish  or  Ger- 
man, drawn  to  the  country  by  the  temptation  of  bounties 
may  have  been  considerable;  but,  as  a  factor  of  active, 
fighting  strength  it  has  been  misunderstood  and  vastly 
exaggerated.  In  the  early  stages  of  the  war,  more  than 
half  a  million  men,  nearly  all  Americans  and  young,  were 
suddenly  withdrawn  from  industrial  life.  A  paralysis  of 
production  should  necessarily  have  followed.  That,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  it  did  not  follow  was  due  to  an  inrush  of 
foreigners,  filling  the  void  thus  created.  The  immigrants 
replenished  the  depleted  ranks  of  industry,  not  those  of  the 
army  in  the  field.     This  most  interesting  sociological  and 


246  MILITARY  STUDIES 

economical  fact  has  since  been  demonstrated  through  a  care- 
ful analysis  of  records  and  statistics.1  On  the  other  hand, 
any  advantage  the  nationalists  did  actually  derive  from 
bounty-drawn,  immigrant  enlistments  was  far  more  than 
counterbalanced  by  the  drastic  conscription  enforced 
throughout  the  Confederacy.  Three  factors  now  only  re- 
main for  consideration.  One  of  these,  the  sacrificing  of 
those  leaders  who  failed  to  win  victories,  is  a  feature  of 
all  warfare,  and  in  no  way  peculiar  to  our  civil  strife.  As 
a  factor  in  results  it  was  not  especially  noticeable  there; 
and,  moreover,  there  is  no  sort  of  question  that  both  com- 
munities and  those  in  authority  are  as  a  rule  so  constituted 
that  a  preference  is  felt  for  commanders  in  the  field  whose 
names  are  associated  with  bulletins  of  victory  rather  than 
with  the  habitually  " unlucky,"  even  though  plausible  in 
their  explanations  of  failure.  The  writer  of  the  paper  re- 
ferred to  obviously  had  McClellan  in  mind ;  but,  in  his  case, 
history,  and  the  coming  to  light  of  historical  material 
have  more  than  justified  the  course  finally  pursued  by 
Lincoln  and  Stanton  towards  that  excellent  organizer,  but 
exceedingly  insufficient  field  commander.  Of  the  two  re- 
maining factors  of  success,  —  the  blockade  and  absence  of 
foreign  intervention,  —  the  last  may  be  left  out  of  considera- 
tion. It  is  useless  to  discuss  historical  problems  from  the 
point  of  view  of  what  would  have  happened  if  something 
had  occurred  which  in  point  of  fact  never  did  occur.  On 
this  foreign  and  contemporaneous  judgment  of  conditions 
we  are  thus  through  elimination  brought  down  to  one  factor, 
the  blockade,  as  the  controlling  condition  of  Union  success. 
In  other  words,  that  success  was  made  possible  by  the 
undisputed  naval  and  maritime  supremacy  of  the  national 

1  Fite,  Social  and  Industrial  Conditions  in  the  North  during  the  Civil  War, 
5-14. 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE   CIVIL  WAR  247 

government.  Cut  off  from  the  outer  world  and  all  exterior 
sources  of  supply,  reduced  to  a  state  of  inanition  by  the 
blockade,  the  Confederacy  was  pounded  to  death.1 

Or,  to  put  the  proposition  in  yet  another  form,  in  the  game 
of  warfare,  maritime  supremacy  on  the  part  of  the  North  — 
what  Admiral  Mahan  has  since  developed  historically  as  the 
Influence  of  the  Sea  Power  —  even  more  than  compensated 
for  the  military  advantage  of  the  defensive,  and  its  interior 
strategic  lines,  enjoyed  by  the  South.  Such  being  the  case,  the 
greater  command  of  men,  supplies,  munitions  and  transporta- 
tion by  one  party  to  the  conflict  worked  its  natural  result. 

Unquestionably  much  could  be  said  in  support  of  this  con- 
tention. More  than  plausible,  it  fairly  explains  an  outcome 
otherwise  inexplicable  now,  as  contrary  to  all  foreign  expecta- 
tion then.  Without,  however,  going  into  any  elaborate  dis- 
cussion of  the  arguments  for  and  against  it  as  a  satisfactory 
historical  postulate,  but  for  present  purposes  accepting  it  as 
such,  a  distinct  grasp  and  full  recognition  of  the  advantage 
in  the  struggle  pertaining  to  the  mastery  of  the  sea  is  one 
of  the  most  noticeable  deficiencies  in  Mr.  Rhodes's  treatment 
of  the  outcome  of  the  conflict.  In  this  respect  his  narrative 
is  lacking  in  a  proper  sense  of  proportion.  As  compared  with 
the  space  devoted  to  the  movements  on  land,  he  fails  to  give 
to  the  sea  operations  the  emphasis  properly  belonging  to 
them.  Towards  the  close  of  that  portion  of  his  fifth  volume 
devoted  to  a  summary  of  the  preceding  narrative,  Mr.  Rhodes, 
it  is  true,  does  incidentally  say  that  the  "  work  of  the 
United  States  navy  was  an  affair  of  long  patience  unrelieved 
by  the  prospect  of  brilliant  exploits ;  lacking  the  incitement  of 
battle,  it  required  discipline  and  character  only  the  more. 
But  the  reward  was  great ;  for  the  blockade  was  one  of  the 
effective  agencies  in  deciding  the  issue  of  the  war."  2  This 
1  Infra,  317,  320,  321.  *  Vol.  V,  p.  399. 


248  MILITARY  STUDIES 

is  a  somewhat  faint  recognition  of  services  really  decisive; 
but,  such  as  it  is,  it  may  pass.  As  one  reads  Mr.  Rhodes's 
narrative,  however,  it  would  hardly  be  supposed  that  a 
blockade  existed  at  all,  much  less  that  it  entered  into  the 
struggle  as  the  essential  pivot  on  which  turned  many  of 
the  most  important  of  those  land  movements  so  fully  de- 
scribed. For  instance,  an  undisputed  maritime  supremacy 
made  possible  both  Grant's  operations  in  Virginia  and 
Sherman's  march  to  the  sea. 

To  this  general  criticism  an  exception  must  be  made  in 
the  case  of  the  action  between  the  Monitor  and  the  Merrimac. 
To  that  a  sufficiency  of  space  (five  pages)  is  given ;  for,  ob- 
viously, on  its  result  depended  McClellan's  strategy.  Be- 
sides being  temptingly  dramatic  in  itself,  it  had  to  be  dealt 
with  in  connection  with  land  operations.  But  the  capture  of 
Hatteras  Inlet  (August  26,  1861)  and  of  Port  Royal  (Novem- 
ber 7,  1861)  are  incidentally  mentioned  in  part  of  a  twenty- 
three  line  paragraph,  though  strategically  they  were,  and 
subsequently  proved,  of  the  utmost  consequence,  distinctly 
foreshadowing  that  process  of  devitalization  as  a  result  of 
which  the  Confederacy  ultimately  collapsed.  Again,  the 
taking  of  New  Orleans,  from  every  point  of  view  one  of  the 
most  important  events  of  the  war,  as  well  as  one  of  its 
most  striking  episodes,  —  a  knife-thrust  in  the  very  vitals  of 
the  Confederacy,  —  is  disposed  of  in  two  pages.  The  sinking 
of  the  Alabama  by  the  Kearsarge  is  truly  enough  referred  to 
"as  of  no  moment  towards  terminating  the  war";  but  its 
moral  effect  in  Europe  at  a  critical  period  was  very  memo- 
rable. Finally,  to  assert  that  the  achievements  of  Admiral 
Farragut  contributed  not  less  than  those  of  General  Sherman 
to  the  downfall  of  the  Confederacy  may  or  may  not  be  an 
exaggeration ;  but,  on  the  part  of  the  navy,  it  may  safely  be 
claimed  that  the  running  of  the  forts  at  the  mouth  of  the 


SOME   PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  249 

Mississippi,  and  the  consequent  fall  of  New  Orleans,  was  as 
brilliant  an  operation,  and  one  as  triumphantly  conducted, 
as  the  march  through  Georgia.  It  struck  equal  dismay  into 
the  hearts  of  the  Southern  leaders.  Yet  the  name  of  Farra- 
gut  appears  but  once  in  the  index  of  Mr.  Rhodes's  fifth 
volume,  in  which  he  summarizes  the  war;  and  that  once  is 
in  connection  with  Andrew  Johnson's  famous  "swinging- 
round-the-circle  "  performance.  Twelve  lines  of  text  are 
devoted  to  the  battle  of  Mobile  Bay,  while  two  lines  only  are 
made  to  suffice  for  the  capture  of  Wilmington,  which  closed 
the  last  inlet  of  the  Confederacy,  hermetically  sealing  it. 
Here,  then,  from  Hatteras  Inlet  to  Fort  Fisher,  —  between 
August,  1861,  and  January,  18G5,  —  is  a  consecutive  series 
of  operations,  prime  factors  in  the  final  result,  and  they  are 
disposed  of  in  ninety  lines  of  a  narrative  covering  1350  pages  ! 
About  a  sixth  of  one  per  cent  of  the  entire  space  is  given  to 
them.  With  Hilton  Head,  Hatteras  Inlet,  New  Orleans, 
Hampton  Roads,  Mobile  Bay,  Wilmington  and  Cherbourg 
blazing  imperishably  on  the  record,  Mr.  Rhodes  incidentally 
remarks  that  the  work  of  the  navy  was  "unrelieved  by  the 
prospect  of  brilliant  exploits"  !  Nor  do  the  names  of  those 
identified  with  our  naval  triumphs  thunder  in  the  general 
index.  Judged  by  that  test,  six  lines  suffice  for  the  allu- 
sions to  Farragut,  and  five  for  those  to  Porter;  while  four 
solid  columns  are  judged  scarcely  adequate  for  Grant  and 
two  for  Sherman.  This  is  clearly  disproportionate.  In 
some  future  edition  an  entire  chapter  for  each  year  would 
not  be  too  much  to  devote  to  an  account  of  the  operations 
of  that  arm  of  the  Union  service  which  on  the  sea  counter- 
balanced the  advantage  of  interior  lines  on  the  land  which 
the  Confederates  so  confidently  counted  upon,  and  of  which 
all  the  military  strategists  or  critics,  whether  domestic  or 
foreign,  so  everlastingly  wrote.     To  be  steadily  and  effect- 


250  MILITARY  STUDIES 

ually  throttled  from  behind  is  not  usually  considered  a 
negligible  disadvantage,  if  suffered  by  one  party  to  an 
otherwise  not  wholly  unequal  life-and-death  grapple ;  and 
when  the  throttling  process  is  from  time  to  time  accentuated 
by  a  spear  thrust  in  the  ribs  or  active  knife- work  in  the 
back  the  consequences  are  apt  to  be  contributory  to  defeat. 
In  the  matter  of  our  maritime  supremacy,  the  Confederacy 
so  found  it.  As  a  Southern  writer  has  in  long  reminiscence 
recently  said :  "  Aptly  did  camp  slang  name  the  blockade 
the  '  Conda.'  It  was  the  crush  of  the  '  Conda '  that 
squeezed  us  to  death." 

Passing  to  another  topic  of  scarcely  less  importance,  Mr. 
Rhodes's  sense  of  correct  proportion  is  again  at  fault.  The 
Confederacy  did  not  go  into  the  conflict  unadvisedly.  On  the 
contrary,  its  leaders  gave  what  at  the  time  they  considered 
full  consideration  to  all  the  factors  on  either  side  essential 
to  success.1  As  was  apparent  in  the  outcome,  they  reckoned 
without  their  host ;  but,  none  the  less,  they  did  reckon.  Un- 
fortunately for  it,  the  Southern  community  in  the  years  prior 
to  1861  was  phenomenally  provincial.  Judged  by  its  litera- 
ture and  the  published  utterances  of  its  men  and  women, 
particularly  its  women,  it  seemed  —  intellectually,  socially, 
economically  and  physically  —  to  be  conscious  only  of  itself. 
This  characteristic,  among  many  other  phases  of  develop- 
ment, was  inordinately  and  most  offensively  apparent  in  an 
undervaluation  of  its  prospective  opponent,  both  for  char- 

1  For  instance,  in  the  very  matter  of  a  blockade,  as  an  incident  to  war, 
James  H.  Hammond,  then  in  the  Senate  from  South  Carolina,  in  a  speech 
delivered  in  1858,  and  presently  referred  to,  thus  summarily  dismissed  the 
idea  as  an  absurdity:  "We  have  three  thousand  miles  of  continental  sea- 
shore line  so  indented  with  bays  and  crowded  with  islands  that  when  their 
shore  lines  are  added,  we  have  twelve  thousand  miles.  .  .  .  Can  you  hem 
in  such  a  territory  as  that  ?  You  talk  of  putting  up  a  wall  of  fire  around 
eight  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  square  miles  so  situated  !  How  absurd! " 
—  Selections  from  Letters  and  Speeches  of  James  H.  Hammond,  pp.  311, 312. 


SOME   PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  251 

acter  and  courage,1  and  in  an  overvaluation  of  the  importance 
of  the  South  as  a  commercial  world-power.  As  respects  the 
undervaluation  of  the  prospective  opponent,  the  mental 
condition  of  the  South  in  1861  was  fairly  expressed  by- 
General  L.  P.  Walker,  the  first  Confederate  Secretary  of  War, 
when,  on  the  occasion  of  the  running  up  of  the  Confederate 
flag  on  the  capitol  of  Montgomery,  Alabama,  on  a  day  in 
early  April,  1861,  he  pledged  himself  to  the  excited  crowd 
there  gathered  to  raise  at  no  remote  time  the  flag  in  question 
over  "Faneuil  Hall  in  the  City  of  Boston. "  Curiously  as 
it  now  sounds,  there  is  no  exaggeration  in  the  statement 
that  "  at  first  flush  of  war  the  masses  of  the  South  really 
believed  that  one  Southerner  '  could  whip  a  half-dozen 
Yankees  and  not  half  try.7  "2 

The  explanation  of  this  and  other  utterances  of  a  similar 
character  has  since  been  very  tersely  stated  by  General 
Bradley  T.  Johnson,  himself  a  Confederate,  though  born  in 
Maryland,  —  at  once  jurist  and  veteran:  "The  Southern 
people  for  several  generations  had  trained  themselves  into 
a  vainglorious  mood  toward  the  Northern  men.  They  be- 
lieved that  they  were  inconquerable  by  the  North  and  that 
the  men  of  the  North  were  not  their  physical  nor  mental 
equals."  2  And,  reviewing  the  conflict  and  outcome  through 
the  vista  of  thirty  years,  this  typical  Southron  reached  a 
conclusion,  bearing  directly  on  the  query  suggested  by  Mr. 
Rhodes:  "The  Confederate  States  were  not  crushed  by 
overwhelming  resources  nor  overpowering  numbers.  They 
were  out-thought  by  the  Northern  men."3     As  respects  the 

1  "  Vulgar,  fanatical,  cheating  Yankees  —  hypocritical,  if  as  women 
they  pretend  to  real  virtue  ;  and  lying,  if  as  men  they  pretend  to  be 
honest." — W.  H.  Russell,  My  Diary  North  and  South,  Chap.  XIX. 

2  T.  C.  De  Leon,  Belles,  Beaux  and  Brains  in  the  60's,  pp.  56,  394. 

3  Memoir  of  the  Life  and  Public  Service  of  Joseph  E.  Johnston  (1891), 
pp.  60,  61. 


252  MILITARY  STUDIES 

other  great  factor  of  self-deception,  the  overvaluation  of  itself 
by  the  South  as  a  commercial  world-power,  the  mere  men- 
tion of  that  delusion  recalls  to  memory  the  once  familiar, 
now  quite  forgotten,  postulate,  —  " Cotton  is  King!"  To 
the  South  its  infatuation  on  this  point  was  the  fruitful  mother 
of  calamity;  for  the  commercial  supremacy  of  cotton, 
accepted  as  a  fundamental  truth,  was  made  the  basis  of 
political  action.  The  unquestioning  faith  in  which  that 
patriarchal  community  cherished  this  belief  has  now  passed 
out  of  memory,  and  the  statement  of  it  savors  of  exaggera- 
tion. As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  does  not  admit  of  exaggeration. 
For  instance,  what  modern  historical  presentation  could  be 
so  framed  as  to  exceed  in  strength,  broadness  and  color  the 
following  from  a  speech  delivered  in  the  United  States  Senate, 
March  4,  1858?  James  H.  Hammond,  representing  South 
Carolina,  then  said :  — 

"  But  if  there  were  no  other  reason  why  we  should  never  have 
war,  would  any  sane  nation  make  war  on  cotton  ?  Without  firing 
a  gun,  without  drawing  a  sword,  should  they  make  war  on  us  we 
could  bring  the  whole  world  to  our  feet.  The  South  is  perfectly 
competent  to  go  on  one,  two,  or  three  years  without  planting  a  seed 
of  cotton.  .  .  .  What  would  happen  if  no  cotton  was  furnished 
for  three  years?  I  will  not  stop  to  depict  what  every  one  can 
imagine,  but  this  is  certain :  England  would  topple  headlong  and 
carry  the  whole  civilized  world  with  her,  save  the  South.  No, 
you  dare  not  make  war  on  cotton.  No  power  on  earth  dares  to 
make  war  upon  it.  Cotton  is  King.  Until  lately  the  Bank  of 
England  was  king,  but  she  tried  to  put  her  screws  as  usual,  the 
fall  before  the  last,  upon  the  cotton  crop,  and  was  utterly  van- 
quished. The  last  power  has  been  conquered.  Who  can  doubt, 
that  has  looked  at  recent  events,  that  cotton  is  supreme?"  x 

It  would  not  be  difficult  to  multiply  almost  indefinitely 

utterances  like  the  above ;   but  for  the  purpose  in  hand  this 

1  Selections  from  the  Letters  and  Speeches  of  James  H.  Hammond  (New 
York,  1866),  pp.  316,  317. 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  253 

one  will  suffice.  Intensely  provincial,  the  idea  was  vulgarly 
commercial ;  in  the  jargon  of  the  Stock  Exchange,  the  South 
was  satisfied  that  she  had  in  her  hand  a  corner  on  Cotton, 
and,  if  she  so  willed  it,  the  World  must  walk  up  to  her 
counter,  and  settle  on  any  terms  she  saw  fit  to  prescribe ! 
As  Russell,  of  the  London  Times,  observed:  " These  tall, 
thin,  fine-faced  Carolinians  are  great  materialists.  Slavery 
perhaps  has  aggravated  the  tendency  to  look  at  all  the 
world  through  parapets  of  cotton-bales  and  rice-bags,  and, 
though  more  stately  and  less  vulgar,  the  worshippers  here 
are  not  less  prostrate  before  the  ' almighty  dollar'  than 
the  Northerners."  * 

Thus  in  complete  provincialism  and  childlike  faith  a  com- 
munity was  willing  to  venture,  and  actually  did  venture,  life, 
fortune  and  sacred  honor  on  its  contempt  for  those  composing 
the  largest  part  of  the  community  of  which  they  were  them- 
selves but  a  minority,  and  on  the  soundness  of  a  commercial 
theory.  In  regard  to  the  extent  and  implicit  character  of  the 
faith  held  on  both  these  points,  no  better  witness  could  testify 
than  Dr.  William  H.  Russell,  the  once  famous  Times  Crimean 
correspondent  just  referred  to.  Russell  certainly  had  no 
prejudice  against  the  South,  or  Southern  men.  On  the  con- 
trary, he  liked  both;  while  he  did  not  take  kindly  to  the 
North  as  a  whole,  or  to  its  people.  A  foreign  observer  with 
a  remarkable  faculty  for  vivid  description,  he  was  here  to 
take  notes  and  to  portray  things  as  they  appeared.  In 
South  Carolina  immediately  after  the  bombardment  of 
Sumter,  he  there  mixed  freely  with  the  exponents  of  public 
sentiment.  In  his  Diary  he  thus  describes  what  he  heard 
on  the  subject  of  Southern  superiority  and  cotton  supremacy, 
—  he  is  recording  what  occurred  at  the  Charleston  Club  on 
the  evening  of  April  16,  1861,  ex-governors  of  the  State, 
1  My  Diary  North  and  South,  Chap.  XV. 


254  MILITARY  STUDIES 

senators,  congressmen,  and  other  prominent  South  Carolinians 
being  of  the  company :  — 

"We  talked  long,  and  at  last  angrily,  as  might  be  between  friends, 
of  political  affairs. 

"I  own  it  was  a  little  irritating  to  me  to  hear  men  indulge  in  ex- 
travagant broad  menace  and  rodomontade,  such  as  came  from  their 
lips.  'They  would  welcome  the  world  in  arms  with  hospitable 
hands  to  bloody  graves.'  'They  never  could  be  conquered.' 
'Creation  could  not  do  it/  and  so  on.  I  was  obliged  to  handle  the 
question  quietly  at  first, — to  ask  them  'if  they  admitted  the 
French  were  a  brave  and  warlike  people  ! '  '  Yes,  certainly.' 
'Do  you  think  you  could  better  defend  yourselves  against  invasion 
than  the  people  of  France  ? '  '  Well,  no ;  but  we'd  make  it  pretty 
hard  business  for  the  Yankees.'  'Suppose  the  Yankees,  as  you 
call  them,  come  with  such  preponderance  of  men  and  materiel,  that 
they  are  three  to  your  one,  will  you  not  be  forced  to  submit?' 
'Never.'  'Then  either  you  are  braver,  better  disciplined,  more 
warlike  than  the  people  and  soldiers  of  France,  or  you  alone,  of  all 
the  nations  in  the  world,  possess  the  means  of  resisting  physical 
laws  which  prevail  in  war,  as  in  other  affairs  of  life.'  'No.  The 
Yankees  are  cowardly  rascals.  We  have  proved  it  by  kicking 
and  cuffing  them  till  we  are  tired  of  it ;  besides,  we  know  John  Bull 
very  well.  He  will  make  a  great  fuss  about  non-interference  at 
first,  but  when  he  begins  to  want  cotton  he'll  come  off  his  perch.' 
I  found  this  was  the  fixed  idea  everywhere.  The  doctrine  of 
'cotton  is  king'  —  to  us  who  have  not  much  considered  the  ques- 
tion a  grievous  delusion  or  an  unmeaning  babble  —  to  them  is 
a  lively  all-powerful  faith  without  distracting  heresies  or  schisms."1 

The  following  day,  Dr.  Russell  was  one  of  a  party  on  an  ex- 
cursion down  Charleston  harbor,  visiting  Forts  Sumter  and 
Moultrie.  In  the  course  of  the  trip  he  met,  among  others, 
L.  T.  Wigf  all,  the  notorious  Texan  who  had  recently  resigned 

1  My  Diary  North  and  South,  Chap.  XIII.  Later,  April  19,  the  Times 
correspondent  called  on  the  governor  of  the  State,  F.  W.  Pickens.  Of 
him  he  wrote:  "The  Governor  writes  very  good  proclamations,  never- 
theless, and  his  confidence  in  South  Carolina  is  unbounded.  If  we  stand 
alone,  sir,  we  must  win.     They  can't  whip  us."  — Ibid.  Chap.  XVI. 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  255 

a  seat  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  to  throw  in  his 
fortunes  with  the  Confederacy.  Dr.  Russell  says  in  his  Diary, 
April  17:  — 

"For  me  there  was  only  one  circumstance  which  marred  the 
pleasure  of  that  agreeable  reunion.  Colonel  and  Senator  Wigfall, 
who  had  not  sobered  himself  by  drinking  deeply,  in  the  plenitude 
of  his  exultation  alluded  to  the  assault  on  Senator  Sumner  as  a  type 
of  the  manner  in  which  the  Southerners  would  deal  with  the 
Northerners  generally,  and  cited  it  as  a  good  exemplification  of 
the  fashion  in  which  they  would  bear  their  'whipping.'"  1 

A  day  or  two  later,  Mr.  Bunch,  the  British  consul  at 
Charleston,  who  not  long  afterwards  achieved  a  most  unhappy 
diplomatic  notoriety,  entertained  Dr.  Russell  at  dinner.  It 
was  a  " small  and  very  agreeable  party,"  but  of  the  talk  at 
that  table  the  guest  recorded  :  — 

"It  was  scarcely  very  agreeable  to  my  host  or  myself  to  find  that 
no  considerations  were  believed  to  be  of  consequence  in  reference 
to  England  except  her  material  interests,  and  that  these  worthy 
gentlemen  regarded  her  as  a  sort  of  appanage  of  their  cotton  king- 
dom. 'Why,  sir,  we  have  only  to  shut  off  your  supply  of  cotton 
for  a  few  weeks,  and  we  can  create  a  revolution  in  Great  Britain. 
There  are  four  millions  of  your  people  depending  on  us  for  their 

1  A  month  later  Mr.  Wigfall  received,  through  his  wife,  from  a  corre- 
spondent in  Providence,  R.  I.,  an  ardent  sympathizer  with  the  Con- 
federacy, a  warning  curiously  characteristic  of  the  period,  and  most 
suggestive  of  the  estimate  in  which  the  Northern  community  was  then 
held  by  those  impregnated  with  Southern  ideals  :  — 

"I  think,  however,  that  you  at  the  South  are  wrong  to  undervalue  the 
courage  and  resources  of  the  Northern  States.  They  were  no  doubt  less 
accustomed  to  the  use  of  firearms  —  there  are  very  few  who  know  how 
to  ride,  and  they  are  less  fiery  in  their  impulses.  They  are  less  disposed 
to  fight,  but  they  are  not  cowardly  where  their  interests  are  concerned 
and  will  fight  for  their  money.  Where  their  property  is  at  stake  they  will 
not  hesitate  to  risk  their  lives.  ...  I  would  not  advise  you  of  the  South 
to  trust  too  much  in  the  idea  that  the  Northerners  will  not  fight ;  for  I 
believe  they  will,  and  their  numbers  are  overwhelming."  —  Mrs.  D.  G. 
Wright,  A  Southern  Girl  in  '61,  pp.  52,  53. 


256  MILITARY  STUDIES 

bread,  not  to  speak  of  the  many  millions  of  dollars.     No,  sir,  we 
know  that  England  must  recognize  us/  etc. 

"Liverpool  and  Manchester  have  obscured  all  Great  Britain  to 
the  Southern  eye.     I  confess  the  tone  of  my  friends  irritated  me." 

He  next  visited  the  leading  merchants,  bankers  and 
brokers :  — 

"In  one  office  I  saw  an  announcement  of  a  company  for  a  direct 
communication  by  steamers  between  a  southern  port  and  Europe. 
'When  do  you  expect  that  line  to  be  opened?'  I  asked.  'The 
United  States  cruisers  will  surely  interfere  with  it.'  'Why,  I 
expect,  sir/  replied  the  merchant,  'that  if  those  miserable  Yankees 
try  to  blockade  us,  and  keep  you  from  our  cotton,  you'll  just  send 
their  ships  to  the  bottom  and  acknowledge  us.  That  will  be 
before  autumn,  I  think.'  It  was  in  vain  I  assured  him  he  would 
be  disappointed.  'Look  out  there/  he  said,  pointing  to  the 
wharf,  on  which  were  piled  some  cotton  bales;  'there's  the 
key  will  open  all  our  ports,  and  put  us  into  John  Bull's  strong 
box  as  well.'" 

A  guest  shortly  after  on  the  island  plantation  of  Mr.  Tres- 
cot,  he  there  met  Edmund  Rhett,  a  member  of  a  family 
prominent  in  South  Carolina  public  life.  The  Rhett  dwell- 
ing house  and  plantation  were  on  Port  Royal  Island,  a  few 
miles  only  from  the  smaller  island  on  which  Mr.  Trescot 
dwelt.  They  thus  were  neighbors.  The  stranger  and  guest 
describes  the  South  Carolinian  as  "a,  very  intelligent  and 
agreeable  gentleman,"  but  from  his  lips  also  came  the  same 
old  story.  " 'Look/  he  said,  'at  the  fellows  who  are  sent  out 
by  Lincoln  to  insult  foreign  courts  by  their  presence/  I 
said  that  I  understood  Mr.  Adams  and  Mr.  Dayton  were  very 
respectable  gentlemen,  but  I  did  not  receive  any  sympathy ; 
in  fact,  a  neutral  who  attempts  to  moderate  the  violence  of 
either  side  is  very  like  an  ice  between  two  hot  plates.  Mr. 
Rhett  is  also  persuaded  that  the  Lord  Chancellor  sits  on  a 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  257 

cotton  bale.  'You  must  recognize  us,  sir,  before  the  end  of 
October.'  "* 

But  perhaps  the  curious  and  complete  state  of  misappre- 
hension, material  and  moral,  then  pervading  the  Southern 
community,  has  best  been  described  by  a  Southerner  who 
himself  at  the  time  shared  in  it  to  the  full  extent.  Writing 
nearly  fifty  years  later,  he  said,  speaking  of  the  very  time 
described  by  Russell  in  the  above  extracts:  "Two  ideas, 
however,  seemed  to  pervade  all  classes.  One  was  that  key- 
stone dogma  of  secession,  'Cotton  is  king/  the  other  that 
the  war  —  did  one  come  —  could  not  last  over  three  months. 
The  man  who  ventured  dissent  from  either  idea,  back  it  by 
what  logic  he  might,  was  looked  upon  as  an  idiot,  if  his 
disloyalty  was  not  broadly  hinted  at."  2 

As  respects  the  outcome  of  what  may  well  enough  be  called 
the  South's  cotton  campaign,  Mr.  Rhodes's  narrative  is 
again  distinctly  deficient.  In  fact  the  most  far-reaching, 
and,  in  world  effect,  the  most  important  of  all  the  cam- 
paigns inaugurated  and  carried  out  by  the  Confederacy,  in  its 
result  they  sustained  complete  and  disastrous  defeat,  — 
a  defeat  which  entailed  on  them  in  the  midst  of  the  contest 
and  in  presence  of  the  enemy,  an  entire  change  of  front, 
economical,  financial  and  diplomatic.  This  nowhere  appears 
in  Mr.  Bhodes's  narrative;  and  yet  on  this  phase  of  the 
struggle  both  Confederate  finance  and  Confederate  diplo- 
macy hinged.  And  here  again  the  blockade  comes  to  the 
front. 

Had  the  theory  as  respects  the  potency  of  cotton  on  which 

1  This  meeting  was  on  April  28.  A  few  days  only  more  than  six  months 
later  both  the  Rhetts  and  Mr.  Trescot  hurriedly  abandoned  their  homes, 
immediately  after  the  bombardment  and  capture  of  the  forts  at  Hilton 
Head,  November  7,  1861,  by  the  expedition  under  command  of  Captain, 
afterwards  Admiral,  Dupont.  All  of  the  South  Carolina  sea-islands,  as 
they  were  called,  were  thenceforth  occupied  by  the  Union  forces. 

2  T.  C.  De  Leon,  Belles,  Beaux  and  Brains  of  the  60' s  (1907),  p.  50. 


258  MILITARY  STUDIES 

the  South  went  into  the  war  been  sound,  the  blockade  would 
have  proved  the  Confederacy's  most  potent  ally;  for  the 
blockade  shut  off  from  Europe  its  supply  of  cotton  as  it  could 
have  been  shut  off  by  no  other  possible  agency.  In  so  far 
the  government  of  the  Union  played  the  game  of  the  Con- 
federacy, and  played  it  effectively.  In  the  early  days  of  the 
struggle,  they  talked  at  Richmond  of  an  export  duty  on  their 
one  great  staple,  and  of  inhibiting  its  outgo  altogether ;  the 
blockade  made  any  action  of  this  nature  quite  unnecessary. 
Through  the  blockade  the  cotton-screw,  so  to  speak,  was 
applied  to  the  fullest  possible  extent.  Nor  was  the  over- 
throw of  the  potentate  brought  about  easily.  He  was  well 
entrenched,  and  dethroning  him  entailed  on  the  commercial 
world  one  of  the  most  severe  trials  it  has  ever  been  called 
upon  to  pass  through.1  In  this  phase  of  the  struggle  Lanca- 
shire was  the  field  of  central  battle ;  and  there,  as  the  result 
of  a  torture  extending  through  eighteen  months,  the  Con- 
federate ikon  was  tumbled  down.  The  catastrophe  was 
complete;  and  the  whole  Southern  program,  economical, 
fiscal,  and,  at  last,  strategic,  where  it  did  not  utterly  col- 
lapse, underwent  great  change.  The  summer  of  1862 
marked  the  crisis ;  before  that,  as  Mr.  Rhodes  truly  states,2 
the  Confederate  policy  was  to  keep  cotton  at  home,  and  by 
withholding  it  to  compel  foreign  recognition;  after  that, 
the  one  effort  was  to  get  it  to  market  with  a  view  to  its 
conversion  into  ships,  munitions  of  war  and  necessaries  of 
life.  Mr.  Rhodes  disposes  of  this  crucial  Confederate  defeat 
lightly.  He  says:  "As  we  have  seen,  [England  and  France] 
when  they  could  not  get  cotton  from  America,  got  it  else- 
where." The  authority  on  which  this  statement  is  made 
does  not  appear ;  but  it  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  facts. 
In  the  early  months  of  1861  the  estimated  weekly  consump- 
*  Infra,  405.  2Vol.  V,  p.  382. 


SOME  PHASES   OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  259 

tion  of  cotton  in  Great  Britain  was  50,000  bales;  at  the 
close  of  1862  it  had  fallen  to  20,000  bales,  inferior  in  weight 
as  well  as  quality.  Indeed,  so  bad  was  the  quality  that  its 
manufacture  was  destructive  to  machinery.  Of  this  greatly 
reduced  quantity,  moreover,  a  considerable  portion  —  some 
twenty  per  cent  —  was  the  American  product,  run  through 
the  blockade.  So  great  was  the  dearth  that  in  September, 
1862,  the  staple,  which  two  years  before  had  sold  in  Liver- 
pool for  fourpence  a  pound,  had  gone  up  until  it  touched 
the  unheard-of  price  of  half  a  crown.  Cotton  simply  was 
not  forthcoming  from  any  quarter,  and  the  commercial 
world  was  everywhere  in  search  of  substitutes  for  it. 

To  this  subject  Mr.  Rhodes  might  well  have  devoted  a 
chapter.  As  it  stands,  it  is  a  case  of  anti-climax;  intro- 
duced with  a  loud  blast  of  trumpets,  the  potentate  simply 
vanishes,  —  like  Macbeth's  witches,  he  made  himself  air. 
How,  and  what  became  of  him,  nowhere  appears.  Judging 
by  Mr.  Rhodes's  narrative,  one  would  infer  that  it  was  a  case 
of  insensible  dissolution,  or,  as  Mr.  Lincoln  might  have 
phrased  it,  a  disappearance  "unbeknownst."  As  an  his- 
torical fact,  it  was  very  far  otherwise.1  Not  all  that  Mr. 
Hammond  and  others  predicted,  or  that  the  Confederate 
leaders  confidently  looked  to  see  happen,  actually  did 
happen;  but,  none  the  less,  the  process  involved  a  com- 
mercial and  industrial  disturbance  of  the  first  magnitude. 
The  episode,  too,  carried  with  it  a  most  instructive  historical 
lesson  as  to  the  danger  even  nations  incur  from  indulging 
with  undue  confidence  in  a  theory,  —  in  other  words,  the  old 
South  furnished  in  1860-1861  a  very  striking  illustration  of 
the  homely  truth  that  the  risks  incident  to  what  is  humanly 
known  as  a  condition  of  mental  "cocksureness"  are  not  con- 
fined to  individuals.     In  1861   that  whole  Southern  com- 

1  Infra,  315-318. 


260  MILITARY  STUDIES 

munity  was  socially  and  economically  daft.  But  no  people 
and  no  period  are  exempt  from  such  states  of  delusion. 
Within  the  memory  of  those  now  living,  this  country  has 
been  subject  to  a  dozen  such;  but,  fortunately,  as  respects 
the  extent  and  awful  character  of  the  consequences  of  a 
delusion,  the  experience  of  the  South  was  exceptional ;  for 
by  their  excess  of  over-confidence  and  utter  misconception 
of  the  real  facts  of  the  case  as  respects  the  world  at  large, 
as  well  as  both  themselves  and  their  immediate  opponent, 
the  people  of  the  South  brought  down  on  their  devoted 
heads  the  contents  of  the  vials  of  wrath  to  the  very  dregs 
thereof.  The  vividness  of  it  is  now  forgotten ;  but,  at  the 
time,  the  world-wide  supremacy  of  King  Cotton  was  a 
Southern  dream  from  which  the  awakening  must  have  been 
terribly  bitter. 

The  first  recorded  indication  of  this  awakening  may  be 
found  in  a  speech  made  by  William  L.  Yancey  at  an  im- 
promptu reception  given  him  in  the  rotunda  of  the  St. 
Charles  Hotel  at  New  Orleans,  on  his  return  in  March,  1862, 
from  that  wholly  abortive  mission  to  Europe  on  which  he 
had  been  sent  by  Jefferson  Davis  a  year  before.  He  had 
learned  something  in  the  course  of  his  travels,  and  he  then 
significantly  said:  "It  is  an  error  to  say  that  ' Cotton  is 
King/  It  is  not.  It  is  a  great  and  influential  power  in 
commerce,  but  not  its  dictator."  A  little  foreign  travel 
had  educated  that  particular  Southern  prophet  out  of  some 
of  his  provincialism.  Almost  immediately  his  words  found 
an  echo  in  Richmond,  a  Louisiana  senator  there  sadly 
declaring  in  debate,  "We  have  tested  the  powers  of  King 
Cotton  and  have  found  him  to  be  wanting."  l  While  three 
months  later,  in  June,  1862,  Alexander  H.  Stephens  enun- 

1  Apple  ton's  Annual  Cyclopaedia,  1862,  p.  261,  quoted  by  Rhodes, 
Vol.  V,  p.  411. 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  261 

ciated  too  late  the  correct  principle.  They  had  been  pos- 
sessed with  the  idea,  he  told  them,  that  "  cotton  was  a 
political  power.  There  was  the  mistake,  —  it  is  only  a 
commercial  power."  * 

Passing  to  the  other  topics  in  the  treatment  of  which  the 
narrative  of  Mr.  Rhodes,  though  sufficiently  full,  seems  from 
another  point  of  view  open  to  criticism,  reference  may  next 
be  made  to  his  account  of  Sherman's  famous  march  to  the 
sea  in  November,  1864,  and  Grant's  advance  on  Richmond 
in  May,  1864.  Mr.  Rhodes  quotes  General  Sherman  as  say- 
ing in  his  Memoirs:  "Were  I  to  express  my  measure  of  the 
relative  importance  of  the  March  to  the  Sea  and  of  that 
from  Savannah  northward,  I  would  place  the  former  at 
one  and  the  latter  at  ten,  or  the  maximum.'7  We  are  then 
told,  in  a  foot-note  to  the  same  page,2  that  General  Scho- 
field  was  of  a  different  opinion.  "Considered,"  he  said  in 
his  Forty-six  Years  (p.  348),  "as  to  its  military  results, 
Sherman's  march  cannot  be  regarded  as  more  than  I  have 
stated  —  a  grand  raid.  The  defeat  and  practical  destruc- 
tion of  Hood's  army  in  Tennessee  was  what  paved  the  way 
to  the  speedy  termination  of  the  war,  which  the  capture  of 
Lee  by  Grant  fully  accomplished ;  and  the  result  ought  to 
have  been  essentially  the  same  as  to  time  if  Sherman's  march 
had  never  been  made." 

1  What  is  known  as  the  alternative  Confederate  fiscal  policy  is  referred 
to,  and  discussed,  by  Mr.  Rhodes  (Vol.  V,  pp.  381,  382).  There  is  in  the 
appendix  to  Roman's  Life  of  Beauregard  (Vol.  II,  pp.  674-680)  an  elaborate 
letter  on  this  subject  written  by  Mr.  Stephens  to  Beauregard  in  1882, 
seventeen  years  after  the  close  of  the  struggle.  In  the  letter  he  quotes 
at  length  from  a  speech  made  by  him  at  Crawfordville,  Ga.,  in  the 
fall  of  1862.  He  then  said  :  "The  great  error  of  those  who  supposed  that 
King  Cotton  would  compel  the  English  ministry  to  recognize  our  govern- 
ment and  break  the  blockade,  and  who  will  look  for  the  same  result  from 
the  total  abandonment  of  its  culture,  consists  in  mistaking  the  nature  of 
the  kingdom  of  the  potentate.  His  power  is  commercial  and  financial, 
not  political."  2  Vol.  V,  p.  107. 


262  MILITARY  STUDIES 

On  this  point  Mr.  Rhodes  expresses  no  opinion.  He  wisely 
leaves  it  for  the  military  critics  to  fight  it  out  among  them- 
selves. At  the  time,  however,  and  in  Europe,  this  view  of 
the  relative  importance  of  operations  did  not  obtain.  Far 
from  it.  Schofield,  of  course,  refers  to  Sherman's  march 
north  from  Savannah,  through  the  Carolinas;  but  it  is 
open  to  grave  doubt  whether  his  estimate  of  the  strategic 
importance  of  that  march,  or  Sherman's  estimate  of  its  rela- 
tive importance  as  compared  with  that  through  Georgia,  are 
either  of  them  correct.  While,  so  far  as  the  fall  of  the  Con- 
federacy was  concerned,  both  exercised  great  influence  on 
the  outcome,  there  is  good  ground  for  belief  that  the  march 
through  Georgia  was  the  more  potent  in  influence  of  the 
two.  It  was  so  for  an  obvious  reason.  In  war,  as  in  most 
other  affairs  in  which  mankind  gets  itself  involved,  moral 
effects  count  for  a  good  deal ;  and  especially  is  this  so  with 
somewhat  volatile  and  excitable  communities,  such  as  that 
inhabiting  the  South  unquestionably  was.  But,  so  far  as 
Europe  was  concerned,  it  is  safe  to  assert  that  no  other 
operation  of  the  entire  war  was  productive  of  a  moral  effect 
in  any  way  comparable  with  that  caused  by  the  march  to 
the  sea.  Indeed,  coming  as  it  did  and  when  it  did,  it  is  not 
too  much  to  say  it  was  an  epochal  event  in  that  it  marked 
the  turning  of  the  tide  of  European  and  especially  of  English 
opinion  as  respects  the  United  States  and  things  American. 

James  Russell  Lowell  wrote  in  those  years  a  well-remem- 
bered essay  "Upon  a  Certain  Condescension  in  Foreigners"; 
and,  during  the  earlier  stages  of  the  Civil  War,  this  "  con- 
descension" resolved  itself  quite  naturally  into  a  studied 
tone  of  scorn,  in  no  way  veiled.  The  change  which  has  since 
become  so  marked  in  this  respect  began  with  Sherman's 
march.  That  march  in  a  way  smote  the  foreign  imagina- 
tion;   and    the    whole    course    of    subsequent    events    has 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  263 

served  to  promote  what  has  now  developed  into  a  revolution 
in  tone  and  estimate.  As  every  one  realizes,  Lowell's  "  for- 
eigner" has  undergone  a  total  change;  his  " condescension" 
is  of  the  past.  The  beginning  of  that  change  may  best 
perhaps  be  traced  through  the  utterances  of  the  European 
press.  Up  to  the  autumn  of  1864,  and  the  reelection  of 
Lincoln,  the  general  tone  of  the  European  and  especially  of 
the  English  periodicals  and  papers  was  one  of  exaggerated 
admiration  for  Confederate  valor  and  leadership;  while,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  leadership  and  courage  of  the  Union 
side  were  referred  to  with  studied  contumely.  Sometimes, 
however,  the  contempt  was  equally  distributed  over  both 
parties  to  the  fray.  The  famous  remark  attributed  at  least 
to  Von  Moltke  is  still  remembered,  that  he  "did  not  have 
time  to  devote  to  the  study  of  the  combats  of  two  armed 
mobs."  But  a  much  more  curious  and  illustrative  utter- 
ance was  one  of  Charles  Lever,  the  Irish  military  novelist, 
who,  most  unfortunately  for  himself,  chose  as  the  time  and 
place  in  which  to  deliver  himself  the  January  Blackwood's 
of  1865.  The  paper  was,  of  course,  prepared  some  time 
before.  By  mere  ill  luck,  however,  it  appeared  in  London 
just  as  Sherman  put  in  his  appearance  at  Savannah.  In  this 
paper  Mr.  Lever  undertook  to  compare  the  American  com- 
batants to  two  inmates  of  a  lunatic  asylum  playing  chess. 
They  went  through  moves  similar  to  those  of  chess,  but 
without  the  slightest  comprehension  of  the  game.  He  then 
goes  on:  "Now,  does  not  this  immensely  resemble  what 
we  are  witnessing  this  moment  in  America?  There  are  the 
two  madmen  engaged  in  a  struggle,  not  one  single  rule  nor 
maxim  of  which  they  comprehend.  Moving  cavalry  like 
infantry,  artillery  like  a  wagon  train,  violating  every  princi- 
ple of  the  game,  till  at  length  one  cries  Checkmate,  and  the 
other,   accepting  the  defeat  that  is   claimed    against  him, 


264  MILITARY  STUDIES 

deplores  his  mishap,  and  sets  to  work  for  another  contest. 
.  .  .  Just,  however,  as  I  feel  assured,  nobody  who  ever 
played  chess  would  have  dignified  with  that  name  the 
strange  performance  of  the  madmen,  so  am  I  convinced  that 
none  would  call  this  struggle  a  war.  It  is  a  fight  —  a  very 
big  fight,  if  you  will,  and  a  very  hard  fight  too,  but  not 
war." l  There  is  much  more  to  the  same  effect,  the  intensely 
ludicrous  side  of  which  at  just  that  juncture  the  genial 
Irishman  himself  subsequently  appreciated  most  keenly. 
What  I  have  quoted  will,  however,  suffice  for  the  purpose  of 
present  illustration.  At  the  very  time  Mr.  Lever  was  thus 
rashly  committing  himself  in  cold  print,  General  Sherman 
was  entering  on  his  famous  march;  and,  while  that  march 
was  in  progress,  the  daily  tone  of  the  London  newspapers 
was  pitched  in  much  the  same  key  as  that  of  Mr.  Lever's 
lucubration  in  the  forthcoming  number  of  Blackwood's.  The 
outcome  of  the  move  of  the  " Yankee"  general  was  looked 
for  with  a  contemptuous  interest:  it  clearly  was  not  war; 
a  harebrained  effort,  dictated  probably  by  desperation,  it 
could  end  only  in  disaster;  most  probably  it  was  an  ill- 
considered  attempt  at  getting  out  of  an  impossible  military 
situation.  But  one  day  the  tidings  came  that  the  heads  of 
Sherman's  columns  had  emerged  on  the  sea-coast,  that  they 
had  made  short  work  of  the  forces  there  found  to  oppose 
them,  and  that  Savannah  had  fallen.  The  Union  army  and 
the  Union  navy  had  struck  hands !  The  announcement 
seemed  absolutely  to  take  away  the  breath  of  the  foreign 
critics,  —  social,  military,  journalistic.  An  undeniably  orig- 
inal and  brilliant  strategic  blow  had  been  struck ;  an  opera- 
tion, the  character  of  which  could  neither  be  ignored  nor 

1  Cornelius  O'Dowd  upon  Men  and  Women  and  other  Things  in  General, 
Part  XII,  The  Fight  over  the  Way.  Blackwood's  Edinburgh  Magazine, 
Vol.  XCVII,  pp.  57-59, 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  265 

mistaken,  had  been  triumphantly  carried  through  to  a 
momentous  result ;  the  thrust  —  and  such  a  thrust !  —  had 
penetrated  the  vitals  of  the  Confederacy ;  —  what  next  ? 
From  that  moment  the  end  was  plainly  foreshadowed. 
Europe  recognized  that  a  new  power  of  unknown  strength, 
but  undeniable  military  capacity,  was  thenceforth  to  be 
reckoned  with. 

To  one  feature,  and  one  feature  only,  in  Mr.  Rhodes's 
account  of  this  memorable  war  episode,  is  there  occasion 
here  to  allude.  The  historian  passes  somewhat  gently  over 
the  pronounced  vandalism  which  characterized  Sherman's 
operations  from  Atlanta  to  Savannah ;  and  yet  more  from 
Savannah  to  Raleigh.  It  is  referred  to,  indeed,  both  gen- 
erally, and  more  especially  in  connection  with  what  occurred 
in  South  Carolina,  reaching  a  climax  at  Columbia;  but  the 
treatment  is,  notwithstanding,  distinctly  perfunctory.1  The 
other  and  more  realistic  side  is  portrayed  in  sufficient  detail, 
and  with  reference  to  chapter  and  verse,  in  General  Bradley 
T.  Johnson's  Life  of  Joseph  E.  Johnston.2  It  there  appears 
what  Sherman  meant  by  his  famous  aphorism  "War  is 
Hell."  The  truth  is  that  in  1864-1865  the  conflict  had 
lasted  too  long  for  the  patience  of  the  combatants.  The  de- 
fence of  the  South  had  been  unreasonably  stubborn.  The  rules 
and  limitations  of  civilized  warfare,  so  far  as  non-combatants 

1  J'lt  seems  probable  that  the  inhabitants  of  North  Carolina  were  better 
treated  than  had  been  those  of  the  sister  State.  Nevertheless  correction 
of  the  bad  habits  engendered  in  the  soldiery  by  the  system  of 
foraging  upon  the  country  was  only  gradually  accomplished  and  the  ir- 
regular work  of  stragglers  was  not  circumscribed  by  State  boundary  lines. 
.  .  .  The  men  who  followed  Sherman  were  probably  more  humane  gen- 
erally than  those  in  almost  any  European  army  that  marched  and  fought 
before  our  Civil  War,  but  any  invading  host  in  the  country  of  the  enemy 
is  a  terrible  scourge.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  considerable  Southern 
evidence  of  depredations  committed  by  Wheeler's  cavalry." — Vol.  V, 
pp.  102,  104. 

2  Chaps.  XI,  XII,  XIII,  pp.  119-225. 


266  MILITARY  STUDIES 

were  concerned,  were  no  longer  observed,  and  Sherman's 
advancing  army  was  enveloped  and  followed  by  a  cloud  of 
irresponsible  stragglers,  known  throughout  the  country  as 
" bummers,"  who  were  simply  for  the  time  being  desperadoes 
bent  on  pillage  and  destruction,  — subject  to  no  discipline, 
amenable  to  no  law.  They  were  looked  upon  then  by  the 
North,  weary  of  the  war,  with  a  half-humorous  leniency ;  but, 
in  reality,  a  band  of  Goths,  their  existence  was  a  disgrace  to 
the  cause  they  professed  to  serve.  It  is  not  a  pleasant 
admission,  but  the  historic,  if  ungrateful,  truth  is  that,  as 
respects  what  are  euphemistically  termed  the  " severities" 
of  warfare,  the  record  made  by  our  armies  during  the  latter 
stages  of  the  conflict  will  not  bear  comparison  with  that  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  while  in  Pennsylvania 
during  the  Gettysburg  campaign.1  Lee's  memorable  general 
order  (No.  73)  dated  at  Chambersburg,  June  27,  1863, 
is  well  known,  and  need  not  be  quoted ;  but  there  was 
truth  in  the  reference  to  those  opposed  to  him  when  in 
it  he  said,  "No  greater  disgrace  could  befall  the  army, 
and  through  it  our  whole  people,  than  the  perpetration 
of  barbarous  outrages  upon  the  unarmed  and  defence- 
less, and  the  wanton  destruction  of  private  property,  that 
have  marked  the  course  of  the  enemy  in  our  own  country. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  we  make  war  only  upon  armed 
men."  Our  own  methods  during  the  final  stages  of  the 
conflict  were  sufficiently  described  by  General  Sheridan, 
when,  during  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  as  the  guest  of  Bis- 
marck, he  declared  against  humanity  in  warfare,  contending 
that  the  correct  policy  was  to  treat  a  hostile  population  with 
the  utmost  rigor,  leaving  them,  as  he  expressed  it,  "  nothing 
but  their  eyes  to  weep  with  over  the  war."  2 

1  Infra,  308. 

2  Infra,  294. 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  267 

In  other  words,  a  veteran  of  our  civil  strife,  General  Sheri- 
dan, advocated  in  an  enemy's  country  the  sixteenth-century 
practices  of  Tilly,  described  by  Schiller,  and  the  later  devas- 
tation of  the  Palatinate  policy  of  Louis  XIV,  commemorated 
by  Goethe.  In  the  twenty-first  century,  perhaps,  partisan 
feeling  as  regards  the  Civil  War  performances  having  by 
that  time  ceased  to  exist,  American  investigators,  no  longer 
regardful  of  a  victor's  self-complacency,  may  treat  the  epi- 
sodes of  our  struggle  with  the  same  even-handed  and  out- 
spoken impartiality  with  which  Englishmen  now  treat  the 
revenges  of  the  Restoration,  or  Frenchmen  the  dragonnades 
of  the  Grand  Monarque.  But  when  that  time  comes,  the 
page  relating  to  what  occurred  in  1864  in  the  valley  of  the 
Shenandoah,  in  Georgia,  and  in  the  Carolinas,  —  a  page 
which  Mr.  Rhodes  somewhat  lightly  passes  over,  —  will 
probably  be  rewritten  in  characters  of  far  more  decided 
import. 

One  final  topic;  dealt  with  by  Mr.  Rhodes  in  his  fourth 
volume  rather  than  in  the  fifth,  it  still  occupies  a  prominent 
place  in  his  narrative,  and  its  treatment  necessarily  involves 
a  man  who,  first  and  last,  for  good  or  evil,  will  assuredly 
stand  forth  in  history  as  one  of  Massachusetts'  most  conspic- 
uous contributions  to  our  Great  Rebellion  period.  The  topic 
is  that  Virginia  campaign  which  made  sadly  memorable  the 
spring  and  summer  of  1864;  the  individual,  General  B.  F. 
Butler.  It  may  well  be  questioned  whether  Mr.  Rhodes 
has  either  done  justice,  or  fully  meted  out  justice,  to  the  epi- 
sode or  to  the  man. 

And,  primarily,  something  remains  to  be  said  of  Grant's 
strategy  in  that  campaign,  no  less  memorable  than  bloody. 
Reasons  might  readily  be  adduced  for  deeming  the  plan  for 
the  operations  this  campaign  necessarily  involved  much 
better  considered,  and  more  creditable  to  him,  than  would 


268  MILITARY  STUDIES 

be  inferred  from  Mr.  Rhodes's  narrative.  Mr.  Rhodes 
then,  secondarily,  fails  to  place  where  it  belongs  the  grave 
responsibility  for  the  failure  of  Grant's  plan  with  the  awful 
loss  of  life  therein  involved.  Grant's  original  scheme  as- 
sumed the  active  and  harmonious  cooperation  of  three  dis- 
tinct armies,  — that  of  the  Potomac,  under  General  Meade ; 
that  of  the  James,  operating  in,  or  from,  the  military  de- 
partment of  which  General  Butler  was  in  command,  but 
with  General  W.  F.  Smith  in  immediate  charge  of  field 
movements;  and,  finally  the  Ninth  Corps,  15,000  strong, 
under  General  Burnside.  Grant  himself,  with  independent 
and  movable  headquarters,  was  present  in  the  field  of  opera- 
tions, thereby  insuring  the  necessary  concentration  and 
directness  of  movement.  Meade,  with  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  was  to  advance  and  engage  Lee,  holding  the  Con- 
federate army  of  Northern  Virginia  fully  occupied ;  Burnside, 
meanwhile,  was  to  be  in  reserve,  immediately  in  Meade's  rear ; 
and,  while  Lee  was  thus  occupied,  the  Army  of  the  James, 
composed  of  two  corps,  the  Tenth  and  Eighteenth,  and  in 
all  some  35,000  to  40,000  strong,  was  to  push  forward  vigor- 
ously, threatening  Richmond,  and  jeopardizing  Lee's  com- 
munications. Thus  an  important,  if  not  vital,  part  in  the 
plan  of  operations  depended  on  the  Army  of  the  James. 
Opposed  to  that  completely  equipped  and  numerically  for- 
midable command,  was  a  wholly  inadequate  and  widely 
scattered  force  under  General  Beauregard,  recently  (April  15) 
assigned  to  duty,  and  not  yet  on  the  ground.1  If  by  an 
offensive  movement,  intelligently  conceived  and  skilfully  as 
well  as  vigorously  handled,  the  Confederate  line  could  be 
broken  and  thrown  back  into  Richmond,  Lee's  rear  would 

1  Beauregard  was  at  Weldon,  N.  C,  from  April  22  to  May  10,  wait- 
ing the  development  of  the  Union  plan  of  campaign.  He  did  not  reach 
Petersburg  until  May  10. 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  269 

be  exposed,  his  lines  of  communication  threatened,  and  he 
must,  abandoning  Richmond,  have  fallen  back  towards 
Lynchburg  or  the  Carolinas.  Grant  then  proposed  to  follow 
him  up,  hanging  doggedly  on  his  rear,  and  catch  Lee  be- 
tween an  upper  and  a  nether  millstone,  —  the  Army  of  the 
James  holding  him  in  check  until  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
hurrying  up,  could  force  a  decisive  battle. 

Grant's  orders  were  framed  accordingly.  To  Meade  he 
wrote:  "Lee's  army  will  be  your  objective  point.  Wher- 
ever Lee  goes,  there  you  will  go  also.  Gillmore  will  join 
Butler  with  about  10,000  men  from  South  Carolina.  Butler 
can  reduce  his  [Fortress  Monroe  garrison]  so  as  to  take 
23,000  men  into  the  field  directly  to  his  front.  The  force 
will  be  commanded  by  Major-General  W.  F.  Smith.  With 
Smith  and  Gillmore,  Butler  will  seize  City  Point,  and  operate 
against  Richmond  from  the  south  side  of  the  river.  His 
movement  will  be  simultaneous  with  yours."1  At  the  same 
time  Grant  wrote  to  Butler  as  follows:  Major-General 
Smith  "is  ordered  to  report  to  you  to  command  the  troops 
sent  into  the  field  from  your  own  department.  .  .  .  The 
fact  that  Richmond  is  to  be  your  objective  point,  and  that 
there  is  to  be  cooperation  between  your  force  and  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  must  be  your  guide."  Butler  was  at  once 
to  seize  City  Point,  and  there,  Grant  wrote,  "concentrate  all 
your  troops  for  the  field  as  rapidly  as  you  can.  From  City 
Point  directions  cannot  be  given  at  this  time  for  your  further 
movements."  Holding  a  firm  base  on  the  south  bank  of  the 
James,  the  force  from  Butler's  department,  under  the  field 
command  of  Smith,  was  thus  left  free  to  move  in  any  direc- 
tion its  commander  saw  fit;  and  "should  the  enemy  be 
forced  into  his  intrenchments  in  Richmond,  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  would  follow,  and  by  means  of  transports  the 

1  Grant  to  Meade,  April  9,  1864,  Personal  Memoirs,  Vol.  II,  p.  135. 


270  MILITARY  STUDIES 

two  armies  would  become  a  unit." *  Such  were  Butler's 
instructions;  meanwhile  of  Smith,  who  was  "to  command 
the  troops  sent  into  the  field/'  Grant  at  the  same  time  wrote 
to  Halleck,  General  Smith  "is  possessed  of  one  of  the  clearest 
military  heads  in  the  army;  is  very  practical  and  indus- 
trious. No  man  in  the  service  is  better  qualified  than  he 
for  our  largest  commands."2  General  Smith  "is  really  one 
of  the  most  efficient  officers  in  service,  readiest  in  expedients, 
and  most  skilful  in  the  management  of  troops  in  action."3 
Grant's  orders  were  defective  in  one  respect.  Given  neces- 
sarily to  Butler  as  the  major-general  commanding  the 
Military  Department,  they  did  not,  regardless  of  Butler's 
feelings,  ambitions  or  desires,  distinctly  specify  that  he  was 
to  confine  himself  strictly  to  departmental  duties,  with  his 
headquarters  at  Norfolk  or  at  Fortress  Monroe,  leaving 
Smith  in  full  command  of  all  operations  in  the  field  and  in 
direct  communication  with  Grant  himself.  Grant  was  yet 
to  make  himself  acquainted  with  Butler's  peculiarities  as  a 
man  and  his  military  limitations.  Butler,  in  no  way  dis- 
posed to  be  ignored  or  relegated  to  purely  departmental 
functions,  availed  himself  of  the  opportunity  thus  afforded, 
and  assumed  full  field  command.  Grant  acquiesced,  evi- 
dently hoping  that  Butler  would  in  active  operations  allow 
himself  to  be  guided  by  Smith. 

Such,  however,  was  in  no  way  Butler's  purpose.  Eager 
for  military  distinction,  inordinately  self-confident  until 
face-to-face  with  an  opponent  in  actual  battle,  when,  on  the 
night  of  May  5,  the  Army  of  the  James  was  landed  from 
the  transports  at  Bermuda  Hundreds,  Butler  was  there  in 
full  command.     The  movement  was  a  complete  surprise  to 

1  Grant  to  Butler,  April  2,  1864,  Butler's  Book,  p.  630 ;  War  Records, 
Serial  No.  95,  p.  15. 

2  Grant  to  Stanton,  November  12,  1863,  Chattanooga  to  Petersburg,  p.  15. 

3  Grant  to  Halleck,  July  1,  1864,  ibid.  p.  29. 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE   CIVIL  WAR  271 

the  Confederates.  By  mere  chance  General  Hagood's  South 
Carolina  brigade  was  on  its  way  to  Richmond.  Suddenly 
called  into  field  service  from  garrison  duty  at  Charleston,  the 
men  composing  it  were  little  better  than  militia,  and,  as  sub- 
sequent operations  showed,  unreliable  in  presence  of  resolute 
attack.1  A  detachment  of  this  brigade,  some  600  strong,  had 
been  pushed  forward  by  rail  from  Petersburg,  and  as  the 
men  jumped  off  the  platform  cars  at  Walthall  Junction  a 
little  before  five  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  May  6,  to  their 
complete  surprise  they  found  themselves  in  the  presence  of  a 
brigade  of  the  Army  of  the  James,  thrown  forward  by  Butler 
to  seize  the  railroad  at  that  point.  The  Confederate  de- 
tachment had  no  artillery  and  no  supports.  Those  compos- 
ing it  should  have  been  incontinently  captured;  but  the 
opportunity,  a  great  one,  was  lost.  A  weak  attack  was  re- 
pulsed; and,  according  to  the  Confederate  rendering,  "Thus 
were  Petersburg  and  Richmond  barely  saved  by  the  oppor- 
tune presence  and  gallant  conduct  of  Hagood's  command. 
It  was  upon  that  occasion  that  General  Butler's  forces  were 
baffled  and  beaten  off  in  their  attempt  to  seize  the  Richmond 
railroad  above  Petersburg." 2  "The  authorities  at  Rich- 
mond were  now  in  a  state  of  great  excitement.  The  enemy 
had  been  repulsed  on  the  Richmond  railroad,  and,  to  all 
appearance,  had  abandoned  his  original  intention  of  investing 
Petersburg ;  but  where  he  would  next  attempt  to  strike  was 
the  all-absorbing  question. "  3  At  this  juncture  Beauregard 
had  not  yet  arrived  from  Weldon ;  nor  were  there  3000  men 
all  told  south  of  Walthall  Junction,  or  available  for  the  de- 
fence of  Petersburg.  The  key  to  the  whole  military  situa- 
tion was  unprotected.  "Meanwhile  troops  were  hastily 
called  for  from  all  quarters,"  and  on  the  10th  Beauregard 

1  Hagood,  Memoirs,  221,  224. 

2  Roman,  Beauregard,  Vol.  II,  p.  198.  •  Ibid.  p.  199. 


272  MILITARY  STUDIES 

arrived,  with  the  first  body  of  reinforcements.  The  golden 
opportunity  was  rapidly  passing.  On  the  evening  of  the 
9th  Generals  Gillmore  and  Smith,  being  then  at  Swift's 
Creek,  about  four  miles  north  of  Petersburg,  united  in  a 
written  communication  to  General  Butler  suggesting  that 
the  whole  command  should  be  directed  on  Petersburg,  in- 
stead of  Richmond,  as  previously  agreed.  They  claimed 
that  "all  the  work  of  cutting  the  [railjroad,  and  perhaps 
capturing  the  city,  can  be  accomplished  in  one  day."  Re- 
fusing even  to  consider  the  suggestion,  General  Butler,  the 
same  evening,  returned  a  reply  beginning  as  follows :  — 

"  Generals,  —  While  I  regret  an  infirmity  of  purpose  which  did 
not  permit  you  to  state  to  me,  when  I  was  personally  present,  the 
suggestion  which  you  made  in  your  written  note,  but  left  me  to 
go  to  my  headquarters  under  the  impression  that  another  and 
far  different  purpose  was  advised  by  you,  I  shall  not  yield  to  the 
written  suggestions,  which  imply  a  change  of  plan  made  within 
thirty  minutes  after  I  left  you.  Military  affairs  cannot  be  carried 
on,  in  my  judgment,  with  this  sort  of  vacillation.  The  informa- 
tion I  have  received  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  convinces  me 
that  our  demonstration  should  be  toward  Richmond,  and  I  shall 
in  no  way  order  a  crossing  of  the  Appomattox  for  the  purpose 
suggested  in  your  note."  l 

The  date  of  this  correspondence  (May  9)  is  important. 
The  battle  of  the  Wilderness  had  been  fought  on  May  5 
and  6,  that  of  Spottsylvania  was  to  begin  on  May  10,  and 
not  until  the  12th  was  the  famous  assault  made  on  Lee's 
salient.  The  Confederate  army  was  hard  pressed.  To 
what  extent  at  just  this  juncture  would  sudden  tidings  of 
the  capture  of  Petersburg,  and  the  consequent  severing  of 
his  line  of  southern  sea-coast  communication,  have  affected 
Lee's  mind  and  the  entire  strategic  situation?     And  it  was 

1  War  Records,  Serial  No.  68,  p.  35. 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  273 

just  then  that  Butler,  contemptuously  and  insolently  ignor- 
ing the  recommendations  of  his  two  subordinates,  allowed 
Beauregard  to  establish  himself  at  Petersburg,  while  the 
Army  of  the  James  made  "a  demonstration"  toward  Rich- 
mond !  In  his  official  report  of  the  whole  campaign  Grant 
subsequently  said  of  this  "demonstration"  that  "the  time 
thus  consumed  lost  to  us  the  benefit  of  the  surprise  and 
capture  of  Richmond  and  Petersburg,  enabling,  as  it  did, 
Beauregard  to  collect  his  loose  forces  in  North  and  South 
Carolina,  and  bring  them  to  the  defence  of  those  places." * 
The  occasion  was  great,  and  Beauregard  showed  himself 
equal  to  it.  Rapidly  concentrating  his  scattered  and  scanty 
command,  he,  on  the  15th,  assumed  the  offensive.  The 
next  day  (16th)  he  attacked  Butler  at  Drewry's  Bluff. 
"Butler's  army  was  driven  back,  hemmed  in,  and  reduced 
to  comparative  impotency,  though  not  captured.  The 
danger  threatening  Richmond  was,  for  the  time  being, 
averted."  2 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  at  that  juncture  fighting  at 
Spottsylvania  fiercely  and  futilely,  and  not  until  June  3,  a 
fortnight  later,  did  the  slaughter  of  Cold  Harbor  occur.  The 
great  opportunity  of  May  9,  pointed  out  to  Butler  by  his 
lieutenants,  had  been  allowed  wholly  to  escape;  Lee's  rear 
and  communications  were  secure ;  Butler  was  safely  "bottled 
up";  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  sorely  crippled,  had  sus- 
tained losses  as  heavy  as  they  were  unnecessary;  Grant's 
whole  plan  of  campaign  had  gone  to  pieces.  Had  Butler  on 
May  9,  correctly  taking  in  the  military  situation,  complied 
with  the  suggestion  of  his  two  corps  commanders,  Petersburg 
must  have  fallen  into  his  hands;  Lee  would  perforce  have 
been  compelled  to  fall  back  on  Richmond ;  the  Cold  Harbor 

1  War  Records,  Serial  No.  95,  p.  19. 

2  Roman,  Beauregard,  Vol.  II,  p.  209. 


274  MILITARY  STUDIES 

assaults  would  not  have  occurred ;  and  all  subsequent  opera- 
tions would  have  been  other  than  they  were. 

Prior  to  this,  May  7,  General  Butler  had  written  a  letter 
marked  "  Confidential "  to  Senator  Wilson  of  Massachusetts, 
then  on  the  Senate  Military  Committee,  beginning  thus: 
"My  Dear  Sir:  —  I  must  take  the  responsibility  of  asking 
you  to  bring  before  the  Senate  at  once  the  name  of  General 
Gillmore,  and  have  his  name  rejected  by  your  body.'7  Nomi- 
nated for  promotion  to  the  rank  of  Major-General,  the  nomi- 
nation of  General  Gillmore  was  then  pending.1  Under  such 
circumstances  the  state  of  affairs  in  the  Army  of  the  James 
not  unnaturally  became  in  May  so  unsatisfactory  that  Gen- 
eral Ilalleck  at  the  request  of  General  Grant  sent  (May  21) 
Generals  Meigs  and  Barnard  to  investigate.  On  the  24th 
they  gave  it  as  their  opinion  that  "an  officer  of  military  ex- 
perience and  knowledge  [should  be  placed]  in  command. 
.  .  .  General  Butler  .  .  .  has  not  experience  and  training  to 
enable  him  to  direct  and  control  movements  in  battle.  .  .  . 
General  Butler  evidently  desires  to  retain  command  in  the 
field.  If  his  desires  must  be  gratified,  withdraw  Gillmore, 
place  Smith  in  command  of  both  corps  under  the  supreme 
command  of  Butler.  .  .  .  You  will  thus  have  a  command 
which  will  be  a  unit,  and  General  Butler  will  probably  be 
guided  by  Smith,  and  leave  to  him  the  suggestions  and  prac- 
tical execution  of  army  movements  ordered.  Success  would 
be  more  certain  were  Smith  in  command  untrammelled,  and 
General  Butler  remanded  to  the  administrative  duties  of  the 
departments."  2  Difficulties  naturally  suggested  themselves 
to  the  adoption  of  the  course  thus  recommended.  General 
Gillmore  was  relieved  of  his  command  early  in  June,3  and 

1  Butler's  Book,  pp.  644,  1065. 

2  War  Records,  Serial  No.  69,  p.  178. 

3  Butler's  Book,  p.  679. 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  275 

the  ill-feeling  between  Butler  and  Smith  culminated,  June 
21,  in  a  characteristic  and  extremely  sharp  correspondence/ 
as  a  result  of  which  General  Smith  requested  to  be  relieved  of 
the  command  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps.  Then  followed  one 
of  the  most  extraordinary  and  inexplicable  episodes  of  the 
war.  Grant  wrote  (July  1)  to  Halleck,  advising  him  of  the 
situation.  He  said:  "I  regret  the  necessity  of  asking  for  a 
change  of  commanders  here,  but  General  Butler,  not  being  a 
soldier  by  education  or  experience,  is  in  the  hands  of  his  sub- 
ordinates in  the  execution  of  all  orders  military."  Grant, 
however,  hesitated  "to  recommend  his  [Butler's]  retire- 
ment." 2  This  brought  out  a  most  suggestive  reply  (July  3) 
from  Halleck.  In  it  he  said  :  "It  was  foreseen  from  the  first 
that  you  would  eventually  find  it  necessary  to  relieve  Gen- 
eral B.  on  account  of  his  total  unfitness  to  command  in  the 
field,  and  his  generally  quarrelsome  character."  3  The  Chief 
of  Staff  then  went  on  to  discuss  the  several  dispositions  which 
might  be  made  of  Butler,  significantly  pointing  out  the  dan- 
ger to  be  apprehended  from  "his  talent  at  political  intrigue, 
and  his  facilities  for  newspaper  abuse."  He  finally  suggested, 
"Why  not  leave  General  Butler  in  the  local  command  of  his 
department,  including  North  Carolina,  Norfolk,  Fort  Monroe, 
Yorktown,  &c,  and  make  a  new  army  corps  of  the  part  of  the 
Eighteenth  under  Smith."  The  letter  closed  with  a  sen- 
tence indicative  of  the  personal  apprehension  General  Butler 
seemed  to  excite  in  the  breasts  of  those  put  in  any  position 
antagonistic  to  him.  The  official  Chief  of  Staff  said :  "As 
General  Butler  claims  to  rank  me,  I  shall  give  him  no  orders 
wherever  he  may  go,  without  the  special  direction  of  yourself 
or  the  Secretary  of  War."     Three  days  later,  July  6,  Grant 

1  War  Records,  Serial  No.  81,  pp.  299-301 ;  From  Chattanooga  to  Peters- 
burg, pp.  28,  155,  186-188. 

2  War  Records,  Serial  No.  81,  p.  559.  3  Ibid.  p.  598. 


276  MILITARY  STUDIES 

wrote  to  Halleck:  "Please  obtain  an  order  assigning  the 
troops  of  the  Department  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina 
serving  in  the  field  to  the  command  of  Major-General  W.  F. 
Smith,  and  order  Major-General  Butler,  commanding  depart- 
ment, to  his  headquarters,  Fortress  Monroe."  This  request 
was  simply  a  reversion,  after  the  mischief  had  been  done,  to 
Grant's  original  plan  of  operations ;  and,  in  accordance  with 
it  General  Order  No.  225  was  at  once  issued.  Curiously 
enough,  the  original  order,  forwarded  both  to  Butler  and 
Smith,1  read  that  "Maj.  Gen.  Smith  is  assigned  by  the  Presi- 
dent to  the  command  of  the  corps,"  etc. ;  in  the  order  as  for- 
mally made  public  the  words  "  by  the  President  "do  not  appear. 
A  presidential  canvass  was  now  in  progress,  and,  appar- 
ently, Lincoln  did  not  care  to  invite  further  complications 
by  any  act  of  direct  interposition  which  would  make  him 
the  objective  of  Butler's  "talent  at  political  intrigue,  and  his 
facilities  for  newspaper  abuse."  Under  the  circumstances, 
the  omission  of  the  words  specified  was  probably  judicious. 
The  order,  though  in  conformity  with  the  recommendation 
of  Generals  Meigs  and  Barnard  of  six  weeks  before  (May  24), 
was,  of  course,  highly  objectionable  to  General  Butler.  Im- 
mediately on  receipt  of  it  at  Bermuda  Hundred  he  rode 
over  to  the  headquarters  of  General  Grant,  and  asked  if 
"this  was  his  act  and  his  desire."  Grant  replied:  "But, 
I  don't  want  this."  Colonel  Mordecai  afterwards  wrote, 
"Gen'l  Butler  returned  to  camp  about  dusk,  as  I  recall  it, 
and,  as  he  dismounted  from  his  horse,  remarked  to  a  number 
of  his  staff  officers  who  were  near  him,  '  Gentlemen,  the  order 
will  be  revoked  to-morrow.'  "  2  Not  only  was  the  order 
revoked,  but  General  Butler's  field  command  was  extended  so 
as  to  include  the  Nineteenth  Corps,  while  General  Smith  was 

1  Butler's  Book,  p.  695 ;  From  Chattanooga  to  Petersburg,  p.  33. 

2  Chattanooga  to  Petersburg,  p.  189., 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  277 

"  relieved  from  the  command  of  the  Eighteenth  Army  Corps, 
and  [directed  to]  proceed  to  New  York,  and  await  further 
orders."  * 

As  respects  the  details  of  what  transpired  at  the  interview 
above  referred  to,  General  James  H.  Wilson,  whose  relations 
at  the  time  and  subsequently  were  intimate  with  both  Gen- 
eral Grant  and  Smith,  wrote  in  1904  as  follows:  — 

"It  must  be  confessed  that  Grant's  explanations  of  his  later 
attitude  towards  Smith,  and  of  the  reasons  for  relieving  him  and 
restoring  Butler  to  command,  were  neither  full  nor  always  stated 
in  the  same  terms.  He  ignores  the  subject  entirely  in  his  memoirs, 
but  it  so  happens  that  Mr.  Dana,  then  Assistant  Secretary  of  War, 
was  sitting  with  General  Grant  when  Butler,  clad  in  full  uniform, 
called  at  headquarters,  and  was  admitted.  Dana  describes  Butler 
as  entering  the  General's  presence  with  a  flushed  face  and  a  haughty 
air,  holding  out  the  order  relieving  him  from  command  in  the  field, 
and  asking  :  '  General  Grant,  did  you  issue  this  order  ? '  To  which 
Grant  in  a  hesitating  manner  replied:  'No,  not  in  that  form.' 
Dana,  perceiving  at  this  point  that  the  subject  under  discussion 
was  an  embarrassing  one,  and  that  the  interview  was  likely  to 
be  unpleasant,  if  not  stormy,  at  once  took  his  leave,  but  the  im- 
pression made  upon  his  mind  by  what  he  saw  while  present  was 
that  Butler  had  in  some  measure  'cowed'  his  commanding  officer. 
What  further  took  place  neither  General  Grant  nor  Mr.  Dana  has 
ever  said.  Butler's  Book,  however,  contains  what  purports  to  be 
a  full  account  of  the  interview,  but  it  is  to  be  observed  that  it 
signally  fails  to  recite  any  circumstance  of  an  overbearing  nature." 2 

The  disposition  of  commands  made  in  Special  Order  No.  62, 
above  referred  to,  continued  in  force  until  the  Wilmington 
expedition  and  the  famous  powder-boat  explosion  of  the  fol- 
lowing December.  During  the  months  intervening  much  had 
happened.  July,  1864,  came  about  during  one  of  the  most 
depressing,  if  not  the  most  depressing,  period  of  the  whole 

1  Special  Order  No.  62,  July  19,  1864 ;  Butler's  Book,  p.  1087. 

2  Life  and  Services  of  W.  F.  Smith,  pp.  112,  113. 


278  MILITARY  STUDIES 

struggle.  Grant's  movement  against  Richmond  and  Lee's 
army  had  failed,  after  excessive  loss  of  life ;  Sherman's  move- 
ment against  Atlanta  had  not  yet  succeeded ;  Washington 
was  threatened  from  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah ;  a  presi- 
dential election  was  immediately  impending ;  the  country  at 
large,  in  deepest  mourning  because  of  losses  in  the  field, 
was  also  in  a  state  of  extreme  discouragement;  the  ad- 
ministration and  the  Union  generals  in  the  field  stood  in 
manifest  fear  of  Butler.  Six  months  later  the  whole  aspect 
of  affairs  had  undergone  a  complete  and,  indeed,  almost 
magical  change.  Grant,  it  is  true,  was  still  held  in  firm  check 
before  Petersburg:  but  Sherman  had  marched  through 
Georgia  and  captured  Savannah;  Sheridan  had  won  his 
victories  in  the  valley;  Lincoln  had  been  reelected;  the 
Confederacy  was  believed  to  be  in  extremities.  Under  these 
circumstances  that  might  safely  be  done  which  in  July  had 
seemed  to  involve  a  political  risk.  Accordingly,  on  January 
4,  1865,  Grant  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War:  "I  am  con- 
strained to  request  the  removal  of  Maj.  Gen.  B.  F.  Butler 
from  the  command  of  the  Department  of  Virginia  and 
North  Carolina.  I  do  this  with  reluctance,  but  the  good 
of  the  service  requires  it.  In  my  absence  General  Butler 
necessarily  commands,  and  there  is  a  lack  of  confidence 
felt  in  his  military  ability,  making  him  an  unsafe  com- 
mander for  a  large  army.  His  administration  of  the 
affairs  of  his  department  is  also  objectionable."  *  Three 
days  later  (January  7)  the  following  was  issued  from  the 
War  Department :  — 

"  General  Order  No.  1. 

"I.   By  direction  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  Maj. 
Gen.  Benjamin  F.  Butler  is  relieved  from  the  command  of  the 
Department  of  North  Carolina  and  Virginia.  .  .  . 
1  War  Records,  Serial  No.  96,  p.  29. 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  279 


a 


II.  Major-General  Butler  on  being  relieved  will  repair  to 
Lowell,  Mass.,  and  report  by  letter  to  the  Adjutant-General  of  the 
Army." 

Of  General  Butler  as  a  field  officer  in  active  military  service 
General  W.  F.  Smith  wrote  to  General  Grant,  after  asking  to 
be  relieved  from  further  service  in  the  Department  of  Virginia 
and  North  Carolina,  —  "I  want  simply ...  to  ask  you  how  you 
can  place  a  man  in  command  of  two  army  corps,  who  is  as 
helpless  as  a  child  on  the  field  of  battle  and  as  visionary  as 
an  opium-eater  in  council  ?"  1  Of  the  same  commander,  Ad- 
miral David  D.  Porter  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
December  29,  1864,  immediately  after  the  withdrawal  of 
the  first  expedition  against  Wilmington,  subsequently  to  the 
powder-boat  fiasco  of  December  24:  "If  this  temporary 
failure  succeeds  in  sending  General  Butler  into  private  life,  it 
is  not  to  be  regretted."  2 

Such  is  the  military  record.  In  his  narrative  Mr.  Rhodes 
fails  to  develop  it.  He  deals  with  Benjamin  F.  Butler 
judicially,  but  as  a  man  and  an  official ;  he  does  not  deal  with 
him  as  a  senior  major-general  standing  in  presence  of  a 
court  of  military  inquiry.  Judicially,  the  sentence  he  passes 
is  severe;  and  the  more  severe  because  carefully  restrained 
in  expression.  But  it  is  confined  to  questions  of  mere  lucre, 
—  "beyond reasonable  doubt,"  Mr.  Rhodes  says,  "he  [Butler] 
was  making  money  [illicitly]  out  of  his  country's  life  struggle." 
That  is  bad ;  but,  however  bad  it  may  be,  it  may  not  unfairly 
be  held  the  rendering  on  a  very  minor  count  in  the  long  in- 
dictment to  which  Massachusetts'  senior  major-general  of 
the  Civil  War  should  be  made  to  answer.  His  departmental 
dishonesty  can  be  measured  in  dollars  and  cents ;  his  head- 
quarters incompetence  cost  blood  and  grief  both  unmeasured 

1  Chattanooga  to  Petersburg,  p.  37;  War  Records,  Serial  No.  81,  p.  595. 

2  Butler's  Book,  p.  1123. 


280  MILITARY  STUDIES 

and  immeasurable.  Who  was  responsible  for  the  greater  part 
of  that  awful  loss  of  life  and  limb,  which  in  May  and  June, 
1864,  littered  the  soil  of  eastern  Virginia  with  dead,  and 
caused  the  hospitals  to  be  choked  with  those  mutilated, — 
a  loss  in  killed  and  maimed  numerically  nearly  equal  to 
the  entire  army  Napoleon  had  on  the  field  at  Waterloo? 
Primarily,  it  was  that  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  James 
who  so  utterly  failed  in  doing  the  work  he  had  himself  in- 
sisted should  be  assigned  him  to  do ;  *  and,  secondarily,  to  the 
commander-in-chief  who  left  a  charlatan  and  an  incompetent 
in  the  place  to  which  he  should  have  designated  his  trustiest 
lieutenant.  It  was  a  parallel  case  to  that  of  Grouchy,  —  the 
fatal  mistake  of  the  man  at  the  head  in  the  choice  of  a  tool. 
In  the  early  days  of  July,  1894,  it  was  my  fortune  to  visit 
Waterloo  in  company  with  the  late  John  C.  Ropes.  That  Mr. 
Ropes  was,  both  in  this  country  and  in  Europe,  an  acknowl- 
edged authority  on  problems  of  strategy,  is  very  generally 
known ;  he  had  also  made  a  special  study  of  the  campaign 
of  1815.  As  respects  it  and  its  incidents,  the  information 
of  no  one  was  more  exact.  Viewing  the  field  of  battle  from 
the  position  held  by  Wellington's  army,  we  looked  across 
toward  Planchenoit,  where  the  Prussians,  first  doubling  back 
Napoleon's  right,  finally  broke  in,  deciding  the  day.  We 
then  again  discussed,  as  frequently  before  and  afterwards, 
what  turn  other  than  that  now  recorded  might  have  been 
given  to  the  momentous  15th  of  June,  1815,  had  Davout, 
instead  of  being  at  the  time  Minister  of  War  and  in  Paris, 
been,  as  he  should  have  been,  in  command  of  Napoleon's 
right  wing.  It  hardly  admits  of  question  that  the  victor 
of  Auerstadt  and  Eckmuhl,  instinctively  taking  in  the  strate- 

1  Yet  in  his  farewell  order  to  the  Army  of  the  James  of  January  8,  1865, 
Butler  boasted  :  "The  wasted  blood  of  my  men  does  not  stain  my  gar- 
ments."—  War  Records,  Serial  No.  96,  p.  71. 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  281 

gic  situation,  would,  during  the  critical  hours  immediately 
following  Bliicher's  disaster  at  Ligny  and  subsequent  move- 
ment to  the  rear,  have  kept  in  close  touch  with  the  Emperor, 
and  that  the  Prussians  would  two  days  later  have  found  the 
road  from  Wavre  to  Waterloo  effectually  blocked.  Napoleon's 
right  arm  would  not  then  have  been  paralyzed ;  he  would 
have  been  free  to  throw  his  whole  weight  on  Wellington's 
flank  and  rear.  Fortunately  for  Wellington,  Grouchy,  and 
not  Davout,  was  that  day  in  command  of  Napoleon's  de- 
tached wing.  Butler's  command  and  mission  in  the  Virginia 
campaign  of  1864  were  almost  exactly  similar  to  the  com- 
mand and  mission  of  Grouchy  in  the  Waterloo  campaign 
of  1815 ;  and  now  to  discuss  the  operations  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  in  the  Wilderness  and  at  Spottsylvania  without 
constant  reference  to  what  the  Army  of  the  James  was  on 
those  days  doing  east  and  south  of  Richmond  is  a  treatment 
no  less  defective  than  it  would  be  to  try  to  explain  what 
took  place  at  Waterloo  without  giving  any  consideration  to 
Grouchy's  blundering  march  from  Gembloux  to  Wavre. 
Butler,  like  Grouchy,  was  left  by  the  commander-in-chief  to 
act,  under  general  instructions,  as  the  conditions  of  time  and 
place,  and  the  movements  of  the  enemy  in  his  front,  might 
make  more  expedient,  the  plan  of  campaign  and  general 
strategic  situation  being  always  clearly  in  mind.  Both  failed, 
and  failed  utterly.  In  each  case  incalculable  disaster  en- 
sued ;  but  in  the  narrative  of  Mr.  Rhodes,  Butler  does  not 
figure  as  the  Grouchy  of  the  Wilderness. 


282  MILITARY  STUDIES 

NOTES 
Supra,  239,  n. 

In  his  contribution  (Chapter  II  of  Part  V)  entitled  "The  South 
in  the  War  for  Southern  Independence"  (Vol.  IV,  pp.  499-519)  in 
the  recent  publication,  The  South  in  the  Building  of  the  Nation  (12 
vols.,  Southern  Historical  Publication  Society,  Richmond,  Va., 
1909),  President  L.  G.  Tyler,  of  William  and  Mary  College,  refers 
(p.  496,  n.)  to  the  statement  in  the  text.  He  then  says:  "In 
round  numbers  the  South  had  on  her  muster  rolls  from  first  to  last 
about  600,000  men,  and  in  this  list  the  South  had  all  it  could 
muster ;  for  at  last  it  had  enlisted  in  its  armies  all  men  between 
sixteen  and  sixty  years." 

This  statement  is  not  in  accord  with  other  statements  relating 
to  the  same  subject  elsewhere  contained  in  the  same  publication. 
The  Border  Slave  States,  so-called,  those  never  members  of  the 
Confederacy,  furnished  according  to  President  Tyler  (Vol.  IV, 
504)  approximately  316,424  men  to  the  Federal  army.  In  The 
South  it  is  elsewhere  stated  that  the  same  States  contributed  as 
follows  to  the  army  of  the  Confederacy :  — 

Kentucky,  Vol.  I,  295 30,000 

Maryland,  Vol.  I,  205 20,000 

Missouri,  Vol.  Ill,  236 60,000 

West  Virginia,  Vol.  I,  385  (minimum) 7,000 

Total  from  Border  States 117,000 

That  the  States  named,  sympathizing,  as  at  the  time  all  Southern 
authorities  claimed,  most  deeply  with  the  Confederacy,  should 
have  furnished  over  316,000  recruits  to  the  Federal  army,  and  only 
117,000  to  that  of  the  Confederacy,  is,  to  say  the  least,  deserving 
of  remark.  It  calls  for  explanation.  The  figures  are,  however, 
those  given  in  The  South,  and,  for  present  purposes,  are  to  be 
accepted. 

Deducting  the  117,000  men  from  the  Border  States  from  the 
asserted  total  (600,000)  on  the  Confederate  muster-rolls,  483,000 
would  remain  as  the  whole  number  of  men  supplied  by  the  eleven 
States  constituting  the  Confederacy. 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  283 

Turning  now  to  The  South,  the  numbers  enrolled  from  the  several 
States  named  are  given  as  follows  :  — 

Alabama,  Vol.  II,  290  (minimum) 90,000 

Arkansas,  Vol.  Ill,  308 50,000 

Mississippi,  Vol.  II,  422 70,000 

North  Carolina,  Vol.  I,  485 120,000 

South  Carolina,  Vol.  II,  86  (minimum) 75,000 

Tennessee,  Vol.  II,  517 115,000 

Texas,  Vol.  Ill,  504  (minimum) 50,000 

Virginia,  Vol.  I,  121 175,000 

Total  from  eight  States 745,000 

Those  enrolled  from  three  States  of  the  Confederacy  —  Georgia, 
Louisiana,  and  Florida  —  are  not  given  even  approximately  in  The 
South.  They  can,  however,  be  supplied  with  sufficient  accuracy 
from  other  Confederate  sources. 

Georgia,  Avery,  p.  221      .     .     .     .  \  12o  000 

Jones,  Georgia  in  the  War,  p.  71     .  J 

Louisiana,    Confederate    Military   History,    ed.    by  Gen.    C.   A. 

Evans  ;  John  Dimitry,  Louisiana 55,000 

Florida,  Rebellion  Record,  Series  IV,  Vol.  2,  pp.  648,  839    ..     .  15,000 

Total  from  three  States 190,000 

The  figures  thus  furnished  by  Confederate  authorities,  or  to 
The  South  would  then  stand  as  follows  :  — 

Eight  States  of  Confederacy,  minimum  as  given  in  The  South  .  745,000 

Four  Border  States,  as  given  in  same 117,000 

Three  States  of  Confederacy,  numbers  given  by  Confederate 

authorities 190,000 

Total  enrolments 1,052,000 

There  is  obviously  a  wide  discrepancy  between  the  results  thus 
arrived  at  elsewhere  from  The  South,  and  those  given  by  Presi- 
dent Tyler  in  the  passage  above  quoted  from  his  contribution  to 
that  publication.  The  aggregate  reached  from  the  separate  State 
returns  is,  however,  not  only  more  creditable  to  Confederate  man- 
hood, but  much  more  in  consonance  with  the  figures  of  the  census 
than  the  summarized  statement  of  President  Tyler. 

In  the  census  of  1860  the  eleven  States  composing  the  Con- 
federacy reported  an  aggregate  white  population  of  5,067,051; 
the  same  States  reported  in  1870  a  similar  population  of  5,548,355; 


284  MILITARY  STUDIES 

and  this  notwithstanding  the  losses  incurred  during  the  Civil 
War  (1861-1865)  and  the  discouragements,  industrial  and  political, 
incident  to  the  period  of  reconstruction.  The  arms-bearing  effec- 
tives in  any  community  —  males  between  18  and  45  years  of  age 
—  are  roughly  estimated  at  one  in  five  of  the  population ;  or, 
allowing  for  exempts  from  all  causes,  at  one  in  six.  President 
Tyler  asserts  that  "  at  last  [the  Confederacy]  had  enlisted  in  its 
armies  all  men  between  sixteen  and  sixty  years."  There  is  every 
reason  to  believe  that  this  statement  is  not  exaggerated  ;  though 
the  extreme  age  limits  fixed  by  Confederate  conscription  acts 
(February  17,  1864)  were  17  and  50.  No  man  capable  of  doing 
duty  was,  however,  refused  permission  to  bear  arms  on  the  ground 
that  he  was  not  yet  17  or  was  over  50.  Accepting  for  present 
purposes  the  statements  of  President  Tyler,  the  census  tables  are  not 
so  arranged  as  to  make  possible  any  exact  statement  of  the  num- 
ber of  additional  men  between  the  ages  of  16  and  18,  at  one  end, 
and  45  and  60  at  the  other  end,  thus  brought  within  the  age 
of  service  ;  but  it  is  well  known  that  after  the  age  of  45  the 
proportion  of  those  capable  of  doing  military  service  diminishes 
rapidly.  Computations  based  on  the  census  returns  tend,  how- 
ever, to  show  that  at  the  very  lowest  estimate  the  increase  of  time 
of  military  service  would  represent  an  increase  of  at  least  30  per 
cent  in  effectives.  The  effectives  of  the  Confederacy  during  the 
entire  war  period  —  May,  1861  to  May,  1865  —  would  then,  at  the 
lowest  computation,  and  allowing  for  no  increase  of  population 
after  1860,  have  contained  the  original  one  million  returned  in 
1860  as  then  between  18  and  45.  To  those  must  be  added  a  further 
30  per  cent  (300,000)  composed  of  those  between  16  and  18  and 
between  45  and  60.  As  the  census  of  1870  showed  must  have 
been  the  case,  a  further  number  also,  equal  to  three  per  cent  of 
the  whole  each  year  matured,  and  became  military  effectives  dur- 
ing the  continuance  of  the  struggle  (1861-1865)  —  a  total  of  12 
per  cent  (150,000)  additional.  The  figures  would  then  stand  as 
follows  :  1,000,000  original  (1860),  effectives  of  18  to  45  years  of 
age;  300,000  of  those  less  then  18  and  over  45;  150,000  who 
reached  the  age  of  16  between  May,  1861  and  May,  1865;  or  a 
total  aggregate  Confederate  arms-bearing  population  of  1,450,000. 
From  this  aggregate  20  per  cent  is  to  be  deducted  as  representing 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  285 

exempts  of  every  description  and  all  classes.  There  would  then 
remain  a  minimum  of  1,160,000  effectives.  To  these  in  the  case 
of  the  Confederacy  are  to  be  added  the  contingent  (117,000)  from 
the  Border  States.  The  aggregate  thus  reached  is  a  total  Con- 
federate enrolment  of  1,277,000.  The  actual  minimum  total  of 
separate  State  aggregates,  given  in  The  South,  as  above,  is  1,052,000. 
The  figures  are  those  of  the  census  ;  the  result  reached  is  by  com- 
putations based  on  the  statement  of  President  Tyler. 

A  not  dissimilar  result  is  reached  through  another  and  wholly 
different  process  of  computation.  The  three  States  of  Georgia, 
North  Carolina  and  Virginia  contained,  in  1860,  according  to  the 
census  of  that  year,  an  arms-bearing  population  —  that  is,  whites 
between  the  ages  of  18  and  45 —  aggregating  343,000  in  round 
numbers  —  for  exact  figures  are  in  such  cases  a  delusion;  West 
Virginia  is  excluded.  Allowing,  as  in  the  previous  computations, 
an  increase  of  30  per  cent  to  cover  the  extension  of  the  arms-bear- 
ing period,  and  a  further  increase  of  12  per  cent  of  the  aggregate 
thus  reached  to  represent  the  maturing  of  effectives,  the  number 
of  possible  enrolments  in  the  States  named  would  be  increased  to 
500,000.  The  number  reported  as  actually  enrolled  from  these 
States  was  415,000,  or  84  per  cent  of  the  possible  enrolment. 
Applying  this  standard  to  the  entire  Confederacy,  a  possible  enrol- 
ment of  1,450,000  would  result,  84  per  cent  of  which  would  make 
an  actual  enrolment  of  1,223,000;  to  which  must  be  added  the 
117,000  admitted  to  have  been  enrolled  from  the  Border  States. 
The  aggregate  arrived  at  through  this  process  of  computation 
would  be,  in  round  numbers,  1,340,000. 

No  matter,  therefore,  on  what  basis  a  result  is  arrived  at, 
whether  from  computations  covering  the  whole  Confederacy,  or 
computations  based  on  returns  of  certain  States  used  as  a  basis 
for  the  whole,  or  from  an  analysis  of  the  censuses  of  1860  and 
1870,  the  figures  given  in  The  South,  as  above,  for  enrolments 
from  the  several  Confederate  States  are  much  more  than  con- 
firmed not  only  as  being  substantially  correct,  but  also  as  being, 
approximately,  what  would  naturally  and  reasonably  have  been 
anticipated  under  the  conditions  then  existing.  In  any  event,  the 
result  so  reached  is  not  open  to  the  charge  of  exaggeration. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  statement  of  President  Tyler  that  the 


286  MILITARY  STUDIES 

Confederacy  had  from  first  to  last  "  about  600,000  men  "  on  its 
muster-rolls  leads,  when  analyzed,  to  results  difficult  of  accept- 
ance. As  already  pointed  out,  deducting  the  117,000  enrolments 
from  the  so-called  Border  States,  there  would  remain  483,000  as 
the  entire  muster  from  the  eleven  States  composing  the  Confed- 
eracy. Those  States  were  returned  in  the  Census  of  1860  as  con- 
taining, exclusive  of  West  Virginia,  almost  exactly  one  million 
men  of  military  age,  — 18  to  45,  —  but  a  trifle  in  excess  thereof. 
Allowing,  as  before,  for  extension  of  age  of  military  service,  and 
the  maturing  of  effectives,  and  duly  deducting  the  proportion  of 
exempts,  there  would  remain  from  this  total  a  minimum  of  over 
1,200,000  men  available  for  military  service.  If  then  only  483,000 
were  actually  enrolled,  it  would  follow  that,  computed  on  the 
most  favorable  basis,  and  after  every  possible  allowance  had  been 
made,  and  assuming  also  no  double  enrolments,  less  than  one-half 
of  the  available  effectives  in  the  Confederacy  ever  bore  arms  in  its 
defence.  To  be  exact,  those  who  bore  arms  were  only  forty  out  of 
each  hundred  capable  of  so  doing.  In  view  of  the  prolonged  and 
desperate  character  of  the  conflict,  and  the  acknowledged  bravery 
and  devotion  of  the  people  of  the  Confederacy,  such  a  result, 
arithmetically  arrived  at  from  figures  the  essential  correctness  of 
which  does  not  admit  of  question,  cannot  be  considered  otherwise 
than  a  reductio  ad  absurdum. 

Thus,  approached  from  any  direction  and  reached  under  any 
conceivable  method  of  computation,  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  the 
conclusion  that  the  actual  enrolments  of  the  Confederate  army 
during  the  entire  four  years  of  the  conflict  exceeded  1,100,000 
rather  than  fell  short  of  that  number.  The  figures  given  by 
President  Tyler,  opposed  to  all  reasonable  assumption  and  un- 
supported by  documentary  evidence,  are  based  on  assertion  only. 

In  certain  discussions  of  this  subject  much  emphasis  is  also  laid 
by  writers  with  Confederate  sympathies  on  the  large  number  of 
deserters,  etc.,  from  the  armies  in  the  field,  owing  to  lack  of  proper 
clothing,  sustenance,  etc.  It  is  difficult,  however,  to  see  how  this 
affects  the  question  of  enrolment.  To  desert,  a  man  must  pre- 
viously have  been  enrolled,  and  enumerated  as  such.  Desertion, 
moreover,  was  by  no  means  peculiar  to  the  army  of  the  Con- 
federacy ;  and  the  deserters  from  the  Union  army  are  not  excepted 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  287 

by   Confederate   authorities   from   the   total   of   Federal   enlist- 
ments. 

The  genesis  of  the  600,000  legend  of  Confederacy  military  en- 
rolments, and  the  basis  of  evidence  on  which  it  rests,  have  been 
discussed  and  set  forth  by  Colonel  T.  L.  Livermore,  in  a  paper 
printed  in  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proceedings  (Second  Series,  XVIII,  432- 
435),  and  also  in  The  South  in  the  Building  of  the  Nation,  IV,  503. 


Supra,  266,  n. 

"  Thursday,  September  8,  1870.  —  The  Chancellor  gives  a  great 
dinner,  the  guests  including  the  Hereditary  Grand  Duke  of  Meck- 
lenburg-Schwerin,  Herr  Stephan,  the  Chief  Director  of  the  Post 
Office,  and  the  three  Americans.  Amongst  other  matters  men- 
tioned at  table  were  the  various  reports  as  to  the  affair  at  Bazeilles. 
The  Minister  said  that  peasants  could  not  be  permitted  to  take 
part  in  the  defence  of  a  position.  Not  being  in  uniform,  they 
could  not  be  recognized  as  combatants  —  they  were  able  to  throw 
away  their  arms  unnoticed.  The  chances  must  be  equal  for  both 
sides.  Abeken  considered  that  Bazeilles  was  hardly  treated,  and 
thought  the  war  ought  to  be  conducted  in  a  more  humane  manner. 
Sheridan,  to  whom  MacLean  has  translated  these  remarks,  is 
of  a  different  opinion.  He  considers  that  in  war  it  is  expedient, 
even  from  the  political  point  of  view,  to  treat  the  population  with 
the  utmost  rigour  also.  He  expressed  himself  roughly  as  follows : 
'  The  proper  strategy  consists  in  the  first  place  in  inflicting  as  telling 
blows  as  possible  upon  the  enemy's  army,  and  then  in  causing  the 
inhabitants  so  much  suffering  that  they  must  long  for  peace,  and 
force  their  Government  to  demand  it.  The  people  must  be  left 
nothing  but  their  eyes  to  weep  with  over  the  war.'  Somewhat 
heartless  it  seems  to  me,  but  perhaps  worthy  of  consideration."  — 
Busch,  Bismarck:  Some  Secret  Pages  of  his  History,  II,  127. 

To  the  same  effect  General  Sherman  subsequently  declared : 
"I  resolved  to  stop  the  game  of  guarding  their  cities,  and  to 
destroy  their  cities.  We  were  determined  to  produce  results, 
and  now  what  were  those  results  ?  To  make  every  man,  woman 
and  child  in  the  South  feel  that  if  they  dared  to  rebel  against  the 
flag  of  their  country  they  must  die  or  submit." 


288  MILITARY  STUDIES 

The  subsequent  influence  on  the  American  army  of  General 
Sherman's  famous  "War  is  Hell"  aphorism,  and  its  illustration  in 
his  campaigns  in  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas,  are  deserving  of  notice. 

Lieutenant-General  S.  B.  M.  Young  spoke  to  the  same  effect  as 
General  Sheridan,  at  Prince  Bismarck's  table,  at  a  public  dinner 
given  by  the  New  York  Chamber  of  Commerce  at  the  Arlington 
Hotel,  Washington,  in  honor  of  the  representatives  of  certain 
foreign  commercial  bodies  then  in  America,  November  13,  1902. 
General  Young  then  pronounced  "all  the  army's  defamers  densely 
ignorant  of  what  constitutes  the  laws  of  war;"  and  added,  "To 
carry  on  war,  disguise  it  as  we  may,  is  to  be  cruel,  it  is  to  kill  and 
burn,  burn  and  kill,  and  again  kill  and  burn."  If  the  word 
"humane"  could  be  applied  to  war,  he  would  define  it  as  one 
"fast  and  furious  and  bloody  from  the  beginning."  He  added, 
"When  war  has  been  decided  on  by  our  nation  I  agree  with  the 
German  Emperor's  sentiments,  and  believe  that  the  American 
army  should  leave  such  an  impression  that  future  generations 
would  know  we  had  been  there."  —  New  York  Tribune,  November 
14,  1902. 

The  utterance  of  the  German  Emperor  here  referred  to  was  his 
famous  speech  at  Bremerhaven,  July  27,  1900,  to  the  first  con- 
tingent of  his  army  then  embarking  for  China.  He  said  :  "When 
you  meet  the  foe  you  will  defeat  them.  No  quarter  will  be  given ; 
no  prisoners  will  be  taken.  Let  all  who  fall  into  your  mercy  be 
at  your  mercy.  Just  as  the  Huns  a  thousand  years  ago,  under  the 
leadership  of  Attila,  gained  a  reputation  in  virtue  of  which  they 
still  live  in  historical  tradition,  so  may  the  name  of  Germany  be- 
come known  in  such  a  manner  in  China  that  no  Chinaman  will 
ever  again  dare  to  look  askance  at  a  German." 

At  a  court-martial  convened  in  Manila  twenty-one  months  after 
this  utterance,  Brigadier-General  Jacob  H.  Smith  declared  that  in 
operations  conducted  by  him  as  general  in  command  he  had  in- 
structed a  subordinate  "not  to  burden  himself  with  prisoners"; 
that  he  told  him  "that  he  wanted  him  to  kill  and  burn  in  the  in- 
terior and  hostile  country;  and  did  also  instruct  him  that  'The 
interior  of  Samar  must  be  made  a  howling  wilderness';  and  did 
further  instruct  him  that  he  wanted  all  persons  killed  who  were 
capable  of  bearing  arms  and  were  actively  engaged  in  hostilities 


SOME  PHASES  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  289 

against  the  United  States;  and  that  he  did  designate  the  age 
limit  of  ten  years." 

The  court  in  this  case  found  General  Smith  guilty  of  "conduct  to 
the  prejudice  of  good  order  and  military  discipline,"  and  sentenced 
him  to  be  admonished  by  the  reviewing  authority.  The  court 
declared  itself  thus  lenient  "in  view  of  the  undisputed  evidence 
that  the  accused  did  not  mean  everything  that  his  unexplained 
language  implied;  that  his  subordinates  did  not  gather  such  a 
meaning ;  and  that  the  orders  were  never  executed  in  such  sense." — 
57th  Congress,  2d  Session,  Senate  Document  No.  213. 

Historically,  however,  it  is  noticeable  that  the  instructions  given 
by  General  Smith  were  in  strict  accordance  with  the  "War  is  Hell" 
principles  on  which  operations  in  a  hostile  country  should  be  con- 
ducted as  laid  down  on  the  occasion  specified,  by  Lieutenant- 
General  Sheridan,  September  8, 1870,  by  the  German  Emperor,  July 
27,  1900,  and  by  Lieutenant-General  Young,  November  13,  1902. 

In  his  work  entitled  Ohio  in  the  War  (1868),  Mr.  Whitelaw  Reid 
says  of  the  burning  of  Columbia,  "It  was  the  most  monstrous 
barbarity  of  the  barbarous  march.  There  is  no  reason  to  think 
that  General  Sherman  knew  anything  of  the  purpose  to  burn  the 
city,  which  had  been  freely  talked  about  among  the  soldiers 
through  the  afternoon.  But  there  is  reason  to  think  that  he  knew 
well  enough  who  did  it,  that  he  never  rebuked  it,  and  made  no 
effort  to  punish  it.  .  .  .  He  did  not  seek  to  ferret  out  and  punish 
the  offending  parties.  He  did  not  make  his  army  understand  that 
he  regarded  this  barbarity  as  a  crime.  He  did  not  seek  to  repress 
their  lawless  course.  On  the  contrary,  they  came  to  understand 
that  the  leader,  whom  they  idolized,  regarded  their  actions  as  a 
good  joke,  chuckled  over  them  in  secret,  and  winked  at  them  in 
public.  ...  In  both  campaigns  [that  from  Atlanta  to  Savannah, 
and  from  Savannah  to  Goldsboro']  great  bodies  of  men  were 
moved  over  States  and  groups  of  States  with  the  accuracy  and 
precision  of  mechanism.  In  neither  was  any  effort  to  preserve 
discipline  apparent,  save  only  so  far  as  was  needful  for  keeping 
up  the  march. 

"Here,  indeed,  is  the  single  stain  on  the  brilliant  record.  Before 
his  movement  began,  General  Sherman  begged  permission  to  turn 
his  army  loose  in  South  Carolina  and  devastate  it.     He  used  this 


290  MILITARY  STUDIES 

permission  to  the  full.  He  protested  that  he  did  not  wage  war 
on  women  and  children.  But,  under  the  operation  of  his  orders 
the  last  morsel  of  food  was  taken  from  hundreds  of  destitute 
families,  that  his  soldiers  might  feast  in  needless  and  riotous 
abundance.  Before  his  eyes  rose,  day  after  day,  the  mournful 
clouds  of  smoke  on  every  side,  that  told  of  old  people  and  their 
grandchildren  driven,  in  midwinter,  from  the  only  roofs  there  were 
to  shelter  them,  by  the  flames  which  the  wantonness  of  his  soldiers 
had  kindled.  With  his  full  knowledge  and  tacit  approval,  too 
great  a  portion  of  his  advance  resolved  itself  into  bands  of  jewelry- 
thieves  and  plate-closet  burglars.  Yet,  if  a  single  soldier  was 
punished  for  a  single  outrage  or  theft  during  that  entire  move- 
ment, we  have  found  no  mention  of  it  in  all  the  voluminous  records 
of  the  march.  He  did  indeed  say  that  he  'would  not  protect'  them 
in  stealing  'women's  apparel  or  jewelry.'  But  even  this,  with  no 
whisper  of  punishment  attached,  he  said,  not  in  general  orders,  nor 
in  approval  of  the  findings  of  some  righteously  severe  court-martial, 
but  incidentally  —  in  a  letter  to  one  of  his  officers,  which  never 
saw  the  light  till  two  years  after  the  close  of  the  war.  He  rebuked 
no  one  for  such  outrages ;  the  soldiers  understood  that  they  pleased 
him.     Was  not  South  Carolina  to  be  properly  punished? 

"This  was  not  war.  It  was  not  even  the  revenge  of  a  wrathful 
soldiery,  for  it  was  practised,  not  upon  the  enemy,  but  upon  the 
defenceless  'feeble  folk'  he  had  left  at  home.  There  was  indeed 
one  excuse  for  it  —  an  excuse  which  chivalric  soldiers  might  be 
slow  to  plead.  It  injured  the  enemy  —  not  by  open  fight,  where 
a  million  would  have  been  thought  full  match  for  less  than  a 
hundred  thousand,  but  by  frightening  his  men  about  the  situation 
of  their  wives  and  children  I"  — Ohio  in  the  War,  I,  475-479. 


.  VIII 
LEE'S   CENTENNIAL1 

Having  occasion  once  to  refer  in  discussion  to  certain  of  the 
founders  of  our  Massachusetts  Commonwealth,  I  made  the 
assertion  that  their  force  "lay  in  character";  and  I  added 
that  in  saying  this  I  paid,  and  meant  to  pay,  the  highest  trib- 
ute which  in  my  judgment  could  be  paid  to  a  community 
or  to  its  typical  men.  Quite  a  number  of  years  have  passed 
since  I  so  expressed  myself,  and  in  those  years  I  have  grown 
older  —  materially  older ;  but  I  now  repeat,  even  more  con- 
fidently than  I  then  uttered  them,  these  other  words:  "The 
older  I  have  grown  and  the  more  I  have  studied  and  seen,  the 
greater  in  my  esteem,  as  an  element  of  strength  in  a  people, 
has  Character  become,  and  the  less  in  the  conduct  of  human 
affairs  have  I  thought  of  mere  capacity  or  even  genius.  With 
Character  a  race  will  become  great,  even  though  as  stolid 
and  unassimilating  as  the  Romans ;  without  Character,  any 
race  will  in  the  long  run  prove  a  failure,  though  it  may  num- 
ber in  it  individuals  having  all  the  brilliancy  of  the  Jews, 
crowned  with  the  genius  of  Napoleon."  2  We  are  here  to-day 
to  commemorate  the  birth  of  Robert  Edward  Lee,  —  essen- 
tially a  Man  of  Character.     That  he  was  such  all,  I  think, 

1  This  address  was  delivered  on  the  invitation  of  the  president  and 
faculty  of  Washington  and  Lee  University  at  Lexington,  Va.,  Satur- 
day, January  19,  1907,  the  centennial  anniversary  of  the  birth  of  General 
Robert  E.  Lee.  Having  been  subjected  to  no  general  revision,  it  is  here 
reproduced  in  almost  the  exact  form  of  its  original  publication. 

2  Massachusetts  Historical  Society  Proceedings,  Second  Series,  VIII,  408. 

291 


292  MILITARY  STUDIES 

recognize;  for,  having  so  impressed  himself  throughout  life 
on  his  contemporaries,  he  stands  forth  distinctly  as  a  man 
of  character  on  the  page  of  the  historian.  Yet  it  is  not  easy 
to  put  in  words  exactly  what  is  meant  when  we  agree  in  at- 
tributing character  to  this  man  or  to  that,  or  withholding  it 
from  another ;  —  conceding  it,  for  instance,  to  Epaminondas, 
Cato  and  Wellington,  but  withholding  it  from  Themis- 
tocles,  Caesar  or  Napoleon.  Though  we  can  illustrate  what 
we  mean  by  examples  which  all  will  accept,  we  cannot  define. 
Emerson  in  his  later  years  (1866)  wrote  a  paper  on  "Charac- 
ter"; but  in  it  he  makes  no  effort  at  a  definition.  "Char- 
acter," he  said,  "denotes  habitual  self-possession,  habitual  re- 
gard to  interior  and  constitutional  motives,  a  balance  not  to  be 
overset  or  easily  disturbed  by  outward  events  and  opinion,  and 
by  implication  points  to  the  source  of  right  motive.  We  some- 
times employ  the  word  to  express  the  strong  and  consistent 
will  of  men  of  mixed  motive;  but,  when  used  with  em- 
phasis, it  points  to  what  no  events  can  change,  that  is,  a 
will  built  of  the  reason  of  things."  The  more  matter-of-fact 
lexicographer  defines  Character  as  "the  sum  of  the  inherited 
and  acquired  ethical  traits  which  give  to  a  person  his  moral 
individuality."  To  pursue  further  the  definition  of  what  is 
generally  understood  would  be  wearisome,  so  I  will  content 
myself  with  quoting  this  simile  from  a  disciple  of  Emerson: 
"The  virtues  of  a  superior  man  are  like  the  wind;  the  vir- 
tues of  a  common  man  are  like  the  grass ;  the  grass,  when 
the  wind  passes  over  it,  bends."  * 

That  America  has  been  rich  in  these  men  of  superior  vir- 
tues before  whom  the  virtues  of  the  common  man  have  bent, 
is  matter  of  history.  It  has  also  been  our  making  as  a  com- 
munity.    Such  in  New  England  was  John  Winthrop,  whose 

1  Thoreau,  Walden,  "Chap.  VIII ;  taken  from  the  Analects  of  Confu- 
cius.   See  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proceedings,  XLIII,  473-477. 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  293 

lofty  example  still  influences  the  community  whose  infancy 
he  fathered.  Such,  in  New  York,  was  John  Jay.  Such, 
further  south,  was  John  Caldwell  Calhoun,  essentially  a 
man  of  exalted  character  and  representative  of  his  commu- 
nity, quite  irrespective  of  his  teachings  and  their  outcome. 
Such  unquestionably,  in  Virginia,  were  George  Washington 
and  John  Marshall ;  and,  more  recently,  Robert  Edward  Lee. 
A  stock,  of  which  those  three  were  the  consummate  flower, 
by  its  fruits  is  known. 

Here  to  commemorate  the  centennial  of  the  birth  of  Lee,  I 
do  not  propose  to  enter  into  any  eulogium  of  the  man,  to  re- 
count the  well-known  events  of  his  career,  or  to  estimate  the 
final  place  to  be  assigned  him  among  great  military  charac- 
ters. All  this  has  been  sufficiently  done  by  others  far  better 
qualified  for  the  task.  Eschewing  superlatives  also,  I  shall 
institute  no  comparisons.  One  of  a  community  which  then 
looked  upon  Lee  as  a  renegade  from  the  flag  he  had  sworn  to 
serve,  and  a  traitor  to  the  nation  which  had  nurtured  him, 
in  my  subordinate  place  I  directly  confronted  Lee  throughout 
the  larger  portion  of  the  War  of  Secession.  During  all  those 
years  there  was  not  a  day  in  which  my  heart  would  not 
have  been  gladdened  had  I  heard  that  his  also  had  been  the 
fate  which  at  Chancellorsville  befell  his  great  lieutenant; 
and  yet  more  glad  had  it  been  the  fortune  of  the  command 
in  which  I  served  to  visit  that  fate  upon  him.  Forty  more 
years  have  since  gone.  Their  close  finds  me  here  to-day  — 
certainly  a  much  older,  and,  in  my  own  belief  at  least,  a 
wiser  man.  Nay,  more !  A  distinguished  representative  of 
Massachusetts,  speaking  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States 
shortly  after  Lee's  death  upon  the  question  of  a  return  to 
Lee's  family  of  the  ancestral  estate  of  Arlington,  used  these 
words:  "Eloquent  Senators  have  already  characterized  the 
proposition  and  the  traitor  it  seeks  to  commemorate.     I  am 


294  MILITARY  STUDIES 

not  disposed  to  speak  of  General  Lee.  It  is  enough  to  say  he 
stands  high  in  the  catalogue  of  those  who  have  imbrued  their 
hands  in  their  country's  blood.  I  hand  him  over  to  the  aveng- 
ing pen  of  History. "  It  so  chances  that  not  only  am  I  also 
from  the  State  of  Massachusetts,  but,  for  more  than  a  dozen 
years,  I  have  been  the  chosen  head  of  its  typical  historical 
society,  —  the  society  chartered  under  the  name  and  seal  of 
the  Commonwealth  considerably  more  than  a  century  ago,  — 
the  parent  of  all  similar  societies.  By  no  means  would  I  on 
that  account  seem  to  ascribe  to  myself  any  representative 
character  as  respects  the  employment  of  History's  pen, 
whether  avenging  or  otherwise ; x  nor  do  I  appear  here  as  repre- 
sentative of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society :  but,  a 
whole  generation  having  passed  away  since  Charles  Sumner 
uttered  the  words  I  have  quoted,  I  do,  on  your  invitation, 
chance  to  stand  here  to-day,  as  I  have  said,  both  a  Massa- 
chusetts man  and  the  head  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical 
Society,  to  pass  judgment  upon  General  Lee.  The  situation 
is  thus  to  a  degree  dramatic. 

Though  in  what  I  am  about  to  say  I  shall  confine  myself 
to  a  few  points  only,  to  them  I  have  given  no  little  study,  and 
on  them  have  much  reflected.  Let  me,  however,  once  for  all, 
and  with  emphasis,  in  advance  say  I  am  not  here  to  instruct 
Virginians  either  in  the  history  of  their  State  or  the  principles 
of  Constitutional  Law ;  nor  do  I  make  any  pretence  to  pro- 
fundity whether  of  thought  or  insight.  On  the  contrary,  I 
shall  attempt  nothing  more  than  the  elaboration  of  what  has 
already  been  said  by  others  as  well  as  by  me,  such  value  or 

1  Possibly,  and  more  properly,  this  attribute  might  be  considered  as 
pertaining  rather  to  James  Ford  Rhodes,  also  a  member  of  the  society  re- 
ferred to,  and  at  present  (1907)  a  vice-president  of  it.  Mr.  Rhodes's  char- 
acterization of  General  Lee,  and  consequent  verdict  on  the  course  pursued 
by  him  at  the  time  under  discussion,  can  be  found  on  reference  to  his 
History  of  the  United  States,  III,  413. 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  295 

novelty  as  may  belong  to  my  share  in  the  occasion  being  at- 
tributable solely  to  the  point  of  view  of  the  speaker.  In  that 
respect,  I  submit,  the  situation  is  not  without  novelty ;  for, 
so  far  as  I  am  aware,  never  until  now  has  one  born  and  nur- 
tured in  Massachusetts  —  a  typical  bred-in-the-bone  Yankee, 
if  you  please  —  addressed  at  its  invitation  a  Virginian  audi- 
ence, on  topics  relating  to  the  War  of  Secession  and  its  fore- 
most Confederate  military  character. 

Coming  directly  to  my  subject,  my  own  observation  tells 
me  that  the  charge  still  most  commonly  made  against  Lee  in 
that  section  of  the  common  country  to  which  I  belong  and 
with  which  I  sympathize  is  that,  in  plain  language,  he  was 
false  to  his  flag,  —  educated  at  the  national  academy,  an 
officer  of  the  United  States  Army,  he  abjured  his  allegiance 
and  bore  arms  against  the  government  he  had  sworn  to 
uphold.  In  other  words,  he  was  a  military  traitor.  I  state 
the  charge  in  the  tersest  language  possible ;  and  the  facts  are 
as  stated.  Having  done  so,  and,  for  the  purposes  of  the 
present  occasion,  admitting  the  facts,  I  add  as  the  result  of 
much  patient  study  and  most  mature  reflection,  that  under 
similar  conditions  I  would  myself  have  done  exactly  what 
Lee  did.  In  fact,  I  do  not  see  how  I,  placed  as  he  was  placed, 
could  have  done  otherwise. 

And  now  fairly  entered  on  the  first  phase  of  my  theme,  I 
must  hurry  on;  for  I  have  much  ground  to  traverse,  and 
scant  time  in  which  to  cover  it.  I  must  be  concise,  but  must 
not  fail  to  be  explicit.  And  first  as  to  the  right  or  wrong  of 
secession,  this  theoretically;  then,  practically,  as  to  what 
secession  in  the  year  of  grace  1861  necessarily  involved. 

If  ever  a  subject  had  been  thoroughly  thrashed  out,  —  so 
thrashed  out,  in  fact,  as  to  offer  no  possible  gleaning  of  nov- 
elty,—  it  might  be  inferred  that  this  was  that  subject.  Yet 
I  venture  the  opinion  that  such  is  not  altogether  the  case.     I 


296  MILITARY  STUDIES 

do  so,  moreover,  not  without  weighing  words.  The  difficulty 
with  the  discussion  has  to  my  mind  been  that  throughout 
it  has  in  essence  been  too  abstract,  legal  and  technical,  and 
not  sufficiently  historical,  sociological  and  human.  It  has 
turned  on  the  wording  of  instruments,  in  themselves  not 
explicit,  and  has  paid  far  too  little  regard  to  traditions  and 
local  ties.  As  matter  of  fact,  however,  actual  men  as  they 
live,  move  and  have  their  being  in  this  world,  caring  little  for 
parchments  or  theory,  are  the  creatures  of  heredity  and  local 
attachments.  Coming  directly  to  the  point,  I  maintain  that 
every  man  in  the  eleven  States  seceding  from  the  Union  had  in 
1861,  whether  he  would  or  no,  to  decide  for  himself  whether  to 
adhere  to  his  State  or  to  the  Nation ;  and  I  finally  assert  that, 
whichever  way  he  decided,  if  only  he  decided  honestly,  put- 
ting self-interest  behind  him,  he  decided  right. 

Paradoxical  as  it  sounds,  I  contend,  moreover,  that  this 
was  indisputably  so.  It  was  a  question  of  sovereignty  — 
State  or  National ;  and  from  a  decision  of  that  question  there 
was  in  a  seceded  State  escape  for  no  man.  Yet  when  the 
national  Constitution  was  framed  and  adopted  that  question 
was  confessedly  left  undecided;  and  intentionally  so  left. 
Even  more,  the  Federal  Constitution  was  theoretically  and 
avowedly  based  on  the  idea  of  a  divided  sovereignty,  in  utter 
disregard  of  the  fact  that,  when  a  final  issue  is  presented, 
sovereignty  does  not  admit  of  division.1 

Yet  even  this  last  proposition,  basic  as  it  is,  I  have  heard 
denied.  I  have  frequently  had  it  replied  that,  as  matter  of 
fact,  sovereignty  is  frequently  divided,  —  divided  in  domestic 
life,  —  divided  in  the  apportionment  of  the  functions  of  gov- 
ernment. Those  thus  arguing,  however,  do  so  confusedly. 
They  confound  sovereignty  with  an  agreed,  but  artificial, 
modus  Vivendi.2  The  original  constitution  of  the  United  States 
i  Supra,  210-221.  2  Ibid.  218. 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  297 

was,  in  fact,  in  this  important  respect  just  that,  —  a  modus 
vivendi :  —  under  the  circumstances  a  most  happy  and  ingen- 
ious expedient  for  overcoming  an  obstacle  in  the  way  of  na- 
tionality, otherwise  insurmountable.  To  accomplish  the  end 
they  had  in  view,  the  framers  had  recourse  to  a  metaphysical 
abstraction,  under  which  it  was  left  to  time  and  the  individual 
to  decide,  when  the  final  issue  should  arise,  if  it  ever  did  arise 
—  and  they  all  devoutly  hoped  it  never  would  arise  — 
where  sovereignty  lay.  There  is  nothing  in  connection 
with  the  history  of  our  development  more  interesting  from 
the  historical  point  of  view  than  the  growth,  the  gradual 
development  of  the  spirit  of  nationality,  carrying  with  it  sov- 
ereignty. It  has  usually  been  treated  as  a  purely  legal  ques- 
tion to  be  settled  on  the  verbal  construction  of  the  instru- 
ments: "We,  the  People,"  etc.  Webster  so  treated  it.  In 
all  confidence  I  maintain  that  it  is  not  a  legal  question ;  it  is 
purely  an  historical  question.  As  such,  furthermore,  it  has 
been  decided,  and  correctly  decided,  both  ways  at  different 
times  in  different  sections,  and  at  different  times  in  opposite 
ways  in  the  same  section. 

And  this  was  necessarily  and  naturally  so ;  for,  as  develop- 
ment progressed  along  various  lines  and  in  different  localities, 
the  sense  of  allegiance  shifted.  Two  whole  generations 
passed  away  between  the  adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitu- 
tion and  the  War  of  Secession.  When  that  war  broke  out  in 
1861,  the  last  of  the  framers  had  been  a  score  of  years  in  his 
grave;  but  evidence  is  conclusive  that  until  the  decennium 
between  1830  and  1840  the  belief  was  nearly  universal  that  in 
case  of  a  final,  unavoidable  issue,  sovereignty  resided  in  the 
State,  and  to  it  allegiance  was  due.  The  law  was  so  laid 
down  in  the  Kentucky  resolves  of  1798;  and  to  the  law  as 
thus  laid  down  Webster  assented.  Chancellor  Rawle  so 
propounded  the  law;    and  such  was  the  understanding  of 


298  MILITARY  STUDIES 

so  unprejudiced  and  acute  a  foreign  observer  as  Tocque- 
ville.1 

The  technical  argument  —  the  logic  of  the  proposition  — 
seems  plain,  and,  to  my  thought,  unanswerable.  The  original 
sovereignty  was  indisputably  in  the  State ;  in  order  to  estab- 
lish a  nationality  certain  attributes  of  sovereignty  were  ceded 
by  the  States  to  a  common  central  organization;  all  attri- 
butes not  thus  specifically  conceded  were  reserved  to  the 
States,  and  no  attributes  of  moment  were  to  be  construed  as 
conceded  by  implication.  There  is  no  attribute  of  sovereignty 
so  important  as  allegiance,  —  citizenship.  So  far  all  is 
elementary.  Now  we  come  to  the  crux  of  the  proposition. 
Not  only  was  allegiance  —  the  right  to  define  and  establish 
citizenship  —  not  among  the  attributes  specifically  conceded 
by  the  several  States  to  the  central  nationality,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  it  was  explicitly  reserved,  the  instrument  declaring 
that  "the  citizens  of  each  State"  should  be  entitled  to  "all 
Privileges  and  Immunities  of  Citizens  in  the  several  States." 
Ultimate  allegiance  was,  therefore,  due  to  the  State  which 
defined  and  created  citizenship,  and  not  to  the  central  or- 
ganization which  accepted  as  citizens  whomever  the  States 
pronounced  to  be  such.2 

Thus  far  I  have  never  been  able  to  see  where  room  was 
left  for  doubt.  Citizenship  was  an  attribute  recognized  by 
the  Constitution  as  originating  with,  and  of  course  belonging 
to,  the  several  States.  But,  speaking  historically  and  in 
a  philosophical  rather  than  in  a  legal  spirit,  it  is  little  more 
than  a  commonplace  to  assert  that  one  great  safeguard  of 

1  See  note,  infra,  339. 

2  See  W.  H.  Fleming,  Slavery  and  the  Race  Problem  at  the  South,  pp.  19, 
20.  An  authoritative  definition  of  United  States  citizenship,  as  distinct 
from  the  citizenship  of  a  State,  was  first  given  in  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment to  the  Federal  Constitution,  ratified  in  1868.  See  J.  S.  Wise,  A 
Treatise  on  American  Citizenship,  pp.  6,  13,  31. 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  299 

the  Anglo-Saxon  race  —  what  might  almost  be  termed  its 
political  palladium  —  has  ever  been  that  hard,  if  at  times 
illogical,  common-sense,  which,  recognizing  established 
custom  as  a  binding  rule  of  action,  found  its  embodiment  in 
what  we  are  wont  with  pride  to  term  the  Common  Law. 
Now,  just  as  there  can,  I  think,  be  no  question  as  to  the 
source  of  citizenship,  and,  consequently,  as  to  sovereignty, 
when  the  Constitution  was  originally  adopted,  there  can  be 
equally  little  question  that  during  the  lives  of  the  two  suc- 
ceeding generations  a  custom  of  nationality  grew  up  which  be- 
came the  accepted  Common  Law  of  the  land,  and  practically 
binding  as  such.  This  was  true  in  the  South  as  well  as  the 
North,  though  the  custom  was  more  hardened  into  accepted 
law  in  the  latter  than  in  the  former ; 1  but  the  growth  and 
acceptance  as  law  of  the  custom  of  nationality  even  in  the 
South  were  incontrovertibly  shown  in  the  very  act  of  secession, 
—  the  seceding  States  at  once  crystallizing  into  a  Confed- 
eracy.    Nationality  was  assumed  as  a  thing  of  course. 

But  the  metaphysical  abstraction  of  a  divided  sovereignty, 
none  the  less,  bridged  the  chasm.  As  a  modus  Vivendi  it 
did  its  work.  I  have  called  it  a  metaphysical  abstraction; 
but  it  was  also  a  practical  arrangement  resulting  in  great 
advantages.  It  might  be  illogical,  and  fraught  with  possible 
disputes  and  consequent  dangers ;  but  it  was  an  institution. 
And  so  it  naturally  came  to  pass  that  in  many  of  the  States 
a  generation  grew  up,  dating  from  the  War  of  1812,  who, 
gravitating  steadily  and  more  and  more  strongly  to  na- 
tionality, took  a  wholly  different  view  of  allegiance.  For 
them  Story  laid  down  the  law;  Webster  was  their  mouth- 
piece; at  one  time  it  looked  as  if  Jackson  was  to  be  their 
armed  exponent.  They  were,  moreover,  wholly  within  their 
right.     The  sovereignty  was   confessedly  divided;    and  it 

1  Supra,  224-225. 


300  MILITARY  STUDIES 

was  for  them  to  elect.  The  movements  of  both  science  and 
civilization  were  behind  the  nationalists.  The  railroad 
obliterated  State  lines,  while  it  unified  the  nation.  What 
did  the  foreign  immigrants,  now  swarming  across  the  ocean, 
care  for  States  ?  They  knew  only  the  nation.  Brought  up 
in  Europe,  the  talk  of  State  sovereignty  was  to  them  foolish- 
ness. Its  alphabet  was  incomprehensible.  In  a  word,  it 
too  "was  caviare  to  the  general." 

Then  the  inevitable  issue  arose ;  and  it  arose  over  African 
slavery;  and  slavery  was  sectional.  The  States  south  of 
a  given  line  were  arrayed  against  the  States  north  of  that 
line.  Owing  largely  to  slavery,  and  the  practical  exclusion 
of  immigrants  because  thereof,  the  States  of  the  South  had 
never  undergone  nationalization  at  all  to  the  extent  those 
of  the  North  had  undergone  it.  The  growing  influence  and 
power  of  the  national  government,  the  sentiment  inspired 
by  the  wars  in  which  we  had  been  engaged,  the  rapidly  im- 
proving means  of  communication  and  intercourse,  had 
produced  their  effects  in  the  South;  but  in  degree  far  less 
than  in  the  North.  Thus  the  curious  result  was  brought 
about  that,  when,  at  last,  the  long-deferred  issue  confronted 
the  country,  and  the  modus  vivendi  of  two  generations  was 
brought  to  a  close,  those  who  believed  in  national  sovereignty 
constituted  the  conservative  majority,  striving  for  the  pres- 
ervation of  what  then  was,  —  the  existing  nineteenth- 
century  nation,  —  while  those  who  passionately  adhered 
to  State  sovereignty,  treading  in  the  footsteps  of  the  fathers, 
had  become  eighteenth-century  reactionists.  Legally,  each 
had  right  on  his  side.  The  theory  of  a  divided  sovereignty 
had  worked  itself  out  to  its  logical  consequence.  "  Under 
which  King,  Bezonian?" —  and  every  man  had  to  "  speak 
or  die." 

In  the  North  the  situation  was  simple.    State  and  Nation 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  301 

stood  together.  The  question  of  allegiance  did  not  present 
itself ,  for  the  two  sovereignties  merged.  It  was  otherwise 
in  the  South;  and  there  the  question  became,  not  legal  or 
constitutional,  but  practical.  The  life  of  the  nation  had 
endured  so  long,  the  ties  and  ligaments  had  become  so  nu- 
merous and  interwoven,  that,  all  theories  to  the  contrary 
notwithstanding,  a  peaceable  secession  from  the  Union  — 
a  virtual  exercise  of  State  sovereignty  —  had  become  im- 
possible. If  those  composing  the  several  dissatisfied  com- 
munities would  only  keep  their  tempers  under  restraint,  and 
exercise  an  almost  unlimited  patience,  a  theoretical  divided 
sovereignty,  maintained  through  the  agency  and  inter- 
vention of  the  Supreme  Court,  —  in  other  words,  the  per- 
petuation of  the  modus  vivendi,  —  was  altogether  practi- 
cable ;  and  probably  this  was  what  the  framers  had  in  mind 
under  such  a  contingency  as  had  now  arisen.  But  that, 
after  seventy  years  of  Union  and  nationalization,  a  peace- 
able and  friendly  taking  to  pieces  was  possible  is  now,  as 
then  it  was,  scarcely  thinkable.  Certainly,  with  a  most 
vivid  recollection  of  the  state  of  sectional  feeling  which  then 
existed,  I  do  not  believe  there  was  a  man  in  the  United  States 
—  I  am  confident  there  was  not  a  woman  in  the  South  — 
who  fostered  self-delusion  to  the  extent  of  believing  that  the 
change  was  to  come  about  without  a  recourse  to  force.  In 
other  words,  practical  Secession  was  revolution  theoretically 
legal.  Why  waste  time  and  breath  in  discussion !  The 
situation  becomes  manifestly  impossible  of  continuance 
where  the  issue  between  heated  men,  with  weapons  handy, 
is  over  a  metaphysical  distinction  involving  vast  material 
and  moral  consequences.  Lee,  with  intuitive  common- 
sense,  struck  the  nail  squarely  on  the  head  when  amidst  the 
Babel  of  discordant  tongues  he  wrote  to  his  son:  "It  is 
idle  to   talk  of   secession";   the  national    government  as  it 


302  MILITARY  STUDIES 

then  was  "can  only  be  dissolved  by  revolution. "  That 
struggle  of  dissolution  might  be  longer  and  fiercer,  —  as  it 
was,  —  or  shorter,  and  more  wordy  than  blood-letting,  — 
as  the  seceding  States  confidently  believed  would  prove  to 
be  the  case,  —  but  a  struggle  there  would  be. 

Historically,  such  were  the  conditions  to  which  natural 
processes  of  development  had  brought  the  common  country 
at  the  mid-decennium  of  the  century.  People  had  to  elect ; 
the  modus  vivendi  was  at  an  end.  —  Was  the  State  sovereign ; 
or  was  the  Nation  sovereign  ?  And,  with  a  shock  of  genuine 
surprise  that  any  doubt  should  exist  on  that  head,  eleven 
States  arrayed  themselves  on  the  side  of  the  sovereignty  of 
the  State  and  claimed  the  unquestioning  allegiance  of  their 
citizens;  and  I  think  it  not  unsafe  to  assert  that  nowhere 
did  the  original  spirit  of  State  sovereignty  and  allegiance 
to  the  State  then  survive  in  greater  intensity  and  more  un- 
questioning form  than  in  Virginia,  —  the  "Old  Dominion," 

—  the  mother  of  States  and  of  Presidents.  And  here  I  ap- 
proach a  sociological  factor  in  the  problem  more  subtle  and 
also  more  potent  than  any  legal  consideration.  It  has  no 
standing  in  Court :  but  the  historian  may  not  ignore  it ;  while, 
with  the  biographer  of  Lee,  it  is  crucial.  Upon  it  judgment 
hinges.  I  have  not  time  to  consider  how  or  why  such  a  result 
came  about,  but  of  the  fact  there  can,  I  hold,  be  no  question, 

—  State  pride,  a  sense  of  individuality,  has  immemorially 
entered  more  largely  and  more  intensely  into  Virginia  and 
Virginians  than  into  any  other  section  or  community  of  the 
country.  Only  in  South  Carolina  and  among  Carolinians, 
on  this  continent,  was  a  somewhat  similar  pride  of  locality 
and  descent  to  be  found.  There  was  in  it  a  flavor  of  the 
Hidalgo,  —  or  of  the  pride  which  the  Macgregors  and  Camp- 
bells took  in  their  clan  and  country.  In  other  words,  the 
Virginian  and  the  Carolinian  had  in  the  middle  of  the  last 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  303 

century  not  undergone  nationalization  to  any  appreciable 
extent. 

But  this,  it  will  be  replied,  though  true  of  the  ordinary 
man  and  citizen,  should  not  have  been  true  of  the  graduate 
of  the  military  academy,  the  officer  of  the  Army  of  the  United 
States.  Winfield  Scott  and  George  H.  Thomas  did  not  so 
construe  their  allegiance;  when  the  issue  was  presented, 
they  remained  true  to  their  flag  and  to  their  oaths.  Robert 
E.  Lee,  false  to  his  oath  and  flag,  was  a  renegade !  The 
answer  is  brief  and  to  the  point:  the  conditions  in  the 
several  cases  were  not  the  same,  —  neither  Scott  nor  Thomas 
was  Lee.  It  was  our  Boston  Dr.  Holmes  who  long  ago 
declared  that  the  child's  education  begins  about  two  hun- 
dred and  fifty  years  before  it  is  born;  and  it  is  quite  im- 
possible to  separate  any  man  —  least  of  all,  perhaps,  a  full- 
blooded  Virginian  —  from  his  prenatal  traditions  and  living 
environment.  From  them  he  drew  his  being;  in  them  he 
exists.  Robert  E.  Lee  was  the  embodiment  of  those  condi- 
tions, the  creature  of  that  environment,  —  a  Virginian  of 
Virginians.  His  father  was  "  Light  Horse  Harry "  Lee,  a 
devoted  follower  of  Washington;  but  in  January,  1792, 
" Light  Horse  Harry"  wrote  to  Mr.  Madison :  "No  considera- 
tion on  earth  could  induce  me  to  act  a  part,  however  gratify- 
ing to  me,  which  could  be  construed  into  disregard  of,  or 
faithlessness  to,  this  Commonwealth ";  and  later,  when  in 
1798  the  Virginia  and  Kentucky  resolutions  were  under  dis- 
cussion, "Light  Horse  Harry"  exclaimed  in  debate,  "Vir- 
ginia is  my  country;  her  will  I  obey,  however  lament- 
able the  fate  to  which  it  may  subject  me."  Born  in  this 
environment,  nurtured  in  these  traditions,  to  ask  Lee  to  raise 
his  hand  against  Virginia  was  like  asking  Montrose  or  the 
MacCallum  More  to  head  a  force  designed  for  the  subjection 
of  the  Highlands  and  the  destruction  of  the  clans.     Where 


304  MILITARY  STUDIES 

such  a  stern  election  is  forced  upon  a  man  as  then  confronted 
Lee,  the  single  thing  the  fair-minded  investigator  has  to  take 
into  account  is  the  loyalty,  the  single-mindedness  of  the  elec- 
tion. Was  it  devoid  of  selfishness,  —  was  it  free  from  any 
baser  and  more  sordid  worldly  motive,  —  ambition,  pride, 
jealousy,  revenge  or  self-interest?  To  this  question  there 
can,  in  the  case  of  Lee,  be  but  one  answer.  When,  after 
long  and  trying  mental  wrestling,  he  threw  in  his  fate  with 
Virginia,  he  knowingly  sacrificed  everything  which  man 
prizes  most,  —  his  dearly  beloved  home,  his  means  of  sup- 
port, his  professional  standing,  his  associates,  a  brilliant 
future  assured  to  him.  Born  a  slaveholder  in  a  race  of 
slaveholders,  he  was  himself  no  defender,  much  less  an  ad- 
vocate of  slavery;  on  the  contrary,  he  did  not  hesitate  to 
pronounce  it  in  his  place  "a  moral  and  political  evil." 
Later,  he  manumitted  his  slaves.  He  did  not  believe  in 
secession;  as  a  right  reserved  under  the  Constitution  he 
pronounced  it  "idle  talk"  :  but,  as  a  Virginian,  he  also  added, 
"if  the  Government  is  disrupted,  I  shall  return  to  my  native 
State  and  share  the  miseries  of  my  people,  and  save  in  de- 
fence will  draw  my  sword  on  none."  Next  to  his  high 
sense  of  allegiance  to  Virginia  was  Lee's  pride  in  his  pro- 
fession. He  was  a  soldier ;  as  such  rank,  and  the  possibility 
of  high  command  and  great  achievement,  were  very  dear  to 
him.  His  choice  put  rank  and  command  behind  him.  He 
quietly  and  silently  made  the  greatest  sacrifice  a  soldier  can 
be  asked  to  make.  With  war  plainly  impending,  the  fore- 
most place  in  the  army*  of  which  he  was  an  officer  was  now 
tendered  him;  his  answer  was  to  lay  down  the  commission 
he  already  held.  Virginia  had  been  drawn  into  the  struggle ; 
and  though  he  recognized  no  necessity  for  the  state  of  affairs, 
"in  my  own  person,"  he  wrote,  "I  had  to  meet  the  question 
whether  I  should  take  part  against  my  native  State ;  I  have 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  305 

not  been  able  to  make  up  my  mind  to  raise  my  hand  against 
my  relatives,  my  children,  my  home."  It  may  have  been 
treason  to  take  this  position ;  the  man  who  took  it,  uttering 
these  words  and  sacrificing  as  he  sacrificed,  may  have  been 
technically  a  renegade  to  his  flag,  —  if  you  please,  false  to 
his  allegiance;  but  he  stands  awaiting  sentence  at  the  bar 
of  history  in  very  respectable  company.  Associated  with 
him  are,  for  instance,  William  of  Orange,  known  as  The  Silent, 
John  Hampden,  the  original  Pater  Patrice,  Oliver  Cromwell, 
the  Protector  of  the  English  Commonwealth,  Sir  Henry  Vane, 
once  a  governor  of  Massachusetts,  and  George  Washington, 
a  Virginian  of  note.  In  the  throng  of  other  offenders  I  am 
also  gratified  to  observe  certain  of  those  from  whom  I  not 
unproudly  claim  descent.  They  were,  one  and  all,  in  the 
sense  referred  to,  false  to  their  oaths  —  forsworn.  As  to 
Robert  E.  Lee,  individually,  I  can  only  repeat  what  I  have 
already  said,  —  if  in  all  respects  similarly  circumstanced, 
I  hope  I  should  have  been  filial  and  unselfish  enough  to  have 
done  as  Lee  did.1  Such  an  utterance  on  my  part  may  be 
"traitorous";   but  I  here  render  that  homage. 

In  Massachusetts,  however,  I  could  not  even  in  1861  have 
been  so  placed ;  for,  be  it  because  of  better  or  worse,  Massa- 
chusetts was  not  Virginia ;  —  no  more  Virginia  than  England 
once  was  Scotland,  or  the  Lowlands  the  Highlands.  The 
environment,  the  ideals,  were  in  no  respect  the  same.  In 
Virginia,  Lee  was  Macgregor;  and,  where  Macgregor  sat, 
there  was  the  head  of  the  table. 

Into  Lee's  subsequent  military  career,  there  is  no  call  here 
to  enter;  nor  shall  I  undertake  to  compare  him  with  other 
great  military  characters,  whether  contemporaneous  or  of 
all  time.  As  I  said  when  I  began,  the  topic  has  been  thor- 
oughly discussed  by  others ;  and,  moreover,  the  time  limit a- 

1  See  Lee  at  Appomattox  and  Other  Payers  (2d  ed.),  pp.  414-417. 
x 


306  MILITARY  STUDIES 

tion  here  again  confronts  me.  I  must  press  on.  Suffice  it 
for  me,  as  one  of  those  then  opposed  in  arms  to  Lee,  however 
subordinate  the  capacity,  to  admit  at  once  that,  as  a  leader, 
he  conducted  operations  on  the  highest  plane.  Whether 
acting  on  the  defensive  upon  the  soil  of  his  native  State,  or 
leading  his  army  into  the  enemy's  country,  he  was  humane, 
self-restrained  and  strictly  observant  of  the  most  advanced 
rules  of  civilized  warfare.  He  respected  the  non-comba- 
tant; nor  did  he  ever  permit  the  wanton  destruction  of 
private  property.  His  famous  Chambersburg  order  was  a 
model  which  any  invading  general  would  do  well  to  make 
his  own;  and  I  repeat  now  what  I  have  heretofore  had 
occasion  to  say,  "I  doubt  if  a  hostile  force  of  an  equal 
size  ever  advanced  into  an  enemy's  country,  or  fell  back 
from  it  in  retreat,  leaving  behind  less  cause  of  hate  and  bitter- 
ness than  did  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  that  memor- 
able campaign  which  culminated  at  Gettysburg."  1 

And  yet  that  Gettysburg  campaign  is  an  episode  in  Lee's 
military  career  which  I  am  loath  wholly  to  pass  over ;  for  the 
views  I  entertain  of  it  are  not  in  all  respects  those  generally 
held.  Studied  in  the  light  of  results,  that  campaign  has  been 
criticized ;  the  crucial  attack  of  Gettysburg's  third  day  has 
been  pronounced  a  murderous  persistence  in  a  misconception ; 
and,  among  Confederate  writers  especially,  the  effort  has  been 
to  relieve  Lee  of  responsibility  for  final  miscarriage,  trans- 
ferring it  to  his  lieutenants.  As  a  result  reached  from  par- 
ticipation in  those  events  and  subsequent  study  of  them, 
briefly  let  me  say  I  concur  in  none  of  these  conclusions. 
Taking  the  necessary  chances  incident  to  all  warfare  on  a 
large  scale  into  consideration,  the  Gettysburg  campaign 
was  in  my  opinion  timely,  admirably  designed,  energetically 
executed,  and  brought  to  a  close  with  consummate  military 
1  War  is  Hell   (Houghton,  Mifflin  and  Co.,  Boston,  1903),  40  ;  supra,  266. 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  307 

skill.  A  well-considered  offensive  thrust  of  the  most  deadly 
character,  intelligently  aimed  at  the  opponent's  heart,  its 
failure  was  of  the  narrowest;  and  the  disaster  to  the  Con- 
federate side  which  that  failure  might  readily  have  involved 
was  no  less  skilfully  than  successfully  averted. 

I  cannot  here  and  now  enter  into  details.  But  I  hold 
that  credit,  and  the  consequent  measure  of  applause,  in  the 
outcome  of  that  campaign  belong  to  Lee's  opponent,  and  not 
to  him.  All  the  chances  were  in  Lee's  favor,  and  he  should 
have  won  a  great  victory ;  and  Meade  should  have  sustained 
a  decisive  defeat.  As  it  was,  Meade  triumphantly  held  his 
ground ;  Lee  suffered  a  terrible  repulse,  his  deadly  thrust  was 
foiled,  and  his  campaign  was  a  failure. 

So  far  as  Lee's  general  plan  of  operations,  and  the  move- 
ments which  culminated  in  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  were 
concerned,  be  it  always  and  ever  remembered,  a  leader  must, 
in  war,  take  some  chances,  and  mistakes  will  occur ;  but  the 
mistakes  are  rarely,  if  ever,  all  on  one  side.  They  tend  to 
counterbalance  each  other;  and,  commanders  and  com- 
manded being  at  all  equal,  not  unseldom  it  is  the  balance  of 
misconceptions,  shortcomings,  miscarriages,  and  the  generally 
unforeseen,  and  indeed  unforeseeable,  which  tips  the  scale 
to  victory  or  defeat.  I  have  said  that  I  proposed  to  avoid 
comparisons ;  at  best  such  are  invidious,  and,  under  present 
circumstances,  might  from  me  be  considered  as  doubtful  in 
matter  of  taste.  I  think,  however,  some  things  too  obvious 
to  admit  of  denial ;  or,  consequently,  to  suggest  comparison. 
About  every  crisp  military  aphorism  is  as  matter  of  course 
attributed  to  Napoleon ;  and  so  Napoleon  is  alleged  first  to 
have  remarked  that  "In  war,  men  are  nothing;  a  man 
is  everything."  1  And,  as  formerly  a  soldier  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  I  now  stand  appalled  at  the  risk  I  uncon- 
1  "A  la  guerre  les  hommes  ne  sont  rien,  c'est  un  homme  qui  est  tout.'! 


308  MILITARY  STUDIES 

sciously  ran  anterior  to  July,  1863,  when  confronting  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  commanded  as  it  then  was  and 
as  we  were.  The  situation  was  in  fact  as  bad  with  us  in  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  as  it  was  with  the  Confederates  in  the 
southwest.  There  the  unfortunate  Pemberton  simply  was 
not  in  the  same  class  as  Grant  and  Sherman,  to  whom  he 
found  himself  opposed.  Results  followed  accordingly.  So 
here,  in  Virginia,  Lee  and  Jackson  made  an  extraordinary,  a 
most  exceptional  combination.  They  outclassed  McClellan 
and  Burnside,  Pope  and  Hooker;  outclassed  them  some- 
times terribly,  sometimes  ludicrously,  always  hopelessly: 
and  results  in  that  case  also  followed  accordingly.  That 
we  were  not  utterly  destroyed  constitutes  a  flat  and  final 
refutal  of  the  truth  of  Napoleon's  aphorism.  If  we  did  not 
realize  the  facts  of  the  situation  in  this  respect,  our  opponents 
did.  Let  me  quote  the  words  of  one  of  them:  "There  was, 
however,  one  point  of  great  interest  in  [the  rapid  succession 
of  the  Federal  commanders],  and  that  was  our  amazement 
that  an  army  could  maintain  even  so  much  as  its  organiza- 
tion under  the  depressing  strain  of  those  successive  appoint- 
ments and  removals  of  its  commanding  generals.  And  to- 
day (1903)  I,  for  one,  regard  the  fact  that  it  did  preserve  its 
cohesion  and  its  fighting  power  under  and  in  spite  of  such 
experiences,  as  furnishing  impressive  demonstration  of  the 
high  character  and  intense  loyalty  of  our  historic  foe,  the 
Federal  Army  of  the  Potomac."  1 

Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  until  the  death  of  Jackson 
and  the  Gettysburg  campaign  we  were  thus  glaringly  out- 
classed, and  at  a  corresponding  disadvantage  in  every  re- 
spect save  mere  men  and  equipment,  the  one  noticeable 
feature  of  the  succession  of  Virginia  campaigns,  from  that  of 
1862  to  that  of  1864,  was  their  obstinacy  and  indecisive 
1  Stiles,  Four  Years  under  Marse  Robert,  21. 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  309 

character.  The  advantage  would  be  sometimes  on  one  side; 
sometimes  on  the  other:  but  neither  side  could  secure  an 
indisputable  supremacy.  This  was  markedly  the  case  at 
Gettysburg;  and  yet,  judging  by  the  Confederate  accounts 
of  that  campaign  which  have  met  my  eye,  the  inference  would 
be  that  the  Union  forces  labored  under  no  serious  disad- 
vantage, while  Lee's  plans  and  tactics  were  continually  com- 
promised by  untoward  accident,  or  the  precipitation  or 
remissness  of  his  subordinates.  My  study  of  what  then 
took  place  leads  me  to  a  wholly  opposite  conclusion.  Well 
conceived  and  vigorously  carried  out  as  that  campaign  was 
on  the  part  of  the  Confederate  leader,  the  preponderance 
of  the  accidental  —  the  blunders,  the  unforeseeable,  the 
misconceptions  and  the  miscarriages  —  was  distinctly  in 
Lee's  favor.  On  any  fair  weighing  of  chances,  he  should 
have  won  a  decisive  victory ;  as  a  matter  of  actual  outcome, 
he  and  his  army  ought  to  have  been  destroyed.  As  usual, 
on  that  theatre  of  war  at  the  time,  neither  result  came 
about. 

First  as  to  the  chapter  of  accidents,  —  the  misconceptions, 
miscarriages  and  shortcomings.  If,  as  has  been  alleged, 
an  essential  portion  of  Lee's  force  was  at  one  time  out  of 
reach  and  touch,  and  if,  at  the  critical  moment,  a  lieutenant 
was  not  promptly  in  place  at  a  given  hour,  on  the  Union  side 
an  unforeseen  change  of  supreme  command  went  into  effect 
when  battle  was  already  joined,  and  the  newly  appointed 
commander  had  no  organized  staff;  his  army  was  not  con- 
centrated ;  his  strongest  corps  was  over  thirty  miles  from 
the  point  of  conflict;  and  the  two  corps  immediately  en- 
gaged should  have  been  destroyed  in  detail  before  rein- 
forcements could  have  reached  them.  In  addition  to  all  this, 
—  superadded  thereto,  —  the  most  skilful  general  and  per- 
haps the  fiercest  fighter  on  the  Union  side  was  killed  at  the 


310  MILITARY  STUDIES 

outset,  and,  later,  Meade's  line  of  battle  was  almost  fatally 
disordered  by  the  misconception  of  a  corps  commander. 

The  chapter  of  accidents  thus  reads  all  in  Lee's  favor. 
But,  while  Lee  on  any  fair  weighing  of  chances  stands  in  my 
judgment  more  than  justified  both  in  his  conception  of  the 
campaign  and  in  every  material  strategic  move  made  in  it, 
he  none  the  less  fundamentally  misconceived  the  situation, 
with  consequences  which  should  have  been  fatal  both  to  him 
and  to  his  command.  Frederick  did  the  same  at  Kuners- 
dorf;  Napoleon,  at  Waterloo.  In  the  first  place,  Lee  had 
at  that  time  supreme  confidence  in  his  command ;  and  he 
had  grounds  for  it.  As  he  himself  then  wrote  :  "  There 
never  were  such  men  in  an  army  before.  They  will  go  any- 
where and  do  anything,  if  properly  led."  And,  for  myself,  I 
do  not  think  the  estimate  thus  expressed  was  exaggerated ; 
speaking  deliberately,  having  faced  some  portions  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  at  the  time  and  having  since 
reflected  much  on  the  occurrences  of  that  momentous  period,  I 
do  not  believe  that  any  more  formidable  or  better  organized 
and  animated  force  was  ever  set  in  motion  than  that  which 
Lee  led  across  the  Potomac  in  the  early  summer  of  1863.  It 
was  essentially  an  army  of  fighters,  —  men  who,  individually 
or  in  the  mass,  could  be  depended  on  for  any  feat  of  arms  in 
the  power  of  mere  mortals  to  accomplish.  They  would  blanch 
at  no  danger.  This,  Lee  from  experience  knew.  He  had 
tested  them;  they  had  full  confidence  in  him.  He  also 
thought  he  knew  his  opponent ;  and  here  too  his  recent  ex- 
perience justified  him. 

The  disasters  which  had  befallen  the  Confederates  in  the 
Southwest  in  the  spring  and  early  summer  of  1863  had  to 
find  compensation  in  the  East.  The  exigencies  of  warfare 
necessitated  it.  Some  risk  must  be  incurred.  So  Lee  de- 
termined to  strike  at  his  opponent's  heart.    He  had  what  he 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  311 

believed  to  be  the  better  weapon;  and  he  had  reason  for 
considering  himself  incomparably  the  superior  swordsman. 
He  was ;  of  that  he  had  at  Chancellorsville  satisfied  himself 
and  the  world.  Then  came  the  rapid,  aggressive  move ;  and 
the  long,  desperately  contested  struggle  at  Gettysburg,  cul- 
minating in  that  historic  charge  of  Pickett's  Virginia  division. 
Paradoxical  as  it  may  sound  in  view  of  the  result,  that 
charge  —  what  those  men  did  —  justified  Lee.  True,  those 
who  made  the  charge  did  not  accomplish  the  impossible; 
but  towards  it  they  did  all  that  mortal  men  could  do.  But 
it  is  urged  that  Lee  should  have  recognized  the  impossible 
when  face  to  face  confronted  by  it,  and  not  have  directed 
brave  men  to  lay  down  their  lives  in  the  vain  effort  to  do  it. 
That  is  true ;  and,  as  Lee  is  said  to  have  once  remarked  in  an- 
other connection,  "Even  as  poor  a  soldier  as  I  am  can  gen- 
erally discover  mistakes  after  it  is  all  over."  After  Gettys- 
burg was  over,  like  Frederick  at  Kunersdorf  and  Napoleon 
at  Waterloo,  Lee  doubtless  discovered  his  mistake.  It  was 
a  very  simple  one :  he  undervalued  his  opponent.  The 
temper  of  his  own  weapon  he  knew;  he  made  no  mistake 
there.  His  mistake  lay  in  his  estimate  of  his  antagonist: 
but  that  estimate  again  was  based  on  his  own  recent  ex- 
perience, though  in  other  fields. 

On  the  other  hand,  from  the  day  I  rode  over  the  field  of 
Gettysburg  immediately  following  the  fight  to  that  which 
now  is,  I  have  fully  and  most  potently  believed  that  only 
some  disorganized  fragments  of  Lee's  army  should  after  that 
battle  have  found  their  way  back  to  Virginia.  The  war 
should  have  collapsed  within  sixty  days  thereafter.  For 
eighteen  hours  after  the  repulse  of  Pickett's  division,  I  have 
always  felt,  and  now  feel,  the  fate  of  the  Army  of  Virginia 
was  as  much  in  General  Meade's  hands  as  was  the  fate  of 
the  army  led  by  Napoleon  in  the  hands  of  Bliicher  on  the 


312  MILITARY  STUDIES 

night  of  Waterloo.  As  an  aggressive  force,  the  Confederate 
army  was  fought  out.  It  might  yet  put  forth  a  fierce  de- 
fensive effort ;  it  was  sure  to  die  game :  but  it  was  impotent 
for  attack.  Meade  had  one  entire  corps  —  perhaps  his  best, 
—  the  Sixth,  commanded  by  Sedgwick  —  intact  and  in 
reserve.  It  lay  there  cold,  idle,  formidable.  The  true 
counter  movement  for  the  fourth  day  of  continuous  fighting 
would  on  Meade's  part  have  been  an  exact  reversal  of  Lee's 
own  plan  of  battle  for  the  third  day.  That  plan,  as  described 
by  Fitzhugh  Lee,  was  simple.  "His  [Lee's]  purpose  was  to 
turn  the  enemy's  left  flank  with  his  First  Corps,  and,  after 
the  work  began  there,  to  demonstrate  against  his  lines  with 
the  others  in  order  to  prevent  the  threatened  flank  from 
being  reenforced,  these  demonstrations  to  be  converted  into 
a  real  attack  as  the  flanking  wave  of  battle  rolled  over  the 
troops  in  their  front."  What  Lee  thus  proposed  for  Meade's 
army  on  the  third  day,  Meade  should  unquestionably  have 
returned  on  Lee's  army  upon  the  fourth  day.  Sedgwick's 
corps  should  then  have  assailed  Lee's  right  and  rear.  I  once 
asked  a  leading  Confederate  general,1  who  had  been  in  the 
very  thick  of  it  at  Gettysburg,  what  would  have  been  the 
outcome  had  Meade,  within  two  hours  of  the  repulse  of 
Pickett,  ordered  Sedgwick  to  move  off  to  the  left,  and, 
occupying  Lee's  line  of  retreat,  proceeded  to  envelop  the  Con- 
federate right,  while,  early  the  following  morning,  Meade  had 
commanded  a  general  advance.  The  answer  I  received  was 
immediate:  "Without  question  we  would  have  been  de- 
stroyed. We  all  that  night  fully  expected  it;  and  could  not 
understand  next  day  why  we  were  unmolested.  My  ammuni- 
tion" —  for  he  was  an  officer  of  artillery  —  "was  exhausted." 
But  in  all  this,  as  in  every  speculation  of  the  sort,  —  and 

1  General  E.  P.  Alexander,  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  corps  commanded 
by  General  Longstreet. 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  313 

the  history  of  warfare  is  replete  with  them,  —  the  "if"  is 
much  in  evidence;  as  much  in  evidence,  indeed,  as  it  is  in 
a  certain  familiar  Shakespearian  disquisition.  I  here  in- 
troduce what  I  have  said  on  this  topic  simply  to  illustrate 
what  may  be  described  as  the  balance  of  miscarriages  in- 
separable from  warfare.  On  the  other  hand,  the  manner  in 
which  Lee  met  disaster  at  Gettysburg,  and  the  combination 
of  serene  courage,  and  consequent  skill,  with  which  he  ex- 
tricated his  army  from  a  most  critical  situation  commands 
admiration.  I  would  here  say  nothing  depreciatory  of 
General  Meade.  He  was  an  accomplished  officer  as  well  as  a 
brave  soldier.  Placed  suddenly  in  a  most  trying  position,  — 
assigned  to  chief  command  when  battle  was  already  joined, 
—  untried  in  his  new  sphere  of  action,  and  caught  un- 
prepared, —  he  fought  at  Gettysburg  a  stubborn,  gallant 
fight.  With  chances  at  the  beginning  heavily  against  him, 
he  saved  the  day.  Personally,  I  was  later  under  deep  obliga- 
tion to  General  Meade.  Pie  too  had  character.  None  the 
less,  as  I  have  already  pointed  out,  I  fully  believe  that  on 
the  fourth  day  at  Gettysburg  Meade  had  but  firmly  to  close 
his  hand,  and  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  crushed. 
Perhaps  under  all  the  circumstances  it  was  too  much  to  have 
expected  of  him;  certainly  it  was  not  done.  Then  Lee  in 
turn  did  avail  himself  of  his  opportunity.  Skilfully,  proudly 
though  sullenly,  preserving  an  unbroken  front,  he  withdrew 
to  Virginia.     That  withdrawal  was  masterly. 

Narrowly  escaping  destruction  at  Gettysburg,  my  next 
contention  is  that  Lee  and  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
never  sustained  defeat.  Finally,  it  is  true,  succumbing  to 
exhaustion,  to  the  end  they  were  not  overthrown  in  fight. 
And  here  I  approach  a  large  topic,  but  one  closely  inter- 
woven with  Lee's  military  career ;  in  fact,  as  I  see  it,  the 
explanation  of  what  finally  occurred.     What  then  was  it 


314  MILITARY  STUDIES 

that  brought  about  the  collapse  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  and  the  consequent  downfall  of  the  Confederacy? 
The  literature  of  the  War  of  Secession  now  constitutes  a 
library  in  itself.  Especially  is  this  true  of  it  in  its  military 
aspects.  The  shelves  are  crowded  with  memoirs  and  biog- 
raphies of  its  generals,  the  stories  of  its  campaigns,  the 
records  and  achievements  of  its  armies,  its  army  corps  and 
its  regiments.  Yet  I  make  bold  to  say  that  no  well  and 
philosophically  considered  narrative  of  the  struggle  has  yet 
appeared ;  nor  has  any  satisfactory  or  comprehensive  ex- 
planation been  given  of  its  extraordinary  and  unanticipated 
outcome.  Let  me  briefly  set  it  forth  as  I  see  it ;  only  by  so 
doing  can  I  explain  what  I  mean. 

Tersely  put,  dealing  only  with  outlines,  the  Southern  com- 
munity in  1861  precipitated  a  conflict  on  the  slavery  issue, 
in  implicit  reliance  on  its  own  warlike  capacity  and  resources, 
the  extent  and  very  defensible  character  of  its  territory,  and, 
above  all,  on  its  complete  control  of  cotton  as  the  great 
staple  textile  fabric  of  modern  civilization.  That  the  seced- 
ing States  fully  believed  in  the  justice  of  their  cause,  and 
confidently  appealed  to  it,  I  do  not  question,  much  less  deny. 
For  present  purposes,  let  this  be  conceded  in  full.  But, 
historically,  it  is  equally  clear  that  to  vindicate  the  right,  next 
to  their  own  manhood  and  determination,  they  relied  in  all 
possible  confidence  on  their  apparently  absolute  control  of 
one  commercial  staple.  When,  therefore,  in  1858,  with  the 
shadow  of  the  impending  conflict  darkening  the  horizon, 
a  thoughtful  senator  from  South  Carolina,  one  on  whom 
the  mantle  of  Calhoun  had  fallen,  declared  that  "  Cotton  is 
King/7  that  "no  power  on  earth  dares  to  make  war  on  it," 
that  "without  firing  a  gun,  without  drawing  a  sword/'  the  cot- 
ton-producing South  could,  if  war  was  declared  upon  it;  bring 
"the  whole  world"  to  its  feet,  he  only  gave  utterance  to  what 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  315 

was  in  the  South  accepted  as  a  fundamental  article  of  politi- 
cal and  economical  faith.1  Suggesting  the  contingency  that 
no  cotton  was  forthcoming  from  the  South  for  a  period  of 
three  years,  the  same  senator  declared,  —  "This  is  certain: 
England  would  topple  headlong  and  carry  the  whole  civilized 
world  with  her,  save  the  South.  Who,"  he  then  exclaimed, 
"that  has  looked  on  recent  events,  can  doubt  that  cotton 
is  supreme?  "  In  case  of  conflict,  cotton,  if  it  went  forth,  was 
to  supply  the  South  with  the  sinews  of  warfare ;  if  it  did  not 
go  forth,  the  lack  of  it  would  bring  about  European  civil  com- 
motion, and  compel  foreign  intervention.  In  either  case 
the  South  was  secure.  As  to  a  maritime  blockade  of  the 
South,  shutting  it  up  to  die  of  inanition,  the  idea  was  chimeri- 
cal. No  such  feat  of  maritime  force  ever  had  been  accom- 
plished, it  was  claimed;  nor  was  it  possible  of  accomplish- 
ment. To  "talk  of  putting  up  a  wall  of  fire  around  eight 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  square  miles"  situated  as  the 
Confederacy  was,  with  its  twelve  thousand  miles  of  seacoast, 
was  pronounced  too  "absurd"  for  serious  discussion.  And 
certainly,  that  no  such  thing  had  ever  yet  been  done  was 
undeniable.  But,  even  supposing  it  were  possible  of  ac- 
complishment, the  doing  it  would  but  the  more  effectively 
play  the  Confederate  game.  It  would  compel  intervention. 
As  well  shut  off  bread  from  the  manufacturing  centres  of 
Europe  as  stop  their  supply  of  cotton.  In  any  or  either 
event,  and  in  any  contingency  which  might  arise,  the  victory 
of  the  Confederacy  was  assured.  And  this  theory  of  the 
situation  and  its  outcome  was  accepted  by  the  Southern 
community  as  indisputable. 

What  occurred?  In  each  case  that  which  had  been  pro- 
nounced impossible  of  occurrence.  On  land  the  Confederacy 
had  an  ample  force  of  men,  they  swarmed  to  the  standards ; 

1  Supra,  252. 


316  MILITARY  STUDIES 

and  no  better  or  more  reliable  material  was  ever  gathered 
together.  Well  and  skilfully  marshalled,  the  Confederate 
soldier  did  on  the  march  and  in  battle  all  that  needed  to 
be  done.  Nor  were  the  two  sides  unequally  matched,  so 
far  as  the  land  arrays  were  concerned.  As  Lee  with  his  in- 
stinctive military  sense  put  it,  even  in  the  closing  stages  of 
the  struggle:  "The  proportion  of  experienced  troops  is 
larger  in  our  army  than  in  that  of  the  enemy,  while  his  num- 
bers exceed  our  own."  And  in  warfare,  experience,  com- 
bined with  an  advantageous  defensive,  counts  for  a  great 
deal.  This  was  so  throughout  the  conflict;  and  yet  the 
Confederate  cause  sank  in  failure.  It  did  so  to  the  com- 
plete surprise  of  a  bewildered  world ;  for,  in  Europe,  the  ulti- 
mate success  of  the  South  was  accepted  as  a  foregone  con- 
clusion. To  such  an  extent  was  this  the  case  that  the  wisest 
and  most  far-seeing  of  English  public  men  did  not  hesitate 
to  stake  their  reputation  for  foresight  upon  it  as  a  result. 
How  was  the  wholly  unexpected  actual  outcome  brought 
about?  The  simple  answer  is:  —  The  Confederacy  collapsed 
from  inanition !  Suffering  such  occasional  reverses  and 
defeats  as  are  incidental  to  all  warfare,  it  was  never  crushed 
in  battle  or  on  the  field,  until  its  strength  was  sapped  away 
by  want  of  food.  It  died  of  exhaustion,  —  starved  and 
gasping ! 

Take  a  living  organism,  whatever  it  may  be,  place  it  in 
a  vessel  hermetically  sealed,  and  attach  to  that  vessel  an 
air-pump :  —  You  know  what  follows  !  It  is  needless  to  de- 
scribe it.  No  matter  how  strong  or  fierce  or  self-confident 
it  may  be,  the  victim  dies;  growing  weaker  by  degrees,  it 
finally  collapses.  That  was  the  exact  condition  and  fate  of 
the  Confederacy.  What  had  been  confidently  pronounced 
impossible  was  done.  The  Confederacy  was  sealed  up  within 
itself  by  the  blockade ;  and  the  complete  exclusion  of  southern 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  317 

cotton  from  the  manufacturing  centres  of  Europe  did  not 
cause  revolution  there,  nor  compel  intervention  here.  Man's 
foresight  once  more  came  to  grief.  As  usual,  the  unex- 
pected occurred. 

Thus  the  two  decisive  defeats  of  the  Confederacy,  —  those 
which  really  brought  about  its  downfall  and  compelled  Lee 
to  lay  down  his  arms,  —  were  inflicted  not  before  Vicksburg, 
nor  yet  in  Virginia,  —  not  in  the  field  at  all ;  they  were  sus- 
tained, the  one,  almost  by  default,  on  the  ocean ;  the  other, 
most  fatal  of  all,  after  sharpest  struggle  in  Lancashire.  The 
story  of  that  Lancashire  Cotton  Famine  of  1861  to  1864  has 
never  been  adequately  told  in  connection  with  our  Civil 
War.  Simply  ignored  by  the  standard  historians,  it  was  yet 
the  Confederacy's  fiercest  fight,  and  its  most  decisive  as  well 
as  most  far-reaching  defeat.  A  momentous  conflict,  the 
supremacy  of  the  Union  on  the  ocean  hung  on  its  issue; 
and  upon  that  supremacy  depended  every  considerable 
land  operation :  the  retention  by  the  Confederacy  of  New 
Orleans,  and  the  consequent  control  of  the  Mississippi; 
Sherman's  march  to  the  sea;  the  movement  through  the 
Carolinas;  the  operations  before  Petersburg;  generally, 
the  maintenance  of  the  Confederate  armies  in  the  field.  It 
is  in  fact  no  exaggeration  to  assert  that  both  the  conception 
and  the  carrying  out  of  every  large  Union  operation  of  the 
war  without  a  single  exception  hinged  and  depended  on 
complete  national  maritime  supremacy.  It  is  equally  in- 
disputable that  the  struggle  in  Lancashire  was  decisive  of 
that  supremacy.  As  Lee  himself  admitted  in  the  death 
agony  of  the  Confederacy,  he  had  never  believed  it  could  in 
the  long  run  make  good  its  independence  "  unless  Foreign 
Powers  should,  directly  or  indirectly,  assist"  it  in  so  doing. 
Thus,  strange  as  it  sounds,  it  follows  as  a  logical  consequence 
that  Lee  and  his  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  were  first  re- 


318  MILITARY  STUDIES 

duced  to  inanition,  and  finally  compelled  to  succumb,  as 
the  result  of  events  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  largely 
stimulated  by  a  moral  impulse  over  which  they  could  exert 
no  control.  The  great  and  loudly  trumpeted  cotton  cam- 
paign of  the  Confederacy  was  its  most  signal  failure;  and 
that  failure  was  decisive  of  the  war. 

It  is  very  curious,  at  times  almost  comical,  to  trace 
historical  parallels.  Plutarch  is,  of  course,  the  standard 
exemplar  of  that  sort  of  treatment.  Among  other  great 
careers,  Plutarch,  as  every  college  boy  knows,  tells  the 
story  of  King  Pyrrhus,  the  Epirot.  A  great  captain, 
Pyrrhus  devised  a  military  formation  which  his  opponents 
could  not  successfully  face,  and  his  career  was  consequently 
one  of  victory.  But  at  last  he  met  his  fate.  Assaulting 
the  town  of  Argos,  he  became  entangled  in  its  streets ;  and, 
fighting  his  way  out,  he  was  struck  down,  and  killed,  by  a 
tile  thrown  from  a  house-top  by  an  Argive  woman.  The 
Confederacy,  and,  through  the  Confederacy,  Lee  underwent 
a  not  dissimilar  fate;  for,  as  an  historical  fact,  it  was  a 
missile  from  a  woman's  hand  which  was  decisive  of  that 
Lancashire  conflict,  and  so  doomed  the  Confederacy.  A 
startling  proposition ;  but  proof  quite  irrefutable  of  it  exists 
in  a  publication  to  which  as  an  authority  no  Southern  writer 
at  least  will  take  exception,  the  organ  established  in  London 
by  the  agents  of  the  Confederacy  in  1862.  Sustained  as 
long  as  the  conflict  continued  from  Confederate  funds,  with 
a  view  to  influencing  European  public  opinion,  the  Index,  as 
it  was  called,  collapsed  with  the  Confederacy  in  July,  1865. 
Naturally  those  in  charge  of  it  watched  with  feverish  interest 
the  progress  of  the  cotton  famine.  Not  only  was  the  British 
pocket  nerve  touched  at  its  most  sensitive  point,  but  in 
Lancashire  starvation  emphasized  financial  distress.  The 
pressure  thus  brought  to  bear  on  public  opinion  in  Great 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  319 

Britain,  and,  through  that  public  opinion,  on  the  policy  of 
Europe,  was  confidently  counted  on  for  results  decisive  of  the 
American  struggle.  Ten  years  before  Harriet  Beecher 
Stowe  had  launched  through  the  press  her  Uncle  Tom's 
Cabin.  Translated  into  every  civilized  tongue,  it  had  soon 
become  world  literature.  In  Great  Britain,  and  especially 
in  Lancashire,  it  "  carried  the  new  gospel  to  every  cabin  in 
the  land."  Whoever  in  those  days  read  anything  read 
Uncle  Tom's  Cabin.  That  it  was  a  correct  portrayal  of 
conditions  actually  existing  in  the  region  wherein  the  inci- 
dents narrated  were  supposed  to  have  occurred  is  not  now 
to  be  considered.  That  Uncle  Tom  himself  was  a  type  of 
his  race,  or,  indeed,  even  a  possibility  in  it,  few  would  now 
be  disposed  to  contend.1  Ethically,  he  was  a  Christian 
martyr  of  the  most  advanced  description,  and,  on  the  large 
class  who  accepted  the  work  as  a  correct  portrayal,  the 
pathetic  story  and  cruel  fate  of  the  colored  saint,  moralist 
and  philosopher  made  an  indelible  impression.  Indeed, 
that  female  and  sentimentalist  portrayal  lent  a  force  which 
has  not  yet  spent  itself  to  the  contention  that  the  only  dif- 
ference between  the  Ethiopian  and  the  Caucasian  is  epi- 
dermal ;  the  negro  being  in  fact  merely  a  white  man  —  a 
Yankee,  if  you  please  —  who,  having  a  black  skin,  has  never 
been  given  a  chance.  Nay,  more  !  if  Uncle  Tom  and  Legree 
were  to  be  accepted  as  types,  the  black  man  was  superior 
naturally  to  the  white ;  for  Uncle  Tom  was  a  fully  developed 
moralist,  while  Legree  was  a  demon  incarnate.  And  this 
presentation  of  life  and  manners,  and  this  portrayal  of 
typical    racial    characters    were    in    Lancashire    implicitly 

1  J.  C.  Read,  The  Brothers'  War,  pp.  194-198.  There  is  in  Mr.  Read's 
book,  published  fifty  years  after  the  appearance  of  Mrs.  Stowe's  historic 
tale,  and  forty  years  after  the  Proclamation  of  Emancipation,  a  chapter 
(IX)  entitled,  "  Uncle  Tom's  Cabin,"  in  which  are  to  be  found  the  views  of 
an  observant  and  reflecting  Georgian  on  the  statement  in  the  text. 


320  MILITARY  STUDIES 

accepted  as  gospel  truth  !  Such  indisputably  was  the  fact ; 
and,  when  the  final  issue  was  joined,  the  fact  told  heavily 
against  the  Confederacy.  In  contemplation  of  it,  —  realiz- 
ing the  handicap  thus  imposed,  the  burden  of  which  at  the 
moment  the  historian  has  since  ignored,  and  few  conse- 
quently now  appreciate,  —  the  writers  for  the  Index  fairly 
cried  aloud  in  agony.  Their  wail,  long  repeated,  has  in  it  as 
now  read  an  element  of  the  comic.  The  patience  of  the 
victims  of  the  cotton  famine,  they  declared  was  the  ex- 
traordinary feature  of  the  foreign  situation ;  and  the  agents 
of  the  Confederacy  noted  with  unconcealed  dismay  the 
absence  of  political  demonstrations  calculated  to  urge  on  a 
not  unwilling  Palmerston  ministry  "its  duty  to  its  suffering 
subjects."  There  was  but  one  way  of  accounting  for  it. 
Uncle  Tom  and  Legree  were  respectively  doing  their  work. 
So  it  was  that  the  Index  despairingly  at  last  declared  : 
"The  emancipation  of  the  negro  from  the  slavery  of  Mrs. 
Beecher  Stowe's  heroes  is  the  one  idea  of  the  millions  of 
British  who  know  no  better  and  do  not  care  to  know." 
Like  the  Cherubim  with  the  flaming  sword,  this  sentiment 
stood  between  Lancashire  and  cotton;  and  the  inviolate 
blockade  made  possible  the  subjugation  of  the  Confederacy. 
With  Pyrrhus,  it  was  the  tile  thrown  by  a  woman  from  the 
house-top ;  with  Lee,  it  was  a  book  by  a  woman  issued  from 
the  printing-press !  The  missiles  were  equally  fatal.  It 
was  only  a  difference  of  time,  and  its  changed  conditions. 

Foreign  intervention  being  thus  withheld,  and  the  control 
of  the  sea  by  the  Union  made  absolute,  the  blockade  was 
gradually  perfected.  The  fateful  process  then  went  steadily 
on.  Armies  might  be  resisted  in  the  field;  the  working  of 
the  air-pump  could  not  be  stopped :  and,  day  and  night, 
season  after  season,  the  air-pump  worked.  So  the  atmos- 
phere of  the  Confederacy  became   more  and   more  attenu- 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  321 

ated,  respiration  sensibly  harder.  Air-hole  on  air-hole  was 
closed.  First  New  Orleans  fell;  then  Vicksburg,  and  the 
Mississippi  flowed  free ;  next  Sherman,  securely  counting  on 
the  control  of  the  sea  as  a  base  of  new  operations  on  land, 
penetrated  the  vitals  of  the  Confederacy ;  then,  relying  still 
on  maritime  cooperation,  he  pursued  his  almost  unopposed 
way  through  the  Carolinas;  while  Grant,  with  his  base 
secure  upon  the  James  and  Fortress  Monroe,  beleaguered 
Richmond.  Lee  with  his  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  calmly, 
but  watchfully  and  resolutely,  confronted  him.  The  Con- 
federate lines  were  long  and  thin,  guarded  by  poorly  clad 
and  half-fed  men.  But,  veterans,  they  held  their  assailants 
firmly  at  bay.  As  Lee,  however,  fully  realized,  it  was  only 
a  question  of  time.  The  working  of  the  air-pump  was  be- 
yond his  sphere  either  of  influence  or  operations.  Nothing 
could  stop  it. 

As  early  as  the  close  of  1863  Lee  wrote  of  his  men, — "Thou- 
sands are  barefooted,  a  greater  number  partially  shod,  and 
nearly  all  without  overcoats,  blankets,  or  warm  clothing"; 
and  later,  in  the  dead  of  winter,  referring  to  the  elementary 
necessities  of  any  successful  warfare,  he  said  :  "The  supply, 
by  running  the  blockade,  has  become  so  precarious  that  I 
think  we  should  turn  our  attention  to  our  own  resources, 
...  as  a  further  dependence  upon  those  from  abroad  can 
result  in  nothing  but  increase  of  suffering  and  want."  The 
conclusion  here  drawn,  while  necessary,  was  extremely 
suggestive.  "Our  own  resources!'7  —  the  Confederacy  had 
always  prided  itself  on  being  a  purely  agricultural  com- 
munity. With  institutions  patriarchal  in  character,  it 
had  looked  upon  the  people  of  the  North  as  its  agents  and 
factors,  and  those  of  Europe  as  its  skilled  workmen  and 
artisans ;  and  now  that  community,  shut  up  within  its  own 
limits,  under  conditions  of  warfare  active  and  severe,  had 


322  MILITARY  STUDIES 

only  itself  to  rely  upon  for  a  supply  of  everything  its  de- 
fenders needed,  from  munitions  to  shoes,  from  blankets 
to  medicines  and  even  soap.  Viewed  in  a  half-century's 
perspective,  the  situation  was  simply  and  manifestly  impos- 
sible of  continuance.  To  it  there  could  be  but  one  outcome ; 
and  when  at  last  on  the  16th  of  January,  1865,  the  telegraph 
announced  the  fall  of  Fort  Fisher,  the  Confederacy  felt  itself 
hermetically  sealed.  Wilmington,  its  last  breathing-hole, 
was  closed.  Still,  not  the  less  for  that,  the  air-pump  kept 
on  its  deadly,  silent  work. 

Three  months  later  the  long-delayed  inevitable  occurred. 
The  collapse  came.  That  under  such  conditions  it  should 
have  been  so  long  in  coming  is  now  the  only  legitimate  cause 
of  surprise.  That  adversity  is  the  test  of  man  is  a  common- 
place; that  Lee  and  his  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  were 
during  the  long,  dragging  winter  of  1864-1865  most  dire- 
fuliy  subjected  to  that  test  need  not  here  be  said ;  any  more 
than  it  is  needful  to  say  that  they  bore  the  test  manfully. 
But  the  handwriting  was  on  the  wall ;  the  men  were  taxed 
beyond  the  limits  of  human  endurance.  And  Lee  knew  it. 
" Yesterday,  the  most  inclement  day  of  the  winter,"  he 
reported  on  February  8,  1865,  the  right  wing  of  his  army 
"had  to  be  retained  in  line  of  battle,  having  been  in  the  same 
condition  the  two  previous  days  and  nights.  .  .  .  Under 
these  circumstances,  heightened  by  assaults  and  fire  of  the 
enemy,  some  of  the  men  had  been  without  meat  for  three 
days,  and  all  were  suffering  from  reduced  rations  and  scant 
clothing,  exposed  to  battle,  cold,  hail  and  sleet.  .  .  .  The 
physical  strength  of  the  men,  if  their  courage  survives,  must 
fail  under  this  treat ment."  If  it  was  so  with  the  men,  with 
the  animals  it  was  even  worse.  "Our  cavalry/'  he  added, 
"has  to  be  dispersed  for  want  of  forage."  Even  thus  Lee's 
army  faced  an  opponent  vastly  superior  in  numbers,  whose 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  323 

ranks  were  being  constantly  replenished ;  a  force  armed, 
clothed,  equipped,  fed  and  sheltered  as  no  similar  force  in 
the  world's  history  had  ever  been  before.  I  state  only 
indisputable  facts.  Lee  proved  equal  to  even  this  occasion. 
Bearing  a  bold,  confident  front,  he  was  serene  and  outwardly 
calm ;  alert,  resourceful,  formidable  to  the  last,  individually 
he  showed  no  sign  of  weakness,  not  even  occasional  petu- 
lance. Inspired  by  his  example,  the  whole  South  seemed 
to  lean  up  against  him  in  implicit,  loving  reliance.  It  was 
a  superlative  tribute  to  Character.  Finally,  when  in  April 
the  summons  to  conflict  came,  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia, the  single  remaining  considerable  organized  force  of 
the  Confederacy,  seemed  to  stagger  to  its  feet,  and,  gaunt 
and  grim,  shivering  with  cold  and  emaciated  with  hunger, 
worn  down  by  hard,  unceasing  attrition,  it  faced  its  enemy, 
formidable  still.  As  I  have  since  studied  that  situation, 
listened  to  the  accounts  of  Confederate  officers  active  in  the 
closing  movements  and  read  the  letters  written  me  by  those 
of  the  rank  and  file,  it  has  seemed  as  if  Lee's  command  then 
cohered  and  moved  by  mere  force  of  habit.  Those  compos- 
ing it  failed  to  realize  the  utter  hopelessness  of  the  situation 
—  the  disparity  of  the  conflict.  I  am  sure  Jefferson  Davis 
failed  to  realize  it ;  so,  I  think,  in  less  degree,  did  Lee.  They 
talked,  for  instance,  of  recruits  and  of  a  levy  in  mass ;  Lee 
counselled  the  arming  of  the  slaves;  and  when,  after  Lee 
had  surrendered,  Davis  on  the  10th  of  April,  1865,  held  his 
last  war  conference  at  Greensboro',  he  was  still  confident  he 
would  in  a  few  weeks  have  another  army  in  the  field,  and 
did  not  hesitate  to  express  his  faith  that  "we  can  whip  the 
enemy  yet,  if  our  people  will  turn  out."  I  have  often  pon- 
dered over  what  Davis  had  in  mind  when  he  ventured  this 
opinion;1  or  what  led  Lee  to  advocate  the  enlistment  of 

1  Supra,  241. 


324  MILITARY  STUDIES 

negroes.  Both  were  soldiers ;  and,  besides  being  great  in  his 
profession,  Lee  was  more  familiar  than  any  other  man  alive 
with  actual  conditions  then  existing  in  the  Confederate 
camps.  Both  Davis  and  Lee,  therefore,  must  have  known 
that,  in  those  final  stages  of  the  conflict,  if  the  stamp  of  a 
foot  upon  the  ground  would  have  brought  a  million  men 
into  the  field,  the  cause  of  the  Confederacy  would  thereby 
have  been  in  no  wise  strengthened ;  on  the  contrary,  what 
was  already  bad  would  have  been  made  much  worse.  For, 
to  be  effective  in  warfare,  men  must  be  fed  and  clothed  and 
armed.  Organized  in  commands,  they  must  have  rations 
as  well  as  ammunition,  commissary  and  quartermaster 
trains,  artillery  horses  and  forage.  In  the  closing  months 
of  the  Civil  War,  both  Lee  and  Davis  knew  perfectly  well 
that  they  could  not  arm,  nor  feed,  nor  clothe,  nor  transport 
the  forces  already  in  the  field ;  they  were  themselves  without 
money,  and  the  soldiers  most  inadequately  supplied  with 
arms,  clothing,  quartermaster  or  medical  supplies,  com- 
missariat or  ammunition.  Notoriously,  those  then  on  the 
muster-rolls  were  going  home,  or  deserting  to  the  enemy,  as 
the  one  alternative  to  death  from  privation  —  hunger 
and  cold.  If  then,  a  million,  or  even  only  a  poor  hundred 
thousand  fresh  recruits  had  in  answer  to  the  summons 
swarmed  to  the  lines  around  Richmond,  how  would  it  have 
bettered  the  situation?  An  organized  army  is  a  mighty 
consumer  of  food  and  material ;  and  food  and  material  have 
to  be  served  out  to  it  every  day.  It  must  be  fed  as  regu- 
larly as  the  sun  rises  and  sets.  And  the  organized  resources 
of  the  Confederacy  were  exhausted ;  its  granaries  —  Georgia 
and  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah  —  were  notoriously 
devastated  and  desolate;  its  lines  of  communication  and 
supply  were  cut,  or  in  the  hands  of  the  invader. 

Realizing  this  Lee,  when  the  time  was  ripe,  rose  to  the 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  325 

full  height  of  the  great  occasion.  The  value  of  Character 
made  itself  felt.  The  service  Lee  now  rendered  to  the 
common  country,  the  obligation  under  which  he  placed  us 
whether  of  the  North  or  South,  has  not,  I  think,  been  always 
appreciated ;  and  to  overstate  it  would  be  difficult.  Again 
to  put  on  record  my  estimate  of  it  brings  me  here  to-day. 

That  the  situation  was  to  the  last  degree  critical  is  matter 
of  history.  Further  organized  resistance  on  the  part  of  the 
Confederacy  was  impossible.  The  means  for  it  did  not 
exist;  could  not  be  had.  Cut  off  completely  from  the 
outer  world,  the  South  was  consuming  itself,  —  feeding  on 
its  own  vitals.  The  single  alternative  to  surrender  was  dis- 
bandment  and  irregular  warfare.  As  General  Johnston 
afterwards  wrote,  "without  the  means  of  purchasing  supplies 
of  any  kind,  or  procuring  or  repairing  arms,  we  could  con- 
tinue the  war  only  as  robbers  or  guerillas."1  But  that  it 
should  be  so  continued  was  wholly  possible;  nay  more,  it 
was  in  the  line  of  precedent,  —  it  had  been  done  before ; 
and,  more  than  once,  it  has  since  been  done,  notably  in 
South  Africa.  It  was,  moreover,  the  course  advocated  by 
many  Southern  participants  in  the  struggle  as  that  proper 
to  be  pursued ;  and  that  it  would  be  pursued  was  accepted 
as  of  course  by  all  foreign  observers,  and  by  the  organ  of  the 
Confederacy  in  London.  "A  strenuous  resistance  and  not 
surrender,"  it  was  there  declared,  "was  the  unalterable 
determination  of  the  Confederate  authorities."  Lee's  own 
son,  then  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  but  by  chance 
not  included  in  the  surrender,  has  since  described  how  sur- 
prised and  incredulous  he  was  when  news  of  it  first  reached 
him;  and,  "not  believing  for  an  instant  that  our  struggle 
was  over,"  he  made  his  way  at  once  to  Jefferson  Davis,  at 
Greensboro'.    At  the  time   of  his   capture  Davis  himself, 

1  Supra,  243. 


326  MILITARY  STUDIES 

wholly  unsubdued  in  spirit,  was  moving  in  the  direction  of 
the  Mississippi,  intent  on  organizing  resistance  in  Texas,  — 
a  resistance  which  the  writers  of  the  Index  confidently- 
predicted  would  "be  fierce,  ferocious  and  of  long  duration," 
—  ua  successful  or  at  least  a  protracted  resistance."  . 

Indeed,  had  the  veil  over  the  immediate  future  then  been 
lifted,  and  the  outrages,  and  humiliations  worse  than  outrage, 
of  the  period  of  so-called  reconstruction,  but  actual  servile 
domination,  now  to  ensue  revealed  itself,  no  room  for  doubt 
exists  that  the  dread  alternative  would  have  been  adopted. 
Even  as  it  was,  the  scales  hung  trembling.     Anything  or 
everything  was  possible;    even  that  mad  pistol  shot  of  the 
theatrical  fool  which  five  days  later  so  irretrievably  com- 
plicated a  delicate  and  dangerous  situation.     None  the  less, 
what  Lee  and  Grant  had  done  at  Appomattox  on  April 
9  could  not  be  wholly  undone  even  by  the  deed  in  Ford's 
theatre  of  April  14;    much  had  been  secured.     Of  Appo- 
mattox,  and  what  there  occurred,  I  do  not  care  here  to 
speak.     I  feel  I  could  not  speak  adequately,  or  in  words 
sufficiently  simple;  for,  in  my  judgment,  there  is  not  in  our 
whole  history  as  a  people  any  incident  so  creditable  to  our 
manhood,  —  so  indicative  of  our  racial  possession  of  Char- 
acter.    Marked  throughout  by  a  straightforward  dignity  of 
personal  bearing  and  propriety  in  action,  it  was  marred  by 
no  touch  of  the  theatrical,  no  effort  at  posturing.     I  know 
not  to  which  of  the  two  leaders,  there  face  to  face,  preference 
should  be  given.     They  were  thoroughly  typical;  the  one  of 
Illinois  and  the  New  West,  the  other  of  Virginia  and  the 
Old  Dominion.     Grant  was  considerate   and  magnanimous, 
—  restrained  in  victory ;  Lee,  dignified  in  defeat,  carried  him- 
self with  that  sense  of   absolute  fitness  which   compelled 
respect.     Verily  !  —  "he  that  ruleth  his  spirit  is  better  than 
he  that  taketh  a  city!" 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  327 

The  lead  that  day  given  by  Lee  proved  decisive  of  the 
course  to  be  pursued  by  his  fellows  with  arms  in  their  hands. 
At  first,  and  for  a  brief  space,  there  was  in  the  Confederate 
councils  much  diversity  of  opinion  as  to  what  should  or 
could  be  done.  Calm  and  dignified  in  presence  of  over- 
whelming disaster,  the  voice  of  Jefferson  Davis  was  that 
of  Milton's  "scepter'd  king":  "My  sentence  is  for  open 
war!"  Lee  was  not  there;  none  the  less,  Lee,  absent,  pre- 
vailed over  Davis.  The  sober  second  thought  satisfied  all 
but  the  most  extreme  that  what  he  had  done  they  best  might 
do.  Thus  the  die  was  cast.  And  now,  forty  years  and 
more  after  the  event,  it  is  appalling  to  reflect  what  in  all 
human  probability  would  have  resulted  had  the  choice  then 
been  other  than  it  was,  —  had  Lee's  personality  and  char- 
acter not  intervened.  The  struggle  had  lasted  four  full 
years ;  the  assassination  of  Lincoln  was  as  oil  on  the  Union 
fire.  With  a  million  men,  inured  to  war,  on  the  national 
muster  rolls,  men  impatient  of  further  resistance,  accus- 
tomed to  license  and  now  educated  up  to  a  belief  that  War 
was  Hell,  and  that  the  best  way  to  bring  it  to  a  close  was  to 
intensify  Hell,  —  with  such  a  force  as  this  to  reckon  with, 
made  more  reckless  in  brutality  by  the  assassin's  senseless 
shot,  the  Confederacy  need  have  looked  for  no  consideration, 
no  mercy.  Visited  by  the  besom  of  destruction,  it  would 
have  been  harried  out  of  existence.  Fire  and  sword  sweep- 
ing over  it,  what  the  sword  spared  the  fire  would  have  con- 
sumed. Whether  such  an  outcome  of  a  prolonged  conflict 
—  what  was  recently  witnessed  in  South  Africa  —  would  in 
its  result  have  been  more  morally  injurious  to  the  North 
than  it  would  have  been  destructive  materially  to  the  South, 
is  not  now  to  be  considered.  It  would,  however,  assuredly 
have  come  about. 

From   that   crown   of   sorrows   Lee   saved   the   common 


328  MILITARY  STUDIES 

country.  He  was  the  one  man  in  the  Confederacy  who 
could  exercise  decisive  influence.  It  was  the  night  of  the 
8th  of  April,  lacking  ten  days  only  of  exactly  four  full  years, 
—  years  very  full  for  us  who  lived  through  them,  —  since 
that  not  dissimilar  night  when  Lee  had  paced  the  floor  at 
Arlington,  communing  with  himself  over  the  fateful  issue,  a 
decision  on  which  was  then  forced  upon  him.  A  decision 
of  even  greater  import  was  now  to  be  reached,  and  reached 
by  him.  A  commander  of  the  usual  cast  would  under 
such  circumstances  have  sought  advice  —  perhaps  support ; 
at  least,  a  divided  responsibility.  Even  though  himself 
by  nature  and  habit  a  masterful  man  and  one  accustomed  to 
direct,  he  would  have  called  a  council,  and  harkened  to 
those  composing  it.  This  Lee  did  not  do.  A  singularly 
self-poised  man,  he  sought  no  external  aid.  Sitting  before 
his  bivouac  fire  at  Appomattox,  he  reviewed  the  situation. 
Doing  so,  as  before  at  Arlington,  he  reached  his  own  conclu- 
sion. That  conclusion  he  himself  at  the  time  expressed  in 
words,  brief,  indeed,  but  vibrating  with  moral  triumph : 
"The  question  is,  is  it  right  to  surrender  this  army?  If  it  is 
right,  then  I  will  take  all  the  responsibility."  The  conclu- 
sion reached  at  Arlington  in  the  April  night  of  1861  to  some 
seems  to  have  been  wrong  —  inexcusable  even ;  all  concur 
in  that  reached  before  the  Appomattox  camp-fire  in  the 
April  vigils  of  1865.  He  then  a  second  time  decided;  and 
he  decided  right. 

His  work  was  done ;  but  from  failure  he  plucked  triumph. 
Thenceforth  Lee  wore  defeat  as  'twere  a  laurel  crown.  A 
few  days  later  a  small  group  of  horsemen  appeared  in  the 
morning  hours  on  the  further  side  of  the  Richmond  pon- 
toons across  the  James.  By  some  strange  intuition  it  be- 
came known  that  General  Lee  was  of  the  party ;  and,  silent 
and  uncovered,  a  crowd  —  Virginians  all  —  gathered  along 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  329 

the  route  the  horsemen  would  take.  "  There  was  no  excite- 
ment, no  hurrahing;  but  as  the  great  chief  passed,  a  deep, 
loving  murmur,  greater  than  these,  rose  from  the  very  hearts 
of  the  crowd.  Taking  off  his  hat,  and  simply  bowing  his 
head,  the  man  great  in  adversity  passed  silently  to  his  own 
door ;  it  closed  upon  him ;  and  his  people  had  seen  him  for 
the  last  time  in  his  battle  harness." 

From  the  day  that  he  affixed  his  signature  to  the  terms 
of  surrender  submitted  to  him  by  Grant  at  Appomattox  to 
the  day  when  he  drew  a  dying  breath  at  Lexington,  Lee's 
subsequent  course  was  consistent.  In  his  case  there  was 
no  vacillation,  no  regretful  glances  backward  thrown. 
When,  four  months  after  the  last  hostile  shot  was  fired,  he 
was  invited  to  assume  the  presidency  of  this  college,  though 
then  under  indictment  in  flagrant  disregard  of  the  immunity 
assured  him  when  he  gave  his  parole,  he  briefly  set  forth  his 
views.  "I  think  it,"  he  wrote,  "the  duty  of  every  citizen, 
in  the  present  condition  of  the  country,  to  do  all  in  his  power 
to  aid  in  the  restoration  of  peace  and  harmony,  and  in  no 
way  to  oppose  the  policy  of  the  State  or  General  Govern- 
ments directed  to  that  object."  And,  four  days  later,  writ- 
ing to  the  Confederate  governor  of  Virginia,  he  said: 
"The  duty  of  [Virginian]  citizens  appears  to  me  too  plain 
to  admit  of  doubt.  All  should  unite  in  honest  efforts  to 
obliterate  the  effects  of  war,  and  to  restore  the  blessings  of 
peace.  They  should  remain  if  possible  in  the  country; 
promote  harmony  and  good  feeling;  qualify  themselves  to 
vote,  and  elect  to  the  State  and  general  legislatures  wise  and 
patriotic  men,  who  will  devote  their  abilities  to  the  healing 
of  all  dissensions.  I  have,"  he  added,  "invariably  recom- 
mended this  course  since  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  and 
have  endeavored  to  practice  it  myself."  Here  was  a  com- 
plete exposition  of  duty,  combined  with  abnegation  of  self; 


330  MILITARY  STUDIES 

the  purest  patriotism,  it  was  also  the  concentrated  essence 
of  statesmanship.  He  counselled  with  a  wisdom  not  less 
profound  because  unconscious;  and  what  he  said  evinced 
that  underlying  common-sense  which  in  politics  avails  more 
than  genius. 

Five  years  of  life  and  active  usefulness  yet  remained  to 
General  Lee  —  years  in  my  judgment  most  creditable  to 
himself,  the  most  useful  to  his  country  of  his  whole  life; 
for,  during  them,  he  set  to  Virginia  and  his  own  people  a 
high  example  —  an  example  of  lofty  character  and  simple 
bearing.  Uttering  no  complaints,  entering  into  no  contro- 
versies, he  was  as  one,  in  suffering  all,  that  suffers  nothing. 
His  blood  and  judgment  were  well  commingled ;  and  so  it 
fell  out  that  he  accepted  fortune's  buffets  and  rewards  with 
equal  thanks.  His  record  and  appearance  during  those 
final  years  are  pleasant  to  dwell  upon,  for  they  reflect  honor 
on  our  American  manhood.  Turning  his  face  courageously 
to  the  future,  he  uttered  no  word  of  repining  over  the  past. 
Yet,  like  the  noble  Moor,  his  occupation  also  was  gone  — 

"The  royal  banner,  and  all  quality, 
Pride,  pomp  and  circumstance  of  glorious  war  !" 

But  with  Lee  this  did  not  imply :  — 

"Farewell  the  tranquil  mind  !  farewell  content !" 

Far  from  it ;  for  as  the  gates  closed  on  the  old  occupation, 
they  opened  on  a  new.  And  it  was  an  occupation  through 
which  he  gave  to  his  country,  North  and  South,  a  priceless 
gift. 

Speaking  advisedly  and  on  full  reflection,  I  say  that  of  all 
the  great  characters  of  the  Civil  War — and  it  was  productive 
of  many  whose  names  and  deeds  posterity  will  long  bear  in 
recollection  —  there  was  not  one  who  passed  away  in  the  se- 
rene atmosphere  and  with  the  gracious  bearing  of  Lee.    From 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  331 

beginning  to  end  those  parting  years  of  his  will  bear  closest 
scrutiny.  There  was  about  them  nothing  venal,  nothing 
querulous,  nothing  in  any  way  sordid  or  disappointing.  In 
his  case  there  was  no  anti-climax;  for  those  closing  years 
were  dignified,  patient,  useful ;  sweet  in  domesticity,  they 
in  all  things  commanded  respect.  It  is  pleasant  to  catch 
glimpses  of  the  erstwhile  commander  in  that  quiet  Vir- 
ginia life.  There  is  in  the  picture  something  altogether 
human  —  intensely  sympathetic.  "Traveller,"  he  would 
write,  "is  my  only  companion;  I  may  also  say  my 
pleasure.  He  and  I,  whenever  practicable,  wander  out  in 
the  mountains  and  enjoy  sweet  confidence."  Or  again  we 
see  him,  always  with  Traveller,  the  famous  old  charger  this 
time  "stepping  very  proudly"  as  his  rider  showed  those  two 
little  sunbonneted  daughters  of  a  professor,  astride  of  a  plod- 
ding old  horse,  over  a  pleasant  road  quite  unknown  to  them. 
Once  more  in  imagination  we  may  ride,  his  companions, 
through  those  mountain  roads  of  his  dearly  loved  Virginia, 
or  seek  shelter  with  him  and  his  daughter  from  a  thunder- 
shower  in  the  log  cabin,  the  inmates  of  which  are  stunned 
when  too  late  they  realize  that  the  courtly,  gracious  intruder 
was  no  other  than  the  idolized  General  Lee.  Indifferent  to 
wealth,  he  was  scrupulous  as  respects  those  money  dealings 
a  carelessness  in  regard  to  which  has  embittered  the  lives 
of  so  many  of  our  public  men,  as  not  infrequently  it  has  tar- 
nished their  fame.  Lee's  career  will  be  scrutinized  in  vain  for 
a  suggestion  even  of  the  sordid,  or  of  an  obligation  he  failed 
to  meet.  He  was  nothing  if  not  self-respecting.  He  once 
wrote  to  a  member  of  his  family  "Vile  dross'  has  never  been 
a  drug  with  me,"  yet  his  generosity  as  a  giver  from  his  nar- 
row means  was  limited  only  by  his  resources.  Restricting  his 
own  wants  to  necessities,  he  contributed,  to  an  extent  which 
excites  surprise,  to  both  public  calls  and  private  needs.     But 


332  MILITARY  STUDIES 

the  most  priceless  of  those  contributions  were  contained  in 
the  precepts  he  inculcated  and  in  the  unconscious  example 
he  set  during  those  closing  years. 

Lee  was  at  the  head  of  Washington  College  from  October, 
1865,  to  October,  1870;  a  very  insufficient  time  in  which  to 
accomplish  any  considerable  work.  A  man  of  fast  advancing 
years,  he  also  then  had  sufficient  cause  to  feel  a  sense  of  lassi- 
tude. He  showed  no  signs  of  it.  On  the  contrary,  closely 
studied  those  years,  and  Lee's  bearing  in  them,  were  in  cer- 
tain respects  the  most  remarkable  as  well  as  the  most  credit- 
able of  his  life;  they  impressed  unmistakably  upon  it  the 
stamp  of  true  greatness.  Unable  to  pass  them  wholly  over,  I 
shall  deal  very  briefly  with  them.  His  own  means  of  sub- 
sistence having  been  swept  away  by  war,  —  the  property  of 
his  wife  as  well  as  his  own  having  been  sequestered  and  con- 
fiscated in  utter  disregard  not  only  of  law,  but  —  I  add  it 
regretfully  —  of  decency,  —  a  mere  pittance,  designated  in 
courtesy  "  salary, "  under  his  prudent  management  was  made 
to  suffice  for  the  needs  of  an  establishment  the  quiet  dignity 
of  which  even  exceeded  its  severe  simplicity.  Within  five 
months  of  the  downfall  of  the  Confederacy,  he  addressed  him- 
self to  his  new  vocation.  Coming  to  it  from  crushing  defeat, 
about  him  there  was  nothing  suggestive  of  disappointment ; 
and  thereafter  through  public  trials  and  private  misfortunes 
—  for  it  pleased  Heaven  to  try  him  with  afflictions  —  he  bore 
himself  with  serene  patience,  and  a  mingled  firmness  and 
sweetness  of  temper  to  which  mere  words  fail  to  do  justice. 
More  than  that,  becoming  interested  in  his  new  work  he 
evinced,  it  would  seem,  as  the  head  of  a  college,  a  grasp  of  edu- 
cational problems  not  less  clear  and  intelligent  than  he  had 
previously  shown  of  strategic  conditions.  It  was  indeed  ex- 
traordinary that  a  man  educated  in  a  military  school,  first 
an  engineer,  then  an  officer  of  cavalry,  and  finally  a  general 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  333 

in  charge  of  large  field  operations,  should,  when  approaching 
his  sixtieth  year,  have  given  proof  of  such  mental  activity 
and  freshness.  Fully  realizing  the  needs  and  requirements 
of  the  present  age,  the  former  commandant  of  West  Point 
was  the  ardent  advocate  of  complete  classical  and  literary 
culture.  Utterly  out  of  sympathy  with  the  modern  advo- 
cates of  materialistic  education,  he  yet  recognized  the  fact 
that  material  well-being  is,  for  a  people,  the  condition  of  all 
high  civilization;  and,  accordingly,  sought  to  provide,  in 
the  institution  of  which  he  was  the  head,  all  means  for  the 
development  of  science  and  its  practical  application.  With 
a  large  and  correct  conception,  he  planned,  therefore,  to  con- 
nect all  the  departments  of  literary,  scientific  and  professional 
education,  and  to  consolidate  them  under  a  common  or- 
ganization. He  thus  outlined  a  true  university.  So  at  an 
early  day  he  called  into  existence,  as  adjuncts  of  the  college 
he  found  prostrate  and  well-nigh  moribund,  schools  of  ap- 
plied mathematics,  of  engineering  and  of  law;  while  later 
he  submitted  to  its  Board  of  Trustees  a  matured  scheme  for 
the  complete  development  of  the  scientific  and  professional 
departments.  His  death,  just  before  he  had  yet  reached  the 
grand  climacteric,  prevented  the  full  development  of  his 
great  conception.  None  the  less,  he  had  shown  himself  fully 
equal  to  the  new  demand  upon  him. 

The  most  marked  feature  of  his  educational  career  was, 
however,  the  moral  influence  he  exerted  on  the  student  body, 
—  what  has  most  fitly  been  described  by  one  associated  with 
him  as  "the  mighty  influence  of  his  personal  character." 
Here,  as  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  this  was  all- 
powerful.  It  was  sorely  needed,  too,  for  the  young  men  of 
the  South  were  self-willed,  and  resented  efforts  at  restraint. 
Grown  up  in  an  environment  of  warfare  and  consequent  vio- 
lence, they  were  somewhat  disposed  to  take  matters  into  their 


334  MILITARY  STUDIES 

own  hands,  —  to  be,  in  a  word,  a  law  unto  themselves ;  but, 
under  Lee's  presidency,  the  elevation  of  tone  in  this  respect, 
and  the  consequent  improvement  in  student  conduct  were, 
we  are  on  good  evidence  assured,  marked  and  rapid.  Acts  of 
disorder  became  infrequent ;  and  in  the  latter  years  of  Lee's 
brief  administration  it  is  said  that  "hardly  a  single  case  of 
serious  discipline  occurred."  A  Boston  student  of  Washing- 
ton College  in  those  years  —  sent  there  because  of  the  feeling 
of  profound  respect  for  Lee  entertained  by  his  northern 
father  —  has  since  borne  witness  to  me  of  the  personal  in- 
terest taken  by  Washington's  president  in  the  individual  stu- 
dents. In  close  sympathy  with  the  modern  university  spirit, 
the  youth  in  question  was,  I  have  reason  to  suppose,  far  more 
addicted  to  athletics  than  to  his  text-books.  "This  lack  of 
proficiency  in  my  studies, "  he  has  recently  written  me,  "was, 
of  course,  a  matter  for  which  I  was  frequently  called  into 
the  presence  of  General  Lee;  and  I  fully  appreciate  now, 
though  I  did  not  then,  the  difficulties  under  which  he  la- 
bored ;  for,  if  he  had  expelled  me,  as  under  similar  circum- 
stances he  undoubtedly  would  have  expelled  any  southern 
student,  it  would  have  been  considered  a  factional  matter. 
He  would  plead  most  earnestly  with  me  always  that  I  should 
attend  more  to  my  studies  and  less  to  athletics,  and  never 
a  harsh  word  during  the  entire  period. " 

It  remains  to  assign  due  weight  and  value  to  these  precepts 
and  this  great  example  at  just  that  juncture  and  from  just 
that  man.  And  here,  bearing  in  mind  the  common  country, 
—  the  community  to  which  I  belong  as  well  as  that  I  now  ad- 
dress, —  I  feel  I  tread  on  dangerous  ground.  What  I  must 
necessarily  say  will  be  very  susceptible  of  misconstruction. 
Speaking,  however,  in  the  true  historical  spirit,  as  throughout 
I  have  sought  to  do,  I  must  deal  with  this  topic  also  as  best  I 
can. 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  335 

Because  no  blood  flowed  on  the  scaffold  and  no  confisca- 
tions of  houses  or  lands  marked  the  close  of  our  War  of  Seces- 
sion, it  has  always  been  assumed  by  us  of  the  victorious  party 
that  extreme,  indeed  unprecedented,  clemency  was  shown  to 
the  vanquished,  and  that  subsequently  they  had  no  good 
ground  of  complaint  or  sufficient  cause  for  restiveness.  That 
history  will  accord  assent  to  this  somewhat  self-complacent 
conviction  is  open  to  question.  On  the  contrary,  it  may  not 
unfairly  be  doubted  whether  a  people  prostrate  after  civil 
strife  has  often  received  severer  measure  than  was  inflicted 
on  the  so-called  reconstructed  Confederate  States  during  the 
years  immediately  succeeding  the  close  of  strife.  Adam 
Smith  somewhere  defined  Rebels  and  Heretics  as  "  those  un- 
lucky persons  who,  when  things  have  come  to  a  certain  degree 
of  violence,  have  the  misfortune  to  be  of  the  weaker  party." 
Spoliation  and  physical  suffering  have  immemorially  been 
their  lot.  The  Confederate,  it  is  true,  when  he  ceased  to  re- 
sist, escaped  this  visitation  in  its  usual  and  time-approved 
form.  Nevertheless,  he  was  by  no  means  exempt  from  it. 
In  the  matter  of  confiscation,  it  has  been  computed  that  the 
freeing  of  the  slaves  by  act  of  war  swept  out  of  existence 
property  valued  at  some  two  thousand  millions ;  while,  over 
and  above  this,  a  system  of  simultaneous  reconstruction  sub- 
jected the  disfranchised  master  to  the  rule  of  the  enfran- 
chised bondsman.  For  a  community  conspicuously  master- 
ful, and  notoriously  quick  to  resent  affront,  to  be  thus  placed 
by  alien  force  under  the  civil  rule  of  those  of  a  different  and 
distinctly  inferior  race,  only  lately  their  property,  is  not 
physical  torment,  it  is  true,  but  that  it  is  mild  or  considerate 
treatment  can  hardly  be  contended.  Yet  this  —  slave  con- 
fiscation, and  reconstruction  under  African  rule  —  was  the 
war  penalty  imposed  on  the  States  of  the  Confederacy. 
That  the  policy  inspired  at  the  time  a  feeling  of  bitter  resent- 


336  MILITARY  STUDIES 

ment  in  the  South  was  no  cause  for  wonder.  Upon  it  time 
has  already  recorded  a  verdict.  Following  the  high  prece- 
dent set  at  Appomattox,  it  was  distinctly  unworthy.  Con- 
ceived in  passion,  it  ignored  both  science  and  the  philosophy 
of  statesmanship;  worse  yet,  it  was  ungenerous.  Lee,  for 
instance,  again  setting  the  example,  applied  formally  for 
amnesty  and  a  restoration  of  civil  rights  within  two  months  of 
his  surrender.  His  application  was  silently  ignored  ;  while  he 
died  "a  prisoner  on  parole,"  the  suffrage  denied  him  was 
conferred  on  his  manumitted  slaves.  Verily,  it  was  not  alone 
"the  base  Judian  "  of  the  olden  time  who  "threw  a  pearl 
away  richer  than  all  his  tribe  I" 

But  on  such  a  rejection  and  choice  of  material  as  this  was 
the  so-called  reconstruction  edifice  based;  nor  is  it  matter 
for  wonder  that  it  speedily  crumbled  away.  It  was  under 
these  conditions  that  Lee's  bearing  and  example  were  of 
special  national  importance.  The  one  political  result 
the  States  of  the  Confederacy  should  ever  have  kept  steadily 
in  view  after  strife  closed  was  the  restoration  of  local  self- 
government;  and  that,  under  the  traditions  and  political 
instincts  of  the  American  community,  was  sure  to  come.  It 
was  only  a  question  of  time ;  and  patience  and  self-restraint 
were  the  two  qualities  most  sure  to  hasten  the  steps  of  time. 
"We  shall  have  to  be  patient/'  Lee,  in  March,  1866,  wrote  to 
old  companions  in  arms,  "and  suffer  for  a  while  at  least ;  .  .  . 
I  hope,  in  time,  peace  will  be  restored  to  the  country,  and 
that  the  South  may  enjoy  some  measure  of  prosperity.  I 
fear,  however,  much  suffering  is  still  in  store  for  her,  and  that 
her  people  must  be  prepared  to  exercise  fortitude  and  for- 
bearance." To  those  to  whom  it  was  addressed,  no  wiser  or 
more  tactful  counsel  could  at  that  juncture  (March,  1866) 
have  been  imparted ;  for,  while  Lee  himself  possessed  those 
virtues  to  a  well-nigh  unexampled  degree,  patience  and  self- 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  337 

restraint  have  not  been  generally  accepted  as  most  conspicu- 
ous among  the  many  manly  and  ennobling  qualities  of  the 
race  to  which  Lee  belonged. 

In  the  passage  with  which  I  began,  it  was  observed  by 
Emerson  that  "Character  denotes  habitual  self-possession, 
habitual  regard  to  interior  and  constitutional  motives,  a 
balance  not  to  be  overset  or  easily  disturbed  by  outward 
events  and  opinion. "  To  my  knowledge  I  never  saw  General 
Lee ;  I  certainly  never  stood  in  his  presence,  nor  exchanged 
a  word  with  him.  On  the  few  occasions  when  I  was  a  guest 
in  his  house,  he  chanced  to  be  absent.  Even  that  was  long 
ago ;  while  he  and  his  family  still  lived  at  Arlington.  Thus  I 
know  him  only  by  report,  and  through  his  letters.  But,  if 
the  report  of  those  who  did  know  him  well,  and  the  evidence 
of  what  he  wrote,  may  be  relied  on,  "habitual  self-possession, 
habitual  regard  to  interior  and  constitutional  motives,  a 
balance  not  to  be  overset  or  easily  disturbed  by  outward 
events  and  opinion,"  were  his  to  an  eminent  degree,  —  a  de- 
gree which  his  harshest  and  most  prejudiced  critic  could  not 
ignore.  That,  himself  a  devout  man  and  by  conviction  sin- 
cerely religious,  he  was  neither  ashamed  nor  afraid  so  pub- 
licly to  profess  himself,  may  be  read  in  his  repeated  army 
orders ;  or,  to  such  as  prefer  there  to  look  for  it,  in  his  family 
letters.  What  more  expressive  of  a  profound  religious  faith 
could  be  imagined  than  these  words  written  in  the  very 
shadow  of  Gettysburg's  disaster  to  the  dying  wife  of  his 
wounded  and  captured  son? — "In  his  own  good  time  He 
will  relieve  us,  and  make  all  things  work  together  for  our  good, 
if  we  give  Him  our  love  and  place  in  Him  our  trust."  That 
his  immediate  family  circle  regarded  him  with  the  affection- 
ate devotion  founded  on  respect  which  is  the  surest  indication 
of  those  sterling  and  fundamental  qualities  which  alone  can 
cause  a  man  to  seem  a  hero  to  those  near  to  him,  —  the  confi- 


338  MILITARY  STUDIES 

dants  of  his  privacy,  —  appears  from  those  family  letters  and 
recollections  which  have  been  so  freely  published.  That  he 
impressed  himself  on  those  about  him  in  his  professional  and 
public  life  to  an  uncommon  extent,  —  that  the  soldiers  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  as  well  as  those  of  his  staff  and  in 
high  command  felt  not  only  implicit  and  unquestioning  con- 
fidence in  him,  but  to  him  a  strong  personal  affection,  is 
established  by  their  concurrent  testimony.  He,  too,  might 
well  have  said  with  Brutus :  — 

"My  heart  doth  joy  that  yet  in  all  my  life 
I  found  no  man  but  he  was  true  to  me. 
I  shall  have  glory  by  this  losing  day." 

Finally,  one  who  knew  him  well  has  written  of  him:  "He 
had  the  quiet  bearing  of  a  powerful  yet  harmonious  nature. 
An  unruffled  calm  upon  his  countenance  betokened  the  con- 
centration and  control  of  the  whole  being  within.  He  was 
a  kingly  man,  whom  all  men  who  came  into  his  presence  ex- 
pected to  obey. "  That  he  was  gifted  in  a  prominent  degree 
with  the  mens  cequa  in  arduis  of  the  Roman  poet,  none  deny. 
And  now,  Virginians,  a  word  with  you  in  closing:  "Show 
me  the  man  you  honor;  I  know  by  that  symptom,  better 
than  by  any  other,  what  kind  of  man  you  yourself  are.  For 
you  show  me  then  what  your  ideal  of  manhood  is ;  what  kind 
of  man  you  long  possibly  to  be,  and  would  thank  the  Gods, 
with  your  whole  soul,  for  being  if  you  could.  Whom  shall 
we  consecrate  and  set  apart  as  one  of  our  sacred  men? 
Sacred ;  that  all  men  may  see  him,  be  reminded  of  him,  and, 
by  new  example  added  to  old  perpetual  precept,  be  taught 
what  is  real  worth  in  man.  Whom  do  you  wish  to  resemble  ? 
Him  you  set  on  a  high  column,  that  all  men,  looking  at  it, 
may  be  continually  apprised  of  the  duty  you  expect  from 
them."  * 

1  Carlyle,  Latter-Day  Pamphlets,  "  Hudson's  Statue.*' 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  339 

"The  virtues  of  a  superior  man  are  like  the  wind;  the 
virtues  of  a  common  man  are  like  the  grass ;  the  grass,  when 
the  wind  passes  over  it,  bends." 


In  regard  to  the  early  utterances  of  Mr.  Webster  (supra,  297), 
the  following  is  from  a  speech  by  him  in  the  National  House  of 
Representatives,  December  9,  1814.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind 
that  this  speech  was  delivered  in  the  midst  of  the  gloomiest  period 
of  the  War  of  1812-15,  four  months  after  the  battle  of  Bladens- 
burg  and  the  capture  of  Washington,  and  one  month  before  the 
British  were  defeated  below  New  Orleans.  The  speech  was  first 
published  (1902)  by  C.  H.  Van  Tyne,  in  his  edition  of  the  Letters 
of  Daniel  Webster  (p.  67). 

"In  my  opinion  [the  law  under  consideration  for  compulsory 
army  and  military  service]  ought  not  to  be  carried  into  effect. 
The  operation  of  measures  thus  unconstitutional  and  illegal  ought 
to  be  prevented,  by  a  resort  to  other  measures  which  are  both 
constitutional  and  legal.  It  will  be  the  solemn  duty  of  the  State 
Governments  to  protect  their  own  authority  over  their  own  Militia 
and  to  interpose  between  their  citizens  and  arbitrary  power. 
These  are  among  the  objects  for  which  the  State  Governments 
exist ;  and  their  highest  obligations  bind  them  to  the  preservation 
of  their  own  rights  and  the  liberties  of  their  people.  I  express 
these  sentiments  here,  Sir,  because  I  shall  express  them  to  my 
constituents.  Both  they  and  myself  live  under  a  Constitution 
which  teaches  us,  that  'the  doctrine  of  non-resistance  against 
arbitrary  power  and  oppression  is  absurd,  slavish,  and  destructive 
of  the  good  and  happiness  of  mankind.'  With  the  same  earnest- 
ness with  which  I  now  exhort  you  to  forbear  from  these  measures, 
I  shall  exhort  them  to  exercise  their  unquestionable  right  of  pro- 
viding for  the  security  of  their  own  liberties." 

William  Rawle  was  in  his  day  an  eminent  Philadelphia  lawyer, 
and  chancellor  of  the  Law  Association  of  Philadelphia.  The 
principal  author  of  the  revised  code  of  Pennsylvania,  he  stood  in 
the  foremost  rank  of  American  legal  luminaries  in  the  first  third 


340  MILITARY  STUDIES 

of  the  nineteenth  century.  His  instincts,  sympathies  and  connec- 
tions were  all  national.  His  View  of  the  Constitution,  published 
in  Philadelphia  in  1825,  was  the  standard  text-book  on  the  subject 
until  the  publication  of  Story's  Commentaries,  in  1833.  It  has 
been  asserted  that  Rawle's  View  was  used  as  a  text-book  for  the 
instruction  of  the  students  at  West  Point  until  after  the  year  1840. 
(See  prefatory  matter  to  republication  of  paper  entitled  "  Sectional 
Misunderstandings/'  by  Robert  Bingham,  in  North  American 
Review  of  September,  1904;  also  the  paper  entitled  "Was  Seces- 
sion Taught  at  West  Point,"  read  at  the  meeting,  May  5,  1909,  of 
the  Military  Order  of  the  Loyal  Legion  of  the  United  States  Com- 
mandery  of  the  State  of  Pennsylvania,  by  Lieut.  Colonel  James 
W.  Latta.) 

"If  a  faction  should  attempt  to  subvert  the  government  of  a 
State  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  its  republican  form,  the  pater- 
nal power  of  the  Union  could  thus  be  called  forth  to  subdue  it. 
Yet  it  is  not  to  be  understood  that  its  interposition  would  be 
justifiable  if  the  people  of  a  State  should  determine  to  retire  from 
the  Union,  whether  they  adopted  another  or  retained  the  same  form 
of  government."     (Page  289.) 

"The  States,  then,  may  wholly  withdraw  from  the  Union; 
but  while  they  continue  they  must  retain  the  character  of  repre- 
sentative republics."     (Page  290.) 

"The  secession  of  a  State  from  the  Union  depends  on  the  will 
of  the  people  of  such  State.  The  people  alone,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  hold  the  power  to  alter  their  constitution.  The  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  is,  to  a  certain  extent,  incorporated  into  the 
constitutions  of  the  several  States  by  the  act  of  the  people.  The 
State  legislatures  have  only  to  perform  certain  organical  opera- 
tions in  respect  to  it.  To  withdraw  from  the  Union  comes  not 
within  the  general  scope  of  their  delegated  authority.  There  must 
be  an  express  provision  to  that  effect  inserted  in  the  State  con- 
stitutions. This  is  not  at  present  the  case  with  any  of  them,  and 
it  would  perhaps  be  impolitic  to  confide  it  to  them.  A  matter  so 
momentous  ought  not  to  be  entrusted  to  those  who  would  have 
it  in  their  power  to  exercise  it  lightly  and  precipitately  upon  sudden 
dissatisfaction,  or  causeless  jealousy,  perhaps  against  the  interests 
and  the  wishes  of  a  majority  of  their  constituents. 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  341 

"But  in  any  manner  by  which  a  secession  is  to  take  place, 
nothing  is  more  certain  than  that  the  act  should  be  deliberate, 
clear,  and  unequivocal.  The  perspicuity  and  solemnity  of  the 
original  obligation  require  correspondent  qualities  in  its  dissolu- 
tion. The  powers  of  the  general  government  cannot  be  defeated 
or  impaired  by  an  ambiguous  or  implied  secession  on  the  part  of 
the  State,  although  a  secession  may  perhaps  be  conditional.  The 
people  of  the  State  may  have  some  reasons  to  complain  in  respect 
to  acts  of  the  general  government ;  they  may  in  such  cases  invest 
some  of  their  own  officers  with  the  power  of  negotiation,  and  may 
declare  an  absolute  secession  in  case  of  their  failure.  Still,  how- 
ever, the  secession  must  in  such  case  be  distinctly  and  peremptorily 
declared  to  take  place  on  that  event ;  and  in  such  case,  as  in  the 
case  of  an  unconditional  secession,  the  previous  ligament  with  the 
Union  would  be  legitimately  and  fairly  destroyed.  But  in  either 
case  the  people  is  the  only  moving  power."     (Pages  295,  296.) 

Tocqueville  cannot,  of  course,  be  cited  as  an  authority  on 
American  Constitutional  Law.  Nevertheless,  an  acute  observer, 
his  evidence  carries  great  weight  on  the  question  of  the  views 
generally  current  on  all  constitutional  questions  at  the  time  he 
collected  the  materials  for  his  great  work  (1831-32).  The  follow- 
ing extracts  bearing  upon  the  topic  under  discussion  are  found 
in  the  translation  of  Democracy  of  America  by  Henry  Reeve 
(London,  1889). 

"In  America,  each  State  has  fewer  opportunities  of  resistance 
and  fewer  temptations  to  non-compliance ;  nor  can  such  a  design 
be  put  in  execution  (if  indeed  it  be  entertained)  without  an  open 
violation  of  the  laws  of  the  Union,  a  direct  interruption  of  the 
ordinary  course  of  justice,  and  a  bold  declaration  of  revolt;  in  a 
word,  without  taking  a  decisive  step  which  men  hesitate  to  adopt. 
.  .  .  Here  the  term  Federal  government  is  clearly  no  longer 
applicable  to  a  state  of  things  which  must  be  styled  an  incomplete 
national  government :  a  form  of  government  has  been  found  out 
which  is  neither  exactly  national  nor  federal ;  but  no  further  prog- 
ress has  been  made,  and  the  new  word  which  will  one  day  designate 
this  novel  invention  does  not  yet  exist."     (Vol.  I,  pp.  156,  157.) 

"The  Union  is  a  vast  body  which  presents  no  definite  object 
to  patriotic  feeling.     The  forms  and  limits  of  the  State  are  distinct 


342  MILITARY  STUDIES 

and  circumscribed ;  since  it  represents  a  certain  number  of  objects 
which  are  familiar  to  the  citizens  and  beloved  by  all.  It  is  identi- 
fied with  the  very  soil,  with  the  right  of  property  and  the  domestic 
affections,  with  the  recollections  of  the  past,  the  labours  of  the 
present,  and  the  hopes  of  the  future.  Patriotism,  then,  which  is 
frequently  a  mere  extension  of  individual  egotism,  is  still  directed 
to  the  State,  and  is  not  excited  by  the  Union."     (Vol.  I,  p.  394.) 

"The  Federal  Government  is,  therefore,  notwithstanding  the 
precautions  of  those  who  founded  it,  naturally  so  weak  that  it  more 
peculiarly  requires  the  free  consent  of  the  governed  to  enable  it  to 
subsist. 

"If  the  Union  were  to  undertake  to  enforce  the  allegiance  of 
the  Confederate  States  by  military  means,  it  would  be  in  a  position 
very  analogous  to  that  of  England  at  the  time  of  the  War  of  In- 
dependence."    (Vol.  I,  p.  395.) 

"The  Union  was  formed  by  the  voluntary  agreement  of  the 
States;  and,  in  uniting  together,  they  have  not  forfeited  their 
nationality,  nor  have  they  been  reduced  to  the  condition  of  one 
and  the  same  people.  If  one  of  the  States  chose  to  withdraw  its 
name  from  the  contract,  it  would  be  difficult  to  disprove  its  right 
of  doing  so ;  and  the  Federal  Government  would  have  no  means 
of  maintaining  its  claims  directly,  either  by  force  or  by  right." 
(Vol.  I,  p.  396.) 

"  It  appears  to  me  unquestionable  that  if  any  portion  of  the 
Union  seriously  desired  to  separate  itself  from  the  other  States, 
they  would  not  be  able,  nor  indeed  would  they  attempt,  to  prevent 
it;  and  that  the  present  Union  will  only  last  as  long  as  the  States 
which  compose  it  choose  to  continue  members  of  the  confedera- 
tion."    (Vol.  I,  p.  397.) 

"The  dangers  which  threaten  the  American  Union  do  not  orig- 
inate in  the  diversity  of  interests  or  of  opinions,  but  in  the  various 
characters  and  passions  of  the  Americans.  The  men  who  inhabit 
the  vast  territory  of  the  United  States  are  almost  all  the  issue  of 
a  common  stock  ;  but  the  effects  of  the  climate,  and  more  especially 
of  slavery,  have  gradually  introduced  very  striking  differences 
between  the  British  settler  of  the  Southern  States  and  the  British 
settler  of  the  North."     (Vol.  I,  p.  402.) 

"I  think  that  I  have  demonstrated  that  the  existence  of  the 


LEE'S  CENTENNIAL  343 

present  confederation  depends  entirely  on  the  continued  assent  of 
all  the  confederates;  and,  starting  from  this  principle,  I  have 
inquired  into  the  causes  which  may  induce  the  several  States  to 
separate  from  the  others.  The  Union  may,  however,  perish  in 
two  different  ways :  one  of  the  confederate  States  may  choose 
to  retire  from  the  compact,  and  so  forcibly  to  sever  the  Federal 
tie ;  and  it  is  to  this  supposition  that  most  of  the  remarks  that  I 
have  made  apply :  or  the  authority  of  the  Federal  Government 
may  be  progressively  entrenched  on  by  the  simultaneous  tendency 
of  the  united  republics  to  resume  their  independence."  (Vol.  I, 
p.  412.) 

"The  Constitution  had  not  destroyed  the  distinct  sovereignty 
of  the  States ;  and  all  communities,  of  whatever  nature  they  may 
be,  are  impelled  by  a  secret  propensity  to  assert  their  indepen- 
dence."    (Vol.  I,  p.  415.) 

The  most  recent  and  elaborate  discussion  of  this  subject,  from 
the  historical  point  of  view,  is  by  Hannis  Taylor,  a  Southerner  by 
birth  and  residence,  in  the  chapter  (X)' entitled  "  Sixty-one  Years 
of  Constitutional  Growth  "  in  his  Origin  and  Growth  of  the  Ameri- 
can Constitution  (Boston,  1911). 


IX 

AN   HISTORICAL   RESIDUUM1 

Some  fifteen  years  ago  the  late  Edward  L.  Pierce,  the 
biographer  of  Charles  Sumner,  submitted  to  the  Massachu- 
setts Historical  Society  an  amusing  as  well  as  interesting  and 
suggestive  paper,  entitled  Recollections  as  a  Source  of  History. 
Buried  in  the  rarely  consulted  volumes  of  the  Proceedings  of 
the  Society,  this  paper,  never  having  attracted  any  consider- 
able notice,  is  now  quite  forgotten ;  but  none  the  less  as  a 
study  based  on  a  personal  experience,  both  long  and  varied, 
its  perusal  will  well  repay  the  general  reader,  while  for  the 
historical  investigator  it  hangs  out  a  veritable  danger  signal. 
Naturally,  as  the  indefatigable  student  of  the  Sumner  period, 
Mr.  Pierce  drew  his  instances  mainly  from  the  "  Rebellion  " 
literature,  as  he  still  designated  it ;  and  towards  the  close  of 
his  paper  he  observed:  "Of  all  reminiscences  those  concern- 
ing public  men  at  Washington  are  the  most  untrustworthy. 
.  .  .  Stories  of  public  characters  have  somewhat  the  in- 
terest of  fiction,  and  the  mass  of  readers  care  little  whether 
they  are  true  or  not.  Managers  of  magazines  are  keen  in 
their  search  for  them;  and  the  result  is  a  medley  of  tales, 
with  little  of  truth  in  them,  and  that  little  of  truth  so  com- 
pounded with  falsehood  as  to  be  worse  than  falsehood  entire. 
They  obtain  a  credence  with  even  intelligent  people,  who 

1  Originally  prepared  for  submission  to  the  Massachusetts  Historical 
Society,  at  its  October  meeting,  1899,  this  paper  is  printed  under  the  title 
The  Laird  Rams  in  the  Proceedings  of  the  Society  (Second  Series,  XIII,  177- 
197).  In  its  present  form  it  has  been  recast,  abbreviated  in  parts,  and 
elsewhere  developed  by  the  use  of  new  material  since  brought  to  light. 

344 


AN  HISTORICAL  RESIDUUM  345 

fancy  that  what  is  in  type  must  be  true.  In  ten,  twenty  or 
thirty  years  they  are  thought  worthy  of  recognition  as  a 
source  of  history.  Now  and  then  a  valuable  contribution 
.  .  .  appears,  but  generally  reminiscences  of  Washington 
life  and  affairs  should  be  dismissed  without  consideration  by 
historians."  1 

One  of  this  "medley  of  tales  "  it  is  proposed  now  to  con- 
sider. A  dramatic  and  interesting  specimen,  an  effort,  on 
behalf  of  the  future  historian,  will  be  made  to  extract  from 
it  what  "little  of  truth"  may  be  therein.  The  story,  as  will 
be  seen,  was  intimately  connected  with  a  very  memorable 
episode  ;  and  on  its  face  it  would  seem  to  be  entitled  to 
absolute  credence,  coming  as  it  did  from  a  man  of  great 
respectability,  one  who  occupied  long  and  with  credit  to 
himself  a  highly  responsible  government  position  affording 
him  access  to  the  most  secret  springs  of  action  and  sources 
of  information.  If  this  does  not  constitute  a  basis  for  "cre- 
dence," it  is  difficult  to  say  what  would ;  and  yet,  in  fact, 
the  story  merely  supplies  one  more  striking,  almost  con- 
clusive, illustration  of  the  truth  of  Mr.  Pierce's  conclusion 
that  "reminiscences  of  Washington  life  and  affairs  should 
be  dismissed  without  consideration  by  historians." 

During  the  administration  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  Mr.  L.  E. 
Chittenden  was  Register  of  the  Treasury.  Born  in  Vermont, 
in  the  year  1824,  he  was  by  profession  a  lawyer,  though 
taking  an  active  interest  in  politics.  A  member  of  the  State 
Senate  of  Vermont  between  1857  and  1859,  in  1861  he  was 
a  delegate  to  the  Peace  Convention  which  met  at  Washington 
in  February  of  that  year.  In  April,  1861,  he  was  appointed 
Register  of  the  Treasury.  Retiring  from  his  position  in 
1865,  he  removed  to  New  York,  where  he  engaged  in  the 
practice  of  the  law,  giving  at  the  same  time  considerable  at- 
1  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proceedings,  Second  Series,  X,  483. 


346  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

tention  to  literary  pursuits  and  historical  study.  In  1890 
he  wrote  out  his  recollections  of  what  occurred;  more  or  less 
within  his  own  observation,  during  his  connection  with  public 
affairs.  The  papers  drawn,  as  he  stated,  from  memoranda 
made  by  him  at  the  time,  first  appeared  in  Harper's  Mag- 
azine, the  series  running  through  the  year  1890;  and  in 
1891  these  articles,  revised  by  the  author,  were  published  in 
a  volume  by  the  firm  of  Harper  and  Brothers,  under  the  title 
of  Recollections  of  President  Lincoln  and  his  Administra- 
tion. The  extraordinary  story  now  about  to  be  consid- 
ered was  told  in  much  detail  and  with  great  particularity  in 
that  volume,  filling  an  entire  chapter,  eighteen  pages  in 
length;  and,  at  the  time  attracting  much  notice  and  com- 
ment, has  since  been  the  subject  of  constant  inquiry  and 
conjecture.  Too  long  to  quote  in  full,  the  narrative  can  for 
present  purposes  be  briefly  summarized.  It  is  only  necessary 
to  premise  that  the  events  referred  to  occurred  between  the 
months  of  March  and  September,  1863.  This  period  would 
probably  by  common  consent  be  agreed  upon  as  that  of 
acute  crisis  in  the  War  of  Secession,  —  it  was  the  period 
following  Burnside's  Fredericksburg  fiasco,  that  marked  by 
the  great  battles  of  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg,  and  by 
Grant's  brilliant  Vicksburg  campaign.  Taken  altogether  a 
gloomy  stage  of  the  struggle,  its  outcome  was  at  the  time 
indisputably  doubtful.  It  must  also  be  borne  in  mind  that 
no  Atlantic  cable  was  then  in  operation,  and  communication 
by  steam  packet  between  America  and  Europe  was  slow  and 
comparatively  irregular. 

Greatly  condensed,  Mr.  Chittenden's  narrative  reads  as 
follows :  — 

"At  about  eleven  o'clock  on  a  certain  well-remembered 
Friday  morning,  in  1862,"  as  he  asserts,  but  in  reality  in 
March,  1863,  Mr.  Chittenden  was  called  upon  to  go  to  the 


AN  HISTORICAL  RESIDUUM  347 

White  House  "without  a  moment's  delay."  Obeying  the 
summons,  he  there  found  Secretaries  Chase  and  Seward  in 
anxious  consultation  with  President  Lincoln.  They  wished 
to  know  what  was  the  shortest  time  within  which  ten  millions 
in  United  States  coupon  five-twenty  bonds  could  be  prepared, 
signed  and  issued.  With  some  circumlocution,  the  Register 
informed  them.  Both  secretaries  said  that  the  time  sug- 
gested could  not  be  allowed.  The  bonds  must  be  signed, 
and  ready  for  use,  before  the  following  Monday,  this,  it  will  be 
remembered,  being  Friday.  Moreover,  there  must  be  noth- 
ing on  the  face  of  the  bonds  thus  signed  to  indicate  that 
they  were  issued  otherwise  than  in  the  regular  course  of 
business.  Under  the  Act  of  Congress  each  bond  issued 
had  to  be  signed  by  the  Register  personally.  He  could  not 
appoint  a  substitute.  Only  seventy  hours  were  allowed, 
therefore,  between  the  time  of  discussion  and  the  time 
when  the  bonds  must  be  on  their  way  to  New  York.  This 
extraordinary  proceeding  was  necessitated  by  a  special 
despatch  received  from  Mr.  Adams,  the  minister  in  Lon- 
don. Mr.  Adams,  it  appeared,  had  for  months  been  watch- 
ing the  work  in  progress  in  the  Laird  yards,  at  Birkenhead, 
where  two  armored  vessels  were  then  being  constructed  for 
the  Confederate  government.  In  tonnage,  arms  and  speed 
these  vessels  were  reported  to  be  superior  to  any  which  the 
United  States  had  at  its  disposal.  The  country  was,  there- 
fore, face  to  face  with  a  breaking  of  the  blockade,  and  with 
that  immediate  recognition  of  the  Confederacy  by  Great 
Britain  which  would  unquestionably  follow  thereon.  The 
question  of  arresting  these  vessels  on  the  evidence  submitted 
had,  at  the  request  of  Mr.  Adams,  been  referred  by  the  British 
government  to  the  Crown  counsel ;  and,  in  accordance  with 
their  opinion,  a  restraining  order  had  been  issued,  which, 
however,  could  not  be  enforced  against  the  vessels  until  any 


348  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

possible  damages  incurred  by  the  builders  because  of  the 
restraint  had  been  provided  for.  To  indemnify  against 
possible  damages,  a  cash  deposit  of  £1,000,000  sterling  was 
required.  The  situation  was  critical  ;  the  more  so  because 
of  the  not  unnatural  supposition  that  the  Crown  lawyers, 
never  for  a  moment  supposing  that  the  United  States  min- 
ister would  anticipate  their  decision  and  provide  himself 
with  funds  accordingly,  in  reality,  planned  that  the  ships 
would  not  be  delayed.  Mr.  Chittenden  then  goes  on  as 
follows :  — 

"But  the  unexpected  sometimes  happens.  The  event  which 
prevented  these  floating  engines  of  destruction  from  entering 
upon  their  intended  work  was  as  unanticipated  as  a  miracle.  It 
constituted,  possibly,  the  most  signal  service  ever  rendered  by  a 
citizen  of  one  country  to  the  government  of  another.  It  was  all 
the  more  noble  because  it  was  intended  to  be  anonymous.  The 
eminently  unselfish  man  who  performed  it  made  a  positive  con- 
dition that  it  should  not  be  made  public ;  that  not  so  much  as  his 
name  should  be  disclosed,  except  to  the  officers  of  our  govern- 
ment, whose  cooperation  was  required,  in  order  to  transact  the 
business  in  a  proper  manner  and  upon  correct  principles.  So 
earnest  was  his  injunction  of  secrecy  that  his  identity  will  not 
even  now  be  disclosed,  although  he  has  long  since  gone  to  his 
reward. 

"  Within  the  hour  after  the  Crown  lawyers'  decision,  with  its 
conditions,  had  been  made  known  to  Mr.  Adams,  and  when  he 
had  given  up  all  hope  of  arresting  these  vessels,  a  quiet  gentleman 
called  upon  him  and  asked  if  he  might  be  favored  with  the  op- 
portunity of  making  the  deposit  of  coin  required  by  the  order? 
He  observed  'that  it  had  occurred  to  him  that,  if  the  United  States 
had  that  amount  to  its  credit  in  London,  some  question  of  authority 
might  arise,  or  Mr.  Adams  might  otherwise  be  embarrassed  in 
complying  with  the  condition,  especially  as  communication  with 
his  government  might  involve  delay;  so  that  the  shortest  way 
to  avoid  all  difficulty  would  be  for  him  to  deposit  the  coin,  which 
he  was  quite  prepared  to  do.' 


AN  HISTORICAL  RESIDUUM  349 

"  Had  a  messenger  descended  from  the  skies  in  a  chariot  of  fire, 
with  $5,000,000  in  gold  in  his  hands,  and  offered  to  leave  it  at  the 
embassy  without  any  security,  Mr.  Adams  could  not  have  been 
more  profoundly  surprised.  He  had  accepted  the  condition  as 
fatal  to  his  efforts;  he  had  concluded  that  nothing  short  of  a 
miracle  could  prevent  the  departure  of  the  vessels;  and  here, 
if  not  a  miracle,  was  something  much  like  one.  He  made  no 
secret  of  the  pleasure  with  which  he  accepted  the  munificent  offer, 
provided  some  method  of  securing  the  liberal  Englishman  could 
be  found.  The  latter  seemed  indisposed  to  make  any  suggestions 
on  the  subject.  '  It  might  be  proper, '  he  said,  '  that  some  obligation 
should  be  entered  into,  showing  that  the  American  government 
recognized  the  deposit  as  made  on  its  account ;  beyond  that  he  • 
should  leave  the  matter  wholly  in  the  hands  of  Mr.  Adams.'  " 


The  narrative  then  goes  on,  stating  that  Mr.  Adams 
thereupon  proposed  that  $10,000,000  of  the  "five-twenties" 
should  be  delivered  to  this  unnamed  gentleman,  to  be  re- 
turned when  the  order  of  arrest  was  discharged.  The  min- 
ister further  volunteered  the  assurance  that  these  bonds 
should  be  transmitted  to  London  in  the  first  steamer  which 
left  New  York  after  his  despatch  concerning  the  transaction 
was  received  in  the  State  Department. 

"It  was  this  assurance  of  Mr.  Adams  which  the  President  and 
both  of  the  secretaries  desired  should  be  made  good.  They  re- 
garded the  faith  of  the  government  as  pledged  for  its  performance 
and  that  faith  they  proposed  should  not  be  violated. 

"All  the  details  of  this  transaction  were  not  then  disclosed. 
They  reached  the  government  in  private,  confidential  despatches 
from  Mr.  Adams,  some  of  them  long  after  wards.' ' 

Matters  being  thus  arranged,  it  only  remained  to  settle 
points  of  detail.  Getting  the  bonds  ready  for  immediate 
issue  would  involve  the  affixing  of  12,500  signatures  between 
twelve  o'clock  on  Friday  noon  and  four  A.M.  of  the  fol- 
lowing Monday.     Mr.  Chittenden  then  goes  on  to  describe 


350  DIPLOMATIG  STUDIES 

the  physical  test  to  which  he  was  subjected,  in  thus  writing 
his  name :  — 

"It  is  unnecessary  to  describe  all  the  details  of  the  devices  and 
means  resorted  to  prevent  sleep  and  to  continue  the  work.  Changes 
of  position,  violent  exercise,  going  out  into  the  open  air  and  walk- 
ing rapidly  for  ten  minutes,  concentrated  extracts,  prepared  food, 
stimulants  more  in  kind  and  number  than  can  now  be  recalled  — 
every  imaginable  means  was  employed  during  the  night  of  Satur- 
day. .  .  . 

"I  have  not  had  at  any  time  since  a  very  accurate  memory  of 
the  events  of  that  Sunday  morning.  That  I  could  not  remain  in 
the  same  position  for  more  than  a  few  moments,  that  the  bonds 
were  carried  from  desk  to  table  and  from  place  to  place  to  enable 
me  to  make  ten  signatures  at  a  time,  that  my  fingers  and  hand 
were  twisted  and  drawn  out  of  their  natural  shape  —  these  and 
other  facts  are  faintly  remembered.  The  memory  is  more  dis- 
tinct that  at  about  twelve  o'clock,  noon,  the  last  bond  was  reached 
and  signed,  and  the  work  was  finished,  the  last  hundred  bonds 
requiring  more  time  than  the  first  thousand.  One  fact  I  have 
special  cause  to  remember.  This  abuse  of  muscular  energy  even- 
tually caused  my  resignation  from  the  Treasury,  and  cost  me  several 
years  of  physical  pain.  ..." 

Finally,  he  says  :  — ■ 

"The  ability  of  Mr.  Adams  to  comply  with  the  condition  and 
furnish  the  security  was  accepted  as  the  end  of  the  controversy. 
It  is  known  that  a  few  months  later  $6,000,000  of  the  $10,000,000 
of  the  bonds  issued  were  returned  to  the  Treasury  in  their  original 
packages,  with  the  seals  of  the  Treasury  unbroken.  The  remain- 
ing $4,000,000  were  afterward  sold  for  the  benefit  of  the  Treas- 
ury. .  .  . 

"Since  the  publication  of  the  foregoing  facts  in  Harper's  Mag- 
azine for  May,  1890,  I  have  been  solicited  by  many  correspondents 
to  give  the  name  of;  the  gentleman  who  offered  to  perform  such  a 
signal  service  to  our  country.  It  must  be  obvious  that  nothing 
could  give  me  greater  pleasure  than  to  publish  his  name,  and  to 
secure  for  him  the  enduring  gratitude  of  the  American  people. 
I  have,  however,  a  special  reason  for  my  present  determination 


AN  HISTORICAL  RESIDUUM  351 

not  to  disclose  it,  nor  to  permit  myself  to  speculate  upon  the  con- 
sequences of  the  disclosure.  When  we  were  informed  that  the 
emergency  had  passed,  it  became  necessary  to  make  a  change  in 
the  entries  of  this  large  amount  upon  the  books  of  the  Register. 
This  was  found  to  be  a  difficult  matter,  unless  a  plain  statement 
of  the  issue,  to  the  gentleman  in  question,  and  its  purpose,  was 
made  with  its  subsequent  cancellation.  This  course  I  proposed  to 
Secretary  Chase.  He  was  decided  in  his  opinion  that  the  value  of 
the  service  would  not  have  been  enhanced  if  an  actual  deposit  of 
the  money  had  been  required,  and  that,  as  the  gentleman  himself 
had  imposed  the  obligation,  he  was  the  only  authority  who  could 
possibly  release  it.  While  I  regarded  his  conclusion  as  incontro- 
vertible, I  did  suggest  that  our  first  duty  was  the  official  one,  to 
our  own  obligation  to  conceal  nothing,  and  to  make  our  official 
records  strictly  conform  to  the  fact. 

" '  We  should  have  thought  of  that  at  the  time/  said  the  secretary. 
'We  might  have  declined  his  offer,  coupled  as  it  was  with  the 
obligation  to  conceal  his  name.  But  I  do  not  remember  that  we 
considered  that  question.     Do  you?' 

"  'No,'  I  said.  'Nothing  was  discussed  in  my  presence  except 
the  possibility  of  compliance  with  his  conditions,  to  the  letter.' 

"  'Then,  I  think,  we  must  continue  to  keep  his  secret,  whatever 
the  consequences  may  be,  until  he  releases  us  from  the  obligation,' 
was  the  final  conclusion  of  the  secretary. 

"I  am,  I  believe,  the  only  survivor  of  those  to  whom  this  gentle- 
man's name  was  known.  I  have  hitherto  declined  to  discuss  the 
question  of  his  name  or  its  disclosure.  I  depart  from  my  practice 
far  enough  to  say  that  I  do  not  believe  he  was  interested  in  the 
price  of  cotton,  or  that  he  was  moved  in  the  slightest  degree  by 
pecuniary  motives,  in  making  his  offer.  More  than  this,  at 
present,  I  do  not  think  I  have  the  moral  right  to  say.  If  I  should 
at  any  time  hereafter  see  my  way  clear  to  a  different  conclusion,  I 
shall  leave  his  name  to  be  communicated  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  who  will  determine  for  himself  the  propriety  of  its  dis- 
closure." 

As  a  result  of  these  very  mysterious  and  somewhat  oracular 
utterances,  a  good  deal  of  curiosity  was  not  unnaturally 


352  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

aroused  as  to  the  identity  of  the  " quiet  gentleman"  in 
question,  and  frequent  inquiries  reached  all  those  in  any 
way  likely  to  be  informed  on  the  subject,  or  to  have  access 
to  sources  of  information.  Especially  were  these  inquiries 
addressed  to  the  custodians  of  the  papers  of  Mr.  Adams, 
he  having  died  some  two  years  before  Mr.  Chittenden's  dis- 
closure was  made.  In  lack  of  a  more  definite  identification, 
the  process  of  guesswork  through  exclusion  then  began,  and 
progressed  until  it  seemed  to  centre  on  Mr.  Joshua  Bates  as 
the  one  man  who,  in  every  sense  of  the  expression,  "  filled 
the  bill."  Mr.  Bates,  by  birth  a  Massachusetts  man,  had 
then  (1863)  long  been  the  senior  partner  in  the  great  British 
commercial  firm  of  Baring  Brothers  &  Co.  No  man  was 
better  known  on  the  Royal  Exchange,  and  no  man  there 
stood  higher.  Then  in  his  seventy-fifth  year,  Mr.  Bates 
could,  if  he  saw  fit,  at  any  time  put  a  million  sterling  on 
deposit,  and  his  assurance  would  have  been  held  sufficient 
for  almost  any  additional  amount  within  reason.  Writing  in 
1890,  Mr.  Chittenden  said  of  this  unknown,  "He  has  long 
since  gone  to  his  reward" ;  Joshua  Bates  died  in  London  in 
September,  18G4.  Answering,  with  the  less  well  informed, 
the  requirements  at  every  point,  he  must,  it  was  argued,  have 
been  the  individual  whose  identity  Mr.  Chittenden  had  not 
the  "moral  right"  to  disclose;  nor,  so  far  as  known,  did  the 
whilom  Register  of  the  Treasury  leave  behind  him  any  name, 
as  he  intimated  he  might,  "to  be  communicated  to  a  future 
Secretary"  thereof.  Indeed,  as  respects  the  solution  of 
this  mystery,  it  could  be  said  of  Mr.  L.  E.  Chittenden,  as  of 
Shakespeare's  Cardinal  Beaufort,  —  "He  dies,  and  makes  no 
sign." 

Such  was  the  story  of  the  stoppage  of  the  famous  Birken- 
head rams  of  1863,  —  its  secret  history  as  told  by  Mr.  Lin- 
coln's Register  of  the  Treasury,  personally  cognizant  of  the 


AN  HISTORICAL  RESIDUUM  353 

facts  whereof  he  spoke,  knowing  even  the  name  of  the  mys- 
terious stranger  with  the  heavy  bank  account,  who  in  this 
case  proved  indeed  a  Deus  ex  machina. 

Doubtless  Mr.  Chittenden  when  he  wrote  this  story  fully 
believed  all  he  said.  He,  too,  like  the  credible  gentleman 
mentioned  by  Mr.  Pierce,  had  told  the  tale  so  often  that  he 
had  himself  grown  to  a  faith  in  every  word  of  it.  Repetition 
took  the  place  of  memory.  On  the  other  hand  when,  in  conse- 
quence of  Mr.  Chittenden's  revelations,  inquiries  poured  in, 
Mr.  Henry  Adams,  at  the  time  in  question  his  father's  private 
secretary,  and,  as  such,  cognizant  of  everything  that  occurred, 
professed  absolute  ignorance  of  any  transaction  of  the  kind,  or 
any  even  bearing  a  remote  resemblance  to  it.  He  pronounced 
the  whole  statement  a  pure  figment  of  Mr.  Chittenden's  im- 
agination. In  this  he  was  confirmed  by  Colonel  Hay,  Mr. 
Lincoln's  biographer,  who  in  the  course  of  his  investigations 
nowhere  could  find  any  trace  of  the  incidents  described. 
None  existed  certainly  in  the  records  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment, nor  among  the  Seward  papers.  Finally,  an  exami- 
nation of  Mr.  Adams's  careful  private  diary  brought  no  cor- 
roborative evidence  to  light.  Not  even  an  allusion  was  there 
found  which  by  any  possibility  corroborated  what  could 
not  have  been  other  than  the  most  startling  as  well  as  mem- 
orable event  of  a  lifetime.  Thus  the  enigma  was  dismissed 
as  insoluble.  It  apparently  only  remained  for  Mr.  Pierce's 
"ten,  twenty,  or  thirty  years"  to  pass  away  until  the  histo- 
rian of  the  future  should  deem  the  story  "  worthy  of  recog- 
nition." 

Eight  of  the  first  ten  years  actually  had  passed  away, 
when  the  small  residuum  of  historic  fact  at  the  basis  of  Mr. 
Chittenden's  "yarn"  — for  it  is  entitled  to  no  better  name  — 
was  at  last  revealed.  On  the  12th  of  October,  1898,  John  M. 
Forbes,  of  Milton,  Massachusetts,  closed  a  long,  and  notice- 

2a 


354  DIPLOMATIC   STUDIES 

ably  active  life.  Immediately  after  his  death  there  ap- 
peared in  the  papers  an  obituary  notice  of  him,  manifestly 
prepared  by  some  exceptionally  well-informed  writer,  in  the 
course  of  which  reference  was  made  to  a  mysterious  mission 
of  Mr.  Forbes  and  Mr.  William  H.  Aspinwall  to  Europe  in 
1863.  It  was  clearly  an  unwritten  Civil  War  episode.  It 
appeared  that  the  two  gentlemen,  hastily  summoned  to  a 
conference  in  New  York  by  Messrs.  Chase  and  Welles,  then 
respectively  secretaries  of  the  Treasury  and  the  Navy,  had 
been  hurried  off  to  England  to  prevent,  if  possible,  the  fit- 
ting out  in  British  ports  of  Confederate  cruisers,  and  more 
especially  of  the  two  iron-clads  then  well  known  to  be  in  an 
advanced  stage  of  construction  at  the  yards  of  the  Laird 
Brothers,  at  Birkenhead.  Great  Britain  was  in  fact  then 
being  systematically  utilized  as  a  base  from  which  Confed- 
erate naval  operations  could  be  conducted  against  the  com- 
merce and  ports  of  the  United  States,  a  nation  with  which 
Great  Britain  was  professedly  at  peace.  More  effectually 
to  put  a  stop  to  any  such  illicit  operations,  the  two  gentle- 
men were,  it  was  stated,  further  authorized  to  purchase,  if 
need  be,  any  vessels  in  course  of  preparation,  and  for  that 
purpose  took  out  with  them  "some  millions  of  the  new  5-20 
bonds."  The  writer  of  the  notice  added  that,  though  Mr. 
Forbes  failed  to  accomplish  what  he  was  sent  out  to  do, 
"our  minister,  the  Hon.  Charles  Francis  Adams,  did  all  he 
could  to  second  their  efforts."  Here  was  an  historical  clue; 
a  sudden  sending  to  Europe  of  a  large  amount  of  5-20 
bonds  in  connection  with  the  Laird  iron-clads.  The  follow- 
ing up  of  this  clue  was  then  made  further  possible  through 
the  publication  of  the  Letters  and  Recollections  of  John 
Murray  Forbes,  by  his  daughter,  Mrs.  Hughes,  in  1899.  In 
the  Forbes-Aspinwall  mission  of  1863  was  to  be  found  the 
residuum  of  truth  at  the  bottom  of  the  Chittenden  legend. 


AN  HISTORICAL  RESIDUUM  355 

From  the  letters  and  memoranda  in  Mrs.  Hughes's  vol- 
umes it  appears  that,  on  the  14th  of  March,  1863,  Mr.  Forbes, 
being  then  unwell  at  his  house  in  Milton,  received  a  brief  tele- 
gram from  Secretary  Chase,  requesting  him  to  meet  the  sender 
the  next  morning  in  New  York  at  the  Fifth  Avenue  Hotel. 
Mr.  Forbes  complied,  and  there  found  both  Mr.  Chase  and 
Mr.  Welles.  Mr.  Aspinwall  also  was  present.  The  secretaries 
wished  Mr.  Forbes  to  go  forthwith  to  England ;  while  Mr. 
Aspinwall  was  to  follow  immediately  after,  bringing  with 
him  $10,000,000  of  that  issue  of  United  States  bonds  subse- 
quently well  known  as  "five-twenties,"  and  so  denominated 
because,  maturing  in  twenty  years  from  the  date  of  issue, 
they  could  be  redeemed  at  the  option  of  the  government 
at  the  end  of  five  years  from  issue.  Bearing  interest  payable 
in  gold  at  the  rate  of  6  per  cent,  this  issue  had  been 
recently  authorized.  Subsequently  in  great  demand  both 
at  home  and  in  Europe,  the  5-20's  were  sold  at  par  in  cur- 
rency, gold  then  being  quoted  at  a  premium  of  some  40  per 
cent.  The  five-twenties,  therefore,  a  few  years  later  called 
in  and  paid  off  at  par,  in  the  summer  of  1863  were  selling  at 
a  fluctuating  price  in  gold,  varying  from  60  per  cent  to  75  per 
cent  of  their  face  value,  with  absolutely  no  market  for  them  on 
any  European  exchange.  With  $10,000,000  of  these  securi- 
ties at  their  disposal  to  enable  them  so  to  do,  Messrs.  Forbes 
and  Aspinwall  were,  if  possible,  to  stop  the  Confederate  cruis- 
ers by  purchase  or  otherwise. 

The  meeting  in  New  York  between  the  two  Secretaries 
and  the  proposed,  and  secretly  accredited,  emissaries  took 
place  apparently  on  Sunday;  and  on  Monday  Mr.  Forbes 
submitted  a  hastily  drawn  up  letter  of  instructions,  which 
Secretary  Welles  signed.  The  purchase  of  any  vessels  then 
being  fitted  out  was  the  essential  object  in  view.  A  formal 
open  letter,  in  the  nature  of  credentials,  was  also  prepared 


356  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

and  signed  by  Mr.  Welles,  enclosing  another  to  Messrs.  Baring 
Brothers,  then  the  financial  agents  of  the  government  in 
London,  advising  them  that  Messrs.  Aspinwall  and  Forbes 
were  authorized  to  arrange  for  a  loan  of  a  million  sterling, 
on  the  security  of  $10,000,000  of  5-20  bonds  in  their  hands. 
This  was  on  Monday,  the  16th,  and  Mr.  Forbes  sailed  on 
the  steamer  of  Wednesday;  while,  on  the  17th,  Mr.  Welles 
noted  in  his  diary  that  he  " returned  last  evening  from 
a  strictly  confidential  visit  to  New  York."  Mr.  Aspinwall, 
bringing  with  him  the  $10,000,000  of  bonds,  must  have 
followed  Mr.  Forbes  a  week  later,  on  the  25th,  for  he  was 
in  London  and  called  on  Mr.  Adams  on  Tuesday,  the  7th 
of  April.  As  Mr.  Chittenden  is  particular  in  specifying 
that  it  was  on  a  "well  remembered  Friday  morning"  that 
he  was  summoned  to  the  White  House  in  the  matter  of 
these  bonds,  the  morning  in  question  must  have  been  that 
of  Friday,  March  20  ;  but  March,  1863,  and  not,  as  he 
asserts  in  his  recollections,  1862.  He  is  a  year  out  in  his 
time;  nor  is  there  any  possible  question  on  this  point,  in- 
asmuch as  work  had  not  been  fairly  begun  on  the  Laird  rams 
until  the  middle  of  July,  1862,  and,  under  the  contract  for 
their  construction,  they  were  not  to  be  ready  for  sea  until 
March  and  May,  1863.  Mr.  Chittenden  says  that,  when 
he  received  his  directions  in  regard  to  signing  the  ten  millions 
of  bonds,  a  messenger  from  Mr.  Adams  had  brought  the 
startling  intelligence  that  "  within  three  days  the  vessels  were 
to  sail."  That  Mr.  Adams  never  sent  such  a  messenger  is 
immaterial ;  the  essential  fact  is  that  the  statement  fixes 
the  year  of  the  whole  transaction  as  1863,  and  not  1862, 
inasmuch  as,  owing  to  delays  from  various  causes,  the  Laird 
iron-clads  were  not  launched  until  July  and  August,  1863, 
nor  were  they  ready  for  sea  until  early  in  the  following 
October.     As  also  only  one  lot  of  bonds  of  this  magnitude 


AN  HISTORICAL  RESIDUUM  357 

was  thus  hurriedly  signed  and  mysteriously  transmitted  to 
Europe,  Mrs.  Hughes's  book  fixes  the  time  of  their  prepa- 
ration as  the  week  ending  Tuesday,  March  24,  1863,  the 
Laird  iron-clads  being  then  still  on  the  ways. 

Messrs.  Forbes  and  Aspinwall  reached  England  during  the 
gloomiest  period  of  the  War  of  Secession,  —  that  darkest 
hour  before  the  slowly  breaking  dawn  which  immediately 
preceded  the  fall  of  Vicksburg  and  the  repulse  of  Lee  at  Get- 
tysburg. In  Europe,  so  far  as  the  United  States  was  con- 
cerned, the  situation  was  at  that  time  in  the  last  degree 
critical.  The  Alabama  was  in  the  midst  of  her  career 
of  piratical  depredation;  the  Confederate  cotton  loan 
had  been  successfully  negotiated ;  the  blockade-runner 
Peterhoff  had  just  been  captured  under  circumstances  which 
deeply  concerned  English  shipping  interests ;  the  Alexandra, 
another  cruiser  contracted  for  by  the  agents  of  the  Confed- 
eracy and  then  being  made  ready  for  sea  at  Liverpool,  was 
about  to  be  seized  by  order  of  the  government,  with  a  view 
to  making  of  its  seizure  a  test  case  on  which  to  get  a  judicial 
construction  of  the  British  Foreign  Enlistment  Act;  the 
Confederate  iron-clads  at  Birkenhead  were  being  rapidly 
pushed  to  completion.  Mr.  Adams,  while  preserving  a  firm 
outward  front,  now  privately  recorded  his  fear  that  "the 
peace  will  scarcely  last  six  months";  while  Mr.  John  Bige- 
low,  coming  over  from  Paris,  expressed  to  him  the  opinion 
that  war  was  " inevitable.'7  The  mission  of  Messrs.  Forbes 
and  Aspinwall  was  important,  and  the  resources  at  their 
disposal  were  considerable  ;  any  indiscretion  on  their  part 
might  involve  serious  consequences.  They  were  there  on 
behalf  of  the  government  to  buy  vessels  not  only  to  prevent 
their  use  by  the  rebels,  but  in  certain  cases  for  the  use  of  the 
United  States  in  the  hostilities  then  going  on;  and  this 
while  Mr.   Adams,  the  officially   accredited   representative 


358  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

of  their  country,  was  vehemently  denying  the  legality  of  the 
construction  or  sale  of  such  vessels  for  or  to  either  bellig- 
erent. Seeking  thus,  under  the  exigencies  of  the  situation, 
both  to  "run  with  the  hare  and  hunt  with  the  hounds/ '  the 
n  government  not  unnaturally  instructed  its  emissaries  to 
"endeavor  to  avoid  establishing  a  precedent  that  may  em- 
barrass our  minister  when  urging  the  British  government  to 
stop  the  sailing  of  vessels  belonging  to  the  rebels."  l 

A  sufficient  account  of  this  futile  mission  is  given  in  Mrs. 
Hughes's  volumes.  A  more  judicious  selection  of  agents 
could  not  have  been  made ;  and  Messrs.  Forbes  and  Aspin- 
wall,  while  they  did  all  that  circumstances  permitted,  acted 
throughout  with  the  utmost  circumspection.  This  is  made 
curiously,  and  sometimes  amusingly,  apparent  through 
Mr.  Adams's  diary  references  to  them  and  what  they  did. 
With  Mr.  Forbes  he  was  of  course  well  acquainted.  Close 
neighbors  at  home,  for  they  lived  in  adjoining  towns,  they 
had  not  only  known  each  other  long,  but  recently  they  had 
been  in  more  or  less  active  correspondence  as  representative 
and  constituent  during  the  troubled  period  which  preceded 
the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War.  Mr.  Forbes  says  in  his  notes 
that  immediately  on  reaching  London,  after  seeing  the  Messrs. 
Baring,  he  called  on  Mr.  Adams,  who,  he  adds,  "wanted  to 
know  only  what  was  absolutely  necessary  of  our  mission,  so 
that  he  might  not  be  mixed  up  with  our  operations,  which 
we  knew  might  not  be  exactly  what  a  diplomat  would  care  to 
endorse."  This  was  on  the  31st  of  March;  and  that  day 
Mr.  Adams  wrote  "who  should  come  in  but  Mr.  John  M. 
Forbes?  He  gave  me  some  intimation  of  his  errand,  which 
is  to  investigate  the  practicability  of  obtaining  contingents 
of  troops  from  any  quarter  in  Germany.  I  thought  not; 
the  only  course  was  to  engage  the  men.  I  did  not  doubt 
1  Forbes,  Letters  and  Recollections,  II,  6,  26. 


AN  HISTORICAL  RESIDUUM  359 

they  might  be  had  in  abundance."  Thus  the  resurrected 
memory  of  the  revolutionary  Hessians  seems  to  have  been 
evoked  by  Mr.  Forbes  as  a  means  of  averting  suspicion. 
During  the  next  few  days  Mr.  Forbes  dined  with  Mr.  Adams, 
and  saw  him  frequently ;  and,  on  the  7th  of  April,  Mr.  Aspin- 
wall  also  called.  Owing  to  the  capture  of  the  Peterhoff,  the 
seizure  of  the  Alexandra  and  the  destruction  of  the  Georgiana, 
one  of  the  minor  rebel  cruisers,  "the  city"  was  now  in  a  condi- 
tion of  ferment,  both  active  and  noisy.  Movements  initiated 
by  Mr.  Adams  to  stop  vessels  in  process  of  preparation  at 
numerous  points  had,  as  he  wrote,  roused  "the  whole  hive 
of  sympathizers,  as  it  was  never  stirred  before." 

Immediately  on  the  arrival  of  Mr.  Aspinwall,  the  $10,000,- 
000  of  bonds  he  brought  with  him  in  several  small  separate 
trunks  were  safely  deposited  in  the  vaults  of  Baring  Brothers, 
and,  on  the  security  of  a  portion  ($4,000,000)  of  them, 
£500,000  negotiated  through  Mr.  Joshua  Bates,  was  passed, 
as  a  loan,  to  the  credit  of  Mr.  Forbes.  With  that  amount  he 
began  operations.  Though  he,  of  course,  had  no  knowledge 
on  that  point,  a  million  dollars  out  of  the  proceeds  of  the 
recently  negotiated  Cotton  loan  had  been  put  at  the  control 
of  the  Confederate  agents  for  the  construction  of  the  two 
Laird  iron-clads,  the  contract  price  for  which  was  £93,750 
each,  apart  from  all  armament  and  munitions.1  The  purse 
of  the  United  States  emissaries  was  thus  materially  longer 
than  that  of  the  Confederate  agents ;  but  the  money  was 
not  at  the  disposal  of  Mr.  Adams,  nor  did  it  come  from  the 
pocket  of  Mr.  Chittenden's  "quiet  gentleman,"  nor  was  it, 
either  in  whole  or  in  any  part,  used  for  the  purposes  Mr. 
Chittenden  states. 

Three  days  after  the  arrival  of  Mr.  Aspinwall,  on  the  even- 
ing of  Thursday,  April  9,  Mr.  Forbes  very  sociably  dropped 
1  Bulloch,  Secret  Service,  I,  385,  386. 


360  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

in  to  see  Mr.  Adams,  with  a  view  doubtless  to  an  incidental 
talk  on  the  business  in  hand,  the  stoppage  of  the  various 
vessels  in  regard  to  which  he  had  by  this  time  informed  him- 
self. To  those  who  knew  Mr.  Forbes,  and  understood  his 
shrewd  methods  of  working  through  indirections,  Mr. 
Adams's  comment  on  what  took  place  is  suggestive.  "I 
explained  to  him/'  he  wrote,  "all  that  I  had  done;  but  he 
seemed  to  think  private  action  might  effect  more.  Here  is 
an  instance  of  the  opposite  nature  of  British  and  American 
training.  The  former  always  thinking  of  nothing  but  gov- 
ernment action ;  the  latter  always  underrating  it."  On 
the  17th  Mr.  Forbes  again  called,  this  time  to  report  about 
the  vessels  over  which  he  and  Mr.  Aspinwall  were  now 
exercising  a  joint  private  supervision,  and  Mr.  Adams 
innocently  wrote,  "he  made  much  of  doing  nothing  to 
embarrass  me."  The  next  entry  was  more  amusing  still. 
The  drift  of  the  mission  was  beginning  to  show  itself,  and 
there  was  almost  a  groan  of  despair  perceptible  through  what 
the  minister  now  wrote.  Mr.  Robert  J.  Walker,  formerly 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  in  the  Polk  administration,  had 
now  also  put  in  an  appearance  in  London,  in  the  capacity  of 
special  agent  of  the  Treasury.  He  was  sent  out  by  Secretary 
Chase  to  acquaint  European  capitalists  with  the  actual  cir- 
cumstances and  resources  of  the  country ;  and,  if  possible, 
to  negotiate  the  sale  of  some  government  securities.  Messrs. 
Forbes  and  Aspinwall  did  not  deem  it  expedient  to  admit  Mr. 
Walker  into  their  confidence ;  while  Mr.  Adams  wrote :  "He, 
as  well  as  Messrs.  Aspinwall  and  Forbes,  are  sent  out  from 
the  Treasury  to  carry  on  operations  of  their  own  with  which 
I  have  nothing  to  do.  Of  course,  they  will  more  or  less,  un- 
dertake to  advise  me,  which  I  shall  try  to  take  in  the  best 
part.  I  feel  sensibly  that  this  mission  is  growing  more  and 
more  difficult."     Certainly  a  less  conventionally  diplomatic 


AN  HISTORICAL  RESIDUUM  361 

situation  could  hardly  be  conceived.  The  United  States, 
in  the  midst  of  the  most  serious  complications,  was  repre- 
sented in  London  by  at  least  three  different  agencies, 
drawing  their  instructions  from  separate  sources,  and  each 
operating  in  secrecy  so  far  as  the  others  were  concerned. 
That,  under  such  an  ingeniously  bad  system,  a  catastrophe 
did  not  result,  speaks  volumes  for  the  discretion  of  those 
concerned. 

On  the  23d  of  April  Mr.  Forbes  breakfasted  with  Mr. 
Adams,  showing  him  "a  general  review  of  all  the  ship-yards 
of  the  island,  and  a  description  of  every  suspicious  vessel. 
The  activity  of  these  rogues,"  Mr.  Adams  wrote,  "is  greater 
than  ever.  I  do  not  know  that  any  anxiety  I  have  is  heavier 
than  this."  Then,  on  the  28th,  Messrs.  Forbes  and  Aspin- 
wall,  feeling  evidently  that  now  they  must  face  the  real  pur- 
pose of  their  errand,  or  they  might  compromise  the  minister, 
came  to  discuss  the  expediency  of  buying  the  ships  then 
being  built  for  the  Confederacy.  "I  think,"  wrote  Mr. 
Adams,  "this  is  merely  playing  the  game  of  the  Englishmen. 
The  competition  for  arms  at  the  outset  of  the  war  raised 
their  price  more  than  double,  and  so  it  would  be  with 
steamers." 

The  situation  had  its  grotesque  as  well  as  critical  side,  and 
casuistry  played  a  conspicuous  part  in  the  statements  and 
asseverations  then  made.  For  example,  Messrs.  Forbes  and 
Aspinwall,  privately  accredited  by  Secretary  Welles,  were  in 
London  trying  surreptitiously  to  buy  the  very  vessels  then 
being  built  in  the  Laird  yards.  The  Assistant  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  G.  V.  Fox,  was  writing  to  Mr.  Forbes:  "You 
must  stop  them  at  all  hazards.  .  .  .  Let  us  have  them  in 
the  United  States  for  our  own  purposes,  without  any  more 
nonsense,  and  at  any  price." 1  Shortly  after,  Secretary 
1  Hughes,  Forbes,  II,  23. 


362  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

Welles  himself  wrote  to  Mr.  Forbes  to  the  same  effect,  "If 
we  caught  hold  of  any  swift  privateers  which  they  are  con- 
structing or  fitting  out,  the  great  purpose  of  your  mission  will 
have  been  accomplished."  Yet  in  the  very  same  letter,  while 
his  agent  is  feeling  his  way  towards  the  purchase  of  ships  at 
that  very  time  in  course  of  construction  in  the  yards  of  the 
Laird  Brothers,  the  Secretary  indignantly  denounces  the 
former  senior  member  of  the  firm,  then  in  Parliament,  for 
there  asserting  "that  propositions  had  been  made  to  him  to 
build  vessels  for  the  United  States."  He  declared  the  state- 
ment "destitute  of  truth"  and  thought  it  might  be  "advis- 
able to  expose  Mr.  Laird."  *  This  he  did  in  a  letter  to  Mr. 
Sumner,2  sent  May  19,  which  Mr.  Sumner  made  public  on  the 
6th  of  the  following  August.  In  it  he  arraigned  Mr.  Laird 
as  "  a  mercenary  hypocrite  without  principle  or  honesty." 
'  It  was  certainly  fortunate  for  all  concerned,  except  Mr.  Laird, 
that  the  purposes  of  the  confidential  mission  of  Messrs. 
Forbes  and  Aspinwall,  and  the  methods  pursued  by  them, 
were  as  yet  undisclosed,  as  the  distinction  between  build- 
ing ships  and  buying  ships  half  built  and  on  the  stocks, 
might  not  have  carried  conviction  to  all  minds.  Mean- 
v/hile,  Messrs.  Forbes  and  Aspinwall  at  about  this  time 
were  settling  down  to  the  sensible  conviction  reached  by  Mr. 
Adams  that  "to  offer  to  buy  the  iron-clads  without  success 
would  only  be  to  stimulate  the  builders  to  greater  activity, 
and  even  to  building  new  ones  in  the  expectation  of  find- 
ing a  market  for  them  from  one  party  or  the  other." 
And  all  this  time  on  the  other  side,  the  agents  and  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Confederacy  were  protesting  before  high 
Heaven  that  they  had  no  concern  or  interest  in  the  Birken- 
head iron-clads;  and  were  executing  fraudulent  papers  "in 
proper  legal  forms  "  making  them  "the  property  of  Messrs. 
1  See  also  Welles,  Diary,  I,  291,  306,  394,  396.  2  Ibid.  292. 


AN  HISTORICAL  RESIDUUM  363 

Bravay  and  Co.  of  Paris,  agents  for  the  Pasha  of 
Egypt."  Altogether,  it  was  a  nicely  complicated  all- 
around  case  of  fraud,  deceit,  duplicity,  and  double-dealing 
generally. 

Throughout  the  month  of  May,  Messrs.  Forbes  and  Aspin- 
wall  remained  in  England,  gradually  reaching  the  conclusion 
that  they  could  accomplish  nothing.  Meanwhile  Mr.  William 
M.  Evarts  had  been  added  to  the  contingent  of  special  gov- 
ernment emissaries,  he  being  sent  out  to  supervise  the  legal 
proceedings  in  the  case  of  the  Alexandra.  "It  cannot,  be 
denied,"  wrote  Mr.  Adams,  "that  ever  since  I  have  been  here 
the  almost  constant  interference  of  government  agents  of 
all  kinds  has  had  the  effect,  however  intended,  of  weakening 
the  position  of  the  minister.  Most  of  all  has  it  happened 
in  the  case  of  Mr.  Evarts,  whom  the  newspapers  here  have 
all  insisted  to  have  been  sent  here  to  superintend  my  office 
in  all  questions  of  international  law.  I  doubt  whether  any 
minister  has  ever  had  so  much  of  this  kind  of  thing  to  con- 
tend with." 

It  is  instructive  to  know  that  it  was  not  Mr.  Adams  alone 
who  was  at  this  time  thus  encumbered  with  aid.  The  Con- 
federate emissaries  seem  to  have  had  similar  cause  of  com- 
plaint; and  in  September,  1862,  nine  months  before  Mr. 
Adams  made  the  foregoing  entry  in  his  diary,  Captain  Bulloch 
had  written  on  this  head  as  follows  to  the  Confederate  Sec- 
retary of  the  Navy:  "I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  embar- 
rassment has  already  been  occasioned  by  the  number  of 
persons  from  the  South  who  represent  themselves  to  be 
agents  of  the  Confederate  States  Government.  There  are 
men  so  constituted  as  not  to  be  able  to  conceal  their  connec- 
tion with  any  affairs  which  may  by  chance  add  to  their  impor- 
tance, and  such  persons  are  soon  found  out  and  drawn 
into  confessions  and  statements  by  gossiping  acquaintances, 


364  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

to  the  serious  detriment  of  the  service  upon  which  they  are 
engaged."  * 

During  the  early  years  of  Mr.  Adams's  mission,  indeed 
until  the  autumn  of  1863,  when  the  government  detained 
the  Birkenhead  iron-clads,  Great  Britain  was,  for  reasons 
which  at  once  suggest  themselves,  the  special  field  of  diplo- 
matic activity,  and  the  minister  at  London  was  at  last 
driven  to  active  remonstrance.  The  emissaries  were  of  four 
distinct  types:  (1)  the  roving  diplomat,  irregularly  ac- 
credited by  the  State  Department;  (2)  the  poaching  dip- 
lomat, regularly  accredited  to  one  government,  but  seeking  a 
wider  field  of  activity;  (3)  the  volunteer  diplomat,  not  ac- 
credited at  all,  but  in  his  own  belief  divinely  commissioned 
at  that  particular  juncture  to  enlighten  foreign  nations 
generally,  and  Great  Britain  in  particular;  and  (4)  the 
special  agent,  sent  out  by  some  department  of  the  govern- 
ment to  accomplish,  if  possible,  a  particular  object. 

As  to  these  unassigned  and  peripatetic  diplomats  of  the 
Civil  War  period,  their  name  was  legion,  and  they  could  only 
be  dealt  with  in  adequate  fashion  in  a  separate  paper.  To 
understand  the  system  pursued  it  is  necessary  to  begin  with  a 
reference  to  Secretary  Seward's  idiosyncrasies  and  political 
methods.  When,  in  March,  1861,  the  ex-governor  of  New 
York,  and  the  leading  partner  in  the  former  firm  of  Seward, 
Weed  &  Greeley,  then  dissolved  by  the  withdrawal  of  its 
junior  member,  —  when  Secretary  Seward  took  charge 
(March,  1861)  of  the  Department  of  State,  he  at  once 
adopted  a  policy  and  inaugurated  a  system  characteristic  of 
New  York  politics.  The  country  was  face  to  face  with 
what  amounted  to  a  revolution.  The  outcome  was  in  large 
degree  plainly  dependent  on  the  course  of  events  in  Europe, 

1  Bulloch,  Secret  Service,  I,  390 ;  also  Bigelow,  Retrospections,  I,  481 ; 
II,  137. 


AN  HISTORICAL  RESIDUUM  365 

and  especially  in  Great  Britain  and  France.  That  course 
of  events  was  again  necessarily  much  influenced  by  the 
public  opinion  in  those  countries  prevailing;  so,  with  a 
view  to  the  situation,  President  Lincoln's  foreign  secretary 
arranged  the  machinery  of  his  office  on  a  plan  peculiarly  his 
own.  He  did  not  propose  to  depend  altogether  on  the 
traditional  accredited  representatives  of  the  country.  He 
planned ,  on  the  contrary,  to  have  his  own  private  bureau 
of  intelligence,  and  system  of  manikin  wires.  Accordingly, 
with  a  view  to  influencing,  as  he  so  considered,  the  European 
mind,  while  at  the  same  time  informing  himself,  he,  first 
and  last,  precipitated  on  Europe  a  flight  of  generally  ac- 
credited representatives  and  special  agents,  —  men  of 
eminence,  dignitaries  of  the  established  churches,  eminent 
evangelistic  divines,  journalists,  lawyers  and  financiers,  — 
whose  province  it  was,  besides  educating  and  influencing 
benighted  Europe,  to  keep  him  personally  advised,  much 
in  the  fashion  of  a  newspaper  press  agency.  Of  those 
thus  specially  commissioned,  Mr.  John  Bigelow  was  one  of 
the  more  judiciously  selected ;  and,  probably,  distinctly  the 
most  efficient.  Without  any  special  qualification  for  the 
post,  he  was  appointed  consul-general  at  Paris;  with  the 
clear  further  understanding  that  he  was  to  use  his  journalistic 
experience  acquired  in  the  editorial  rooms  of  the  New  York 
Evening  Post  to  influence  the  press  of  continental  Europe. 
The  manipulation  of  the  English  press  was  at  the  samp 
time  entrusted  to  Mr.  Thurlow  Weed,  the  secretary's  jour- 
nalistic and  political  fidus  Achates.  While  the  private  and 
confidential  communications  with  the  Secretary  of  State 
of  those  gentlemen,  as  of  others  similarly  commissioned, 
have  never  as  yet  to  any  large  extent  seen  the  light,  they 
probably  contained  a  varied  assortment  of  information  and 
gossip,  the  nature  and  value  of  which  can  only  be  surmised. 


366  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

The  presence  of  this  corps  of  international  supernumeraries 
was  well  known  abroad,  and,  naturally,  not  understood. 
By  the  foreign  chancelleries,  it  was  taken  to  indicate  a  lack 
of  confidence  in  the  regularly  accredited  representatives; 
and  was  not  unskilfully  manipulated  to  that  end  by  the 
agents  of  the  Confederacy. 

Of  those  of  the  class  first  specified,  the  generally  accred- 
ited or  roving  diplomats,  lay  and  church,  it  is  unnecessary 
here  to  speak.  The  more  discreet  and  better  informed  of 
those  invited  to  go  declined  so  to  do ;  of  those  who  did  go, 
Mr.  Adams  subsequently  said  they  " failed  entirely,"  while 
in  so  doing  they  "worried"  him  more  than  they  enlightened 
the  English.1  Among  the  poaching  brethren  of  the  second 
class  he  especially  mentioned  Henry  S.  Sanford,  and 
Cassius  M.  Clay,  accredited  respectively  to  Belgium  and 
Russia.  Of  Mr.  Sanford's  private  correspondence  with 
the  Secretary,  nothing  is  known.  It  was  probably  largely 
made  up  of  gossip  and  secret  service  information.  Other- 
wise, Mr.  Sanford's  most  active  negotiation  was  conducted 
neither  in  Belgium  nor  in  Great  Britain,  but  in  Italy ;  and 
was  in  connection  with  a  most  ill-considered  move  to  in- 
duce Garibaldi  to  go  to  America  and  there  accept  high  mili- 
tary command.  A  commission  as  major-general  was  actu- 
ally offered  him  ;  but  the  Italian  insisted  on  a  dictatorship, 
civil  as  well  as  military.2  So,  most  fortunately,  Mr.  San- 
ford's  diplomatic  activities  proved  altogether  abortive. 

In  view  of  the  subsequent  career  of  Mr.  Cassius  M.  Clay, 
and  his  widely  published  domestic  episodes,  it  is  charitable 
to  say  as  little  as  may  be  of  his  diplomatic  experiences. 
They  were,  to  say  the  least,  the  reverse  of  either  conventional 
or  happy.     Meanwhile,  the  late  John  Hay,  then  Lincoln's 

1  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proceedings,  Second  Series,  XVI,  465. 

2  Ibid.  Third  Series,  I,  319-325. 


AN  HISTORICAL  RESIDUUM  367 

private  secretary  though  himself  Secretary  of  State  thirty 
years  afterwards,  used  to  tell  a  story  of  Mr.  Clay  not  only 
characteristic,  but  too  entertaining  to  be  lost.  While  Mr. 
Clay  was  representing  the  country  at  St.  Petersburg,  Charles 
Sumner,  then  chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  greatly  offended  him  by  some  utterance,  whether 
on  the  floor  of  the  Senate  or  elsewhere.  Mr.  Clay  there- 
upon sat  down  and  indited  an  official  despatch  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  State,  in  which  he  dealt  with  the  Massachusetts 
Senator  quite,  as  the  expression  goes,  without  gloves,  and 
certainly  without  mercy.  There  were,  indeed,  according 
to  Mr.  Hay,  few  possible  animadversions  of  an  offensive 
nature  left  unexpressed.  Having  thus  relieved  himself, 
Mr.  Clay  at  the  close  of  his  fulmination  dropped  suddenly  into 
the  diplomatic  style,  ending,  mutatis  mutandis,  with  the 
regulation  formula,  "You  may  read  this  despatch  to  Mr. 
Sumner,  and  should  he  request  it  you  can  give  him 
a  copy." 

But,  if  Mr.  Adams  was  " worried"  by  intrusions  on  his 
peculiar  domain  from  without,  if  Secretary  Welles  can  be 
depended  on  as  an  authority,  the  London  situation  was  not 
wholly  free  from  its  domestic  annoyances.  When  Mr. 
Adams  assumed  the  duties  of  his  mission,  the  Secretary  ap- 
pointed Mr.  Charles  L.  Wilson,  of  Chicago,  as  First  Secretary 
Legation.  Wholly  without  diplomatic  experience  or  famil- 
iarity with  foreign  or  official  life,  Mr.  Wilson  was  chief  owner 
and  editor  of  a  Chicago  daily  newspaper  of  the  western  type 
of  that  period,  which  had  been  ardent  in  support  of  Mr. 
Seward  in  his  presidential  aspirations.  He  may  have  been 
in  private  communication  with  Mr.  Seward,  but  Mr.  Wilson 
certainly  did  not  feel  either  at  home  or  at  ease  amid  his  new 
surroundings.  Accordingly,  at  the  very  time  that  Messrs. 
Forbes  and  Aspinwall  were  bestirring  themselves  in  British 


368  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

shipping  circles,  Secretary  Welles  was  making  the  following 
diary  entry : *  — 

"  Sumner  tells  me  of  a  queer  interview  he  had  with  Seward. 
The  first  part  of  the  conversation  was  harmonious  and  related 
chiefly  to  the  shrewd  and  cautious  policy  and  management  of  the 
British  ministry,  who  carefully  referred  all  complex  questions 
to  the  law  officers  of  Her  Majesty's  government.  It  might  have 
been  a  hint  to  Seward  to  be  more  prudent  and  considerate,  and 
to  take  legal  advice  instead  of  pushing  on,  wordy  and  slovenly,  as 
is  sometimes  done.  .  .  .  Our  Minister,  Mr.  Adams,  was  spoken 
of  as  too  reserved  and  retiring  for  his  own  and  the  general  good. 
Sumner  said,  in  justification  and  by  way  of  excuse  for  him,  that  it 
would  be  pleasanter  and  happier  for  him  if  he  had  a  Secretary  of 
Legation  whose  deportment,  manner,  and  social  position  were 
different,  —  if  he  were  more  affable  and  courteous,  in  short  more 
of  a  gentleman,  —  for  he  could  in  that  case  make  up  for  some  of 
Mr.  A.'s  deficiencies.  At  this  point  Seward  flew  into  a  passion, 
and,  in  a  high  key,  told  Sumner  he  knew  nothing  of  political 
(meaning  party)  claims  and  services,  and  accused  him  of  a  design 
to  cut  the  throat  of  Charley  Wilson,  the  Secretary  of  Lega- 
tion at  London.  Sumner  wholly  disclaimed  any  such  design 
or  any  personal  knowledge  of  the  man,  but  said  he  had  been  in- 
formed, and  had  no  doubt  of  the  fact,  that  it  was  the  daily  prac- 
tice of  Wilson  to  go  to  Morley's,  seat  himself  in  a  conspicuous 
place,  throw  his  legs  upon  the  table,  and,  in  coarse  language,  abuse 
England  and  the  English.  Whatever  might  be  our  grievances 
and  wrong,  this,  Sumner  thought,  was  not  a  happy  method  of 
correcting  them,  nor  would  such  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  second 
officer  of  the  legation  bring  about  kinder  feelings,  or  a  better 
state  of  things,  whereas  a  true  gentleman  could  by  suavity  and 
dignity  in  such  a  position  win  respect,  strengthen  his  principal, 
and  benefit  the  country.  These  remarks  only  made  Seward  more 
violent,  and  louder  in  his  declarations  that  Charley  Wilson  was  a 
clever  fellow  and  should  be  sustained." 

Perhaps  the  most  unfortunate  of  the  volunteer,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  roving,  poaching,  and  special  diplomats 
1  Welles,  Diary,  I,  300,  301. 


AN  HISTORICAL  RESIDUUM  369 

of  that  period,  was  Mr.  Moncure  D.  Conway.  In  1863 
Mr.  Conway  made  his  appearance  in  England,  whither  he 
had  gone  "to  enlighten  the  British  public  in  regard  to  the 
causes  of  the  war."  He  almost  at  once  invited  a  correspond- 
ence with  Mr.  Mason,  the  Confederate  envoy,  the  outcome 
of  which  was  bewildering  rather  than  either  happy  or  signifi- 
cant. It  is  now  an  altogether  forgotten  incident,  and  at  the 
moment  was  not  material.  It  had,  however,  a  certain 
interest  as  illustrating  the  dangers  inseparable  from  volun- 
teer diplomacy  in  troublous  times;  and  it  led  to  some 
highly  suggestive  comments  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Adams,  to 
be  found  in  a  despatch  (No.  437)  from  that  gentleman  to 
Secretary  Seward,  under  date  of  June  25,  1863. *  Any  one 
curious  to  read  the  Conway-Mason  correspondence  in  con- 
nection with  the  history  of  that  period,  can  find  it  in  full  in 
the  columns  of  the  London  Times  of  June  18,  1863  ;  while 
Mr.  Conway  subsequently  (1904)  gave  in  detail  his  own 
account  of  it  and  its  consequences  to  himself  personally, 
entitling  it,  "The  Mason  Incident."  2 

This  divergence,  though  long  perhaps,  is  still  not  without 
its  interest  and  even  value  in  connection  with  the  diplomatic 
history  of  the  Civil  War  period.  It  at  least  has  the  merit 
of  novelty.  But,  returning  now  to  the  mission  of  Messrs. 
Forbes  and  Aspinwall,  they,  as  also  Mr.  Evarts,  were  of  the 
last  description  of  the  "accredited,"  —  special  agents  sent 
out  by  some  department  for  a  particular  purpose.  They 
were  men  of  energy,  tact  and  discretion.  Accordingly  they 
had  the  good  sense  to  confine  themselves  to  the  work  they 
were  there  to  do,  and  did  not  indulge  in  a  pernicious, 
general  activity.  With  his  rare  tact,  shrewd  judgment  and 
quick  insight  into  men,  Thurlow  Weed,  a  roving  diplomat, 

1  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  1863,  Part  I,  318 ;  also  Seward  to  Adams, 
No.  654,  ibid.  358.  *  Autobiography,    I,    412-428. 

2b 


370  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

made  himself  of  use  both  in  Great  Britain  and  on  the  Conti- 
nent, and  relations  of  a  friendly  character  grew  up  between 
him  and  Mr.  Adams.  Of  others,  roving,  poaching  or 
volunteer,  Mr.  Adams  had  grave  and  just  cause  of  com- 
plaint; they  were  officious,  they  meddled,  and  they  were 
to  the  last  degree  indiscreet.  They  were  peculiarly  addicted 
to  the  columns  of  the  Times,  in  which  their  effusions  ap- 
peared periodically :  but  not  always  did  they  confine  them- 
selves to  ill-considered  letter-writing  or  mere  idle  talk. 

Meanwhile  during  the  early  months  of  1863  the  scrutiny 
exercised  both  at  home  and  in  Great  Britain,  be  it  through 
government  officials,  Union  detectives  or  Confederate 
sympathizers,  was  altogether  too  close  to  enable  men  as 
active  and  prominent  as  Messrs.  Forbes  and  Aspinwall  to 
escape  suspicion.  The  Confederate  newspaper  correspond- 
ents in  New  York  almost  at  once  got  scent  of  their  mission, 
and  set  to  work  to  make  trouble.  One  of  them,  signing  him- 
self " Manchester,"  spoke  of  the  two  as  "delegates"  about 
"to  be  followed  by  eight  other  men  of  note,"  one  being 
Mr.  W.  M.  Evarts,  all  of  whom  would  "regulate  our  affairs 
abroad,  and  Mr.  Adams  is  ordered  to  be  their  mouthpiece." 
This  correspondent  then  proceeds  as  follows:  "[Mr.  Evarts] 
is  a  particular  friend  of  W.  H.  Seward.  The  latter,  it 
is  well  known,  has  lost  all  confidence  in  Mr.  Adams,  who, 
but  for  his  name,  would  have  been  recalled  long  ago.  Mr. 
Seward  expresses  himself  on  all  occasions,  early  and  late, 
that  the  real  source  of  bad  feeling  in  England  towards  the 
North  has  been  caused  by  the  extraordinary  stupidity  of 
Mr.  Adams,  our  minister,  and  the  really  clever  ability  of  all 
the  rebel  agents."  This  utterance  seems  to  have  caused 
Secretary  Seward  some  annoyance,  as  the  Treasury  w&°  in 
its  turn  now  poaching  "on  the  domain  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment.    Moreover,  it  did  not  require  much  time  to  satisfy 


AN   HISTORICAL  RESIDUUM  371 

Messrs.  Forbes  and  Aspinwall  that  the  Confederate  agents 
were  sufficiently  in  funds  to  "  render  it  impossible  to  ap- 
proach the  Messrs.  Laird  with  an  offer  for  the  rams";  and, 
accordingly,  they  were  forced  to  limit  themselves  to  watching 
the  effects  of  the  legal  proceedings  initiated  by  Mr.  Adams,  in 
the  hope  that  an  opportunity  would  offer  for  "some  negotia- 
tor to  step  in."  In  the  interim,  obviously  to  avert  suspicion, 
it  was  thought  expedient  for  Mr.  Forbes  to  visit  Germany, 
the  land  of  Hessian  mercenaries,  while  Mr.  Aspinwall  betook 
himself  to  France.  They  remained  away  until  well  into 
June ;  and,  on  their  return  to  London,  satisfied  of  their  in- 
ability to  do  anything  towards  stopping  work  on  the  Birken- 
head iron-clads,  the  first  of  which  was  then  nearly  ready  to 
be  launched,  they  decided  to  return  to  America.  This  action 
on  their  part  was  accelerated  by  the  news  from  home  ;  for 
the  crisis  of  the  struggle  was  plainly  at  hand.  It  came, 
indeed,  while  they  were  on  the  ocean.  For  a  man  of  Mr. 
Forbes's  intense  activity  a  longer  absence  at  such  a  time 
was  well-nigh  impossible.  Indeed,  when,  five  weeks  before, 
the  details  of  the  disaster  at  Chancellorsville  reached  London, 
he  had  been  so  much  depressed  by  the  news  that,  as  he  at 
the  time  told  Mr.  Adams,  he  had  been  strongly  inclined  to 
abandon  his  mission  and  start  back  to  America  that  very 
day. 

To  return  to  the  $10,000,000  of  5-20  bonds  brought  out  by 
Mr.  Aspinwall,  and  placed  in  the  keeping  of  Baring  Brothers. 
As  already  stated,  $4,000,000  had  been  pledged  to  that  firm 
as  security  for  the  loan  of  £500,000.  The  remaining  $6,000,- 
000  were  now  withdrawn,  and  taken  back  to  America.  The 
two  commissioners  landed  in  New  York  on  the  12th  of  July, 
just  before  the  breaking  out  of  the  draft  riots  of  1863.  Mr. 
Forbes,  though  not  until  twenty-one  years  later,  wrote  down 
his  own  recollections  of  how  he  handled  on  the  wharf  his 


372  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

"pile  of  trunks,  which  included  three  containing  six  millions 
of  5-20  bonds";  and  these,  doubtless,  were  the  bonds 
which  Mr.  Chittenden  refers  to  as  being  a  few  days  later 
"returned  to  the  Treasury  in  the  original  packages,  with 
the  seals  of  the  Treasury  unbroken." 

Such  is  the  residuum  of  authentic  history  at  the  bottom 
of  this  portion  of  Mr.  Chittenden's  recollections.  Where 
his  story  was  not  a  pure  figment  of  the  imagination,  his 
memory  deceived  him  at  almost  every  point.  The  amount 
involved,  and  the  number  of  bonds  returned  to  the  Treasury, 
together,  probably,  with  the  physical  exertion  he  underwent 
in  signing  them,  were  alone  accurately  stated.  It  only  re- 
mains to  suggest  some  plausible  theory  through  which  to 
explain  a  deception  so  singular ;  for,  undoubtedly,  Mr.  Chit- 
tenden believed  what  he  wrote.  That  explanation  probably 
is  not  far  to  seek.  The  heads  of  department  undeniably 
concerned  in  the  mission  were  Secretaries  Welles  and  Chase. 
Mr.  Chittenden  also  asserts  that  the  President  and  Secretary 
Seward  were  "in  anxious  consultation  "  over  it.  This  may  or 
may  not  be  so ;  but,  undoubtedly,  they  were  cognizant  of  it. 
In  any  event,  the  utmost  secrecy  was  necessary  to  the  success 
of  the  scheme,  and  it  was  highly  desirable  that  as  few  persons 
as  possible  should  be  in  any  way  informed  as  to  it.  The 
whole  proceeding  was  to  the  last  degree  irregular,  and  most 
suggestive  as  to  the  way  in  which  government  operations  were 
then  conducted.  The  Navy  Department  was  that  more 
immediately  concerned.  In  it  the  scheme  originated,  and 
by  it  the  agents  were  accredited.  Yet  not  an  allusion  to 
it  of  any  sort  is  to  be  found  in  the  diary  of  Mr.  Welles, 
beyond  the  brief  mention  of  a  "strictly  confidential  visit  to 
New  York"  on  March  17,  1863.  As  to  the  Treasury,  a  query 
at  once  suggested  itself  as  to  how  far  those  methods  of  pro- 
cedure were  carried  in  other  and  not  dissimilar  cases.     Ten 


AN  HISTORICAL  RESIDUUM  373 

millions  of  dollars  is  no  inconsiderable  sum.  Five  or  six 
trunks  full  of  government  bonds  are  worth  looking  after.  In 
this  case  ten  millions  of  bonds  were  withdrawn  from  the 
vaults  and  their  official  custodians,  and  put  in  the  hands 
of  two  private  gentlemen  to  take  out  of  the  country,  and 
dispose  of  pretty  much  as  they  saw  fit ;  and,  so  far  as  ap- 
pears, not  a  receipt  even  was  filed  to  indicate  what  had  be- 
come of  them.  The  proceeding  was  wrapped  in  impenetrable 
mystery.  Messrs.  Forbes  and  Aspinwall  were  not  officers 
of  the  government,  or  responsible  to  any  one.  Ten  million 
dollars  were  simply  put  at  their  service,  and  the  two  secre- 
taries alone  had  cognizance  of  the  transaction,  knew  where 
the  securities  were,  what  it  was  proposed  to  do  with  their 
proceeds,  or  who  could  account  for  them.  To  the  heads  of 
department  during  the  Rebellion  period,  " millions  of  money 
were  as  star  distances  to  ordinary  men,  whether  two  or  three 
hundred  billions  of  miles,  what  difference ?" 

Meanwhile,  large  and  irregular  as  the  Treasury  operations 
then  unquestionably  were,  the  taking  of  ten  millions  of 
bonds  from  the  Treasury  and  sending  them  in  one  body  to 
Europe,  where  it  was  notorious  no  market  or  demand  then 
existed,  could  not  but  excite  comment  among  the  officials 
necessarily  concerned.  The  Register  of  the  Treasury,  sud- 
denly called  upon  to  authenticate  this  large  issue  by  his 
own  signature  to  each  particular  bond,  might  naturally  be 
prompted  to  ask  some  explanation  of  a  proceeding  at  once 
so  large,  so  hasty,  and  so  shrouded  in  mystery.  The  in- 
ference would  be  reasonable  that  the  explanation  given  by 
Mr.  Chittenden  was  in  a  general  way  concocted  and  agreed 
upon  between  the  two  secretaries,  Chase  and  Welles,  to  be 
ready  for  use  in  case  of  emergency  ;  and  they  tried  it  on  the 
Register.  He  accepted  it  in  perfect  good  faith,  and  relig- 
iously preserved  it  for  years  as  a  state  secret.     Then,  at 


374  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

last,  through  a  magazine  of  large  circulation,  he  took  the 
public  into  his  confidence,  verifying  none  of  his  facts  or 
dates.  Meanwhile  he  intimates  that,  at  the  time  when  he 
reduced  his  " Recollections"  to  paper,  he  was  actually  in 
possession  of  the  name  of  that  mysterious  and  altogether 
mythical  " quiet  gentleman"  who  " offered  to  perform  such 
a  signal  service  to  our  country."  This  is  not  impossible. 
He  may  have  got  it  from  Secretary  Chase;  and  not  im- 
possibly a  gleam  of  suppressed  humor  lurked  in  the  Secre- 
tary's eye,  as,  with  a  face  otherwise  wholly  imperturbable,  he 
invented  a  name  very  proper  to  complete  the  grave  mystifi- 
cation of  the  Register.  The  mystification  is,  however,  now 
cleared  up,  one  more  cock-and-bull  historical  fiction  is  dis- 
posed of,  and  a  small  residuum  of  truth  has  been  precipi- 
tated. 


X 

QUEEN   VICTORIA  AND   THE   CIVIL  WAR1 

On  the  7th  of  February,  1901,  the  New  York  Chamber  of 
Commerce  took  occasion  at  its  monthly  meeting  to  observe 
the  recent  death  of  Queen  Victoria.  Speeches  were  made 
and  resolutions  offered  and  passed.  Among  the  speeches 
was  one  by  Abram  S.  Hewitt,  then  in  his  seventy-ninth 
year,  and  perhaps  fairly  entitled  to  the  designation  of  New 
York's  first  citizen.  A  man  of  large  experience,  who  had 
held  high  public  office,  Mr.  Hewitt's  word,  whether  on  matter 
of  opinion  or  of  fact,  carried  weight;  for  through  a  long 
life  he  had  shown  himself  conscientious  and  truthful.  Him- 
self conversant  with  the  inside  of  affairs  of  state,  he  pre- 
sumably knew  that  whereof  he  spoke.  As  his  eulogist  not 
untruly  said  of  him  immediately  after  his  death,  "  What 
he  wrote  or  said  in  public  addresses  was  weighty  in  the  best 
sense.  .  .  .  He  was  absolutely  free  from  the  slovenly  pro- 
fuseness  in  public  speech  with  which  many  worthy  men  in 
American  public  life  afflict  their  country.' ' 2 

On  the  occasion  referred  to,  Mr.  Hewitt,  though,  as  he 
said,   "  grown  very  reluctant  to   [speak]  upon  any  public 

1  The  substance  of  this  study  appeared  originally  in  three  separate 
papers  submitted  to  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society  at  its  meetings, 
respectively,  of  October,  1903,  January,  1904,  and  November,  1906.  (Pro- 
ceedings, Second  Series,  XVII,  440-448;  XVIII,  123-154;  XX,  454-474.) 
These  papers  have  for  the  present  publication  been  revised,  largely  recast 
and  materially  added  to,  as  well  as  compressed.  For  citations  of  author- 
ities, etc.,  when  not  given,  recourse  can  be  had  to  the  Mass.  Hist.  Soc. 
Proceedings. 

2  E.  M.  Shepard  in  The  American  Monthly  Review  of  Reviews  for  Feb- 
ruary, 1903,  p.  164. 

375 


376  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

occasion/'  accepted  the  invitation  so  to  do,  and  by  request 
seconded  the  resolutions  prepared  and  moved  by  Seth  Low, 
then  President  of  Columbia  College,  later  Mayor  of  the  city 
of  New  York.  Not  only  did  he  speak,  but  he  incorporated 
in  what  he  said  the  following  noteworthy  personal  remi- 
niscence and  startling  historical  revelation :  — 

"  President  Low  has  referred  to  the  Trent  affair.  It  is  known 
to  all  of  you.  I  shall  take  no  time  in  elaborating  the  incident, 
but  it  was  the  first  occasion  when  the  Queen  had  to  remember  the 
reception  which  had  been  given  [here  in  America  the  year  before] 
to  the  Prince  of  Wales  and  the  future  King  of  England.  We  are 
told  that  with  her  own  hand  she  modified  the  harsh  and  unfriendly 
language  which  would  undoubtedly  have  made  it  impossible,  if  it 
had  been  published,  for  Mr.  Seward  to  extricate  himself  from  the 
unfortunate  dilemma  in  which  we  were  placed  by  the  arrest  of  the 
Confederate  envoys  by  Commodore  Wilkes.  But  other  occasions 
arose  for  the  Queen  to  show  her  kindly  feeling,  and  as  to  one  of 
these,  I  am,  I  suppose,  the  only  living  witness,  and  this  explains 
why  I  accepted  the  invitation  of  your  President  to  appear  here 
and  do  what  I  have  grown  very  reluctant  to  do,  —  make  an  ad- 
dress upon  any  public  occasion.  It  happened  that  in  1862  I  was 
sent  by  the  Government  on  a  confidential  mission  to  England  and 
France.  In  the  course  of  my  work  I  had  the  most  intimate  re- 
lations with  Minister  Charles  Francis  Adams  and  with  Judge 
Dayton,  who  was  the  Minister  to  France.  One  afternoon  I  re- 
ceived a  message  from  Judge  Dayton  asking  me  to  come  to  the 
Embassy,  where  he  asked  me  if  I  could  leave  for  London  that  night. 
I  told  him  I  could  if  the  matter  were  important.  He  said  a  piece 
of  information  had  just  come  to  his  notice  which  he  could  not 
trust  to  the  telegraph  or  even  to  the  post.  That  he  wished  a 
special  messenger  to  go  to  Mr.  Adams  and  report  to  him  what  had 
happened.  I  told  him  I  would  go,  and  he  then  said,  'I  have  just 
received  information  from  a  confidential  source  that  the  Emperor 
Napoleon  III  has  proposed  to  the  British  Government  to  recog- 
nize the  Confederacy  at  once.  I  am  sure  that  Mr.  Adams  has  no 
knowledge  of  the  fact.  I  want  you  to  proceed  to  London  to-night, 
see  him  as  early  as  possible  in  the  morning,  and  communicate 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  377 

the  information  to  him.'  I  went  to  London.  I  saw  Mr.  Adams 
very  early  the  next  morning,  as  soon  as  he  was  visible,  and  I  told 
him  what  Judge  Dayton  had  said.  I  found  that  Mr.  Adams  had 
already  an  intimation  from  some  source  that  the  recognition  was 
impending.  However,  he  said  he  would  call  upon  Lord  John 
Russell,  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  ascertain  what  was 
proposed  to  be  done.  He  made  the  call  and  I  waited  for  his  return. 
He  told  me  that  he  had  seen  Lord  John  Russell  and  had  asked 
him  distinctly  whether  any  proposition  had  been  received  for  the 
recognition  of  the  Confederacy.  He  received  an  evasive  reply. 
It  was  evident  to  him  that  something  of  a  very  serious  nature 
was  on  foot.  But  Lord  John  Russell  declined  to  communicate 
any  definite  information  on  the  subject.  He  told  me  that  he  then 
said  to  Lord  John  Russell,  'I  desire  an  audience  with  the  Queen/ 
Lord  John  Russell  replied  that  it  was  not  usual  for  Ministers  to 
have  an  audience  with  the  Queen ;  that  all  communications  must 
pass  through  the  Foreign  Office.  I  believe  —  perhaps  General 
Wilson  will  correct  me  if  I  am  wrong  —  that  there  is  a  usage  by 
which  only  Ambassadors  can  demand  an  interview  with  the  Sov- 
ereign, and  that  Ministers  —  at  that  time  we  had  no  Ambassadors 
—  that  Ministers  had  no  such  right,  but  that  it  might  be  accorded 
as  a  matter  of  courtesy.  Mr.  Adams  said  he  told  Lord  John  Russell 
that  he  hoped  he  would' arrange  it ;  but  at  any  rate  he  was  going 
to  Windsor  that  day  in  person,  and  would  send  a  request,  asking 
the  Queen  to  hear  him  personally.  He  went  to  Windsor.  Whether 
Lord  John  Russell  made  any  communication  or  not,  I  do  not 
know.  Mr.  Adams  saw  the  Queen  in  the  presence  of  Prince  Albert ; 
told  her  why  he  had  come,  and  he  said  to  her :  '  If  there  is  any 
foundation  for  this  information  which  I  have  received,  I  appeal  to 
your  Majesty  to  prevent  so  great  a  wrong,  which  will  result  in  uni- 
versal war,  for  I  can  assure  your  Majesty  that  the  American  people 
are  prepared  to  fight  the  whole  world  rather  than  give  up  the 
Union. '  [Applause.]  He  said  that  the  Queen,  in  the  most  gra- 
cious manner,  replied, '  Mr.  Adams,  give  yourself  no  concern.  My 
Government  will  not  recognize  the  Confederacy.'     [Applause.] 

"Now,  this  may  be  a  very  inappropriate  course  of  remark  for 
this  occasion,  but  I  am  anxious  to  have  these  facts  preserved  in 
the  records  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce.     I  think  it  very  likely 


378  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

that  the  despatch  of  Mr.  A  dams  to  Secretary  Seward  contains  the 
information  which  I  have  given  you  here,  but  I  have  never  seen 
it,  and  I  do  not  know  that  it  has  ever  been  published." 

The  extreme  vagueness  of  this  reminiscence  cannot  fail 
at  once  to  attract  notice.  No  details  as  respects  either  time 
or  place  are  given,  while  the  statements  have  no  recognizable 
relation  with  established  historical  facts.  Correspondence 
with  Mr.  Hewitt  failed  to  elicit  anything  more  specific,  ex- 
cept that  "it  must  have  been  as  early  as  the  month  of  July," 
presumably  of  the  year  1862. 1  Indicating,  as  the  proceed- 
ings did,  an  almost  equal  disregard  of  English  constitutional 
methods  and  of  Court  etiquette,  the  story  could  have 
been  accepted  by  no  writer  of  even  average  care.  Never- 
theless, coming  directly  from  Mr.  Hewitt  in  so  public  a 
way  and  in  such  a  specific  shape,  it  excited  curiosity.  Where, 
in  this  case,  was  the  residuum  of  historic  fact?  Presum- 
ably there  must  be  such  a  residuum,  could  it  but  be  precipi- 
tated. 

In  his  paper,  elsewhere  referred  to,2  on  Recollections  as  a 
Source  of  History,  Mr.  Edward  L.  Pierce  mentions  one 
credible  gentleman  who  had  told  a  tale  so  often  that  he 
had  himself  grown  to  a  faith  in  every  word  of  it  ;  and 
another  who  had  in  early  life  heard  the  story  of  an  event, 
and,  frequently  telling  it,  had  at  last  come  to  believe  that 
he  had  himself  been  a  witness  of  what  he  described .  It  was 
probably  so  with  Mr.  Hewitt,  and  his  Chamber  of  Commerce 
Victorian  reminiscence  ;  but  while  in  the  previous  case 
of  Mr.  Chittenden's  "  Recollections/ '  thanks  to  the  publi- 
cation of  Mrs.  Hughes's  Letters  and  Recollections  of  John 
M.  Forbes,  a  residuum  of  historical  fact  was  reached,3  in 
the    case    of    Mr.    Hewitt    the    most  careful  search  among 

1  See  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proceedings,  Second  Series,  XVII,  444. 

2  Supra,  344.  8  Supra,  374. 


QUEEN   VICTORIA  AND   THE  CIVIL  WAR  379 

papers  and  records  brought  nothing  to  light.  It  accord- 
ingly at  last  became  apparent  that  in  every  part  —  scope 
as  well  as  detail  —  the  incident  was  imaginary  —  an  octo- 
genarian's hallucination ! * 

So  far  as  internal  evidence  and  established  facts  afford 
basis  for  a  conclusion,  the  incidents  described  by  Mr.  Hewitt 
must  have  occurred  during  the  first  four  months  of  1862. 
But  it  so  chances  Mr.  Adams  kept  a  detailed  diary  through- 
out his  life,  and  especially  during  his  mission  to  Great  Britain. 
In  that  diary  a  record  of  no  single  day  of  the  period  in  ques- 
tion is  lacking ;  yet  in  it  there  is  no  mention  of  any  dip- 
lomatic visit  to  Windsor,  such  as  that  described.  And  here 
the  investigation  narrows.  In  his  reminiscence  Mr.  Hewitt 
says  that  "Mr.  Adams  saw  the  Queen  in  presence  of  Prince 
Albert."  But  it  so  chances  that  Prince  Albert  had  died  on  the 
14th  of  December  of  the  previous  year,  1861.  Subsequently, 
as  is  perfectly  well  known,  the  Queen,  prostrated  by  the 
death  of  the  Prince  Consort,  became  practically  unsettled 
in  mind.  Completely  secluding  herself,  she  thereafter, 
for  months  and  even  years,  saw  no  one  but  members  of  her 
household,  her  closest  personal  friends  and  her  ministers. 
So  far  as  Mr.  Adams  was  concerned,  as  matter  of  fact  he 
never  during  his  long  mission  —  May,  1861,  to  May,  1868 
—  was  officially  at  Windsor,  except  as  a  member  of  the 
diplomatic  .corps  on  the  occasion  of  the  marriage  of  the 
Prince  of  Wales.  The  Queen  was  not  then  visible  from 
the  place  assigned  to  the  American  minister ;  and  after  the 
death  of  Prince  Albert  he  did  not  again  lay  eyes  on  her 
Majesty  until  her  reappearance  on  occasions  of  state  at  a 
"Court"  held  at  Buckingham  Palace  on  the  9th  of  April, 
1864,  —  the  time  of  Grant's  advance  upon  Richmond. 

This,  the  first  function  at  which  the  Queen  presided  subse- 
1  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proceedings,  Second  Series,  XVIII,  124. 


380  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

quent  to  the  death  of  the  Prince  Consort,  took  place  nearly 
twenty-eight  months  later.  All  thought  of  a  European 
intervention  in  the  American  war  had  then  been  dismissed. 
In  the  interim,  Mr.  Adams  had  been  under  the  same  roof 
with  the  Queen  once  only,  the  occasion  already  mentioned, 
the  marriage  of  the  Prince  of  Wales.  Mr.  Hewitt's  alleged 
Windsor  interview,  if  it  took  place  at  all,  must  therefore 
have  taken  place,  not  in  1862,  but  in  1861.  Moreover,  if  it 
took  place  in  1861,  it  must  have  been  prior  to  November  25 
of  that  year,  as  on  that  day  Mr.  Adams  left  London  to  pay 
a  visit  to  Lord  Houghton  at  Frystone ;  nor  did  he  return 
to  London  until  after  the  arrival  of  the  news  of  the  Trent 
affair,  and  the  first  development  (December  1)  of  the  fatal 
illness  of  the  Prince.  But,  unfortunately,  Mr.  Hewitt  says 
he  himself  was  not  sent  to  Europe  until  1862.  Even  sup- 
posing he  was  mistaken  in  this,  and  was  in  London  in  the 
summer  of  1861,  the  royal  family  were  at  Balmoral  from 
August  31  to  October  22  of  that  year,  at  which  date  they 
started  to  come  up  to  Windsor.  The  interview  could,  there- 
fore, by  any  possibility  have  occurred  only  between  October 
24,  1861,  when  they  reached  Windsor,  and  December  1, 
when  the  Prince  sickened;  but  during  that  brief  space  of 
time  every  day  is  fully  accounted  for  in  Mr.  Adams's  diary, 
and  no  such  incident  is  mentioned. 

It  is  always  difficult  to  prove  a  negative  to  demonstration. 
Especially  is  this  so  when  the  facts  alleged,  or  something 
resembling  them,  may  have  taken  place  anywhere  during  a 
period  of  years.  In  the  present  instance,  however,  a  com- 
plete negative  is  proved  not  only  as  above  set  forth,  but 
by  the  additional  and  decisive  fact  that  no  mention  what- 
ever of,  nor  even  an  allusion  to,  any  such  extraordinary  per- 
formance as  that  described  by  Mr.  Hewitt,  is  anywhere  to  be 
found    in   Mr.   Adams's   diary,    correspondence   or   papers, 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  381 

much  less  in  any  public  or  private  despatch  of  his  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  State.  No  accredited  minister  to  any  foreign 
country  could,  of  course,  have  ventured  on  such  an  un- 
precedented and  wholly  irregular  step  without  reporting 
it  at  once  to  his  government.  Mr.  Adams,  moreover,  was 
of  all  men  that  one  least  likely  to  have  had  recourse  to  such 
a  supreme  effort  at  what  could,  perhaps,  best  be  denomi- 
nated shirt-waist  diplomacy. 

How,  then,  account  for  Mr.  Hewitt's  extraordinary  state- 
ment ?  On  what  basis  of  fact  was  it  built  up  ?  That  Mr. 
Hewitt  was  in  Europe  during  the  Civil  War  is  unquestionable. 
He  was  also  in  England,  and  saw  more  or  less  of  Mr.  Adams. 
That  he  interested  himself  greatly,  and  after  his  own  en- 
ergetic fashion,  in  the  efforts  to  detain  the  Confederate 
cruisers  and  to  circumvent  the  plans  of  the  agents  of  the 
Confederacy  goes  almost  without  saying.  That  he  was 
also  at  one  time  sent  over  by  Mr.  Dayton  to  advise  Mr. 
Adams  of  diplomatic  moves  then  on  foot,  but  which  subse- 
quently failed  to  materialize,  is  altogether  probable ;  though 
curiously  enough  a  fairly  careful  examination  fails  to  reveal 
any  allusion  to  him  in  such  a  capacity  in  Mr.  Adams's 
papers.  All  this,  though  not  important,  is  highly  probable. 
But,  admitting  all  this,  and,  if  need  be,  much  more,  it  does 
not  seem  possible  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  the  whole 
account  of  that  extremely  unconventional  Windsor  morning 
call,  with  its  royal  though  somewhat  autocratic  if  informal, 
assurance  of  peace  and  good-will,  was  a  pure  figment  of  the 
imagination,  —  "such  stuff  as  dreams  are  made  on."  In 
this  case  the  most  careful  analysis  yields  positively  no  re- 
siduum whatever  of  historical  fact. 

But  the  Hewitt  reminiscence  naturally  leads  up  to  an- 
other Civil  War  legend,  —  the  accepted  tradition,  now  be- 
come almost  an  article  of  American  faith,  that  somehow  and 


382  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

in  some  way  the  cause  of  the  Union  was  in  its  hour  of  trial 
dear  to  Queen  Victoria,  and  that  we  of  the  North  were 
then  under  deep  and  peculiar  obligation  to  her. 

It  was  on  the  7th  of  February,  1901,  that  Mr.  Hewitt  put 
on  formal  record  his  recollection,  based  wholly  on  hearsay, 
of  that  apocryphal  interview  had  between  the  American 
minister  and  Queen  Victoria  in  the  royal  domesticity  of 
Windsor,  in  which  the  latter  took  occasion  to  commit  herself 
so  unreservedly  against  any  action  of  her  constitutional  ad- 
visers which  might  lead  to  hostilities  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States.  Almost  exactly  a  year  after  the  ex- 
Mayor  of  New  York  made  this  contribution  to  the  diplo- 
matic history  of  our  Civil  War,  her  grandson,  Prince  Henry 
of  Prussia,  came  to  Boston  in  the  course  of  a  tour  through 
the  United  States,  and,  on  the  6th  of  March,  1902,  an  hon- 
orary degree  was  conferred  upon  him  by  Harvard  Univer- 
sity. In  a  carefully  prepared  address  delivered  in  Saunders 
Theatre  by  President  Eliot,  when  conferring  the  degree, 
was  the  following :  — 

"Universities  have  long  memories.  Forty  years  ago  the  Ameri- 
can Union  was  in  deadly  peril,  and  thousands  of  its  young  men 
were  bleeding  and  dying  for  it.  It  is  credibly  reported  that  at  a 
very  critical  moment  the  Queen  of  England  said  to  her  prime 
minister,  'My  Lord,  you  must  understand  that  I  shall  sign  no 
paper  which  means  war  with  the  United  States.'  The  grandson 
of  that  illustrious  woman  is  sitting  with  us  here." 

To  much  the  same  effect,  though  nearly  thirty  years 
earlier,  Mr.  Joseph  H.  Choate  thus  expressed  himself  at  a 
reception  tendered  that  very  true  friend  of  ours,  the  Right 
Hon.  William  E.  Forster,  at  the  Union  League  Club  of  New 
York  City,  December  14,  1874 :  "  We  shall  probably  find 
out  that  we  had  [in  Great  Britain,  during  the  War  of 
Secession]  more  friends  than  we  knew,  both  in  Parliament 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  383 

and  in  the  Government;  and  there  is  the  best  of  reasons 
for  believing  that  that  gracious  lady,  the  Queen  herself, 
was  from  the  first  to  the  last  an  obstinately  faithful 
ally  of  America,  and  was  utterly  averse  to  anything 
that  might  tend  to  a  breach  of  the  peace  with  her  dearest 

ally." 

Here  in  two  instances,  far  removed  from  each  other  both 
in  place  and  time,  was  Mr.  Hewitt's  story,  appearing  and 
reappearing  in  a  slightly  different  form.  Mr.  Choate  ad- 
duced in  support  of  his  statement  a  letter  from  Thurlow 
Weed,  telling  the  familiar  and  to  us  pathetic  story  of  Prince 
Albert's  suggested  modifications  of  Earl  Russell's  first 
draught  of  a  despatch  to  Lord  Lyons,  in  November,  1861, 
when  news  of  the  Mason-Slidell  seizure  on  the  Trent  reached 
England.  The  somewhat  carefully  guarded  statement  of 
President  Eliot  was  both  more  recent  and  more  specific. 
The  language  quoted  by  him  as  that  made  use  of  by  the 
Queen  was  substantially  the  same  as  that  contained  in 
the  Hewitt  reminiscence ;  but  it  was,  in  this  version,  uttered 
to  her  minister  and  not  to  the  representative  of  a  foreign 
country,  and  that  country  the  one  directly  involved.  In 
so  far  the  Eliot  version  bore  an  aspect  of  much  greater  prob- 
ability than  the  Hewitt  version.  The  Eliot  version  was,  hu- 
manly speaking,  at  least  possible ;  this  can  scarcely  be  said 
of  the  Hewitt  version.  In  reply  to  a  letter  asking  his 
authority  for  the  statement  thus  made,  if  indeed  he  had 
any  authority  except  Mr.  Hewitt's  then  comparatively 
recent  utterance,  President  Eliot  wrote  as  follows :  — 

"In  1874  I  was  at  Oxford  for  a  week.  Dr.  Acland,  to  whom  I 
had  a  letter,  procured  for  me  an  invitation  to  lunch  with  Prince 
Leopold,  who  was  then  living  with  a  tutor  in  a  small  house  at  Ox- 
ford and  going  to  some  lectures.  Dr.  Acland  went  with  me,  and 
we  were  four  at  the  table.     In  the  course  of  luncheon  the  Prince 


384  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

told  the  story  of  the  Queen's  interview  with  Lord  Russell,  Dr. 
Acland  prompting  him  to  do  so.  He  gave  no  authorities,  and 
said  nothing  about  the  source  of  his  information.  He  must  have 
been  a  small  boy  at  the  time  of  this  interview  with  the  Queen.  Dr. 
Acland  spoke  of  the  story  as  if  he  believed  it.  Naturally  I  re- 
membered the  Prince's  statement,  but  I  do  not  know  that  I  ever 
talked  about  it.  Quite  lately  —  that  is,  since  last  March  —  I 
heard  somebody  else  attribute  this  statement  to  Prince  Leopold, 
but  I  have  now  forgotten  who  that  somebody  else  was.1  I  have 
never  seen  any  real  authority  for  it,  and  that  is  the  reason  I  used 
the  expression  '  credibly  stated.'" 

It  thus  appears  that  President  Eliot  spoke  from  his  own 
recollection  of  what  he  had  twenty-seven  years  previously 
been  told  by  a  youth  of  twenty-one  of  an  occurrence  and 
conversation  which  must  have  taken  place  at  least  twelve 
years  before  that,  and  when  the  youth  in  question  was  still 
a  boy ;  for  Prince  Leopold,  born  in  April,  1853,  was,  in  1862, 
as  yet  a  child  of  nine.  Nevertheless,  here  is  authority,  such 
as  it  is.  Sir  Henry  Acland  was  in  1874  a  man  of  fifty-nine. 
He  had  been  in  America,  a  member  of  the  suite  of  the  Prince 
of  Wales  during  his  memorable  tour  of  1860.  In  1874  he 
was  Regius  Professor  of  Medicine  at  Oxford,  and  honorary 
physician  to  Prince  Leopold,  then  an  undergraduate.  Thus  a 
man  very  competent  to  form  an  opinion  on  such  a  point,  and 
so  situated  as  to  have  special  sources  of  information  thereon, 
intimated  a  belief  in  the  story.  This  is  corroborative  evi- 
dence too  strong  to  be  lightly  brushed  aside.  It  indicates 
clearly  and  indisputably  that  an  accepted  tradition  pre- 
vailed in  the  royal  family  and  about  Windsor  Castle,  that, 
at  some  period  of  crisis  in  the  course  of  our  Civil  War, 
Queen  Victoria  did  take  a  decided  stand  with  the  min- 
istry in  opposition  to  anything  calculated  to  provoke  hostil- 

1  The  person  referred  to  was  the  late  Prof.  N.  S.  Shaler.  See  his  Auto- 
biography,  264. 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  385 

ities  with  the  United  States.  Accepted  traditions  are  rarely 
without  some  foundation  of  fact. 

For  this  particular  tradition,  now  welded  into  our  Ameri- 
can popular  belief,  can  any  clearly  established  foundation 
in  fact  be  found  ?  —  and  was  the  policy  of  the  Palmerston- 
Russell  ministry,  in  power  throughout  our  War  of  Secession, 
at  any  juncture  of  that  war  gravely  influenced  by  the  Queen  ? 
To  get  at  the  probabilities  in  the  case  it  is  necessary  to  go 
far  back,  and  obtain  a  correct  understanding  of  the  way  in 
which,  at  the  time  in  question,  the  Queen  and  her  principal 
advisers  viewed  the  situation  of  affairs  and  course  of  events, 
so  far  as  the  troubles  in  America  were  concerned.  Nor 
in  attempting  this  is  it  necessary  to  enter  into  any  elaborate 
analysis  of  the  character  of  Queen  Victoria  necessarily  drawn 
from  the  most  general  sources  of  information.  It  is  sufficient 
for  present  purposes  to  call  attention  to  a  very  noticeable 
article,  entitled  "The  Character  of  Queen  Victoria/'  which 
appeared  in  the  Quarterly  Review  shortly  after  her  death.1 

This  article,  the  authorship  of  which,  only  surmised,  has 
never  been  publicly  avowed,  was  evidently  prepared  by  a 
practised  writer,  probably  in  collaboration  with  some  woman, 
presumably  of  rank,  who  enjoyed  long  and  peculiar  means 
of  intimate  observation  of  the  royal  family.  From  what 
is  said  in  this  paper,  —  which  at  the  time  occasioned  a 
great  deal  of  talk  in  England,  —  several  points  of  much  sig- 
nificance in  the  present  connection  may  safely  be  educed. 
Neither  naturally,  nor  under  the  shaping  influence  of  the 
Prince  Consort,  did  the  Queen  have  any  bias  towards 
democracy.  It  was  Francis  Joseph  of  Austria  who  on  some 
occasion  remarked,  "Royalty  is  my  business";    and  Queen 

1  Referred  to  by  Mr.  Morley  in  his  Life  of  Gladstone  (Vol.  II,  p.  425)  as 
"the  remarkable  article  in  the  Quarterly  Review"  No.  386,  April,  1901, 
p.  320. 

2o 


386  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

Victoria  might  well  have  so  said.  Throughout  her  entire  life 
she  bore  herself  in  the  spirit  of  the  apothegm ;  and  towards 
democracy  in  all  its  aspects  and  wherever  existing,  she  felt 
an  instinctive  aversion.  An  ingrained  Jacobite,  one  of  her 
"strongest  traits  was  her  partiality  for  the  Stuarts;  she 
forgave  them  all  their  faults.  She  used  to  say,  '  I  am 
far  more  proud  of  my  Stuart  than  of  my  Hanoverian  an- 
cestors'; and  of  the  latter  indeed  she  very  seldom  spoke. " 
She  would  permit  of  no  disparagement  of  even  poor  old 
James  II ;  and  Dean  Stanley  used  to  say  that,  in  character, 
she  much  resembled  Queen  Elizabeth,  —  whom  by  the 
way,  she  particularly  disliked.  "When  she  faces  you  down 
with  her  'It  must  be/  "  the  Dean  declared,  "I  don't  know 
whether  it  is  Victoria  or  Elizabeth  who  is  speaking.7'  In 
the  social  life  of  the  Palace,  also,  there  was  nothing  of 
the  bourgeois  Queen  about  Victoria.  She  was  insistent  on 
Court  etiquette;  and  the  picture  given  in  the  article  in  the 
Quarterly  of  the  German  evenings  at  Windsor  is  extremely 
suggestive.  "The  Royalties  stood  together  on  the  rug  in 
front  of  the  fire,  a  station  which  none  durst  hold  but  they  ; 
and  amusing  incidents  occurred  in  connection  with  this  sacred 
object."  Thus  the  Queen  was  utterly  devoid  of  what  may 
be  termed  sympathy  for  those  democratic  institutions  of 
which  the  American  Union  was  the  great  exponent  among 
the  nations,  or  for  any  movement  in  that  direction.  On  the 
other  hand,  she  had  an  instinctive  dread  of  war,  and  of  all 
foreign  complications  likely  to  result  in  war.  Moreover,  she 
had  in  1860  been  gratified,  and  even  touched,  by  the  warm 
'welcome  everywhere  extended  to  the  Prince  of  Wales  by 
the  great  English-speaking  community  across  the  Atlantic. 
The  recollection  of  it  was  still  fresh  in  memory  when  the 
issues  of  the  Civil  War  presented  themselves.  A  single 
thing  more  remains  to  be  said.     Queen  Victoria  was  in  one 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  387 

important  respect  the  true  grandchild  of  George  III,  our 
old  revolutionary  bete  noir.  To  quote  again,  and  for  the 
last  time,  from  the  article  in  the  Quarterly:  "No  one  that 
knew  her  late  Majesty  well  will  be  inclined  to  deny  that  her 
extraordinary  pertinacity,  her  ingrained  inability  to  drop 
an  idea  which  she  had  fairly  seized,  might  naturally  have 
developed  into  obstinacy.  By  nature  she  certainly  was  what 
could  only  be  called  ob^+inate,  but  the  extraordinary  number 
of  opposite  objects  upon  which  her  will  was  incessantly  ex- 
ercised saved  her  from  the  consequences  of  this  defect."  This 
final  saving  clause  was  of  course  naturally  limited  to  normal 
conditions.  It  would  be  wholly  safe,  on  the  other  hand,  to 
surmise  that  the  latent  peculiarity  of  character  here  alluded 
to  would,  in  her  case  as  in  the  case  of  her  grandfather, 
become  morbidly  active  in  presence  of  sufficiently  exciting 
causes,  or  under  an  excessive  nervous  strain. 

Such  was  the  Queen,  a  factor  in  the  political  conditions 
of  her  kingdom  which  no  minister  or  combination  of  min- 
isters was,  during  her  long  reign,  ever  able  to  ignore  or  even 
override.  The  royal  sphere  might  be  limited,  and  closely 
hedged  about;  but  it  was  there,  and  within  it  her  Majesty 
was  supreme. 

During  the  Civil  War  the  so-called  Palmerston-Russell 
ministry  was  in  power.  Formed  in  June,  1859,  with  an  un- 
derstanding between  the  two  chiefs  that  either  who  might 
be  sent  for  would  accept  office  under  the  other,  it  was 
" looked  upon  as  the  strongest  administration  ever  formed, 
so  far  as  the  individual  talents  of  its  members  were  con- 
cerned." 1  And  this  fact  of  the  individuality  and  character 
of  those  composing  the  ministry  became  subsequently  of 
great  importance  in  deciding  the  policy  to  be  pursued  at 
several  very  critical  diplomatic  junctures;  for  the  Palmer- 
1  Ashley,  Lord  Palmer ston  (ed.  1879),  II,  364. 


388  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

ston-Russell  ministry  remained  in  the  firm  control  of  the 
government  from  June,  1859,  until  the  death  of  Lord  Palm- 
erston  in  October,  1865,  following  the  collapse^  of  the 
Confederacy.  The  three  leading  characters  in  it  were  Lord 
Palmerston,  Premier,  Lord  John  Russell,  —  created  Earl 
Russell  in  July,  1861,  —  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
and  Mr.  Gladstone,  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer. 

In  the  first  place,  as  respects  Lord  Palmerston.  It  has 
always  been  assumed  that,  from  the  very  commencement 
of  our  troubles,  his  sympathies  were  with  the  Confederates, 
and  that  his  instincts  as  a  member  and  representative  of  the 
British  privileged  classes  were  hostile  to  the  more  democratic 
North.  There  can  be  no  question  that  this  was  so.  Never- 
theless, during  the  earliest  stages  of  the  struggle,  and  before 
the  Trent  affair  gave  a  decided  adverse  bent  to  the  Premier's 
feelings,  there  was  room  for  question.  At  first  he  seems  to 
have  regarded  both  parties  to  the  quarrel  with  indifference, 
and,  apparently,  equal  dislike.  He  cared  not  which  whipped. 
Even  as  late  as  October  18,  —  only  twenty-one  days  before 
the  seizure  of  Mason  and  Slidell,  —  the  Premier  thus  wrote 
to  the  Foreign  Secretary:  aAs  to  North  America,  our  best 
and  true  policy  seems  to  be  to  go  on  as  we  have  begun,  and 
to  keep  quite  clear  of  the  conflict  between  North  and  South. 
.  .  .  The  love  of  quarrelling  and  fighting  is  inherent  in 
man,  and  to  prevent  its  indulgence  is  to  impose  restraints 
on  natural  liberty.  ...  I  quite  agree  with  you  that  the 
want  of  cotton  would  not  justify  such  a  proceeding.  .  .  .  The 
only  thing  to  do  seems  to  be  to  lie  on  our  oars  and  to  give 
no  pretext  to  the  Washingtonians  to  quarrel  with  us,  while, 
on  the  other  hand,  we  maintain  our  rights  and  those  of 
our  fellow  countrymen."  1 

Thus  Palmerston  was  writing  to  Earl  Russell,  he  then 
1  Ashley,  Palmerston,  II,  411. 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  389 

being  at  Broadlands  and  the  Foreign  Secretary  in  attend- 
ance on  the  Queen,  who  was  still  at  Balmoral.  Meanwhile 
Mr.  John  Lothrop  Motley  was  at  that  juncture  in  Great 
Britain.  He  had  in  August  been  appointed  to  the  Austrian 
mission,  and;  on  his  way  to  Vienna,  necessarily  passed 
through  England.  Mr.  Seward,  newly  installed  in  his  office 
of  Secretary  of  State,  was  then  eager  to  inform  himself 
through  all  possible  channels  1  as  to  the  state  of  affairs  in 
Europe,  and  the  views  of  our  conflict  held  by  public 
men,  especially  those  of  Great  Britain  and  France.  Mr. 
Motley's  English  acquaintance  was  exceptionally  large; 
indeed,  there  were  few  persons  he  could  not  reach.  Deeply 
interested  in  the  Union  cause,  he  now  made  frequent  reports 
of  a  semi-official  character  to  the  Secretary  of  State.  In 
them  is  the  following  account  of  interviews  and  conversations 
with  Earl  Russell  and  the  Queen,  and  the  writer's  impressions 
as  to  the  views  and  tendencies  of  Palmerston :  — 

"I  had  addressed  a  note  to  Lord  Russell  (who,  as  I  under- 
stood, was  at  his  country  house  called  Abergeldie  in  the  north  of 
Scotland)  saying  that  I  had  just  returned  to  this  country  from 
America  and  that,  before  I  departed  for  Vienna,  I  should  be  glad 
to  accept  an  invitation  often  made  by  him,  that  I  should  visit 
him  in  Scotland.  The  answer  came  by  return  of  post,  that  he 
would  be  delighted  to  see  me  at  once,  and  that  he  hoped  I  would 
stay  as  long  as  I  could. 

"On  the  ninth  of  September  I  reached  Abergeldie,  where,  how- 
ever, my  engagements  did  not  permit  me  to  stay  longer  than  a  day 
and  a  half.  During  this  time,  I  had  many  full  conversations  with 
him  of  several  hours'  duration.  I  believe  that  we  discussed  the 
American  question  in  all  its  bearings,  and  he  was  frank  and 
apparently  sincere  in  his  expressions  of  amity  towards  the  United 
States,  and  in  deprecation  of  a  rupture  or  of  serious  misunder- 
standing. .  .  . 

"I  spoke  to  him  of  the  report  alluded  to  by  the  editor  of  the 

1  Supra,  364-365. 


390  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

Spectator,  that  England  would  recognize  the  Confederacy  in 
November.  He  smiled,  and  said  that  it  was  a  pure  fiction ;  that 
no  such  purpose  existed.  He  discussed  this  matter  at  considerable 
length  and  alluded  to  the  practice  of  nations  to  recognize  de  facto 
governments,  when  they  had  become  facts ;  observing  that  such 
things  went  more  rapidly  in  modern  times  than  they  did  of  old ; 
but  saying  distinctly,  and  repeating  it  many  times,  that  the  gov- 
ernment were  not  thinking  of  recognizing  the  Southern  Confed- 
eracy at  present.  .  .  . 

".  .  .  He  did  not  wonder  at  our  determination  to  put  down  the 
insurrection;  but  added  that  it  was  of  so  extensive  a  character, 
and  was  spread  over  so  wide  a  surface,  as  to  make  our  task  seem  a 
very  formidable  one.  Five  millions  of  people  he  thought  hard  to 
subdue,  when  fighting  on  their  own  soil ;  but  he  had  no  disposition 
to  prejudge  the  case.  He  admitted  the  possibility  of  our  efforts 
being  successful,  but  thought  that  the  effect  of  the  Bull's  Run 
affair  would  be  to  encourage  the  Confederates.  He  spoke  very 
reasonably  of  that  event,  and  did  not  attribute  any  great  con- 
sequence to  the  panic,  because  it  was  well  known  that  this  was  not 
uncommon  among  raw  levies  and  volunteers,  who  might  after- 
wards become  the  best  of  soldiers.  He  thought  that  much  less 
effect  had  been  produced  in  England  by  the  defeat  and  the  rout, 
than  by  the  circumstance  of  so  many  regiments  leaving  on  the 
eve  of  active  operations,  because  their  term  of  enlistment  had 
expired.  .  .  . 

"  Of  course  the  subject  of  blockade  was  discussed.  I  said  that  in 
the  Southern  States  there  was  the  utmost  confidence  expressed 
that  Great  Britain  would  break  our  blockade,  so  soon  as  the  cotton 
famine  became  imminent.  It  was  notorious  that  the  whole  in- 
surrection had  been  founded  upon  the  theory  that  Great  Britain 
could  not  exist  without  American  cotton,  and  that  therefore  she 
could  be  relied  upon  to  come  to  their  rescue,  after  the  United  States 
should  have  effectually  blockaded  the  cotton  ports.  The  South 
believes  itself  possessed  of  the  power  of  life  and  death  over  England 
by  means  of  this  single  product,  and  therefore  felt  sure  of  forcing 
her  into  an  alliance  and  into  hostility  to  the  United  States.  On 
the  other  hand,  there  was  doubtless  great  uneasiness  on  the  sub- 
ject in  the  free  states.     To  blockade  the  coast  was  one  of  the  most 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  391 

indisputable  of  belligerent  rights,  and  a  forcible  infringement  by 
neutral  governments  of  an  effectual  blockade  was  of  course  tanta- 
mount to  a  declaration  of  war.  There  was  much  anxiety  therefore 
lest  the  stress  of  cotton  should  lead  to  war  on  the  part  of  Great 
Britain.  In  this  case,  the  consequences  to  humanity  would  be 
most  disastrous.  Without  reference  to  the  damage  which  each 
nation  might  inflict  on  the  other,  it  was  sufficient  to  intimate  that 
the  first  effect  of  an  infringement  of  the  blockade  and  con- 
sequently of  war  made  on  the  United  States  by  Great  Britain  or 
by  France,  or  by  both  united,  would  be  a  proclamation  of  universal 
emancipation  of  the  slaves.  .  .  . 

"...  He  was  well  aware,  he  said,  of  the  power  which  the  South 
thought  itself  possessed  of  over  foreign  nations  by  means  of  their 
cotton,  and  he  sympathized  with  the  general  impatience  of  England 
under  this  supposed  monopoly.  The  government  was  doing, 
would  do,  what  it  could  to  foster  the  production  of  cotton  in  India 
and  other  countries,  and  he  felt  hopeful  of  the  result.  He  alluded 
to  the  resolution  taken  by  the  South  to  forbid  the  exportation  of 
cotton,  and  showed  me  a  familiar  note  to  himself  from  Lord  Pal- 
merston  on  that  subject,  saying —  'We  are  up  to  that  dodge.'  .  .  . 

"On  the  morning  after  my  arrival,  Lord  Russell  mentioned  to 
me  at  breakfast,  that  the  Queen,  then  residing  at  Balmoral,  about 
a  mile  and  a  half  from  Abergeldie,  was  aware  that  I  was  making 
him  a  brief  visit  and  that  I  was  to  leave  early  next  morning.  She 
had  accordingly  sent  to  say  that  the  Prince  Consort  as  well  as 
herself  would  be  pleased  if  I  would  come  to  Balmoral  that  after- 
noon. .  .  . 

"In  the  afternoon  he  took  me  to  Balmoral  in  the  carriage,  and 
we  were  received  by  the  Prince  Consort  in  the  most  informal  and 
agreeable  manner.  The  conversation  was  of  some  twenty  min- 
utes' duration,  and  was  strictly  limited  to  commonplace  subjects, 
without  reference  to  politics ;  but  the  Prince  Consort  took  es- 
pecial pains,  I  thought,  to  be  polite  and  friendly,  and  certainly 
produced  a  most  pleasing  impression  upon  me.  While  we  were 
conversing,  the  door  opened,  and  her  Majesty  walked,  quite  un- 
attended, into  the  room,  dressed  in  plain,  black  morning  costume. 
The  Prince  Consort  presented  me,  and  I  was  received  with  much 
affability;    the  Queen  making  a  gracious  observation  in  regard 


392  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

to  myself,  which  I  forbear  to  repeat,  and  then  speaking  at  once, 
and  with  warmth,  of  the  great  pleasure  which  she  had  derived 
from  the  reception  which  the  Prince  of  Wales  had  met  with  in 
America  last  year.  The  Prince  Consort  also  expressed  himself 
with  eagerness  on  this  subject,  and  alluded  to  the  very  great 
delight  which  the  young  Prince  himself  had  experienced  in  his 
tour  and  in  the  friendly  greeting  which  he  had  received  from 
our  nation. 

"Nothing  else,  worthy  to  be  repeated,  was  said,  but  I  thought 
it  my  duty  to  mention  the  incident ;  for  it  seemed  intended  as  a 
mark  of  respect  and  goodwill  to  the  United  States.  .  .  . 

"On  our  way  back,  I  observed  to  Lord  Russell  that  the  Queen 
and  Prince  Consort  seemed  carefully  to  have  abstained  from  an 
allusion  to  politics. 

"He  said  —  'Yes  —  of  course  —  for  neither  would  choose  to  ap- 
pear as  interfering  with  the  constitutional  advisers  of  the  crown.' 
He  added,  however,  that  the  Prince  had  asked  him,  on  his  coming 
into  the  room,  a  few  minutes  before  I  was  introduced,  *  well,  what 
about  recognition/  or  something  to  that  effect ;  and  that  he  had 
answered,  'no,  we  are  not  thinking  of  that  at  present;  we  are  not 
prepared  to  recognize  the  Southern  confederacy.'  'I  suppose  you 
mean/  said  the  Prince  Consort,  'that  you  don't  intend  to  pledge 
yourself  for  all  time  never  to  do  it,  whatever  events  might  happen.' 
'Yes/  answered  Lord  Russell,  'we  can't  look  into  all  the  future  — 
but,  for  the  present,  we  have  no  intention  of  recognizing  them.' " 

The  next  letter  from  Mr.  Motley  was  dated  "  Vienna, 
Nov./61."     In  it  he  wrote:  — 

"In  the  present  administration  and  its  supporters,  I  know  that 
we  have  many  warm  friends,  warmer  in  their  sentiments  towards 
us  than  it  would  be  safe  for  them  in  the  present  state  of  parties  to 
avow.  Lord  Palmerston  is  not  one  of  these  friends.  He  knows 
little  of  our  politics  or  condition,  and  cares  less  for  them ;  and  he 
is  reckless  of  consequences  should  we  give  him  good  and  popular 
cause  of  quarrel.  But  he  is  too  adroit  to  place  himself  technically 
and  flagrantly  in  the  wrong ;  and  therefore  all  fears  that  there 
would  be  a  forcible  infringement  of  our  blockade  have  always 
seemed  to  me  quite  groundless.'' 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  393 

It  is  important  to  note  the  date  —  September  9,  1861  — 
of  the  visit  and  conversations  thus  so  graphically  described. 
It  was  two  months  to  a  day  before  the  occurrence  of  the 
Trent  affair,  and  eighty  days  only  before  all  England  was 
set  aflame  by  the  arrival  (November  27)  of  the  news  of  that 
affair.  The  attitude  towards  things  American  of  the  British 
ministry  at  the  earlier  date  was  thus  explicitly  set  forth. 
It  certainly  presented  no  grounds  for  complaint  on  our  part. 
The  glimpse  given  of  the  royal  family  is  also  suggestive. 

Up  to  this  time  (September,  1861),  the  recently  appointed 
American  minister,  Mr.  Adams,  had  met  Lord  Palmerston 
merely  in  an  official  capacity  and  in  the  most  formal  way. 
He  had  been  in  London  nearly  five  months;  but  he  had 
arrived  when  the  season  was  already  well  advanced  towards 
its  later  stages,  and  had  seen  the  Premier  only  on  state  oc- 
casions, or  from  the  gallery  of  the  House  of  Commons.  To- 
wards the  end  of  September  he  had  made  a  flying  visit  to 
Scotland  at  the  invitation  of  Earl  Russell,  and  had  been 
the  guest  of  the  latter  at  Abergeldie  Castle  for  a  single 
day  (September  25),  occupied  with  official  business.  Mr. 
Motley  had  preceded  him  as  a  guest  by  about  two  weeks. 
While  there  he  had  seen  nothing  of  the  royal  family.  Sub- 
sequently, on  the  9th  of  November,  he  had  been  one  of  the 
guests  and  speakers  at  the  Lord  Mayor's  dinner,  at  which 
the  Premier  was  a  prominent  figure.  What  the  Premier  says 
at  the  annual  Guild-hall  dinner  is  apt  to  be  significant.  On 
this  occasion  Mr.  Adams  listened  with  the  keenest  interest. 
The  struggle  in  America  was  the  issue  then  uppermost  in 
all  men's  minds,  the  cotton  market  was  excited,  and  it  was 
not  improbable  that  the  policy  of  the  government  might  be 
shadowed  forth  in  anticipation  of  the  meeting  of  Parliament. 
The  impression  left  on  Mr.  Adams's  mind  was  favorable. 
He  referred  to  what  Lord  Palmerston  said  as  being  marked 


394  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

by  his  "  customary  shrewdness,"  adding,  "He  touched 
gently  on  our  difficulties;  and,  at  the  same  time,  gave  it 
clearly  to  be  understood  that  there  was  to  be  no  interference 
for  the  sake  of  cotton."  This  was  on  the  9th  of  Novem- 
ber; and,  the  very  day  before,  the  steamer  Trent  had  been 
stopped  in  the  Old  Bahama  Channel,  some  four  thousand 
miles  away,  and  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slid  ell  taken  from  her. 
Eighteen  days  later,  on  the  27th,  the  occurrence  became 
known  in  England.  On  the  12th,  three  days  after  the  oc- 
currence in  the  West  Indian  waters,  and  fifteen  days  before 
it  was  known  in  England,  the  first,  as  also  the  last,  personal 
interview  between  Mr.  Adams  and  Lord  Palmerston  took 
place.  Of  it,  Mr.  Adams  immediately  afterwards  made  the 
following  diary  record  :  — 

"  Tuesday,  12th  November,  1861 :  —  Received  a  familiar  note 
from  Lord  Palmerston  asking  me  to  call  at  his  house  and  see  him 
between  one  and  two  o'clock.  This  took  me  by  surprise,  and  I 
speculated  on  the  cause  for  some  time  without  any  satisfaction. 
At  one  o'clock  I  drove  from  my  house  over  to  his,  Cambridge 
House  in  Piccadilly.  In  a  few  minutes  he  saw  me.  His  reception 
was  very  cordial  and  frank.  He  said  he  had  been  made  anxious  by 
a  notice  that  a  United  States  armed  vessel  had  lately  put  into 
Southampton  to  get  coal  and  supplies.1  It  had  been  intimated  to 
him  that  the  object  was  to  intercept  the  two  men,  Messrs.  Slidell 

xThe  United  States  steamer  James  Adger,  Commander  John  B.  Mar- 
chand,  had  left  New  York  October  16,  under  orders  to  intercept,  if  possible, 
the  Confederate  steamer  Nashville,  which  ran  the  blockade  at  Charleston 
on  the  night  of  October  10,  1861,  and  was  falsely  reported  to  have  Messrs. 
Mason  and  Slidell  on  board,  presumably  destined  for  some  European  port. 
The  Confederate  commissioners  in  fact  left  Charleston  on  the  Theodora, 
also  a  Confederate  vessel,  two  days  later,  on  the  night  of  October  12.  The 
following  day  they  arrived  at  Nassau,  their  immediate  destination ;  and 
thence  went  to  Cuba,  still  on  the  Theodora,  landing  at  Cardenas.  The 
orders  under  which  Commander  Marchand  sailed  were  issued  under  an 
entire  misapprehension  of  facts,  and  his  instructions  related  exclusively 
to  the  Nashville.  See  Official  Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Navies 
in  the  war  of  the  Rebellion,  I,  128,  224-227. 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  395 

and  Mason,  who  were  understood  to  be  aboard  the  British  West 
India  steamer  expected  to  arrive  to-morrow  or  next  day.  He  had 
been  informed  that  the  Captain,  having  got  gloriously  drunk  on 
brandy  on  Sunday,  had  dropped  down  to  the  mouth  of  the  river 
yesterday,  as  if  on  the  watch.  He  did  not  pretend  to  judge  abso- 
lutely of  the  question  whether  we  had  a  right  to  stop  a  foreign 
vessel  for  such  a  purpose  as  was  indicated.  Even  admitting  that 
we  might  claim  it,  it  was  yet  very  doubtful  whether  the  exercise 
of  it  in  this  way  could  lead  to  any  good.  The  effect  of  it  here 
would  be  unfavorable,  as  it  would  seem  as  if  the  vessel  had  come 
in  here  to  be  filled  with  coal  and  supplies,  and  the  Captain  had 
enjoyed  the  hospitality  of  the  country  in  filling  his  stomach  with 
brandy,  only  to  rush  out  of  the  harbor  and  commit  violence  upon 
their  flag.  Neither  did  the  object  to  be  gained  seem  commen- 
surate with  the  risk.  For  it  was  surely  of  no  consequence  whether 
one  or  two  more  men  were  added  to  the  two  or  three  who  had 
already  been  too  long  here.  They  would  scarcely  make  a  difference 
in  the  action  of  the  government  after  once  having  made  up  its 
mind.  He  was  then  going  on  to  another  question,  when  I  asked 
leave  to  interrupt  him  so  far  as  to  reply  on  this  point.  I  would  first 
venture  to  ask  him  if  he  would  enlighten  me  as  to  the  sources  of  in- 
formation upon  which  he  imputed  the  intention  of  Captain  Mar- 
chand to  take  such  a  step.  His  Lordship  answered  that  he  had  no 
positive  information,  but  that  his  belief  rested  on  inferences  of  the 
motive  for  sending  the  vessel  so  far,  and  the  coincidence  in  her 
time  of  departure.  To  this  I  remarked  that  Captain  Marchand  had 
been  to  see  me,  and  had  shown  me  the  instructions  under  which 
he  sailed.  The  object  of  the  government  had  been,  upon  receiving 
information  that  the  steamer  Nashville  from  Charleston  had  suc- 
ceeded in  breaking  the  blockade  and  was  proceeding  with  these 
men  on  a  voyage  to  Europe,  to  despatch  vessels  in  several  directions 
with  the  design  of  intercepting  and  capturing  her.  I  presumed 
that  no  objection  could  exist  to  such  a  proceeding  on  our  part.  His 
Lordship  assented,  though  he  did  not  seem  to  have  heard  of  the 
Nashville  or  to  understand  its  destination.  I  then  said  that  the 
James  Adger  had  been  sent  in  this  direction,  but  finding  no  news 
of  the  Nashville,  and  learning  that  the  two  emissaries  had  stopped 
at  the  West  Indies,  Captain  Marchand  had  written  to  me  his  in- 


396  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

tention  to  return  to  the  United  States.  I  would,  however,  remark 
that  I  had  urged  him  to  follow  up  a  steamer  called  the  Gladiator 
which  had  been  fitted  up  and  despatched  from  London  with 
contraband  of  war  for  the  insurgents.  Though  sailing  under 
British  colors,  I  advised  him  to  seize  her  on  the  first  symptom  of 
destination  to  a  harbor  in  the  United  States.  His  Lordship  did 
not  deny  my  right,  but  he  intimated  that  the  proof  ought  to 
be  well  established.  I  said  that  my  government  had  no  desire  to 
open  questions  with  this  country.  On  the  contrary  I  think  they 
would  do  all  in  their  power  to  avoid  them.  But  I  could  not 
deny  that  these  proceedings  in  England  were  excessively  annoy- 
ing, and  that  there  would  spring  up  a  strong  desire  to  arrest 
them  as  decisively  as  possible.  His  Lordship  then  passed  to  the 
case  of  Mr.  Bunch,  the  consul  at  Charleston.  .  .  .  We  then 
passed  into  more  general  conversation,  in  the  course  of  which  I 
ventured  to  ask  if  it  was  to  be  presumed  that  the  two  governments 
of  France  and  Great  Britain  were  acting  in  concert  in  regard  to 
the  United  States.  He  said,  Yes.  I  then  mentioned  my  having 
received  in  my  latest  despatch  notice  that  M.  Mercier  had 
apprised  my  government  that  the  French  stood  in  need  of  cotton. 
Was  I  to  understand  that  this  was  in  concert  too  ?  His  Lordship 
said  that  he  was  aware  of  the  French  government  having  directed 
a  suggestion  to  be  made,  that  it  would  be  glad  to  have  cotton, 
but  it  was  nothing  more,  and  Lord  Lyons  had  not  any  direction  to 
join  in  it.  I  replied  that  I  so  understood  it,  but  that  I  could  not 
but  regret  such  steps  as  they  formed  the  only  foundation  upon 
which  the  insurgents  rested  their  hopes  of  success. 1  Mr.  Yancey 
in  his  speech  at  the  fishmongers'  dinner  had  sufficiently  expressed 
it,  but  in  point  of  fact  I  had  reason  to  know  that  he  and  his  associ- 
ates had  been  indefatigable  in  their  representations  of  the  certainty 
of  interference  in  their  behalf.  It  was  this  view  of  the  subject 
which  created  the  irritation  in  the  United  States.  If  we  could  be 
left  entirely  to  ourselves,  the  issue  would  not  be  long  doubtful. 
To  this  his  Lordship  made  the  common  remark  among  his 
countrymen  that  we  might  perhaps  coerce  and  subdue  them,  but 
that  would  not  be  restoring  the  Union.  I  answered  that  such 
was  not  our  desire.     What  we  expected  to  do  was  to  give  them 

1  Supra,  255. 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  397 

an  opportunity  of  making  an  unbiased  decision.  We  believed 
that  this  was  a  conspiracy  which  had  blown  up  a  great  rebellion. 
A  short  time  would  test  the  sense  of  the  whole  community.  If 
the  presence  of  a  force  adequate  to  protection  did  not  develop 
a  counter  movement  to  return  to  the  Union,  I  did  not  believe  that 
pure  coercion  would  be  persevered  in.  I  did  not,  however,  add 
my  conviction  that  slavery  as  a  political  element  must  be  com- 
pletely expunged  before  there  can  be  any  hope  of  permanent 
peace.     I  then  took  my  leave  and  returned  home."  l 

This  record  certainly  shows  Lord  Palmerston  in  no  at- 
titude of  hostility  to  America.  On  the  contrary,  he  dis- 
tinctly went  out  of  his  way  to  give  a  friendly  intimation 
calculated  to  forestall  and  prevent  the  doing  of  something 
which  was  unfortunately  already  done,  but  which  is  now 
universally  admitted  to  have  been  the  super-zealous  act  of 
well-nigh  incredible  folly  on  the  part  of  a  highly  indiscreet 
and  ill-balanced  naval  officer.  And  Lord  Palmerston  did  this, 
too,  in  a  very  kindly  way.  There  was  in  his  manner  nothing 
either  rough  or  brusque,  or  in  any  way  offensive.  On  the 
contrary,  it  was  marked  by  much  characteristic  bonhomie. 
Mr.  Adams  so  accepted  it,  and  even  began  to  relax  in  his 
suspicions  of  the  Premier. 

Meanwhile,  Mr.  Adams  did  not  know  that  only  the  day 
before  the  Premier  had  been  in  solemn  conference  with 
Lord  Chancellor  Westbury,  Dr.  Lushington  and  the  three 
official  Law  Officers  of  the  Crown,  to  consider  the  very 
contingency  he  now  suggested.  And,  furthermore,  much 
to  his  regret  as  well  as  surprise,  he  had  been  then  advised 
that,  according  to  the  principles  of  international  law  ac- 
cepted in  English  courts,    and   practised   and   enforced  by 

1  Mr.  Adams's  official  account  of  this  highly  significant  interview  is 
in  a  despatch  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  dated  November  15,  1861. 
Never  printed  in  the  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  it  is  to  be  found 
almost  in  full  in  War  Records,  Serial  No.  115,  pp.  1078,  1079. 


398  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

Great  Britain,  a  belligerent  had  a  right  to  stop  and  search 
any  neutral  not  being  a  ship  of  war  suspected  of  carrying 
enemy's  despatches.  Consequently,  either  Commander  Mar- 
chand  or  Captain  Wilkes,  on  accepted  English  principles 
of  law,  might  stop  the  Trent,  search  her,  and  if  Messrs. 
Mason  and  Slidell,  their  despatches  and  credentials,  were 
found  on  board,  "  either  take  them  out,  or  seize  the  packet 
and  carry  her  back  to  New  York  for  trial."  *  The  Premier, 
fully  advised  as  to  the  law  in  the  case,  was  thus  doing  his 
utmost  to  prevent  the  occurrence  of  that  which,  unknown 
to  either  himself  or  Mr.  Adams,  had  already  happened. 
The  next  glimpse  we  get  of  Palmerston,  he  appears  in 
quite  another  character.  It  is  from  the  recently  published 
Memoirs  of  Sir  Horace  Rumbold.  The  Trent  was  stopped 
November  8 ;  the  interview  between  Mr.  Adams  and  the 
Premier  at  Cambridge  House  was  on  the  12th ;  the  news 
of  what  had  taken  place  on  the  8th  reached  London  on  the 
27th.  Sir  Horace  Rumbold  says:2  "As  soon  as  the  news 
reached  England,  a  Cabinet  Council  was  summoned,  and  I 
had  it  on  the  same  day  from  Evelyn  Ashley  that  Lord 
Palmerston,  on  entering  the  room  where  the  Ministers  met 
in  Downing  Street,  threw  his  hat  on  the  table,  and  at  once 
commenced  business  by  addressing  his  colleagues  in  the 
following  words:  'I  don't  know  whether  you  are  going  to 
stand  this,  but  I'll  be  d d  if  I  do  ! 7  The  ultimatum  de- 
manding the  surrender  of  the  prisoners  was  decided  upon 
there  and  then,  and  sent  out  within  two  days  (on  the  fol- 
lowing Sunday)." 

Into  what  subsequently  occurred  in  the  so-called  Trent 
affair  it  is  not,  for  present  purposes,  necessary  to  enter.  It 
is  matter  of  history.     The  royal  family  was  then  at  Windsor, 

1  Dasent,  John  Thadeus  Delane,  II,  36. 

2  Recollections  of  a  Diplomatist,  II,  83. 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  399 

having  left  Balmoral  October  22.  The  Prince  Consort  began 
to  sicken  on  the  1st  of  December ;  he  died  on  December  14. 
As  is  well  known,  his  very  last  public  act  was  to  soften 
down  the  asperities  of  the  despatch  to  Lord  Lyons  as 
originally  drawn  up  by  the  Foreign  Secretary,  and, 
according  to  usage,  submitted  to  the  Queen  before  trans- 
mission. Full  details  on  this  subject  may  be  found  in  Sir 
Theodore  Martin's  Life  of  the  Prince  Consort.  It  is  suffi- 
cient here  to  say  —  but  to  emphasize  it  is  of  importance 
in  the  matter  under  discussion  —  the  last  working  hours  of 
the  Prince  were  anxiously  devoted  to  an  effort  to  preserve 
friendly  relations  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States.  That  might  well  have  been  considered  his  dying 
injunction  to  the  Queen.  The  Prince  was  buried  on  the 
23d  of  December;  and  when,  on  the  9th  of  the  following 
month,  Lord  Palmerston  officially  communicated  to  her 
Majesty  the  intelligence  that  the  Trent  affair  was  happily 
solved,  she  promptly  reminded  him  of  the  fact  that  "this 
peaceful  issue  of  the  American  quarrel  was  greatly  owing 
to  her  beloved  Prince."  l 

In  America  active  military  operations  had  then  ceased, 
and  the  two  parties  to  the  conflict  were  preparing  for  a 
supreme  trial  of  strength  when  the  coming  season  should 
open.  Europe  was  looking  on ;  a  universal  mourning  for  the 
Prince  Consort  overshadowed  Great  Britain ;  the  stoppage 
of  cotton  shipments  by  the  Federal  blockade  was  beginning 
to  make  itself  felt  in  the  manufacturing  districts  of  both 
England  and  France;  the  combined  French,  Spanish  and 
English  movement  on  Mexico  was  in  preparation;  the  ex- 
pediency and  consequent  probability  of  a  joint  movement  of 
European  powers  looking  to  a  recognition  of  the  Confed- 
eracy and  their  subsequent  intervention  in  our  Civil  War 
1  Lee,  Victoria,  p.  382. 


400  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

was  under  discussion;  no  active  movement  to  that  end 
had,  however,  yet  been  initiated.  The  Queen  herself, 
much  broken  by  the  death  of  her  husband,  and  both  men- 
tally and  physically  in  a  condition  causing  profound  solici- 
tude, attended  to  her  public  duties  and  transacted  business 
with  her  ministers  as  had  been  her  habit,  but  naturally  had 
to  be  treated  by  them  with  great  consideration.  Morbid 
excitement  was  feared,  and  anything  which  might  in  any 
way  conduce  thereto  was  carefully  avoided. 

This  condition  of  affairs  lasted  all  through  both  the  winter 
and  spring  of  1862,  —  the  months  immediately  following  the 
death  of  the  Prince  Consort.  During  that  time  there  is  no 
reason  whatever  to  suppose  that,  as  a  question  of  policy,  any 
issue  growing  out  of  the  American  difficulties  was  brought 
to  the  Queen's  notice.  She  had  no  occasion  to  express 
herself;  and,  weighed  down  by  domestic  affliction,  her 
mind  was  intent  on  other  things.  During  those  months, 
however,  the  cotton  famine  reached  its  worst  stages  both 
in  Great  Britain  and  France ;  and,  contemporaneously,  the 
Union  operations  underwent  severe  reverses.  As  a  natural 
result,  the  question  of  recognition,  and  consequent  inter- 
vention, became  urgent.  The  French  Emperor  publicly 
favored  this  course,  repeatedly  and  persistently  urging  the 
British  government  to  take  the  initiative,  and  signifying 
his  readiness  to  cooperate.1  The  struggle  in  America  was 
the  uppermost  subject  of  interest  throughout  Europe,  and 
especially  in  Great  Britain,  where  the  tide  of  sympathy  ran 
strongly  with  the  Confederates  in  what  was  looked  upon 
as  their  gallant  struggle  for  independence  against  over- 
whelming odds  of  men  and  resources.  The  condition  of  the 
Queen,  though  not  discussed  openly,  was  well  understood 
in  court  circles.  She  was  unequal  to  any  nervous  strain. 
1  Rhodes,  United  States,  IV,  94,  n.,  346. 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  401 

This  was  recognized  by  the  Confederate  emissaries  in  London 
as  a  serious  obstacle  in  the  way  of  that  recognition  for  which 
they  were  praying.  They  were  also  well  informed  on  this 
point;  probably  far  better  informed  than  the  American 
minister,  for  at  least  four  out  of  five  of  the  ministry  and 
members  of  Parliament,  and  almost  the  entire  court  circle, 
were  strong  sympathizers  with  the  Confederacy.  Accord- 
ingly, on  February  28, 1862,  James  M.  Mason,  the  Confederate 
commissioner  in  London,  wrote  to  Mr.  Hunter,  the  Richmond 
Secretary  of  State:  "In  political  circles  it  is  thought  the 
condition  of  the  Queen  has  much  to  do  with  the  manifest 
reluctance  of  the  Ministry  to  run  any  risk  of  war  by  inter- 
ference with  the  blockade.  It  is  said  that  she  is  under 
great  constitutional  depression,  and  nervously  sensitive  to 
anything  that  looks  like  war.  Indeed,  mufch  fear  is  enter- 
tained as  to  the  condition  of  her  health."  And  a  few  days 
later  (March  11)  to  the  same  effect:  "Many  causes  concur 
[in  bringing  about  a  general  support  of  the  ministry  in  its 
policy  of  non-intervention].  First,  the  prevailing  disinclina- 
tion in  any  way  to  disturb  the  mourning  of  the  Queen.  The 
loyalty  of  the  English  people  to  their  present  Sovereign  is 
strongly  mixed  up  with  an  affectionate  devotion  to  her  person. 
You  find  this  feeling  prevalent  in  all  circles  and  classes." 
Finally,  writing  on  the  31st  of  July  following,  Mason  says: 
"The  Queen  remains  in  great  seclusion,  and  it  is  more  than 
whispered  that  apprehension  is  entertained  lest  she  lapse 
into  insania."  * 

That  summer  the  Queen  passed  at  Osborne,  at  Balmoral, 
and  at  Windsor ;  but  early  in  the  autumn  (September)  she 
went  over  to  Germany,  and  was  for  a  short  time  at  Gotha, 
returning  to  England    October   26.    ,Earl    Russell  was  in 

1  The  Public  Life  and  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  James  M.  Mason, 
264,  265,  315. 


402  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

attendance  there  upon  her;  and  the  crisis  in  American 
affairs,  so  far  as  European  intervention  was  concerned,  then 
occurred. 

It  came  about  in  this  wise :  —  Referring  to  the  outcome 
of  the  so-called  Pope,  or  second  Bull  Run,  campaign  before 
Washington  in  August,  1862,  Lord  Palmerston  wrote  to 
Earl  Russell,  then  (September  14)  in  attendance  at  Gotha, 
suggesting  whether  the  time  had  not  come  "for  us  to  con- 
sider whether,  in  such  a  state  of  things,  England  and  France 
might  not  address  the  contending  parties  and  recommend  an 
arrangement  upon  the  basis  of  separation."  This  suggestion 
strongly  commended  itself  to  the  Foreign  Secretary,  who 
replied  on  the  17th  that  he  was  decidedly  of  the  same  mind 
as  the  Premier:  "I  agree  with  you  that  the  time  is  come 
for  offering  mediation  to  the  United  States  government, 
with  a  view  to  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the 
Confederates.  I  agree  further  that,  in  case  of  failure,  we 
ought  ourselves  to  recognize  the  Southern  States  as  an  in- 
dependent State.  For  the  purpose  of  taking  so  important  a 
step,  I  think  we  must  have  a  meeting  of  the  Cabinet.  The 
23d  or  20th  would  suit  me  for  the  meeting."  To  this  very 
emphatic  acquiescence  in  his  views,  Lord  Palmerston  six 
days  later,  on  the  23d,  wrote  back:  "Your  plan  of  proceed- 
ings .  .  .  seems  to  be  excellent.  ...  As  to  the  time  of 
making  the  offer  [of  mediation]  if  France  and  Russia 
agree  —  and  France,  we  know,  is  quite  ready  and  only 
waiting  for  our  concurrence  —  events  may  be  taking  place 
which  might  render  it  desirable  that  the  offer  should  be 
made  before  the  middle  of  October."  Lord  Russell  now 
left  Gotha  and  returned  to  London,  Lord  Granville  relieving 
him  in  attendance  on  the  Queen. 

It  has  been  surmised1  that  it  was  at  this  juncture,  if  ever, 
1  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proceedings,  Second  Series,  XVIII,  145,  153. 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  403 

that  the  incident  occurred  of  which  Prince  Leopold  retained 
the  boyish  recollection  upon  which  President  Eliot  based 
his  " credibly  reported"  statement.  A  mystery  did  indeed 
hang  over  the  outcome  of  events  at  that  most  curiously 
critical  period  —  a  mystery  the  American  minister  was 
unable  at  the  time  to  penetrate,  in  fact  never  did  pene- 
trate —  but  which  admitted  of  an  altogether  natural  ex- 
planation on  the  hypothesis  that  the  incident  narrated  by 
Prince  Leopold  then  occurred.  It  seemed  not  at  all  im- 
possible in  view  of  the  solicitude  felt  over  her  mental  as 
well  as  physical  condition,  that  the  whole  course  of  events 
might  have  turned  on  the  individual  attitude  of  the  widow 
of  Prince  Albert.  The  surmise  was  erroneous.  The  Queen 
had  nothing  to  do  with  that  particular  sequence  of  events. 
There  is  no  evidence  that  she  in  any  way  concerned  herself 
in  it.  On  the  contrary,  in  so  far  as  she  was  not  absorbed  by 
her  widow's  grief,  her  mind  was  intent  on  other  things  much 
nearer  home.  The  solution  of  the  mystery,  sought  elsewhere, 
is  found  in  Lord  Granville's  correspondence,  as  set  forth  in 
his  recently  (1905)  published  Life  by  Lord  Edmond  Fitz- 
maurice. 

The  concurrence  and  course  of  events  can  be  briefly  stated. 
Throughout  the  months  of  July  and  August,  1862,  the  cause 
of  the  Union  had  sustained  a  series,  almost  unbroken,  of 
reverses.  The  Confederacy  had  not  only  made  good  its  right 
to  be  recognized  as  a  belligerent,  but  it  was  a  victorious  bel- 
ligerent. The  Mexican  expedition  of  the  French  Emperor 
having  overrun  that  country,  he  was  urging  upon  the  British 
Cabinet  an  aggressive  attitude  towards  the  United  States 
which  would  inevitably  have  proved  the  first  step  toward 
a  direct  armed  intervention,  and  the  consequent  breaking 
of  the  blockade.  The  great  Lancashire  cotton  famine, 
necessarily  incident  to  the  blockade  and  confidently  relied 


404  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

on  throughout  the  Confederacy  to  compel  intervention  in 
its  behalf,  was  at  its  height.  If  gold  in  New  York  stood  at 
a  premium  of  50,  cotton  stood  at  one  of  200  in  Liverpool. 
The  looms  were  idle,  and  a  long  and  sustained  wail  of 
famine  and  pitiable  agony  went  up  from  the  most  crowded 
districts  of  Great  Britain.  Whether  the  fact  was  realized 
in  America  or  not,  the  hour  of  crisis  was  at  hand ;  and  the 
issue  was  to  be  settled,  not  on  the  banks  of  the  Potomac, 
as  generally  assumed,  but  in  Downing  Street,  London. 

The  two  weeks  after  Lord  Russell's  return  to  Lon- 
don from  Gotha  were  utilized  by  him  in  the  preparation  of 
an  elaborate,  though  confidential,  Cabinet  circular  in  direct 
furtherance  of  the  mediation  programme.  In  this  circular 
the  question  was  plainly  put  to  those  composing  the  Cabinet, 
whether  in  the  light  of  what  had  taken  place  in  America 
and  the  condition  of  distress  prevailing  throughout  the  manu- 
facturing districts  of  England  and  France,  it  was  not  the 
duty  of  Europe  "to  ask  both  parties,  in  the  most  friendly 
and  conciliatory  terms,  to  agree  to  a  suspension  of  arms 
for  the  purpose  of  weighing  calmly  the  advantages  of  peace" 
—  and  so  forth  and  so  on,  in  the  somewhat  unctuous  par- 
lance usual  with  philanthropic,  but  interested,  neutrals. 

Mr.  Gladstone  was  at  this  time  Chancellor  of  the  Ex- 
chequer, and  next  to  the  Premier,  Lord  Palmerston,  and  the 
Foreign  Secretary,  Earl  Russell,  the  most  influential  member 
of  the  Cabinet.  He  was  now  consulted  as  to  the  proposed 
programme,  and  gave  his  hearty  approval  to  it.  It  entirely 
met  the  views  he  at  that  time  entertained  and  did  not  hesi- 
tate to  express.  The  cry  of  agony  coming  up  from  the 
cotton  spinning  districts  appealed  to  his  strong  humanita- 
rian sympathies;  he,  like  Lord  Palmerston,  was  fully  con- 
vinced that  a  reestablishment  of  the  Union  was  impossible 
as  well  as  undesirable;   finally,  by  that  subtle  process  of 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  405 

reasoning  always  characteristic  of  him,  he  had  persuaded 
himself  that  the  victory  of  the  slave-owner  would  result  in 
the  downfall  of  slavery.  There  was  in  Russell's  attitude  a 
certain  coldness  of  political  conviction,  as  in  that  of  Pal- 
merston  there  was  apparent  an  element  of  cynical  hesita- 
tion; but  Gladstone  seems  at  this  juncture  to  have  thrown 
himself  into  the  proposed  movement  with  that  fervor  of 
sympathetic  conviction  always  characteristic  of  him.  Nor 
was  he  chary  of  utterance,  as  he  afterwards,  in  the  day  of 
his  sackcloth  and  ashes,  had  good  cause  to  remember  and 
admit.  For  instance,  he  thus  a  few  weeks  later,  in  reply  to 
a  letter,  wrote  to  Cyrus  W.  Field  in  terms  unmistakably 
Gladstonese  setting  forth  "the  heavy  responsibility  you 
[Americans  of  the  North]  incur  in  persevering  with  this 
destructive  and  hopeless  war  at  the  cost  of  such  dangers 
and  evils  to  yourselves,  to  say  nothing  of  your  adversaries, 
or  of  an  amount  of  misery  inflicted  upon  Europe  such 
as  no  other  civil  war  in  the  history  of  man  has  ever  brought 
upon  those  beyond  its  immediate  range."  The  writer  then 
went  on  thus  to  set  forth  the  wickedness  of  any  further 
continuance  of  our  efforts  towards  a  reestablishment  of  the 
Union:  "The  impossibility  of  success  in  a  war  of  conquest 
of  itself  suffices  to  make  it  unjust.  When  that  impossibility 
is  reasonably  proved,  all  the  horror,  all  the  bloodshed,  all 
the  evil  passions,  all  the  dangers  to  liberty  and  order,  with 
which  such  a  war  abounds,  come  to  lie  at  the  door  of  the 
party  which  refuses  to  hold  its  hand  and  let  its  neighbor  be. 
You  know  that  in  the  opinion  of  Europe  that  impossibility 
has  (in  the  present  case)  been  proved."  * 

The  concurrence  of  Mr.  Gladstone  in  the  proposed  pro- 
gramme rendered  assurance  doubly  sure ;  for,  as  Lord  Gran- 

1  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proceedings,  Second  Series,  XX,  470,  n. ;  Harper's 
Monthly  Magazine  (May,  1896),  Vol.  XCII,  p.  847. 


406  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

ville  had  a  few  months  before,  and  in  another  connection, 
written  to  Lord  Canning:  "He  [Gladstone],  Johnny  [Russell] 
and  Pam  [Palmerston]  are  a  formidable  phalanx  when  they  are 
united  in  opposition  to  the  whole  Cabinet  in  foreign  matters." 
And  in  the  present  case  a  large  majority  of  the  Cabinet  were 
with  "the  formidable  phalanx."  It  was  now  that  the  wholly 
unforeseeable,  the  strangely  unexpected,  occurred.  The  meet- 
ing of  the  Cabinet  was  fixed  for  the  23d  of  October.  Mr. 
Adams  got  an  inkling  of  what  was  on  foot,  and  was  greatly 
disturbed.  "For  a  fortnight,"  he  wrote,  "my  mind  has  been 
running  so  strongly  on  all  this  night  and  day  that  it  seems 
almost  to  threaten  my  life."  He  had  good  reason  for 
his  anxiety,  however  extreme.  The  tension  was  becoming 
strained  to  the  extent  that  something,  it  would  seem, 
must  break,  and  that  soon.  For,  weeks  previously,  ap- 
prehending just  such  an  emergency  as  was  now  impending, 
Mr.  Adams  had  written  home  asking  for  specific  instructions 
for  his  guidance  if  what  he  apprehended  should  occur. 
Those  instructions  he  had  in  due  time  received  from 
Secretary  Seward;  they  were  explicit.  To  make  the 
narrative  intelligible  and  fully  set  forth  the  extreme 
character  of  the  crisis  then  impending,  these  instructions 
must  be  quoted  at  some  length.  Even  at  the  interval  of 
half  a  century  they  bear  reading;  for,  carrying  the  stand- 
ard entrusted  to  him  high  and  with  a  firm  hand,  the  Sec- 
retary bore  himself  in  a  way  of  which  his  country  had  cause 
to  be  proud.     The  paper  read  in  part  as  follows:  — 

"If  the  British  government  shall  in  any  way  approach  you 
directly  or  indirectly  with  propositions  which  assume  or  con- 
template an  appeal  to  the  President  on  the  subject  of  our  inter- 
nal affairs,  whether  it  seems  to  imply  a  purpose  to  dictate,  or  to 
mediate,  or  to  advise,  or  even  to  solicit  or  persuade,  you  will 
answer  that  you  are  forbidden  to  debate,  to  hear,  or  in  any  way 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  407 

receive,  entertain,  or  transmit  any  communication  of  the  kind. 
You  will  make  the  same  answer  whether  the  proposition  comes 
from  the  British  government  in  combination  with  any  other 
power. 

"If  you  were  asked  an  opinion  what  reception  the  President 
would  give  to  such  a  proposition,  if  made  here,  you  will  reply 
that  you  are  not  instructed,  but  you  have  no  reason  for  supposing 
that  it  would  be  entertained. 

"If  contrary  to  our  expectations  the  British  government,  either 
alone  or  in  combination  with  any  other  government,  should  ac- 
knowledge the  insurgents,  while  you  are  remaining  without  fur- 
ther instructions  from  this  government  concerning  that  event, 
you  will  immediately  suspend  the  exercise  of  your  functions,  and 
give  notice  of  that  suspension  to  Earl  Russell  and  to  this  depart- 
ment. I  have  now  in  behalf  of  the  United  States  and  by  the 
authority  of  their  chief  executive  magistrate  performed  an  im- 
portant duty.  Its  possible  consequences  have  been  weighed,  and 
its  solemnity  is  therefore  felt  and  freely  acknowledged.  This  duty 
has  brought  us  to  meet  and  confront  the  danger  of  a  war  with 
Great  Britain  and  other  states  allied  with  the  insurgents  who  are 
in  arms  for  the  overthrow  of  the  American  Union.  You  will  per- 
ceive that  we  have  approached  the  contemplation  of  that  crisis 
with  the  caution  which  great  reluctance  has  inspired.  But  I 
trust  that  you  will  also  have  perceived  that  the  crisis  has  not 
appalled  us." 

It  was  with  these  ringing  instructions  before  him  that 
Mr.  Adams,  with  such  fortitude  as  he  could  command,  now 
awaited  the  outcome  he  was  powerless  in  any  material 
way  to  affect.  The  special  Cabinet  meeting  was  called  for 
the  23d  of  October;  to  all  outward  appearance  and  in  all 
human  probability  that  was  the  fateful  day;  the  ordeal 
must  then  be  faced.     The  programme  for  it  was  arranged. 

The  day  came;  and  passed.  Upon  it  nothing  happened. 
The  wholly  unexpected  had  again  occurred. 

What  had  taken  place  ?  Why  was  the  carefully  prepared 
programme,   so   world-momentous   and   far   reaching,  sud- 


408  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

denly,  quietly  abandoned  ?  It  is  a  curious  story ;  in  dip- 
lomatic annals  scarce  any  more  so.  It  was,  it  will  be  re- 
membered —  for  dates  in  this  connection  are  all-important 
—  the  23d  of  October  that  had  been  assigned  for  the  special 
Cabinet  meeting,  and  sixteen  days  before,  on  the  7th  of 
that  month,  Mr.  Gladstone  delivered  that  famous  Newcastle 
speech  in  which  he  declared  that  Jefferson  Davis  had  "made 
a  nation,"  and  that  the  independence  of  the  Confederacy 
and  dissolution  of  the  American  Union  were  as  certain  "as 
any  event  yet  future  and  contingent  could  be."  That 
speech,  a  marvel  of  indiscretion,  —  or,  as  Mr.  Gladstone 
himself  subsequently  expressed  it,  "a  mistake  of  incredible 
grossness,"  —  though  at  the  moment  it  caused  in  the  mind 
of  Mr.  Adams  deep  despair,  in  reality  saved  the  situation. 
It  was  for  the  Union  a  large  cash  prize  drawn  in  fortune's 
lottery. 

Speaking  for  himself,  —  "playing  off  his  own  bat,"  as 
Lord  Palmerston  would  have  expressed  it,  —  Mr.  Glad- 
stone had  foreshadowed  a  ministerial  policy.  The  utterance 
was  inspired ;  in  venturing  on  it  Mr.  Gladstone  unquestion- 
ably supposed,  as  he  had  good  cause  to  know,  he  spoke  the 
minds  of  both  Lord  Palmerston  and  Lord  Russell.  In  another 
connection  the  principle  of  the  so-called  " collectivity"  of  the 
British  Cabinet  is  discussed  by  Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice 
in  his  Granville  (II,  322),  and  the  point  made  that  ministers 
are  in  nowise  free  to  put  forward  each  "his  own  views  at 
large  public  meetings  and  elsewhere."  This  Mr.  Gladstone 
had  now  done.  Moreover,  it  was  notorious  in  ministerial 
circles  that  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer  were  not  in  general  harmony.  On  the  con- 
trary, Lord  Palmerston  disliked  and  habitually  thwarted 
Mr.  Gladstone;  and  Mr.  Gladstone  instinctively  distrusted 
Lord  Palmerston.     A  year  before,  the  two  had  been  "in 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  409 

violent  antagonism"  on  financial  questions.  "For  two 
months/ '  Granville  wrote,  "Gladstone  has  been  on  half- 
cock  of  resignation.  .  .  .  Palmerston  has  tried  him  hard 
once  or  twice  by  speeches  and  Cabinet  minutes,  and  says  that 
the  only  way  to  deal  with  him  is  to  bully  him  a  little ;  and 
Palmerston  appears  to  be  in  the  right." 

A  species  of  Cabinet  modus  vivendi  was  then  arrived  at, 
and  had  since  been  more  or  less  observed ;  but  the  two  men 
were  by  nature  antagonistic.  They  instinctively  disliked 
each  other.  Gladstone  was  plainly  the  coming  man;  but 
Palmerston,  so  to  speak,  held  the  fort,  nor  did  he  propose 
to  vacate  it  in  Gladstone's  favor.  It  was  a  case  of  armed 
Cabinet  observation.  Under  these  circumstances  the  Chan- 
cellor of  the  Exchequer  had  in  the  autumn  of  1862  gone  on 
what  proved  to  be  a  sort  of  triumphal  progress  through 
the  northern  counties.  It  amounted  to  a  popular  ova- 
tion; and,  not  unnaturally,  his  colleagues,  especially  his 
chief,  took  cognizance  of  it.  Then  came  the  Newcastle 
indiscretion.  From  his  long  subsequently  published  diary 
entries,  it  appears  that  what  Mr.  Gladstone  then  said  was  no 
hasty,  impromptu  utterance,  but  had  been  well  and  repeat- 
edly considered.  The  inference  is  unavoidable.  Distrust- 
ing the  stability  of  the  Premier's  purpose,  the  Chancellor  of 
the  Exchequer  intended  to  force  his  hand,  thus  clinching 
the  thing.  In  so  purposing,  Mr.  Gladstone  had,  as  a  mem- 
ber of  the  government,  committed  an  offence  against  official 
propriety.  Apparently  it  did  not  take  the  Premier  long 
to  make  up  his  mind  that  the  offender  must  be  disci- 
plined, and  that  severely;  so  he  proceeded  at  once  to  in- 
timate to  Sir  George  Cornewall  Lewis,  also  a  member  of  the 
Cabinet  and  Gladstone's  parliamentary  rival  as  the  coming 
man,  that  if  he  (Lewis)  did  not  take  this  function  on  him- 
self, it  must  devolve  on  the  head  of  the  government  in 


410  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

person.  On  the  14th  of  October,  therefore,  Sir  George  Lewis, 
speaking  at  Hereford  as  the  unrecognized  mouthpiece  of 
the  Premier,  very  pointedly  controverted  the  position  taken 
by  his  colleague  one  week  before  at  Newcastle.  The  hand 
of  the  Premier  was  on  the  Cabinet  lever.  The  blind  goddess 
had  intervened  for  the  preservation  of  the  American  Union  ! 

The  Cabinet  meeting  called  for  the  23d,  the  outcome  of 
which  had  been  settled  in  advance  by  the  concurrence  of  the 
Premier,  the  Foreign  Secretary  and  the  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer  —  Palmerston,  Russell  and  Gladstone  —  was 
for  the  nonce  necessarily  postponed,  and  never  afterwards 
notified.  Mr  Gladstone  had  been  "  called  down/'  —  had 
received  a  distinct  intimation  that  he  was  neither  the  min- 
istry nor  yet  its  accredited  mouthpiece;  and  explanations 
were  in  order.  None  the  less,  as  the  secret  working  of  the 
springs  and  wires  which  brought  about  the  final  result  are 
now  made  apparent,  the  magnitude  and  imminence  of  the 
danger  at  that  juncture  threatening  the  cause  of  the  Union 
are  revealed.     It  was  a  case  of  touch  and  go ! 

Perhaps  the  most  curious  feature  of  the  episode  is,  however, 
that  Mr.  Adams  was  at  the  moment  altogether  wrong  in 
his  understanding  of  the  influences  at  work.  He  thought 
Palmerston  the  evil  genius  of  the  situation,  and  the  source 
of  hostile  machinations ;  in  his  belief,  Earl  Russell  was,  on 
the  whole,  America's  friend.  In  reality  it  was,  as  we  now 
know,  the  other  way.  At  the  critical  moment  Russell,  dis- 
regarding Gladstone's  indiscreet  disclosures,  was  disposed 
to  go  forward  in  the  policy  of  recognition  and  intervention ; 
it  was  Palmerston  who  hesitated  and  called  a  halt.  The 
Premier  was  not  disposed  to  forego  the  opportunity  of  disci- 
plining an  indiscreet  colleague  whom  he  thoroughly  disliked, 
even  though  by  so  doing  the  recognition  of  the  Confederacy 
was  postponed.     In  the  event,  that  postponement  proved 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  411 

final.  Then  and  there  the  dice  had  unknowingly  been  cast. 
Nearly  three  years  later,  when  the  Confederacy  was  in  its 
death  agony,  General  Robert  E.  Lee  mournfully  confessed 
that  he  had  never  believed  it  could  in  the  long  run  make 
good  its  independence  "  unless  foreign  powers  should  directly 
or  indirectly  assist  it  in  so  doing." 

Recurring,  however,  to  what  may  not  inappropriately 
be  termed  the  Victorian  legend  in  this  connection,  there  is 
nothing  whatever  to  indicate  that  the  Queen  ever  felt  any 
personal  interest  in  the  American  struggle,  or,  after  the 
Prince  Consort's  death  (December,  1861)  sought  to  influ- 
ence in  the  slightest  the  policy  of  the  ministry  in  regard  to  it. 
On  this  point  the  Life  of  Lord  Granville  affords  conclusive 
evidence.  Had  she  evinced  such  interest,  or  exerted  any 
influence  on  the  ministry,  it  would  have  been  through  Lord 
Granville;  for  in  all  such  contingencies  "Lord  Granville  was 
her  mainstay  in  the  Cabinet.  On  him  the  Queen  relied,  and 
she  did  not  rely  in  vain."  *  The  personal  correspondence 
which  took  place  between  the  Queen  and  Granville  at  about 
this  time  is  as  curious  as  it  is  conclusive  on  the  point  under 
discussion.  On  her  part  it  is  touching  in  its  outbursts,  — 
its  appeals  for  sympathy  and  aid.  For  instance,  on  one 
occasion  during  the  Schleswig-Holstein  complications  of 
1864,  writing  from  Balmoral,  she  refers  to  certain  " danger- 
ous steps  which  Lord  Palmerston  and  Lord  Russell  would  on 
several  occasions  have  plunged  us  into,"  and  authorizes  Lord 
Granville  to  show  her  letter  and  enclosures  "to  any  of  his 
colleagues  (excepting  Lord  Palmerston  and  Lord  Russell) 
whom  he  thinks  it  useful  to  communicate  them  to  " ;  and 
then  in  closing  the  Queen  breaks  out:  ."Oh,  how  fearful  it  is 
to  be  suspected  —  uncheered  —  unguided  and  unadvised  — 
and  how  alone  the  poor  Queen  feels !  Her  friends  must 
1  Fitzmaurice,  I,  477. 


412  DIPLOMATIC  STUDIES 

defend  her."  And  again:  "Alone  and  unaided  .  .  .  she 
writes  to  Lord  Granville  as  a  faithful  friend  and  not  as  a 
minister,  to  hear  from  him  his  opinion."  Finally,  in  a  letter 
from  Osborne:  "The  Queen  suffers  much,  and  her  nerves 
are  more  and  more  easily  shattered,  and  her  rest  broken.  .  .  . 
If  Lord  Granville  only  reflects,  he  will  understand  how 
terrible  her  position  is  !  But  though  all  this  anxiety  is  wear- 
ing her  out,  it  will  not  shake  her  in  her  firm  purpose  of  resist- 
ing any  attempt  to  involve  this  country  in  a  mad  and  useless 
combat."  Such  were  her  relations  ^  with  Lord  Granville  in 
1864,  when  really  interested  in  the  successive  issues  raised  by 
the  gradual  development  of  Bismarck's  plans ;  but  any  indi- 
cations or  expressions  of  a  similar  character  are  wholly 
wanting  as  respects  American  affairs  in  September  and 
October,  1862.  Lord  Granville  was  then  in  personal  attend- 
ance upon  her  on  the  Continent;  and  there  for  the  express 
purpose  of  communicating  with  her  on  questions  of  business. 
Lord  Russell  sent  him  notice  of  the  Cabinet  meeting  called  for 
October  23 ;  and  October  1  Granville  wrote  to  his  col- 
league, Lord  Stanley  of  Alderley,  —  familiarly  "Ben,"  — 
that  Palmerston  had  already  broached  the  idea  of  an  offer 
of  mediation  and  subsequent  recognition;  and  he  adds: 
"I  have  written  to  Johnny  my  reasons  for  thinking  it  de- 
cidedly premature.  I,  however,  suspect  you  will  settle  to  do 
so !  Pam  [Palmerston],  Johnny  [Russell]  and  Gladstone 
would  be  in  favour  of  it;  and  probably  Newcastle.  I  do 
not  know  about  the  others.  It  appears  to  me  a  great  mis- 
take." Here,  in  a  familiar  letter,  is  no  reference  whatever 
to  the  Queen,  her  condition,  her  wishes  or  her  views,  — 
no  intimation  that  she  feels  any  interest  in  the  question  at 
issue,  or  the  policy  to  be  adopted.  In  a  prior  official  letter 
to  Lord  Russell,  of  September  27,  1862,  Granville  had  dis- 
cussed the  question  of  intervention  at  length  and  in  detail, 


QUEEN  VICTORIA  AND  THE  CIVIL  WAR  413 

but  in  it  also  there  was  no  reference  to  the  Queen.  This 
silence  is  conclusive,  so  far  as  negative  evidence  can  ever 
be  accepted  as  conclusive.  Apparently,  another  and  very 
pleasing  tradition  must  be  dismissed  from  history  as,  at  best, 
unauthenticated . 


INDEX 


Abeken,  on  Bazeilles,  287. 

Ability,  military,  1777,  115. 

Aboukir,  57. 

Acland,  Sir  Henry,  383. 

Adair,  John,  189. 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  money  needed 
for  rams,  347 ;  fears  war,  357 ;  meet- 
ings with  Forbes,  358 ;  on  Evarts' 
mission,  363 ;  and  Queen  Victoria, 
377,  379,  381;  criticised,  368,  370; 
on  diplomatic  agents,  366,  370 ; 
message  from  Dayton,  376 ;  visits 
Lord  Russell,  393 ;  relations  with 
Palmerston,  393  ;  interview,  394  ;  in- 
structions on  mediation  and  recog- 
nition, 406  ;   mentioned,  256,  354. 

Adams,  Henry,  197  n.,  353. 

Adams,  John,  on  cavalry,  75 ;  describes 
a  hussar,  82. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  on  separation,  225. 

Africanism  and  the  South,  230. 

Agents,  diplomatic,  in  Europe,  360,  364. 

Alabama,  248,  357. 

Albany,  N.Y.,  117,  134,  144. 

Albert,  Prince  Consort,  death  of,  379 ; 
modifies  Lord  Russell's  despatch,  383, 
399 ;  sees  Motley,  391 ;  on  recogni- 
tion, 392. 

Alexander,  Edward  Porter,  312. 

Alexandra,  357,  359,  363. 

Allegiance,  to  State  or  nation,  208,  211, 
212,  214,  215,  296,  298. 

Alva,  Duke  of,  173. 

Anson,  George,  182. 

Appomattox,  surrender  at,  326. 

Arget,  d\  1. 

Army,  continental,  at  New  York,  25,  28  ; 
parade  through  Philadelphia,  75,  136 ; 
cavalry,  83  n.;  at  Morristown,  123; 
marching  of,  160 ;  British,  evacuates 
Boston,  25;  at  New  York,  28;  on 
Long  Island,  29.  Strength  of,  243. 
Of  the  Potomac,  position  of  danger, 
308;  of  Northern  Virginia,  313 ;  last 
days,  323,  326.     See  Confederacy. 

Arnold,  Benedict,  63,  71,  87. 

Artillery  on  Long  Island,  56. 

Ashford,  Conn.,  2. 

Ashley,  Evelyn,  398. 


Aspinwall,  William  H.,  mission  to  Eu- 
rope, 354,  356. 

Bacon,  Francis,  on  posterity  and  foreign 

nations,  244. 
Bagehot,  Walter,  on  Washington,  166. 
Balancing  of  blunders,  2,  23,  119,    123, 

128,  151. 
Bancroft,  George,  on  Bunker  Hill,  20 ; 

on  Pulaski,  83  ;    mentioned,  208  n. 
Baring  Brothers  and  Company,  352,  356 ; 

deposit  of  bonds,  359,  371. 
Barnard,  John  Gross,  274. 
Barren  Hill,  94. 
Baskingridge,  69. 
Bates,  Joshua,  352.  359. 
Batteries  at  New  York,  28. 
Baylor,  George,  75,  79. 
Bayonet,  dislike  of,  92  n. 
Bazeilles,  287. 
Beauregard,    Pierre    Gustave    Toutant, 

in  Virginia  campaign,  268,  271,  273. 
Belknap,  Jeremy,  on  Bunker  Hill,  19. 
Belle  Isle,  57. 
Bennington,  Vt.,  91,  135. 
Berlin,  142. 

Bigelow,  John,  357,  365. 
Bingham,  Robert,  340. 
Birkenhead,  see  Laird  rams. 
Birmingham,  78. 
Bismarck,  Otto,  furst  von,  287. 
Blackwood's  Edinburgh    Magazine,    244, 

263. 
Bladensburg,    battle   of,    175,    176;    in- 
fluence at  New  Orleans,  186,  188. 
Blake,  Robert,  57. 
Bland,  Theodorick,  75,  79. 
Blockade,   in   Revolution,    121   n.,    153 ; 

in  Civil  War,  246 ;  Hammond  on,  250  ; 

cotton  and,  257 ;    believed  impossible, 

315  ;  effective,  316,  320  ;  Lord  Russell 

on,  390. 
Bloomingdale,  N.Y.,  30. 
Blucher,  Gebhard  Leberecht,  von,  281. 
Blunders,  balancing  of,  2,  119,  123,  128, 

151. 
Boats,  concentration  at  New  York,  42. 
Boers,  cavalry,  93,  98 ;   area,  population 

and  fighting  force,  239. 


415 


416 


INDEX 


Bonds,  five-twenties,  355,  371. 

Boston,  council  of  war,  5 ;  evacuation, 
24. 

Box,  — ,  major,  34. 

Braddock,  Edward,  63. 

Brandywine,  battle  of  the,  72,  78,  87, 
140,  146. 

Bravay  and  Co.,  363. 

Breastworks,  as  defences,  15. 

Breed's  Hill,  3,  7. 

Breslau,  143. 

Brooklyn,  interior  lines,  29 ;  defence  of, 
26,  32 ;   cavalry  of  service,  65. 

Buckle,  Henry  Thomas,  219  n. 

Buford,  Abraham,  104. 

Bugeaud,  Marshal,  on  English  infantry, 
190. 

Bull  Run,  effect  of,  390. 

Bulloch,  James  Dunwoody,  363. 

Bummers,  Sherman's,  266,  289. 

Bunch,  Robert,  consul,  255,  396. 

Bunker  Hill,  British  plan,  3,  5,  18; 
position  of  Americans,  3,  4  ;  American 
plan,  5,  6,  13  ;  consequences  of  defeat, 
6 ;  commander,  7 ;  favorable  to 
Americans,  11 ;  Howe's  conduct  criti- 
cised, 18 ;  strategy  discussed,  19 ; 
results,  13  ;   effect  on  Washington,  56. 

Burgoyne,  John,  144  ;  army,  119  ;  moves 
from  Canada,  73,  124 ;  situation  of, 
131 ;  crushing  of,  131,  133,  135  ;  spoils 
of,  136. 

Burnside,  Ambrose  Everett,  268,  308. 

Burrard,  Sir  Harry,  100. 

Busaco,  174. 

Butler,  Benjamin  Franklin,  in  Virginia 
campaign,  267  ;  instructions  to,  269  ; 
takes  command,  270  ;  fails  at  Walthall 
Junction,  271 ;  rejects  advice,  272 ; 
driven  from  Drewry's  Bluff,  273  ;  op- 
poses Gillmore,  274 ;  recommendations 
upon,  274,  275,  278 ;  quarrels  with 
Smith,  275;  cowes  Grant,  276;  re- 
lieved, 278  ;   measure  of  service,  279. 

Butt-head,  10. 

Cabinet,  British,  collectivity,  408. 

Caesar,  14. 

Calhoun,  John  Caldwell,  222,  293. 

Cambridge,  Mass.,  6,  10. 

Camp,  Continental,  sanitary  condition, 
135,  145. 

Carlyle,  Thomas,  1,  143  n. 

Carolinas,  campaign  in,  103. 

Carrington,  Henry  Beebee,  20,  41,  42,  43. 

Cavalry,  in  Revolution,  59 ;  favorable 
field,  62,  74;  in  colonies,  63;  at 
Brooklyn,  65 ;    results  of  a  want  of, 


70 ;  volunteer,  70  n. ;  in  Continental 
army,  75,  83  n. ;  Continental  Congress, 
82 ;  requirements  to  command,  86 ; 
Clinton's  march,  97;  cost,  92,  99; 
British  advantage,  105 ;  delay  in 
using,  108. 

Census  of  1860,  235. 

Chamberlain,  Daniel  Henry,  205,  207. 

Chancellorsville,  78. 

Character,  influence  of,  291 ;  defined, 
292. 

Charlatan,  Lee  a,  58. 

Charles,  Prince,  142. 

Charleston,  S.  C,  203  ;  address  in,  227  ; 
misfortunes,  228. 

Charlestown,  Mass.,  2,  3,  5. 

Charlestown  Neck,  7,  18. 

Chase,  Salmon  Portland,  208  n.;  meets 
Chittenden,  347 ;  mission  of  Forbes, 
354,  355  ;   mystifies  Chittenden,  373. 

Chatrian,  Alexandre,  163. 

Chesapeake  Bay,  76. 

Chittenden,  Lucius  E.,  career,  345 ; 
story  of  the  bonds,  346,  371 ;  time  of 
incident,  356  ;   disproved,  372. 

Choate,  Joseph  Hodges,  382. 

Citizenship,  question  of,  298. 

City  Point,  Va.,  269. 

Clay,  Cassius  Marcellus,  366. 

Clinton,  Sir  Henry,  102 ;  advises  Gage, 
5,  9 ;  Howe,  10 ;  lands  on  Long 
Island,  29,  55 ;  supersedes  Howe,  94, 
96  ;  moves  to  New  York,  95  ;  up  the 
Hudson,  124  ;  on  Howe's  movements, 
126  n.;  at  New  York,  50,  131,  -134, 
144. 

Clive,  Robert,  101,  102. 

Cochrane,  Alexander  Forester  Inglis,  at 
New  Orleans,  196 ;   on  Ross,  200. 

Coddington,  William,  204. 

Codrington,  Edward,  195,  197. 

Cold  Harbor,  273. 

Collectivity  of  British  Cabinet,  408. 

Collier,  Sir  George,  on  Howe,  52. 

Common  law,  299. 

Concord,  effect  on  Howes,  56. 

"Conda"  navy,  250. 

Confederacy,  Southern,  cavalry,  93; 
arguments  for,  204  ;  causes  of  fall,  234, 
244,  314  ;  fighting  force,  237,  241,  282  ; 
conscription,  284 ;  supplies,  324 ; 
agents  in  Europe,  363;  on  Forbes 
mission,  370;  recognition,  390,  392, 
399,  400,  403. 

Confederation,  States  under,  209. 

Confidence  of  South,  259. 

Confucius,  292  n. 

Congress,  Continental,  82,  138. 


INDEX 


417 


Connecticut  light  horse,  64,  92. 

Conscript  de  1813,  163. 

Conscription,  in  South,  284 ;  Webster 
on,  339. 

Constitution,  divided  sovereignty,  210. 

"Contemporary  Opinion  of  the  Howes," 
110. 

Conway,  Moncure  Daniel,  369. 

Copenhagen,  57. 

Cornwallis,  Charles,  Earl,  105,  126  n., 
148  n. ;  flanks  Washington,  78 ;  at 
the  Brandywine,  101  ;    retreat,  150. 

Corunna  campaign,  114. 

Cotton,  as  king,  252,  254,  255,  256,  314 ; 
blockade,  257 ;  dependence  of  South, 
314,  319;  Lancashire  famine,  317, 
403  ;  intervention  and,  394  ;  defeated, 
258,  260  ;  loan,  359  ;  need  in  France, 
396. 

Councils  of  war,  6,  138,  164. 

Cowpens,  92,  106. 

Craufurd,  Robert,  march  of,  110,  141. 

Cromwell,  Oliver,  14,  63,  72,  113,  115. 

Dana,  Charles  Anderson,  277. 

Daun,    Leopold    Joseph    Maria,    Count 

von,  143. 
Davis,  Jefferson,  Gladstone  on,  234 ;    at 

Greensboro,  241,  323,  327. 
Davout,  Louis-Nicolas,  280. 
Dayton,  William  Lewis,  256,  376. 
Delaware,  defences,  156,  157. 
Democracy  and  history,  111. 
Desertion  in  Confederacy,  286. 
Devens,  Richard,  20. 
Digging  by  soldiers,  16. 
Dilatoriness  of  Howe,  34,  36,  38,  45. 
Diplomats,  classified,  364. 
Dorchester  Heights,  56. 
Dragoons  in  Europe,  82. 
Drewry's  Bluff,  273. 
Dunbar,  battle  of,  163. 
Dupont,  Samuel  Francis,  257  n. 
Du  Portail,  Louis  Le  Begue,  147. 

Edinburgh  Magazine,   Blackwood's,   244, 

263. 
Eliot,  Charles  William,  382,  383. 
Elizabeth,  Queen,  386. 
Elkton,  76,  144. 
Elson's  History,  206  n. 
Emerson,  Ralph  Waldo,  292,  337. 
Erckmann,  Emile,  163. 
Europe,  change  of  opinion,  263. 
Eutaw  Springs,  108. 
Evarts,    William    Maxwell,    mission   of, 

363,  370. 
Everett,  William,  2. 
2e 


Fabius  and  Fabian  tactics,  49,  71,  74. 

Farragut,  David  Glasgow,  248,  249. 

Ferguson,  Patrick,  at  King's  Mountain, 
107  n.;  invents  breech4oading  rifle, 
107  n. 

Field,  Cyrus  West,  405. 

First  Troop  of  Philadelphia,  75. 

Firth,  Charles  Harding,  164  n. 

Fisher,  Sydney  George,  62,  95 ;  on 
American  history,  110;  on  authorities, 
118  n.;   on  Lee's  plan,  121. 

Fiske,  John,  211  n.;  on  Bunker  Hill,  20 ; 
retreat  from  Long  Island,  41 ;  on 
Washington,  61. 

Fitchett,  W.  H.,  129,  180. 

Fitzmaurice,  Lord  Edmund,  403. 

Flanking  movements,  77,  79  n. 

Flatbush,  L.  I.,  29. 

Fleet,  British,  36,  44,  47,  57,  121. 

Forage,  abundant,  65. 

Forbes,  John  Murray,  353 ;  mission  to 
Europe,  354  ;  meets  Chase  and  Welles, 
355 ;  interviews  with  C.  F.  Adams, 
358;  returns,  371. 

Foreigners,  condescension  of,  262. 

Formby,  John,  90  n.     > 

Forrest,  Nathan  Bedford,  70,  90  n.;  on 
strategy,  115. 

Forster,  William  Edward,  382. 

Fort  Du  Quesne,  86;  Edward,  132; 
Fisher,  322;  Mifflin,  141,  157;  Mont- 
gomery, 50 ;   Moultrie,  22,  56,  57. 

Fortescue,  John  William,  127  n. 

"Fortifications,"  198. 

Fox,  Gustavus  Vasa,  361. 

France,  alliance  with,  1778,  152 ;  recog- 
nition of  Confederacy,  400,  403. 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  on  Pulaski,  83  n.; 
on  capture  of  Philadelphia,  149. 

Frederick  the  Great,  14,  98,  139,  140; 
on  cavalry,  68,  72 ;  on  Princeton, 
72  n. ;  rapidity  of  movement,  142 ; 
after  Saratoga,  154. 

Frothingham,  Richard,  20. 

Gage,  Thomas,  102 ;  operations,  6 ;  re- 
jects Clinton's  advice,  9 ;  character, 
10,  14 ;    at  Bunker  Hill,  16. 

Galloway,  Joseph,  on  blockade,  121  n.; 
on  Howe,  147. 

Garibaldi,  Giuseppe,  commission  for, 
366. 

Gates,  Horatio,  53 ;  in  Saratoga  cam- 
paign, 74,  133 ;   cavalry,  102. 

Generals,  sacrifice  of,  246. 

Generalship,  177. 

Genius,  military,  14. 

George  III,  387. 


418 


INDEX 


Georgiana,  359. 

Germain,  George  Sackville,  on  Howe, 
148. 

Germantown,  72,  88. 

Germany,  Hessians,  358,  371. 

Gettysburg,  141  n.;   Lee  at,  306,  312. 

Ghent,  treaty  of,  196. 

Gilbert-town,  106. 

Gillmore,  Quincy  Adams,  in  Virginia 
campaign,  269  ;  urges  Butler  to  attack, 
272 ;   relieved  of  command,  274. 

Gladiator,  376. 

Gladstone,  William  Ewart,  388 ;  on 
American  constitution,  213 ;  predicts 
success  of  South,  235  ;  approves  medi- 
ation, 404;  letter  to  Field,  405; 
rivalry  with  Palmerston,  408. 

Gleig,  George  Robert,  179. 

Glover,  John,  39,  48. 

Gorlitz,  143. 

Goethe,  Johann  Wolfgang,  267. 

Gordon,  William,  20. 

Gordy,  John  Pancoast,  211  n.,  214. 

Government,  centralized,  fear  of,  209. 

Gowanus  Cove,  32. 

Grant,  James,  94. 

Grant,  Ulysses  Simpson,  126  n.,  308 ; 
Virginia  campaign,  267,  273  ;  Butler's 
relations,  275,  276,  277,  278 ;  at  Ap- 
pomattox, 326. 

Granville,  Lord,  403  ;  relations  to  Queen 
Victoria,  411 ;   on  mediation,  412. 

Gravesend,  L.  I.,  29,  31. 

Graydon,  Alexander,  61. 

Great  Britain,  recognition  of  Con- 
federacy, 390,  392. 

Greene,  George  Washington,  167. 

Greene,  Nathanael,  76,  149 ;  illness  on 
Long  Island,  31,  55;  plan  of  defence, 
32  ;  advises  evacuation  of  Manhattan, 
49,  51 ;  on  militia,  52 ;  cavalry,  93, 
105,  108  ;  horses,  96  ;  Southern  cam- 
paign, 102  ;  on  Howe,  159  ;  on  Phila- 
delphia, 164 ;  on  Washington,  167  ; 
character  of,  171. 

Greensboro  conference,  241,  323. 

Grey,  Charles,  at  Paoli,  81. 

Grouchy,  Emmanuel,  280. 

Guilford  Court  House,  108,  150. 

Gun,  magazine,  16. 

Gustavus,  Adolphus,  14. 

Hagood,  Johnson,  271. 

Halleck,  Henry  Wager,  274,  275,  276. 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  on  cavalry,  90  n.; 
on  Revolution,  111;  on  Washington, 
112;  on  blockade,  122  n.;  and  Con- 
stitution, 212. 


Hammond,  James  Henry,  on  cotton  ia 
King,  252,  314 ;   on  blockade,  250. 

Hampton  Roads,  121,  153. 

Hannibal,  14. 

Harcourt,  William,  69. 

Harlem  Heights,  death  of  Knowlton,  2. 

Hartford  Convention,  212,  221  n. 

Hatteras  Inlet,  248. 

Haverswerda,  72. 

Hawkes,  Edward,  57. 

Hay,  John,  353,  366. 

Health  of  soldiers,  135. 

Heath,  William,  on  mounted  patrols,  65. 

Henry,  of  Prussia,  72,  143. 

Henry,  Prince,  382. 

Hero  worship,  113. 

Hewitt,  Abram  Stevens,  character  of, 
375;  on  Queen  Victoria  and  the 
United  States,  376. 

Highlands  on  Hudson,  118. 

History,  accuracy  of  relations,  179 ;  per- 
spective, 233. 

Holmes,  Oliver  Wendell,  303. 

Hood,  John  Bell,  261. 

Hooker,  Joseph,  78,  308. 

Horry,  Peter,  71. 

Horses  in  colonies,  62,  96. 

Houghton,  Richard  Monckton  Milnes, 
Lord,  380. 

Houston,  David  Franklin,  223  n. 

Howe,  Richard,  Lord,  25,  27,  44,  148  n. 

Howe,  Sir  William,  at  Bunker  Hill,  10, 
18 ;  on  Staten  Island,  25,  27,  56 ;  dila- 
tory movements,  10,  34,  45,  52,  147; 
strategy,  53  n.;  southern  move,  54, 
73,  125,  148  n.;  in  New  Jersey,  74; 
at  the  Brandywine,  77,  80,  101 ;  in 
Philadelphia,  87,  94,  127,  140,  159; 
cavalry,  100;  at  New  York,  117,  123; 
neglect  of  blockade,  122  n.;  plan  of 
campaign,  119,  120,  124,  131;  Bur- 
goyne  and,  127 ;  on  Washington,  133  ; 
character  of,  168. 

Hudson  River,  50,  64,  121. 

Huger,  Isaac,  184  n. 

Hughes,  Sarah  Forbes,  354. 

Hussar,  German,  82. 

Immigrants,  army  and  factories,  245 ; 
naturalization,  221. 

Index,  Confederate  organ,  318;  on 
Uncle  Tom's  Cabin,  320 ;  on  contin- 
uance of  war,  326. 

India,  cotton  production,  391. 

Infantry,  British,  at  New  Orleans,  190. 

Intelligence,  British,  on  Long  Island,  28. 

Intervention,  foreign,  in  Civil  War,  246, 
315,  320.     See  Recognition. 


INDEX 


419 


Intrenchments,  Breed's  Hill,  14 ;  in  war, 
15  ;  at  New  York,  26  ;  on  Long  Island, 
35. 

Iredell,  James,  214  n. 

Irving,  Washington,  61,  139,  165. 

Jackson,  Andrew,  at  New  Orleans,  176, 
185,  187,  192. 

Jackson,  Thomas  Jonathan,  78,  308. 

Jagers,  92  n. 

Jamaica  Road,  Long  Island,  33,  55,  65, 
66. 

James  II,  386. 

James  Adger,  394  n.,  395. 

Jay,  John,  293 ;  advises  desolation  of 
New  York,  49,  50  ;  on  Charles  Lee,  58. 

Johnson,  Bradley  Tyler,  on  Southern 
confidence,  251. 

Johnston,  Joseph  Eggleston,  on  employ- 
ing negroes,  239  n.;  on  end  of  war, 
241,  243,  325. 

Jones,  J.  William,  206  n. 

Joseph  [Bonaparte],  King,    134. 

Jourdan,  Jean  Baptiste,  134. 

Junot,  Andoche,  100. 

Kearsarge,  248,, 

Kentucky  resolves  of  1798,  220,  297. 
King's  Mountain,  89,  92,  93,  106. 
Kips  Bay,  N.  Y.,  30,  51,  67. 
Knowlton,  Thomas,  2,  8. 
Kutuzoff,    Michael    Larivonovitch    Go- 
lenitchef,  145. 

Lafayette,  Marquis  de,  76 ;  at  Barren 
Hill,  94  ;  at  the  Brandywine,  147  ;  on 
Washington,  168. 

Laird  rams,  347  ;  time  of  delivery,  356  ; 
Confederate  funds,  359  ;  denounced  by 
Welles,  362. 

Lambert,  John,  at  New  Orleans,  194. 

Lancashire  cotton  famine,  258,  317,  319, 
403. 

Latour,  Arsene  Lacarriere,  200  n. 

Latta,  James  W.,  340. 

Lawyers  on  Constitution,  209. 

Lee,  Charles,  "plan"  of  campaign,  21. 
151 ;  on  repulse  of  Parker,  22  ;  sent 
to  New  York,  24  ;  on  abandoning  New 
York,  50,  54 ;  acclaimed,  58 ;  cap- 
tured, 68 ;  on  cavalry,  68  n. ;  at 
Monmouth,  98  ;  on  authority  of  Wash- 
ington, 134 ;  importance  of  Philadel- 
phia, 149  ;  on  Howe's  campaign,  152  ; 
on  Howe,  170  n. 

Lee,  Henry,  61,  82,  105;  on  Camden, 
102  ;  at  Cowpens,  107  ;  on  loyalty  to 
State,  303. 


Lee's  legion,  89,  96,  99. 

Lee,  Robert  Edward,  16,  308;  order 
No.  73,  266,  306  ;  a  man  of  character, 
292;  charge  of  traitor,  295,  303; 
manumits  slaves,  304 ;  on  secession, 
301,  304;  military  ability,  306;  at 
Gettysburg,  306,  310,  312 ;  successful 
retreat,  313;  quality  of  army,  316; 
its  needs,  321,  322 ;  recognizes  the 
end,  325,  327,  329;  at  Appomattox, 
326;  decides  for  self,  328;  college 
president,  332  ;  under  reconstruction, 
336 ;  in  family,  337 ;  on  foreign  in- 
tervention, 411. 

Legion,  Lee's,  89. 

Le  Marchant,  — ,  182. 

Leopold,  Prince,  on  Queen  Victoria,  383, 
403. 

Leuthen,  142. 

Lever,  Charles,  on  Civil  War,  263. 

Lewis,  George  Cornewall,  409. 

Lexington,  Mass.,  91. 

Light  horse,  66  n.,  70. 

Ligny,  12. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  order  on  Butler,  276 ; 
assassinated,  326,  327. 

Lincoln,  Benjamin,  135. 

Lines  of  communication,  interior,  122, 
138,  144,  162. 

Little  Round  Top,  141  n. 

Livermore,  Thomas  Leonard,  estimates 
of  Confederate  army,  238  n.,  287. 

Lodge,  Henry  Cabot,  on  Union,  205,  215. 

London  Chronicle,  18. 

Long  Island,  battle  of,  22  ;  strategy,  29  ; 
sufferings  of  Continental  army,  37 ; 
storm  and  rain,  37,  38,  45 ;  retreat 
from,  41 ;  merits  of,  48. 

Longstreet,  James,  141  n. 

Louis  XIV,  267. 

Low,  Seth,  376. 

Lowell,  James  Russell,  262. 

Luck  in  war,  1. 

Lunch  hour,  result,  52. 

Lushington,  Stephen,  397. 

Liitzen,  Pinto's  description,  163. 

Maclean,  W.  Neil,  19. 
McClellan,  George  B.,  246,  308. 
McCrady,  Edward,  104,  105. 
McLane,  Allan  97,  99. 
McMahon,  Marie  E.-P.-M.,  16. 
Madison,  James,  on  Constitution,  212, 

215  n. ;   on  divided  interests,  217. 
Mahon,   Stanhope  Philip  Henry,   Lord, 

101. 
Marblehead,  Mass.,  regiment,  39,  48. 
Marchand,  John  B.,  394  n.,  395,  398. 


420 


INDEX 


March  to  sea,  Sherman's,  effect  upon 
Europe,  262 ;   vandalism,  265. 

Marching,  influence  upon  army,  135 ; 
Morgan's,  140  ;  Continental  army,  160. 

Marion,  Francis,  71,  105. 

Marlborough,  John  Churchill,  Duke  of, 
14,  98. 

Marmont,  Duke  of  Ragusa,  at  Sala- 
manca, 178,  181. 

Marshall,  John,  293 ;  on  Brandywine 
affair,  146 ;  on  Delaware  defences, 
156 ;   influence  on  Union,  219  n.,  220. 

Martin,  Sir  Theodore,  399. 

Mason,  James  Murray,  Conway  and, 
369 ;  taken  from  Trent,  394,  398 ;  on 
Queen  Victoria,  401. 

Massachusetts,  differences  in,  1639,  203. 

"Massacre"  at  Paoii,  80,  92  n. 

Massena,  Andre,  178  n. 

Maucune,  — ,  179,  181. 

Mauduit,  Israel,  on  Howe,  18. 

Maxwell,  Sir  Herbert,  on  Salamanca,  180, 
181. 

Meade,  George  Gordon,  72,  268  ;  against 
cavalry,  73 ;  in  Virginia  campaign, 
269 ;    at  Gettysburg,  307,  309,  313. 

Mediation,  Seward's  instructions  to 
Adams,  406.  See  France  and  Great 
Britain. 

Meigs,  Montgomery  Cunningham,  274. 

Men,  influence  of,  218. 

Mercier,  — ,  396. 

Mexico,  European  ambitions  in,  399, 
403. 

Mifflin,  Thomas,  38.  39,  65,  66  n. 

Militia,  unreliability  of,  35,  37,  51,  132, 
189. 

Mississippi  River,  importance  of,  185 ; 
west  bank,  187. 

Mobile,  249. 

Mollwitz,  68. 

Moltke,  Helmuth,  16.  263. 

Monmouth  Court  House,  98. 

Montaigne,  Michel,  on  force  of  laws, 
203. 

Montgomery,  Richard,  63. 

Moore,  George  Henry,  Lee's  plan,  121  n. 

Moore,  Sir  John,  114. 

Mordecai,  Alfred,  276. 

Morgan,  Daniel,  71,  85.  87,  99;  in- 
fluence, 89 ;  on  cavalry,  100  n. ;  at 
Cowpens,  107 ;  sent  northward,  139, 
140,  145. 

Morgan,  David,  188. 

Morris,  Gouverneur,  50. 

Morristown,  N.  J.,  117. 

Moscow,  abandoned  by  Russians,  145. 

Motley,  John  Lothrop,  visits  Lord  Rus- 


sell, 389 ;    sees  the  Queen,  391 ;    on 

Palmerston,  392. 
Moylan,  Stephen,  75,  79. 
Murray,  Mrs.,  52  n. 

Napier,  Charles,  on  Busaco,  174 ;  on 
Pakenham,  175,  195. 

Napier,  Sir  William  Francis  Patrick, 
114;  on  Scott's  error,  61;  on  Crau- 
furd's  march,  141  n.;  on  great  cap- 
tains, 142 ;  Peninsular  War,  143  n. ; 
on  Salamanca,  178,  181. 

Napoleon,  14,  16,  139,  140,  154;  at 
Ligny,  12;  sayings,  107,  243,  307; 
in  1812-1813,  120  ;  Russian  campaign, 
129 ;  on  rapidity  of  movement,  147 ; 
at  Elba,  183 ;   at  Waterloo,  12,  280. 

Napoleon  III,  and  the  South,  376,  400. 

Nashville,  394  n.,  395. 

Nationality,  growth  of,  214,  216,  221, 
227,  297,  299. 

Navy,  Rhodes  on  service  of,  247. 

Negroes  and  the  South,  230 ;  in  Con- 
federacy, 239  ;    enlistment  of,  323. 

Nelson,  Horatio,  57. 

Newcastle  speech  of  Gladstone,  408. 

New  Jersey,  Howe  in,  74. 

New  Orleans,  battle  of,  174 ;  tactics, 
185 ;  influence  of  Bladensburg,  186, 
188 ;  effect  in  Europe,  196 ;  capture 
of,  248. 

New  York,  campaign  in  1776,  22 ; 
strategic  centre,  24,  116;  commanded 
by  sea,  24,  25 ;  prevailing  winds,  36 ; 
meteorological  condition,  44;  should 
not  be  held,  49 ;  devastation  of,  50 ; 
Clinton's  force  at,  131. 

North,  nationalization  of,  221 ;  clemency 
to  South,  335. 

Officers,  British,  character  of,  177. 
Olney,  Stephen,  33. 
Opinion,  contemporary,  244. 

Pacificator  of  Europe,  Frederick  the 
Great.  1. 

Pakenham,  Sir  Edward,  at  Busaco,  175 ; 
record  of,  176 ;  at  Salamanca,  178 ; 
chosen  for  American  campaign,  184  ; 
Wellington  on,  183;  Smith  on,  184; 
bravery,  184 ;  plan  of  action,  187  ; 
error,  188,  193  ;  influence  against,  195. 

Palmerston,  Henry  John  Temple,  Vis- 
count, criticised  by  Index,  320 ; 
ministry,  387 ;  death,  388 ;  attitude 
towards  the  North,  388,  392,  396 ;  on 
Marchand,  394 ;  interview  with 
Adams,  394  ;   on  Trent  affair,  398  ;  on 


INDEX 


421 


intervention,  402,  410 ;  dislike  of 
Gladstone,  408. 

Paoli  "massacre,"  80,  92  n. 

Parker,  Sir  Peter,  22,  36,  57,  126. 

Parthian  tactics,  71,  92,  98. 

Parton,  James,  on  British  officers,  177. 

Patriotism,  113. 

Patrol,  mounted,  65,  66 ;  need  of,  79. 

Patterson,  David  T.,  at  New  Orleans, 
188. 

Peasants  in  arms,  287. 

Pemberton,  John  Clifford,  308. 

Perkins,  James  Breck,  161  n.,  165  n. 

Peterhoff,  357,  359. 

Philadelphia,  first  troop  of,  75 ;  Howe's 
objective,  75,  126,  128;  occupied, 
87,  140;  strategic  position,  117,  129, 
149,  162. 

Pickens,  Andrew,  71,  105. 

Pickens,  Francis  Wilkinson,  254  n. 

Pickering,  Timothy,  47  n.,  90  n.;  on 
Washington,  112,  167. 

Pickett's  charge,  Gettysburg,  311. 

Picton's  division,  178. 

Pierce,  Edward  Lillie,  on  recollections 
as  history,  344,  378. 

Plevna,  18. 

Plowed  Hill,  7. 

Plutarch,  on  King  Pyrrhus,  318. 

Pontgibaud,  Count  de  More,  122  n. 

Pope,  Alexander,  207. 

Pope,  John,  308. 

Port  Royal,  248. 

Porter,  David  Dixon,  249 ;  on  Butler, 
279. 

Posterity  and  foreign  nations,  244. 

Prescott,  William,  2,  7,  9,  11,  14. 

Princeton,  67. 

Progress,  Stephen  on,  229. 

Prospect  Hill,  7,  8. 

Providence  defined,  217. 

Pulaski,  Casimir,  statue,  59  ;  not  known 
to  Washington,  60 ;  Washington  and 
Franklin  on,  83  n.;  character,  85;  at 
the  Brandywine,  83  ;  demands  rank, 
83  n.;  on  cavalry,  84  n.,  87;  at  Ger- 
mantown,  88. 

Putnam,  Israel,  at  Bunker  Hill,  8,  10; 
on  the  Yankee,  17  ;  at  New  York,  25, 
52 ;  in  Brooklyn,  55 ;  in  the  High- 
lands, 118;    incompetence,  141. 

Pyrrhus,  death  of,  318. 

Quatre  Bras,  15. 

Ragusa,  Due  de,  see  Marmont. 

Rainbow,  52. 

Ranger,  American,  91,  92  n.,  99. 


Rapalye's  negro,  48. 

Rashness  of  ignorance,  6. 

Rawdon,  Francis,  Lord,  105. 

Rawle,  William,  297,  340. 

Read,  J.  C,  on  Uncle  Tom's  Cabin,  319. 

Recognition,  Seward's  instructions  to 
Adams,  407. 

Recollections,  as  source  of  history,  344. 

Reconnoitring  extraordinary,  76. 

Reconstruction,  evil  period  of,  326,  335. 

Red  Hook,  36,  39. 

Reed,  Joseph,  39,  40. 

Reid,  Whitelaw,  on  Sherman's  march, 
289. 

"Remarks  upon  General  Howe's  Ac- 
count," 18. 

Renegades  to  flag,  some  historical,  305. 

Retreat  from  Long  Island,  41. 

Revere,  Paul,  63. 

Revolution,  history  of,  110,  111. 

Rhett,  Edmund,  256. 

Rhode  Island,  204,  224. 

Rhodes,  James  Ford.  History,  232;  on 
success  of  North,  234 ;  neglects  sea 
power,  247 ;  on  Sherman's  march, 
265 ;  on  Grant's  Virginia  campaign, 
268  ;   on  Butler,  279  ;   on  Lee,  294  n. 

Rifle  and  riflemen,  89,  91,  92  n. 

Ropes,  John  Codman,  at  Waterloo,  280. 

Rosebery,  Lord,  113. 

Ross,  Robert,  175,  183,  200. 

Rossbach,  142. 

Royalists  in  States,  103. 

Rumbold,  Sir  Horace,  398.. 

Rupert,  Prince,  63,  70,  92. 

Russell,  Lord  John,  Earl,  alleged  inter- 
view with  Adams,  377 ;  despatch 
modified  by  Prince  Albert,  383,  399 ; 
conversation  with  Motley,  389 ;  on 
recognition,  392  ;  on  mediation,  402, 
410  ;    circular  on,  404. 

Russell,  William  Howard,  Southern 
opinion  of  Yankees,  251  n.;  on 
Southerners,  253. 

Rutledge,  Edward,  50. 

Sadowa,  78. 

St.  Clair,  Arthur,  118. 

Salamanca,  battle  of,  178. 

Salt,  price  at  Philadelphia,  121  n. 

Sandy  Hook,  25. 

Sanford,  Henry  Shelton,  366. 

Santa  Cruz  de  Teneriffe,  57. 

Saratoga,  73. 

Savannah,  Ga.,  104. 

Schiller,  Johann  C.  F.,  267. 

Schofield,  John  McAllister,  261. 

Schuyler,  Philip,  133,  135,  144. 


422 


INDEX 


Scott,  John  Morin,  58. 

Scott,  Walter,  Napoleon,  61. 

Scott,  Winfield,  73,  303. 

Sea  power,  247. 

Secession,  ethics  of,  203  ;  right  of,  216, 
295,  340 ;   peaceable,  224,  301. 

Sedan,  15. 

Sedgwick's  corps,  141  n.,  312. 

Seward,  William  Henry,  meets  Chitten- 
den, 347 ;  organizes  intelligence  ser- 
vice, 364  ;  defends  Wilson,  368  ;  Mot- 
ley's reports,  389 ;  instructions  on 
mediation,  406. 

Seydlitz,  Friedrich  Wilhelm  von,  68. 

Shaler,  Nathaniel  Southgate,  384  n. 

Sheldon,  Elisha,  75,  79. 

Sheridan,  Philip  Henry,  on  cavalry,  73, 
90  n.;   on  war,  287. 

Sherman,  William  Tecumseh,  72,  308; 
march  to  sea,  261 ;  effect  in  Europe, 
262  ;   Reid  on,  289  ;   on  war,  289. 

Shoe  leather  in  war,  134. 

Slavery,  African,  300 ;  influence  on 
nationalization,  217. 

Slidell,  John,  taken  from  Trent,  394,  398. 

Sloane,  William  Milligan,  129. 

Smith,  Adam,  on  rebels  and  heretics, 
335. 

Smith,  Goldwin,  on  American  Union, 
205,  215. 

Smith,  Sir  Harry,  on  Pakenham,  184, 
187 ;   at  New  Orleans,  194. 

Smith,  Jacob  Hurd,  orders  to  devastate, 
288. 

Smith,  William  Farrar,  in  Virginia  cam- 
paign, 268  ;  Grant's  opinion  of,  270 ; 
urges  Butler  to  attack,  272 ;  recom- 
mendations upon,  274,  276 ;  relieved, 
276 ;  on  Butler,  279. 

Smith,  Zachary  Frederick,  199  n. 

Soldier,  British,  character,  70. 

South,  the  nationalization,  217,  221 ; 
negro  and,  230  ;  strength  of  army,  236  ; 
self-conscious,  250,  257 ;  idea  of  the 
North,  251,  254  ;  confidence  in  cotton, 
314. 

South  Africa,  cavalry,  63 ;  war,  93,  98, 
104,  325. 

Sovereignty,  where  found  under  Con- 
stitution, 208,  220,  224  ;  divided,  210, 
299  ;   question  of,  296,  302. 

Spottsylvania,  battle  of,  272. 

Squadron,  61. 

Staff,  general,  119,  171. 

Stanley,  Arthur  Penrhyn,  on  Queen 
Victoria,  386. 

Stanley,  Edward  John,  Baron,  412. 

Stark,  John,  135. 


State,   right  to  withdraw  from   Union, 

205,  226;    under  Confederation,  209; 

sovereignty,  209,  226,  297  ;  allegiance, 

213 ;  citizenship,  298. 
Staten  Island,  25,  27. 
Stedman,   Charles,   61,  95 ;    on  Bunker 

Hill,  20  ;  criticises  Howe,  53,  124,  168  ; 

on    Long    Island,  66    n.;     on    King's 

Mountain,  106. 
Stephen,  Leslie,  on  progress,  229. 
Stephens,  Alexander  Hamilton,  on  cotton, 

260. 
Steuben,  Baron,  on  Washington,  112. 
Stiles,  — ,  308. 

Stirling,  Lord,  captured,  33,  46. 
Stowe,  Harriet  Beecher,  and  book,  319. 
Stragglers  to  Sherman's  army,  265,  289. 
Strategy,    defined,     115;     new    system 

developed,    14,    64,    122;    of   British, 

120 ;     of    Americans,    122 ;     at    New 

Orleans,  185,  192. 
Stuart,  Gilbert,  91. 
Sullivan,  John,  on  Long  Island,  31,  55; 

captured,  33,  66  ;  pays  for  patrols,  66, 

79. 
Sumner,  Charles,  362 ;    assault  on,  255  ; 

denunciation   of  Lee,   293 ;    criticised 

by  Clay,  367 ;   on  Wilson,  368. 
Sumter,  Thomas,  71,  105. 
Sylla,  on  vicissitudes  of  war,  114. 
Symmetry,  20. 
Sympathizers  in  Confederate  army,  238. 

Tactics,  at  New  Orleans,  185,  192,  193. 

Tappan  Sea,  27. 

Tarleton,  Banastre,  61,  82;    at  capture 

of  Lee,  69,  71 ;   cavalry  of,  103  n.;   at 

Waxhaws,  104  ;  in  southern  campaign, 

108. 
Taylor,  Hannis,  343. 
Tennyson,  Alfred,  Lord,  207. 
Texas,  as  refuge  for  Confederacy,  242, 

326. 
Theodora,  394  n. 

Thomas,  George  Henry,  71,  303. 
Thomieres,  181. 
Thoreau,  Henry  David,  292  n. 
Thornton,  William,  201. 
Ticonderoga,  118,  131. 
Tilly,  John  Tzerklaes  von,  267. 
Tocqueville,  Alexis  de,  213,  298,  341. 
Tolstoi,  145. 
Torres  Vedras,  17. 
Tower,  Charlemagne,  95. 
"Traveller,"  Lee's  horse,  331. 
Treasury,  loose  methods,  372. 
Trent  affair,   380,  383,  394 ;    Hewitt  on, 

376  ;  right  of,  397. 


INDEX 


423 


Trenton,  67. 

Trescot,  William  Henry,  256. 

Trevelyan,  George  Otto,  62 ;  on  retreat 
from  Long  Island,  10 ;  on  weather  at 
New  York,  44 ;  on  the  Brandywine, 
78;  on  Paoli,  81,  92  n.;  on  campaign 
of  1777,  88 ;  on  cavalry,  89 ;  on  Clin- 
ton's withdrawal  from  Philadelphia,  96, 
97,  98  ;  on  history  of  Revolution,  109  ; 
on  Howe,  168. 

Trumbull,  Jonathan,  sends  mounted 
men,  64. 

Trumbull  Jonathan,  Jr.,  221  n. 

Trumbull,  Joseph,  153. 

Tryon,  William,  28,  81. 

Tucker,  Josiah,  on  American  Union,  218. 

Tyler,  Lion  Gardiner,  216 ;  on  Con- 
federate forces,  282. 

Ulm,  136. 

Uncle  Tom's  Cabin,  in  England,  319. 

Union,  dissoluble,  205. 

Urban,  d',  182. 

Valley  Forge,  88,  146,  149. 

Valori,  Count  de,  1. 

Van  Tyne,  Claude  Halstead,  339. 

Victoria,  Queen, intervention,  376;  alleged 
assurance  to  Adams,  377 ;  character, 
385 ;  unsympathetic  for  democracy, 
385 ;  obstinacy,  385 ;  unable  to 
transact  public  business,  379,  400, 
403 ;  sees  Motley,  391 ;  on  the  con- 
tinent, 401 ;  relations  with  Granville, 
411 ;  no  proof  of  interest  in  America, 
412. 

"  View  of  Evidence,"  18. 

Vimeiro,  Wellington  at,  100. 

Virginia,  intrenchments  in,  15 ;  horses, 
96 ;  sovereignty,  210 ;  resolves,  1798, 
220,  221  n.;    states  rights,  302. 

Vittoria,  134. 

Wales,  Prince  of  (Edward  VI),  visit  to 
America,  376,  386. 

Walker,  Leroy  Pope,  boast  of,  251. 

Walker,  Robert  John,  560. 

Wallabout  Bay,  32. 

War,  luck  in,  1 ;  use  of  intrenchments, 
15 ;  in  colonies,  63 ;  is  hell,  265,  288, 
327 ;  defined,  287. 

Ward,  Artemas,  8,  14. 

Warren,  James,  82. 

Washington,  George,  on  Long  Island,  14, 
22,  31 ;  takes  command  at  New  York, 
25 ;  problems  of  defence,  25 ;  des- 
perate situation  on  Long  Island,  34, 
38,  40;    responsible  for  strategy,  41, 


55 ;  motives,  54 ;  in  command  on 
Long  Island,  55 ;  on  militia,  55,  132 ; 
prestige  in  danger,  57  ;  idea  of  organi- 
zation, 60 ;  refuses  to  employ  horse- 
men, 64,  92 ;  military  career,  71 ; 
want  of  alertness,  72 ;  moves  south- 
ward, 75 ;  reconnoitres,  76 ;  on 
cavalry  and  Pulaski,  83  n.;  failure 
to  value  cavalry,  87 ;  Congress  and 
cavalry,  89  n.;  interest  in  horses,  91 ; 
learns  caution,  95  ;  at  Monmouth,  99  ; 
at  Yorktown,  100;  character  of,  51, 
112;  at  Morristown,  117,  123;  failure 
to  grasp  Howe's  strategy,  128,  129, 
132,  137,  154 ;  authority  of,  133,  163, 
164  n.;  Northern  department  and, 
138 ;  errors  in  strategy,  145 ;  after 
Saratoga,  154  ;  on  Delaware  defences, 
156  ;  learns  strategy,  161 ;  councils  of 
war,  164 ;  cult,  166 ;  Pickering's 
opinion  of,  167  ;  characterized,  170  ;  on 
States,  209  n. ;  influence  on  Union, 
219  n.,  220. 

Washington,  William,  102,  105. 

"Washington  and  Cavalry,"  110. 

Washington  College,  Lee  as  president, 
332. 

Washington  reminiscences,  unhistorical, 
344. 

Waterloo,  battle  of,  12,  280 ;  absence  of 
intrenchments,  15. 

Waxhaws,  affair  at,  104. 

Wayne,  Anthony,  at  Paoli,  80. 

Weather  conditions  at  New  York,  44. 

Webster,  Daniel,  on  sovereignty,  221  n., 
297  339. 

Weed,'  Thurlow,  365,  369,  383. 

Weems,  Mason  Locke,  166. 

"Weems  Dispensation,"  110. 

Wehla,  143. 

Welles,  Gideon,  sends  Forbes  and  Aspin- 
wall  to  England,  354,  355,  372;  on 
buying  ships,  362. 

Wellington,  Arthur  Wellesley,  Duke  of, 
15,  140  ;  at  Torres  Vedras,  17,  49  ;  at 
Vimeiro,  100  ;  allowance  of  shoes,  134  ; 
at  Salamanca,  178;  on  war  corre- 
spondents, 180  ;  on  Pakenham,  183  ; 
to  be  sent  to  America,  184 ;  had  he 
been  at  New  Orleans,  201. 

Westbury,  Richard  Bethell,  Baron,  397. 

West  Point,  340. 

White,  Anthony  Walton,  102. 

White's  Tavern,  69. 

Wigfall,  Louis  Trezevant,  on  assault  on 
Sumner,  255. 

Wilderness,  battle  of,  272. 

Wilkes,  Charles,  398. 


424 


INDEX 


William  of  Orange,  112,  172. 
William  II,  on  war,  288. 
Wilmington,  Del.,  121,  127,  153. 
Wilmington,  N.  C,  fall  of,  249,  322. 
Wilson,  Charles  L.,  367. 
Wilson,  Henry,  274. 
Wilson,  James  Harrison,  277. 
Windsor,  home  life  of  Queen  Victoria, 

386. 
Winter  Hill,  7. 
Winthrop,  John,  203,  292. 


Winthrop,  Robert  Charles,  226. 
Wolfe,  James,  72,  169. 
Woodward,  P.  Henry,  8  n. 

Yancey,  William  Lowndes,  on  cotton,  260, 

396. 
Young,  Pierce  Manning  Butler,  on  war, 

288 
Yorktown,  Va.,  113,  150,  161. 

Ziethen,  Johann  Joachim  von,  68. 


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